作者：Sungwoo Park  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

In a small city in the southeast of the Korean peninsula, the Prime Minister was trapped on a bus. A mob of protesters encircled the vehicle outside, pelting the windows with eggs and water bottles. A few days ago, news had come that the city of Seongju had been chosen as the site for the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, an anti-ballistic missile system operated by the U.S. Army. The citizens of the region have protested the decision, fearing the unknown health effects of the electromagnetic waves emitting from the equipment. In an attempt to allay their concerns, the Prime Minister Hwang Kyo Ahn had made the trip down from Seoul to speak in front of the crowd. Hwang, however, had only managed to further enrage the protesters. News crews broadcasted the furious crowd blockade themselves in front of Hwang’s vehicle, preventing him from leaving the city for six hours.

The residents of Seongju were not the only ones to oppose the deployment of THAAD. China has staunchly stated its opposition to THAAD on the Korean peninsula for months, beginning with the onset of the initial talks between South Korea and the United States last year. While South Korea and the United States have stated that the purpose of the missile system is to protect against an increasingly belligerent North Korea, China remains suspicious that the X-band radar accompanying THAAD will be used to monitor Chinese defense systems.

In February, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Qui Guohong, warned that THAAD would “destroy” Sino-Korean ties “in an instant”. Qui further cautioned that THAAD “would break the strategic balance in the region and create a vicious cycle of Cold War-style confrontations and an arms race, which could escalate tensions.” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, has echoed similar statements. “The THAAD system has far exceeded the need for defense in the Korean peninsula and will undermine the security interests of Russia and China, shatter the regional strategic balance and trigger an arms race”, he stated. China, Wang continued, “can’t understand and we will not accept why [South Korea] made a deployment exceeding the need.”

Qui and Wang’s statements allude to China’s greater concerns of the broader implications of THAAD on the ‘strategic balance’ in Northeast Asia. Whereas once the United States was the undisputed power in Asia and South Korea’s most important ally, China’s rise in economic and strategic importance has challenged the American position on both fronts. In symbolic terms, the THAAD deployment is a reinforcement of South Korea’s commitment towards its military alliance with the U.S. It is also a step backwards for China’s ambitions on regional influence. The move towards strengthening the U.S. alliance came as somewhat of a surprise from South Korean president Park Geun Hye, who has led the country towards a closer relationship with China. In the past few years, South Korea has ratified a long-proposed free trade agreement with China and has joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). President Park has, despite U.S. objections, attended the military parade in Beijing celebrating the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. She has even given a speech in Chinese at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

The THAAD decision suggests that despite its increasingly close ties with China, the South Korean government still considers the U.S. to be its most important ally. But many, especially young South Koreans, hold doubts of the U.S.-Korea relationship. Domestic protests against deployment have largely centered on the unknown health risks of the radar and the government’s seeming unwillingness to listen to public opinion. Yet underlying the opposition movement are also questions of what the THAAD deployment will actually accomplish. Some have outright called into question the effectiveness of the ability of the THAAD system to intercept North Korean missiles aimed at the South, claiming that the system’s capabilities have not been fully tested. These critics argue that THAAD deployment only serves the interests of the United States in protecting North Korean ICBMs aimed at the American mainland as a part of its ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).

Others have also put forth the notion that damaging the Sino-Korean relationship could ultimately prove fatal in dealing with North Korea. There has been hope in recent years that China has been inching away from its support of the totalitarian regime. Xi was the first Chinese president to visit Seoul before Pyongyang, and has shown signs that he is less willing to put up with the dangerous brinksmanship antics of Kim Jong Un. Antagonizing China, some South Koreans feel, risk pushing it back towards its Norther neighbor. “The deployment of THAAD pushes North Korea and China together,” stated Ju Seungyong, a South Korean congressman. “It is not that we are scared of Chinese retaliation. It is that we need China’s help in order to restrict North Korea’s nuclear program.”

Despite these criticisms, there are still many who regard North Korea and China’s ambitions with fear, and prefer the military protection of the United States. “Our enemy has always been North Korea and Communist China,” commented one reader. “The Korean War is not over. It is at a momentary ceasefire.” No matter what decision is ultimately reached, there will be accusations that South Korea has ‘submitted’ to either China or America. Both countries are crucial allies for South Korea, and what it needs to do going forward is try to regain its balance, avoiding further missteps that would alienate one side. As long as China and America continue to regard each other with suspicion and mistrust, Korea will continue be in the unfortunate but all too familiar position of being the “minnow in between two whales”.

By: Sungwoo Park

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/7/28

旧文章ID：15730

作者：Margaret Lu  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On Wednesday night of July 27th, Vice President Joe Biden delivered the best (and hopefully not last) speech he’s ever presented to a large Democratic audience.  With his undeniable passion, strength and motivation, he once again showed us why he was the perfect running mate for President Obama and a great Vice President for the United States of America.

In contrast to President Obama’s elegantly rational address, Vice President Biden’s speech was one heavily tainted with fierce passion and patriotism.  His oration strayed from the conventional restrictions of typical political statements and instead became an utterance from the bottom of his heart.  Like always, Joe Biden is one of the few politicians that seems truly humanized and relatable to the public.  As we all know, Joe Biden is a man of numerous personal tragedies, having lost his first wife and his daughter to a car crash forty-four years ago and also his son Beau to cancer just last year.

Biden begun his speech with a heartfelt tribute to his beloved son, who first introduced Biden as Vice Presidential nominee eight years ago.  Memories of the last convention stirred emotion in many hearts, but Biden’s whirlwind of unbounded pathos was just beginning.

Our Vice President continued to frame his address with references to the typical American working class family with dreams of making it big through integrity and honest work.  Everybody knows that teacher who “(takes) money out of their own pockets to buy pencils and notebooks for the students that can’t afford them” or “the kid in Claymont with the most courage”, who eventually became a cop because he had a passion for helping those in need.  That’s the America that Biden loves.  With the comprehensible examples that supported his well-written speech, Biden won the American heart.

The next portion of his speech was dedicated to the humanization of Hillary Clinton.  Biden skillfully described Clinton as a fighter who truly understands the importance of college education and the need to help those in despair.  He wasn’t talking about Hillary Clinton, the powerful high-end Washington politician that walked straight out of House of Cards.  Instead, he was talking about the Hillary Clinton, that tough, intelligent woman who fought and is still fighting all her life for the America and the American Dream that she loves so fiercely.  As Hillary confirmed in her memoir Hard Choices, Biden is that true gentleman who always sympathized with her values and respected her beliefs.  Biden is that one friend who will not only stick to your side, but can also eloquently tell us why.

Nevertheless, the true climax of this speech happened with his unforgettable attacks on Republican nominee Donald Trump.  This was a memorable climax because again, Biden was not reading an official statement approved by the White House from the teleprompters.  Biden was not speaking as the second most powerful man in a country of millions.  Biden was speaking as the man who fought all his life to create a wonderful legacy for America’s future, as the hero who built a tomorrow that neither his infant daughter nor his loving son will ever see.  Biden, our very own “middle-class Joe”, is the living definition of the American Dream, and he does not want to see that dream destroyed by hate and demagoguery.  He believes the American people will make the right choice, and certainly used powerful rhetoric to persuade them to do so.

Nevertheless, the essence of this speech was not in the praise of Hillary or the disapproval of Trump.  His true message came near the end.  Biden wanted to tell the American people that they should never give up anything and instead must be proud of the country that they worked so hard to construct together.  When Biden tells us, “We lead not only by the example of our power, but by the power of our example” and that “We are America, second to none.  And we own the finish line!”, he is instilling a renewed sense of faith and hope.  He wrapped this historic convention speech with these passionate statements that are bound to serve as American inspiration for generations to come.

By Margaret LU, USCNPM Contributor

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/8/23

旧文章ID：15729

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

This past March, I wrote an article which discussed some of India’s fears over China’s alleged “String of Pearls” which threatened to widen the hold of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. Combined with the increasing Chinese collaboration with Pakistan vis-a-vis the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s activity in South Asia has naturally illicit Indian perception of encirclement.

A few years ago, there were many reasons to believe that India was headed for steady cooperation with China. India’s interest to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, its status among the BRICS, and its participation in the Chinese influence heavy Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank were just some of the examples of closer Sino-Indian cooperation in Asia. Sure, India and China have had their differences including different takes on engagement with Pakistan, the border dispute, and that pesky fellow from Tibet. However, despite the differences, it seemed that India and China would put aside their differences to focus on trade convergence.

Make no mistake, the economic relationship between China and India are as strong as ever. However, in the political realms, the two countries seem to be facing a major perception gap with each other. The growing distrust has emerged from two of this past summer’s major events: India’s rejected membership from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Philippines v. Chinaruling.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of states that seek to promote nuclear non-proliferation. India has sought to join a group, however, despite support from countries including the United States and Canada, India had its applications rejected during the NSG plenary in Seoul this past summer. While many countries, including Switzerland and Turkey, opposed Indian membership, India pointed the finger at China as its main adversary in the application rejection.

External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vikas Swarap, speaking from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan thanked India’s supporters saying that despite “…procedural hurdles persistently raised by one country, a three-hour-long discussion took place last night on the issue of future participation in the NSG. An overwhelming number of those who took the floor supported India’s membership and appraised India’s application positively. We thank each and every one of them. It is also our understanding that the broad sentiment was to take this matter forward.”

China’s main argument against Indian membership is the fact that India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India, however, claims that it received a country-specific waiver on this issue. Some commentators, like Panos Mourdoukoutas, on the other hand, believe that China’s rejection of India’s application is to “punish New Delhi for growing closer to [the] US in recent years, serving Washington’s policy to contain China.”

Indeed, China has recently been harder on India for its warming relations with the West made apparent through a recent article in the state-run Global Times that said India had become “spoiled” from the support of the West and that the country had become “smug on international affairs.” The article even inserts the United States into the mix, arguing that “US backing adds the biggest impetus to India’s ambition” and that by “cozying up to India, Washington’s India policy actually serves the purpose of containing China.”

The notion of Washington’s China containment policy that emerges from Mourdoukoutas and the Global Times suggests that the growing perception gap between India and China emerges from another perception gap between China and the US. As I argue in my weiqi analogy “while China has reached out for more influence in the Indian Ocean, India, Japan, and ASEAN have cooperated greatly in a way that also seems to be encircling China” in the great proverbial weiqi board. Fear of India as one of the US’s “stones” as a means of encirclement pervades China particularly through the now annual Malabar exercises which take place between the United States, India, and Japan. China’s fear is not completely unfounded as some US conservative commentators have suggested that the US seek a sort of containment policy to prevent Chinese assertiveness in East Asia.

However, if China is really using the NSG rejection as a means to punish India, the move will be, in the long run, counterintuitive, as it is more likely to push India closer to the West. While China has cultivated its own relationship with India, it should refrain from simultaneously pushing India away. Additionally, it should be noted that while India has indeed pursued closer relations with the West, there are still major differing interests and policy goals.

Philippines v. China verdict

Another example of contention between India and China appeared in the aftermath of the Philippines v. China verdict. In response to growing Chinese activity in the South China Sea, Philippines brought suit against China to be handled by an arbitral tribunal to rule on the case. China, for the most part, has disregarded the suit as it cannot be enforced. On July 12, 2016 the tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines, declaring that China’s historically-based claim on the South China Sea had no foundation. India has, for the most part, played both sides in the South China Sea dispute.

In April 2016, India, China and Russia issued a joint statement on the South China Sea saying that “Russia, India and China are committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)” and that “all related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned.” This statement came as a surprise as India had previously called for restraint in the South China Sea while at the same time increasing its trade and defense relationship with ASEAN nations, many of which are parties in the South China Sea. With the April 2016 statement, it appeared that India had begun to side with China on the issue. However, this proved to not be the case.

Still bitter over the chide during NSG, New Delhi received the Philippines v. China decision wholeheartedly. The External Affairs Ministry gave a statement: “Sea lanes of communication passing through the South China Sea are critical for peace, stability, prosperity and development. As a State Party to the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), India urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans.”

While appearing to support international covenants, India has, in action, seemed to support the other parties in the South China Sea issue by reaching out to ASEAN militarily and economically, particularly through Prime Minister Modi’s Act East Policy. One example of this is through the BrahMos missile that India has developed with Russia. This missile has recently influenced regional affairs. India upset China by sending some missiles to the India-China border for security purposes and is also currently considering selling the missile to Vietnam, a party in the South China Sea conflict.

India in World Affairs

If anything, the uneasy relationship between India and China has revealed India’s geopolitical flexibility. As Mohan Malik wrote in the American Interest, “The Hague ruling marks a definitive moment in the evolution of maritime law and Asia’s geopolitical order. The court case is over, but the dispute is not. The South China Sea, through which more than $5.3 trillion of maritime trade passes each year, is now the arena of a geopolitical poker game that will determine the future of regional order: Pax Sinica or Pax Americana. Washington seems as determined to preserve the U.S.-led liberal international order as Beijing is to change and modify it.” In a sense, India has the geopolitical flexibility to help shape the geopolitical state of the Asia-Pacific.

It is common knowledge that the international affairs in the globalization age is not black and white and it is unlikely that India will overwhelmingly support one side over the other. In fact, India’s international political efficacy would be maximized in East Asia’s complexity. As with all nations, the most important thing for India is to secure its own interests and in a situation where the United States and China are seeking partners to espouse their regional primacy in East Asia, India has the most to benefit.

If we can learn anything from all of this, it is that the BRICS are not monolithic and the intra-relations of the countries are sure to be varied as China and India rise in power and influence. This geopolitical drama holds great benefit (through cooperation) and detriment (through tension), however (like all good dramas) uncertainty in a dynamic region will be sure to influence perception, and in turn relations and rhetoric. Or perhaps Daniel Drezner is right and “trolling” has just become the language of international diplomacy.

By AARON WALAYAT, USCNPM Contributor

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/8/29

旧文章ID：15728