作者：  来源：中国日报

美国为什么把中国的崛起视作“威胁”，想尽办法极力阻挠?在中国日报社新时代大讲堂上，英国剑桥大学前高级研究员、中国问题专家马丁·雅克认为，这是一种帝国主义大国的心理在作祟。长久以来，美国拥有压倒性的全球霸权，“美国天下第一”的想法深刻于一些美国人骨子里。因此，面对中国的崛起，美国的反应就是从各个方面极力阻挠和打压。但是，马丁·雅克犀利指出，历史证明，没有哪个国家可以一直做老大。

马丁·雅克

英国剑桥大学政治与国际关系学院前高级研究员

“新时代大讲堂”

英文演讲

《中国崛起是世界和平及发展的有力保障，而不是威胁》

(略有删节，中文为译文)

中美早期关系为什么还不错?因为美国认为中国会西化

中国从1978年开始的崛起是在一个相对稳定的国际环境中进行的，而这种发展有一个关键因素，就是中美之间相对良性的关系。

China’s rise from 1978 took place in a relatively stable international environment. And at the core of this was the relatively benign relationship between the United States and China.

在这一时期，美国对中国的态度是基于两个基本假设。

There were two fundamental assumptions that underpinned America’s attitude towards China over this period.

第一个假设是中国在经济上落后太多，几乎没有可能会挑战或威胁到美国在世界范围内的经济优势地位。

The first was that China was so far behind economically, that it was virtually impossible to imagine China becoming an economic challenger or threat to American economic ascendancy in the world.

第二个因素，也是我认为更重要的因素是，美国认为中国在现代化过程中会西化。

And the second factor and I think a more important factor was that the American belief was that as China modernized, it would westernize.

因为美国的态度基本上是，现代化的过程等同于西化的过程。所以美国的假设是中国会渐渐变得像一个西方国家，看起来像美国一样，比如采用西式的政治体制。

Because remember the American attitude fundamentally was that the process of modernization was also a process of westernization. So the American assumption was that over time, China would become increasingly look like a western country, look like the United States have, for example, centrally, a western style political system.

美国想当然地认为，如果中国没有这样发展，那么它的崛起就会走到尽头、碰壁，无法持续。

And the Americans took it for granted that if this didn’t happen, then China’s rise would come to an end, hit a wall, be unsustainable.

转折发生在2008年金融危机

2008年的西方金融危机打破了美国对中国的这两个假想。转折就从这里开始。这完全出乎意料。

Now, what began to undermine these two American assumptions about China really starts with the financial crisis, Western financial crisis in 2008. This was the beginning of the turning point. Now, this was completely unexpected.

自1931年以来，美国还没有经历过这样的金融危机。在这个时期，美国遇到了大麻烦，西方遇到了大麻烦。

America had not experienced a financial crisis like this since 1931. And America was in big trouble – the West was in big trouble during this period.

说实话，西方一直没有真正从这次危机中恢复过来，经济增长一直疲软，疫情开始之后又是另一番样子。从某种程度来说，西方经济艰难地维持着。

And to be frank, it’s never really recovered. Its growth rates are still, until the pandemic which is a different story. To some extent, the Western economy has been on a life support system.

与此同时，中国在这期间的情况完全不同。

Meanwhile, China has been in a completely different situation during this period.

中国当然受到了这次危机的影响，但基本上中国继续以和之前差不多的速度增长。

I mean, China was of course affected by it, but basically China continues to grow at more or less the same rate, as it had before.

到了2014年，根据世界银行的衡量标准，按购买力平价方法计算，中国的国内生产总值赶超美国。这一时期，按年计算，中国在全球经济增长总额当中占三分之一。可以看到，双方的发展出现差异。

And by 2014, extraordinarily, China overtook the United States in terms of GDP, primary purchasing power, according to this measure from the World Bank. China by this time also, on an annual basis, was accounting for one third of global economic growth. So you see, there’s a chasm in experience.

还有一些其他方面的问题不能不提，那就是政治。

But there was something else we must add to this picture. And that was,remember, politics.

西方本以为金融危机会在中国发生，但它却在西方发生了。西方本以为政治危机会在中国发生，但它也在西方发生了。

The economic crisis was expected by the West to happen in China – ithappened in the West. The political crisis was expected by the West to happen in China – it happened in the West.

不满的声音越来越多，特别是美国和其他地方的传统劳动阶层群体。随之而来的是民粹主义的兴起。这是一个非常重要的时刻，对西方的经济和政治形势产生极大影响。

And you got the rise of growing dissatisfaction, particularly amongst traditional working class people and so on in the States and elsewhere. And the rise of what we came to know, as populism. So this was a really important moment, which began to undermine the situation in the West, both economically and politically.

结果是，西方政府，但不仅仅局限于政府圈，对来自中国的“挑战”，越来越感到焦虑。这个自1972年以来的合作伙伴渐渐被视为一种威胁。

And with the consequence that there was also a growing anxiety in the West, and particularly in governing circles, but not only in governing circles, about the challenge of China, the partner as it were since 1972, was seen increasingly as a threat.

焦虑与日俱增，结果就是对中国的敌意越来越大。最终，对中国的敌意在2016年特朗普当选美国总统后达到了高潮。

There was growing anxiety; there was growing hostility towards China as a result of this. And eventually, of course, this culminates in the election of Trump in 2016, as American president.

美国人为什么不能容忍中国崛起

美国为什么不能容忍中国崛起?为什么它把中国崛起直接解读为中国威胁?

Now, why couldn’t America tolerate the rise of China? Why does it immediately translate China’s rise into the China threat?

要解答这个问题，我们必须要了解一个帝国主义大国的心理，尤其是美国。

And here, we have to, I think, understand the psychology of an imperial power, and the United States in particular.

美国在一个相当长的历史时期，几个世纪以来，一直保持着一种上升的势头。从1945年开始，他们一直拥有压倒性的全球霸权。

You see, the Americans are extraordinarily over a very long historical period, centuries, have always been on the rise. And since 1945, they’ve been overwhelmingly global hegemonic.

美国天下第一，这是刻在一些美国人骨子里的一种想法。不仅仅是总统和国会议员这么想，许多普通美国人也对此深信不疑。

The idea that America is number one is part of the American DNA. It’s not just the presidents and the congressmen and so on who believe this. This is deeply imbued, I think, in the average Americans.

他们认为自己是最好的，他们必须是头儿。他们不能被别人指挥，他们不会被别人比下去。

The Americans think they are best; the Americans think they have to be top dogs. They’re not going to be bossed around by anyone else. They’re not going to be rivaled by anyone else.

当然，现实可不是这样。从历史上看，没有任何一个国家可以永保第一。想想中国——百年的屈辱，曾经的地位被取而代之。英国也是如此。美国也将会是这样。

Now, of course, the reality is rather different, historically speaking, because no country can ever expect to be number one forever. Think of China, the century of humiliation – China was displaced. And so this was the case with Britain, and so on. And this will be the case with the United States.

美国经济的相对下滑大概是从80年代左右开始的。但美国一直不承认，时至今日也不承认。一个美国总统如果说：“我们正在衰退而且无法逆转，我们必须调整自己去适应一个全新的世界。”这无异于自杀。美国还没有做好接受这种论调的准备。

America’s relative economic decline probably starts around the 1980s. But the Americans have basically been in denial of this. Even to this day, they’re largely in denial. It would be suicide for an American president to say: "We are in decline, and we cannot change that situation. We have to accommodate ourselves to a new world." Americans are not ready for this kind of argument.

那么美国对中国这个威胁作何反应?从本质上讲，美国的反应是攻击中国，想办法增加中国崛起的难度。如果有可能的话，阻止中国的崛起。如果不行，至少阻挠中国的崛起。所以特朗普当上总统后没过多久贸易战就开始了。

So what was the American response to China as a threat? Essentially, the American response was an assault against China, to find a way of making China’s rise more difficult. To prevent China’s rise, if possible. If not, at least obstruct China’s rise. And so after Trump becomes president, you see, after a short while, the beginning of the trade war.

在贸易战之后，或者说在贸易战 、科技战的同时，对中国的态度愈发尖锐粗暴。你能看到他们在各个方面对中国进行攻击。

And then after the trade war, or alongside the trade war, the tech war and steadily as the acrimonious and abrasive approach to China developed, you see actions to be taken against China on all sorts of different fronts.

美中新“冷战”与美苏冷战有三点不同

我想说的是，也许可以把现在世界所处的形势，以及美国和中国之间的关系称为新“冷战”。

I would argue now, I think probably it would be appropriate to call the situation that the world is now in, and the relationship between the United States and China, as a new "Cold War".

但我们用“冷战”这个词，并不代表我们要把现在的情况与美苏冷战混为一谈。有三个根本区别。

But just because we use the term "Cold War" doesn’t mean we should confuse or conflate this "Cold War" with the one between United States and the Soviet Union. There are three fundamental differences between them.

第一个区别是，美国和苏联所处的和所拥有的是两个完全不同的经济世界。双方永不产生接触，他们拥有两个不同的国际体系。一个是属于美国的，另一个是属于苏联的。

The first is that the United States and the Soviet Union lived and occupied two entirely different economic worlds. Never the twain shall meet – they just had two different international systems, one belonging to the United States, the other to the Soviet Union.

中国的情况当然不是这样，中国与全球经济高度融合。其实在某些方面，中国与全球经济的融合程度比美国还要高。比如贸易，同为进出口贸易国，中国要比美国重要得多。

Now, of course, this is not the situation with China. China is hugely integrated with the global economy. Indeed, I would argue that in some respects, it’s more integrated with the global economy than is true of the United States. I mean, take for one thing, trade. China is a much more important trading nation, exporting and importing, than the United States.

无论美国说什么，无论特朗普政府想做什么，他们都无法将中国从全球经济中剥离出去。他们可能会尝试这样做，但在我看来他们不会走到那一步。

Now, whatever the American say, whatever the Trump administration would like to do, they will not be able to exile China from the global economy. They can go about it, but they won’t get that far in my view.

他们无法将中国从全球经济中剔除，中国实在是太重要了，与全球经济一体化程度太高了，它与众多国家的关系太密切了，不可能被剔除出去。

They can’t take China out of the global economy. It is simply too important; it is too integrated; its relations with so many countries around the world are too advanced for that to happen.

第二点，苏联在经济方面从来都不是美国的对手。顶多只有美国经济规模的60%左右，可能还不到，只有大约一半。

My second point is the Soviet Union was never an economic pair or equal of the United States. At most it had maybe 60% of the size of the American economy, probably less, probably more like half.

但中国不是这样的，2014年中国按购买力平价方法计算，经济规模就已经赶超美国了。

Now, you cannot say that of China. China, already in 2014 as we’ve seen, had overtaken the size of the American economy, measured by primary purchasing power, GDP.

人们普遍预计在未来几年内，也许是五年，一部分取决于疫情的影响，以国内生产总值的另一个衡量标准，也就是以美元为单位来计算，中国的经济规模将超过美国。

Now, it is generally expected that within the next few years, maybe five years, depends partly on the impact of the pandemic, that China will overtake the United States by the other measure of GDP, which is in dollar terms.

如果我们把时间范围再扩大一点，到2030年前后，全球经济大概是这样的：

And if we extend the time horizon a bit further, you’ll see the picture of the global economy by roughly 2030.

这些数字只是预测，不是事实。但你能从中感受到，到2030年，中国可以占到全球生产总值的三分之一。到那时，它的经济规模将达到美国的两倍。按照这个标准，中国的经济规模要比美国大20%。

Now all these figures are obviously projection so they’re not facts. But you’ll see, it gives you some idea, that by 2030 China could account for one third of global GDP, by which time it will be something like twice the size of the American economy, already by this measure, by the way, it is 20% bigger than the American economy.

所以，中国经济的崛起十分强大，而且根基很深。它在许多不同的领域都显示了实力，当然也包括科技。

So, you know, the rise of China economically is formidable. And it is deeply embedded. And it is showing its ability to perform in many different areas, including, of course, technology.

第三点，苏联在对美关系中犯了一个根本性的错误，那就是军备竞赛。它试图在军事上与美国竞争，投入了大量资金，浪费了许多资源，这是一种灾难性的做法。

The third point I would make is that the Soviet Union made a fundamental mistake in its relationship with the United States. And that was the arms race. It tried to compete militarily with the United States. And it spent so much money, wasted such resources, a disastrous approach.

中国不会犯这种错误。中国不像美国或苏联那样强调军事。中国更加重视经济的发展。

China won’t make that mistake. China doesn’t emphasize the military in a way that, for example, the United States does, or the Soviet Union did. China’s approach is the fundamental importance of the economy.

新“冷战”的结束，取决于美国的转变

对于“冷战”和美中之间的对立关系，我们无法预测这种情况会持续多久。但是，可以说这种对立关系改变的条件是美国立场的转变。

I think the prospect is that we are looking at this kind of situation we’ve got now – the "Cold War" and an antagonistic relationship between the United States and China for the foreseeable future. It’s impossible to predict how long. But you can say or I would argue that the condition for a change in this antagonism depends on a shift in the American position.

美国坚持认为他们是世界上唯一的主导者，但这已经不可能了。只有当美国认同必须与中国一道共同实施全球治理的时候，这种气氛和关系才会发生变化。我认为，这是中美关系出现新局面的前提条件。

You see, the Americans are insisting that they should enjoy sole primacy in the world. And this is no longer possible. This atmosphere and relationship will change at the moment when the United States comes to the view that it must share primacy in the world with China, and that will be the precondition for, I think, a new term in the relationship between the United States and China.

西方国家在疫情中对待中国的态度极不光彩

西方国家对待中国最不光彩的、最令人沮丧的一幕，发生在本次全球新冠疫情中。

And I think one of the most depressing, in fact, one of the most disgraceful episodes in western attitudes towards China was to do with the pandemic – COVID-19.

一月，中国正在努力弄清楚这次疫情是什么，确定病毒、研究应对方法。而西方，尤其是美国但不只美国，我自己的国家英国也有参与，无情地攻击中国，说中国掩盖秘密、不告诉我们真相、掩盖存活率、比起人民的生命，政府和政党更重要等等，诸如此类的。

In January, China was struggling to understand to identify it and to work out how to deal with it. And the West, particularly the Americans, but not only the Americans, my own country Britain for sure, attacked, relentlessly attacked China, you know, cover up your secrecy. You’re not telling us the truth. You’re covering up the survival. The government matters, the party matters more than the survival of people.

而这时中国正与巨大的困难抗争。要知道，中国是第一个遭受疫情的国家。而现在，你能看到，中国面对新冠疫情的表现从一月末起就非常优秀。

This is a situation where China was struggling in great, great difficulty. Remember, China was the first to tackle the question of COVID-19. Now and you can see that actually, China’s performance on COVID-19, certainly from late January, was brilliant.

这些数字是按人均计算的百万人均确诊人数。你看中国可能是全世界表现最好的国家，虽然它不得不最先面对新冠疫情。

These figures here, are on the basis per capita, the number of cases per million people, look at China, the strongest, probably the strongest performance of any country in the world, even though it had to tackle COVID-19 before anyone else.

而所有那些大批评家，美国和其他西方国家，包括我的国家英国等等。一月时，他们攻击中国，毫无同情心。他们本应该把握住多出来的两个月的时间，本可以向中国学习。结果看看他们，表现得惨不忍睹。

And all those great critics, the United States and other Western countries, my own United Kingdom and so on, who could not stop themselves to (from) attacking China showed no compassion in January, had those two extra months to deal with it, could have learned from China. And look at them, a miserable performance.

我想说，本次疫情或许首先是对治理能力的考验。毫无疑问中国已经从根本上通过了这个考验，交出了一份出色的答卷，而美国，在特朗普的领导下，很遗憾，证明是不称职的。

And I would say this, in addition, that the pandemic has been, perhaps, above all, a test of governance. And without question, China has come through this fundamentally, with flying colors. And the United States has been proven under the Trump leadership, but I think, unfortunately, more generally, to have been incompetent.

而如今，中国正走出疫情，创造经济机遇。

And the fact that China is now coming out of the pandemic, of course, has created major economic opportunities.

这清单上(国际货币基金组织预测)只有一个国家，2020年的国内生产总值会出现正增长，就是中国。

There’s only one country of this list here, that is going to have positive growth in terms of GDP in 2020. And that is China.

中国的崛起之路不靠战争

我还要说一个方面。自从中国1978年开始崛起，中国并没有真正参与过任何战争。这是中国大崛起、大转型的时期，从一无所有到现在与世界上经济最强大的国家平起平坐。

Let me just say something else as well here. Since China’s rise started in 1978, China has not really been involved in any wars whatsoever. This is the period of China’s great rise, great transformation, from nothing to now being equal with the most powerful country in the world economically.

看看美国的历史，或者德国、英国、日本的历史。这些国家在崛起时期都参与了很多战争。换句话说，中国在这一时期的发展过程中是非常克制的。

Now look at American history, or German history, or British history, or Japanese history, all of these countries were involved in many wars during the equivalent period of their historical development. China, in other words, has exercised extraordinary restraint during this period of its development.

目前的国际体系无法长期存在

我认为目前的国际体系无法长期存在。我们生活在一个与此前完全不同的世界，一个快速转变的世界。

I don’t believe the present international system can survive for a long time. We live in a completely different world, a rapidly transfer changing world.

1980年，世界的经济中心在这里。

In 1980, the center of the global economy was here.

它在随后的30多年里慢慢地转移了。今天，它的位置大约在这里。在这一时期，全球经济的中心基本上在西欧和美国。

And then slowly in the subsequent 30 odd years, it shifted. And today, it’s somewhere about here. That’s the center of the global economy. In those days, the global economy was essentially Western Europe and the United States.

到2050年，它会在这里，基本上就是在印度中国边境地区。

By 2050, it’ll be here, basically on the India-China border.

当事实上的中心在这里时，国际体系不可能再是一个被美国和西欧这些特权国家控制的体系。

There’s no way you can have an international system which is controlled by privileges, the United States and Western Europe, when actually, the center of the action is over here.

这就需要一个不同的全球经济秩序。关于这个新的国际体系，我想说，首先，它的核心将是中国，占全球18%的人口。在目前的国际体系中，美国是核心，它的人口只占世界人口的4.3%。

You need a different kind of global economy, a different kind of global order for that kind of situation. And I would say this, in relationship to this new international system. First of all, the heart of it will be China – 18% of the world’s population. At the heart of the present international system, is the United States – just 4.3% of the world’s population.

换句话说，这将比目前的国际体系更具有人类代表性 。

In other words, we’re talking about an international system which will be far more representative of humanity than it is now.

换句话说，我们正在从一个专制的代表少数人的全球治理体系转变成一个更能代表全世界的体系。它现在已经初具雏形，今后将更加如此。

In other words, we’re moving from an essentially authoritarian, minoritarian system of global governance to something which is far more representative of the world as it has, as it is already, and as it will be even more so in the future.

西方掌控世界的时代要结束了

中国的崛起，不仅仅是中国 ，还有发展中国家的崛起，给西方带来了很大的危机，我称之为西方的生存危机。

The rise of China, not just China, the rise of the developing world as well which China of course, is part, is creating a big crisis in the West. I would call it the existential crisis of the West.

因为200年来，西方一直掌控着世界，把这个世界当成是它的世界。所有主要机构都是它设计的，它一直是这些机构的核心，它的人民管理世界。它的语言，现在是英语，占主导地位。现在管理世界的人，大体上都是白人。

Because for 200 years, the West has run the world, has assumed that the world is its world, has been at the heart of all the major institutions, which it has designed. The assumption that its people will run the world, that its language, now English will dominate, that the people who run the world by and large will be white.

这个时代就要结束了，这个时代已经无法再持续下去。不仅仅是中国的崛起，发展中国家也在崛起。

This era is coming to an end. This era is no longer sustainable. It’s not just the rise of China. It’s the rise of the developing world as well.

反对歧视偏见的行动正在西方国家发生，这种变化，不只是发生在美国，它是一种全球性的变化，是不同民族、不同肤色 、不同语言、不同文化 、不同文明的崛起。

And you’re experiencing in the West now, a backlash against its prejudice. And this change is not just happening in the United States. It’s a global change. It’s the rise of different peoples, different colors, different languages, different cultures, different civilizations.

我喜欢中文的这个表达，包容的文明。而西方还不知道如何接受这一点。

I like the Chinese expression, inclusive civilization. But the West has got no idea how to embrace that.

最后，我想说的是，我认为中国的崛起是非常积极的。这并不代表中国不犯错误，没有犯过错，未来不会犯错。当然会犯错误。

And I’ll just finish by saying this. Look, I regard China’s rise to be extraordinarily positive that doesn’t mean that China doesn’t make mistakes, hasn’t made mistakes, won’t make mistakes in the future. Of course it will.

中国还在学习的过程中，它才刚刚开始真正成为一个大国。但中国非常擅长学习。我们有目共睹。

It’s on a learning curve. It’s only just really beginning to be a great power. But China is a very good learner. We can all see that.

来源时间：2022/9/8   发布时间：2020/9/21

旧文章ID：28303