作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

For the past few weeks, I have talked about Chinese interests in securing maritime lines of communication. Whether in the straits of Indonesia, the Gulf of Aden, or the Indian Ocean, I have described China as a rising power that is using its military muscle to ensure its strategic interests globally. However, in my haste, I fear the practice of sharing my thoughts may have instilled wrong impressions for China’s contemporary maritime role. The image of China in present media, an assertive and aggressive China is only part of the story.

Why is China interested in the South China Sea? Should we accept Robert Kaplan’s thesis that domestic insecurity has pushed Beijing to revive nationalism through aggressive foreign policy? While Kaplan’s reasoning provides a strong explanation to an extent, he does not claim to understand the motivation behind China’s involvement in the first place. Nationalism may be helpful for domestic squabbles; however, there is no single reason.

Besides nationalism, the sea hosts a major amount of global trade and is also filled with a lot of natural resources, including minerals and energy. A growing Chinese presence in the South China Sea would be beneficial as China would be able to control the trade routes under their own terms as well as access the bountiful resources beneath the ocean depths. The growing presence, as well as the land reclamation, is a means for China to control the sea at the expense of neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines who also lay claim to the contested islands.

The portrayal of China as this ruthless and forceful power is not the whole picture. While trade and energy security as well as access to the natural resources of the sea are valuable goals, China’s presence in the sea is as much an issue of its own security as it is a search for resources and shipping control.

Consider a previous article in which I highlighted the importance of the Malacca Strait for China’s trade and energy security. It is important to notice that Singapore, which has a littoral presence to the Malacca Strait and Australia, which has a littoral presence near the Lombok Strait, could effectively choke out Chinese trade through the straits which would damage China’s economy and energy security. It also doesn’t help that the United States Navy is stationed at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base while the United States Marines are stationed in Darwin, Australia.

However, if the straits are so important, why does China continue to threaten its security in those straits by continuing its presence in the South China Sea? Why does China continue to threaten ASEAN members in the sea when Singapore (and the US) could chokehold the Malacca Strait?

The reason is two-fold. First of all, China trusts that the United States and Singapore would not block off the Malacca Strait, as doing so would result in substantial geopolitical repercussions. The same could be said about the United States and Australia around the Lombok Strait. The relationship between China and the United States (as well as China with Australia and ASEAN) is so nuanced that blocking off important straits in response to Chinese efforts in the South China Sea would not only be rash, but unwise, as it could lead to an escalation of military proportions.

The second reason requires a bit of background.

In 2014, John Mearsheimer published an article in Foreign Affairs blaming the Ukraine crisis, in which Russia seized the Crimea peninsula and supported rebels in the Donbas region, on the West. According to Mearsheimer, Russian actions in Ukraine were defensive responses inspired by what was seen as NATO and EU encroachment against Russia. Under the Clinton and second Bush administrations, NATO brought in many of the former eastern bloc countries, some of which even joined the EU. When Ukrainian Maidan protests began to sweep Ukraine with talks of NATO and EU membership, it was the last straw, and Russia acted in order to prevent future Western encroachment against Russia – first by seizing Crimea, which could be a center of strategic interest against Russia and then by supporting pro-Russian forces in Ukraine in order to keep the EU and NATO from out of Russia’s strategic area.

Why do I take time to consider Mearsheimer’s arguments about a completely separate event in an entirely different region of the world? It is because I believe that in the same way that Russia was acting defensively in response to NATO and EU encroachment, China is also acting in response to US encirclement in the region.

China’s actions in the South China Sea, I believe, were carefully calculated. History, resources and trade all played a role in China’s desire to seize islands in the South China Sea; however, it was US influence in East Asia that has pushed China to build up its defenses in the disputed waters. For that reason, China was able to determine that the important Indonesian straits would not be threatened should they take a stronger stance in the disputed waters. The debates about the region have gone on for a long time. However, it is at this point that all the cards are right for China to increase its presence in the sea in order to protect its national interests.

It is easy to look at the leaders of Russia and China and see them as devoid of the fear that is present in the leaders of the West. It is easy for Westerners, particularly Americans, to forget the expansive presence of the United States military and to subconsciously conclude that a US presence is inherently beneficial for the security of the region.

US Military presence in various Asia-Pacific countries

However, what is regional security to the United States is encirclement for China, and seeing close US relations with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as arms sales to Taiwan, China is wary about the American presence in Asia. It is no wonder that the Chinese have put so much focus on the Sea in order to provide flexibility for submariners for China’s nuclear and security concerns.

Militarily, the US pivot to Asia was an oddity as the United States already has a nearly unchallengeable presence in Asia. Now that the Chinese have filled a regional power vacuum, created when the US withdrew troops from the Philippines, US military activity in the area is back and tensions between the United States and China are high. It does not help that many of the regional actors: Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, have sought closer ties with the United States as well as with each other in order to decry the Chinese presence in the South China Sea. The role of India and Australia has also increased tensions as the countries possess their own interests near the disputed waters.

Thankfully, the South China Sea is not the only issue in US-China relations, and the nuances have kept the relationship afloat. As tensions flare in the South China Sea, it is important for the United States to heed Henry Kissinger’s warning that treating China as an enemy would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. While China’s assertiveness in the region remains inexcusable, the United States and its partners in the region must make it a point to recognize China’s interests without ignoring China’s affront to international law. By acknowledging China’s security interests in the region, the United States and its regional partners should be sure to avoid anything that resembles an arm race that would escalate tensions. This would be the wisest choice, as it would avoid unnecessary bloodshed in the region.

By AARON WALAYAT Mar. 28, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/3/28

旧文章ID：15756

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Carter Center Democracy Program intern Hee Jun Yoo shares her thoughts on US-China-South Korea relations and shares some personal experiences with China.

This is the third installment of our series of interviews in which the China Program at the Carter Center is collecting a variety of perspectives on US-China relations. If you are interested in sharing your own thoughts, feel free to shoot a short video (no more than 2 minutes) of your opinion on US-China Relations and share with us at zhongmeiluntan@gmail.com— you might be featured next!

Special Thanks to the Education Program of The Carter Center for sharing the talents from around the world.

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/3/29

旧文章ID：15755

作者：Jordan Ryan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Chinese President Xi Jinping returns to the US in late March to gather with leaders of 50 other nations at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

That’s good news. In these difficult and dangerous times, it’s important for the US and China to work collaboratively on shared global challenges. Too often, US politicians focus on our differences with China, but in fact, the two nations already cooperate in key areas. China played an important role in the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Washington and Beijing worked together in the landmark Paris Climate Summit. China also recently supported a US-led UN Security Council resolution to impose additional sanctions on North Korea.

Less talked about but also meaningful are joint China-US efforts to secure peace and fight disease in Africa. Alongside US aid to combat the 2014 Ebola outbreak, China offered generous support in cash, equipment, and personnel. West African countries, China, the US, and the UN joined forces to stop a pandemic.

Since December 2013, there has been near-constant strife in South Sudan. Again in partnership with regional African states, US and Chinese diplomats have worked together to bring the warring parties to the peace table and prevent a regional crisis. A model of constructive African-led action, backed by China and the US, is slowly emerging.

The Carter Center works in a wide array of African countries. Throughout the continent, the growing presence of China is evident. It is building roads, offering public health assistance and providing peacekeepers. While many Africans and their governments welcome Chinese engagement, some in the Africa and elsewhere have accused China of practicing neocolonialism.

It is counterproductive for those of us in the US to heap criticism on China’s actions in Africa when we could do more to see that our two countries cooperate on the continent. Common interests of development, trade, anti-piracy, and counter-terrorism overlap more than they compete.

China and the US can join forces to promote development in Africa, but they can also collaborate to wage peace. The Carter Center sent missions to observe presidential elections in Guinea in 2010 and legislative elections in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011. On both occasions, China sided with the international community in holding the losing party to the electoral verdict. In December 2014, in a move supported by the US, China deployed combat troops as part of the UN peacekeeping mission to South Sudan, an indication of how seriously both countries take peace there.

During the recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China’s annual meeting with African countries, a number of African leaders reportedly asked Xi to become more involved in fostering peace on the continent. At a recent Carter Center conference on cooperation between Africans, Chinese, and Americans, Xi’s special representative for African affairs, Zhong Jianhua, acknowledged that China is new to promoting peace in Africa. It will take time to learn new procedures and adapt to changing realities. But he said China is ready and willing to absorb from the UN and others the hard-earned lessons of the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, and elsewhere.

China’s goodwill, such as Xi’s pledge last September of $100 million to African Union peacekeeping, should receive our support. Recognizing China’s burgeoning role as a player for peace in Africa would do much for the continent while building mutual respect and future collaboration between two superpowers. Peace is, after all, the ultimate win-win.

Jordan Ryan is our colleague and vice president for peace programs at the Carter Center.

By JORDAN RYAN Apr. 1, 2016 on Global Times

Read more here

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/2

旧文章ID：15754

作者：Margaret Lu  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The views expressed in this article belong entirely to the author and do not represent the views of the US-China Perception Monitor or the China Program at The Carter Center. 

It was 1960. Two men were running to be the commander-in-chief of their country. You may think that this was but another American presidential election, yet what truly differentiated this particular campaign from its predecessors was not the qualifications of the candidates or the exclusiveness of the competition-but instead-the flashing cameras.

The Kennedy-Nixon presidential election marked the first televised presidential debate in American history. In this election, Kennedy was said to have eventually won his people not only by his policies but also by his remarkable charisma, to which a sweat-drenched Nixon could hardly rival. This tradition would remain in America for the next half century, as television and media continue to act as essential factors in a successful political campaign. In fact, today’s presidential debates seem to encapsulate qualities of reality TV shows and are often utilized widely for entertainment purposes. This effect has spurred much conversation and earned the presidential debate stage a reputation of seeming more like an amusement platform. In fact, this phenomenon has even inspired celebrities and reality TV stars to “shoot for the stars” and bargain for their place in the Oval Office.

While it is completely justified for any eligible citizen with a love for their country to run for the presidency, one must question the credibility of unprepared individuals who exploit this privilege and use it to downplay their nation’s politics. Mr. Donald Trump, for example, brings behaviour that might be common on Celebrity Apprentice to the GOP stage instead. His bombastic slogans and controversial comments has earned him excessive attention from the media, which has become his best advertisement. This frequent media exposure and constant demagoguery has earned Mr. Trump almost every Republican primary and secured his position as the Republican front runner. Should this occurrence continue, it seems very likely that the reality TV star will become the Republican Party’s presidential nominee, and heir to the legacies of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt.

Mr. Trump has been widely acclaimed for his apparent honesty and disregard for political filters. Nevertheless, his comments have led to uproarious responses and backlash from the international community. In advocating for his policies, Mr. Trump has insulted many of America’s major allies as well as some of the greatest superpowers across the globe. His feedback ranged from subtle dismay to public discussions on a lifetime ban of entering Great Britain. Mr. Trump may have once seemed harmless, but now with the general election approaching us, we must examine this issue again.

Mr. Trump once said, “I think the big problem this country has is being politically correct.” This attitude may be appreciated by the media and reality TV, but it does not demonstrate the decency and respect American leaders must pay to global society. Nevertheless, his frankness, with some inflation from the media, has proven to be effective in winning people’s hearts. His rhetorics have given people the false impression that politics can be treated like a reality show, where one selects the option that would provide the best entertainment. These beliefs will be immensely dangerous for the nation’s future.

It is an aimable characteristic of democracy for everyone to have an equal opportunity in political campaigns, but now is also the time to question the extent of this attribute. Is it honestly appropriate to display the U.S. presidency election to the world as if it was a crude act, in which anyone is allowed participate at any time? Or is this but an inevitable malfunction of any democracy? In truth, the responsibility to uphold a healthy democracy does not lie solely with the political candidates. After all, the voters still retain the freedom to support the candidate of their own will. The media’s major priority should be reporting the individual policies and promises of each candidate instead of grossly dramatizing the election and feeding the fame of controversial candidates.

If democracy allows the rise of such candidates, yet the American people can still make the right decisions in spite of all the propaganda…then that is a truly impressive accomplishment.

By MARGARET LU Apr. 2, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2018/4/2

旧文章ID：15753

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

With reports of Indonesian fisherman seizures and Filipino international arbitration suits, China’s relationship in Southeast Asia appears to be hitting a rough patch. Such a declaration would naturally premature, as China’s influence in Southeast Asia has greatly increased, as it remains the largest trading partner of most of the region’s nations. More than having a vibrant trade relationship, China has also partnered with a variety of Southeast Asian countries through investment and development, and continues to do so, despite the rising tensions in the South China Sea.

Former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra

In recent years, Thailand has sought closer relations with China. Thailand is a traditional US ally and is considered a “major non-NATO ally”. However, relations between the US and Thailand have soured after a 2014 bloodless coup d’état saw the overthrow of the popularly elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Yingluck Shinawatra and her older brother, former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, were accused of corruption, swelling influence of the Shinawatra family, and for insults against Thailand’s revered king, Bhumibol Adulyadej. Thaksin Shinawatra was also overthrown in a military coup in 2006.

The US has supported the popularly elected Shinawatra ministries. Former US ambassador to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, criticized the coup advocating a “return to democracy” in Thailand which earned a harsh response from Thai royalists. There is a close relationship between the palace and the military in Thailand, and now with a military government in charge in Bangkok, the US relationship with its oldest Southeast Asian ally has soured.

Former US Ambassador to Thailand Kristie Kenney

This is also apparent as the military government in Thailand has also sought closer relations with neighboring China. In 2015, China and Thailand held their first bilateral military exercises and pursued closer military and economic relations. Such warming relations between China and a Thai government that was coolly received by the US government are alarming for American observers. Taken in the context, closer Chinese-Thai relations could be seen in a similar vein as the warming US-Vietnam and US-Philippines relations taken as a way to counter China.

Indeed, closer relations between China and Thailand can be perceived as dubious for US interests. However, China’s pre-existing economic and investment relationship with Thailand hints that the growing relationship is nothing new. In a time where relations between China and Southeast Asia have soured due to tensions in the South China Sea, non-parties like Thailand and Indonesia have found themselves in an advantageous situation.

Chinese President Xi Jinping with Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha

While the parties of the South China Sea conflict, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, have sought closer relations with the US in order to counteract China in the region, nonparties can take advantage of the situation by playing both sides. Observers, particularly American observers, should not be so quick to judge warming China-Thailand relations as an affront against the US, as the US ambassador to Thailand, Glyn Davies, claims stronger Chinese-Thai relations is “good for Thailand” and affirms that the “US has not lost Thailand to China” and Thailand still expresses interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Thailand, as Southeast Asia’s second largest economy, provides a great opportunity for Chinese business and investment. On the other hand, Thailand could benefit greatly from Chinese infrastructural investment and business development. Also, it is impossible to ignore existing troubles that exist between China and Thailand, particularly China’s control of the Mekong River upstream.

Close relations between China and Thailand possess great opportunities for both countries, and while observers fear that close relations between the two will be detrimental for the US, it is also important to see some of the maritime reasons for Chinese involvement in Thailand. In an earlier article, I discussed the difficulties of China’s reliance of the Malacca Strait for its international trade and energy security.

Thailand and Southeast Asia

By having close relations with Thailand, and through infrastructural investment, Thailand could offer China a way to bypass the strait through a major infrastructural feat: a Kra Canal. Such a canal, if friendly to China, will allow Chinese ships to move directly from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. While the project could pose problems for the Singapore economy, which is strategically positioned along the Malacca Strait, the initiative provides strong Singapore influence for international trade. Strategically, however, the military significance of the canal would not be harmful for the US as American presence in Singapore (and Thailand for that matter) still has flexibility to be active in the Gulf of Thailand. Economically, alleviating Malacca and Lombok traffic would be helpful for maintaining fluid movement between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

However, the Thai government has confirmed that a Kra Canal is not presently on the agenda. At present, it seems a canal in Thailand is not the most pressing issue for geopolitics, but the future economic conditions provided by a canal in Thailand would be very beneficial for China. Well, there’s always the one in Nicaragua.

By AARON WALAYAT Apr. 4, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/4

旧文章ID：15752

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

In previous articles, I have often name-dropped Indonesia as a country of particular concern in the Indo-Pacific region. In this case, Indonesia, for the reason of geography alone, has pushed itself to a major talking point in US-China relations.

Indonesia possesses a plethora of economic opportunities. Not only does the archipelago host the straits that are so crucial for international trade, but it is also home to a plethora of natural resources as well as the world’s fourth largest population. Such a key region cannot be ignored by the United States and China, and, most importantly, Indonesia realizes its key geopolitical position.

Indonesia is remarkable, as it shows that sometimes, being caught in the middle of two powers is not always the worst possible scenario. Unlike other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Indonesia, as opposed to the Philippines or Vietnam, has no claim to the South China Sea and has become a sort of nonparty on the issue, although Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has publically claimed that China’s “Nine-Dashed Line” has no basis in international law.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo, affectionately called “Jokowi”

Although relations between China and Indonesia have tensed up during a March 20, 2016, seizure of a Chinese fishing crew off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands such seizures, according to The Diplomat’s Prashanth Parameswaran, are “nothing new.” In fact, Indonesia under Jokowi has pursued a strong stance against illegal fishing in Indonesia’s territorial waters and in the past has sunk illegal fishing vessels of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and even China. Indonesia further complicated its position by pushing hard against illegal Taiwanese fishing in its territorial waters.

Natuna Island, located on a map

What could be a precedent for future conflict is China claims the fishing vessel was sailing through “traditional Chinese fishing grounds” while at the same time not disputing Indonesia’s sovereignty over Natuna.

While the precedent set in the incident contains drastic repercussions, namely, that China could be extending its claim of “traditional fishing grounds” outside of the already controversial Nine-Dashed Line, it is unlikely that relations between China and Indonesia will lead to conflict, made more clear by China’s decision to join Indonesia as well as the United States, Russia, and others in Exercise Komodo 2016. In fact, Indonesia, unlike its ASEAN neighbors, has paid special attention to keep its relationship with the United States and China balanced. Jokowi has gone so far as to advocate Indonesia “taking advantage of rivalries between countries, such as China-US or China-Japan”. During a speech at a December 16, 2015, Indonesian Armed Forces leadership meeting in Cilangkap, Jokowi stated “Indonesia is in the center of those rivalries. What must we do? Take advantage as much as we can and use them for our national interest.”

In fact, it would seem that Indonesia’s grand strategy is directed toward internal development, a project that would need the investment of both the United States and China. Far from maritime issues leading to an Indonesian alienation of China, Indonesia is “relying on [Chinese] investors and state-owned companies to fund 70 percent of its infrastructure needs, and wants a third of that from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

Jokowi’s goals of development in Indonesia, however, will require a careful balance of foreign investment and domestic reform. As Jokowi hopes to make Indonesia a “global maritime fulcrum” his focus will be on “improving maritime connectivity” and will involve “building an integrated network of ports and tollways over the next few years”. However, the project will be difficult and costly as “building 24 ports alone will cost around $24 billion, and that local investors simply cannot finance them because of the large funding required”. Indonesia’s goals find a logical alternative in foreign investment; however that would require “some bold changes in the country’s regulatory environment, including streamlining permitting, harmonizing regulations, and curbing corruption.”

Major sea lines of communications through Indonesia

Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia is not impossible, as the geography, population, and natural resources of the country provide multiple opportunities for further investment. However, in order to ensure investor trust, it is important for Jokowi to ensure that Indonesia is a safe place to invest. Doing this includes alleviating the risks of investment in Indonesia, which is posed by challenges to the country’s sovereignty, regional conflict, and the economic status quo.

It would seem that some of Jokowi’s policies, including building a military base a short ways away from the South China Sea should not be seen as a means of a challenge against China but as a base of operations to ensure Indonesian sovereignty, not only against China but against historical adversaries, like Malaysia. Protecting sovereignty also accounts for Jokowi’s strong policy of sinking vessels that are found illegally fishing in Indonesia’s sovereign territory.

Another important step for Indonesia is to detract regional conflict. It seems somewhat counterintuitive for Indonesia to be asserting its sovereignty while at the same time attempting to offset conflict. However, Jakarta recognizes that conflict would be detrimental for Indonesia as it would scare off investors. In the past, I have offered a series of hypothetical situations in which the United States, with help from its regional allies, would close off the straits to Chinese trade. While I have specifically described these situations as being to China’s detriment, such events would also be greatly problematic for Indonesia.

Conflict in the South China Sea, therefore, would not be beneficial for Indonesia and would lead only to more difficulties for a country with high hopes on foreign investment. It is no surprise, therefore, that Jokowi has called for restraint on both the US and Chinese sides in the South China Sea conflict. Similarly, I believe that Indonesia’s military base near the South China Sea, is not to challenge  China or the United States, but rather a means to assure an Indonesian presence in a region that may be afflicted by possible conflict. It would seem that Indonesia’s position is to, above all, insure Indonesia’s interests.

Finally, Jokowi’s toughest task is to make Indonesia attractive for foreign investment by pushing reforms in his country.

Jokowi’s intention is not to alienate Washington or Beijing, but rather to attract investment from both. This was clear as Jokowijoined the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as well as expressed his intention to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

During an October 2015 visit to Washington, Jokowi expressed his desires to see Indonesia join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In order for Indonesia to join the TPP, the “country will have to undertake significant reforms to get there,” a challenge that Jokowi acknowledged when he declared that “Indonesia intended to free up its private sector from what he termed poorly-conceived policies, excessive permitting and licensing, and unnecessary protectionism, which had caused Indonesian companies to suffer for too long.”

“Ladies and gentlemen,” Jokowi declared, “it is time to free up our private sector.”

In the past, I have represented Indonesia as an important geographical point in US-China relations. However, Indonesia itself, far from the more lopsided relationships of its ASEAN neighbors in one way or another, has consistently sought to maintain a balance between the US and China in order to preserve its national interests and pursue its national goals.

By AARON WALAYAT Apr. 11, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/11

旧文章ID：15751

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

As I recently mentioned, China’s relationship has warmed with many Indian Ocean nations, with the Chinese government investing heavily in infrastructural projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. The most significant, however, is China’s strong relationship with Pakistan. In terms of logistical concerns, Pakistan provides a strong opportunity for China. One example of major cooperation is the Gwadar Port Project.

Gwadar Port, Balochistan, Pakistan

The port, which is entering its second phase of development, has received major investment from China, who has covered as much as “80 per cent of Gwadar Port’s $248 million initial development costs” in 2007. The port has been described as “strategic”, and could potentially provide a strong line of communication for the Chinese business and energy security, that bypasses the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and, most importantly, the Malacca Strait. Gwadar Port’s location, along the coast of Pakistan’s western province of Balochistan, is key as it is littoral to the Arabian Sea. This would allow trade and energy to funnel from the Middle East and Africa through the Gwadar Port into Pakistan and then into China overland, as China shares a border with Pakistan.

The government of Pakistan has welcomed Chinese investment, with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declaring that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will benefit Pakistani business and transform the country into a “regional hub and a pivot for commerce and investment”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

While geopolitical concerns are sure to affect perception of China and Pakistan’s economic partnership, however, it seems that more than anything, Sino-Pakistani cooperation is to ensure mutual benefit, as Pakistan will be happy to receive the Chinese investment while China will be happy to find opportunities to bypass the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. However, it must be affirmed that transit through Gwadar port will not become China’s sole means and is rather just a way to diversify commercial logistics. The laws of physics still affirm shipping will still provide more economical means of trade than the rail and highway. As Chinese cooperation with Africa, the Middle East, and Europe develops, Pakistan could serve as a strong opportunity for China to diversify its lines of communication.

Planned overland routes of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

However, while the benefits of the CPEC provide a plethora of opportunities for Pakistani Development, many challenges still exist for the cooperation to take hold. While concerns from India will always accompany strong relations with Pakistan, India’s existential enemy, the greater concerns lie more so in domestic difficulties. In Pakistan, Baloch militancy and poverty could upset the stability of rail lines and highways that run from Pakistan to China. Baloch separatists in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province have disrupted the stability of the region. In fact, the Baloch Liberation Army and the Baloch Republican Army, two separatist groups in the Province, have caused disturbances near the Gwadar Port. There are also ethnic Balochs who live in the neighboring regions of Iran and Afghanistan.

Balochistan province of Pakistan

Poverty also plays a role, as Balochistan suffers crippling poverty and unemployment. While Chinese investment would be able to provide a strong amount of development in the Province, the new infrastructure is unlikely to utilize the low-skilled workforce of the Province and is unlikely to benefit the local population. This could lead to a variety of difficulties with domestic unrest. Combined with Baloch militancy and the ubiquitous threat of Islamist extremism, economic inequality in the region poses a potential threat for fluid economic activity.

In response with these issues, Pakistan has left nothing to chance and has deployed Pakistani military personnel to defend Chinese investments in the country. However, Pakistan is not alone with the area’s security concerns and China also faces a handful of domestic stability concerns in order to maintain the safety of goods and energy movements from Western China to Eastern China, where economic activity is more developed.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China

China has supported strong Han Chinese migration into the Western Chinese region of Xinjiang. The region poses as a collection of difficulties for China, as conflicts exist with the native Uyghur people. While ethnic relations between Han and Uyghurs are relatively calm on the personal level, there have been strong conflicts between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government. While religious divisions (the Turkic Uyghurs are overwhelmingly Muslim) have spurred conflict and while Islamic extremism still plays a role in the tensions of the region, much of the troubles derive from what is seen as cultural repression of Uyghur culture and language.

With greater economic activity in the region, specifically Kashgar (called Kashi in Mandarin Chinese), much of the business relationships will be conducted in Mandarin Chinese, English, or possibly Urdu (the language of Pakistan of Hindustani origin), all very different from the Turkish origin Uyghur language. With growing economic activity taking place in Western China, local Uyghurs will be pressed to maintain their language or to assimilate linguistically with Mandarin Chinese.

By AARON WALAYAT Apr. 18, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/18

旧文章ID：15750

作者：Wu Jianmin  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China has come a long way in terms of social and economic development since it undertook reform and opening up nearly 40 years ago. As the country becomes more open, our society becomes more diversified and so are the public views on various issues.

As we enjoy more freedom, parochial nationalism is, alarmingly, also rising. In today’s China, those who subscribe to nationalistic sentiments often cast the country as a victim in international affairs. Our web portals and publications are full of comments to the effect that foreign parties take the lion’s share of profits from international projects. At the same time, Chinese people are portrayed as trading their blood and sweat for a living.

As a result, these voices claim that the people of China are losing out because they are still being subjected to the exploitation of Western countries via international cooperation.

Those people might speak some truth, but we must take all the facts into account to get a full picture of things. When the country opened its doors in the early 1980s, we did not possess the technology, money or advanced management skills to make progress. What we had was abundant human resources and a vast market.

Foreign businesses that were willing to come to the country needed to make money, otherwise they would stay home. We could only build our economy on this premise, and it has indeed thrived so much that we had the world’s second largest economy by 2010. Our people have also benefited from these this remarkable progress.

People my age remember well that in the old days there were few things we could buy and most were rationed via a coupon system. Reform and opening has provided us the opportunities to work with foreign partners in win-win situations. To portray China as a victim in international cooperation is an attempt to discredit the policies of the last four decades.

Narrow-minded nationalists often tend to tout military confrontation when dealing with territorial disputes, as opposed to Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “set aside differences and pursue joint development.”

In recent years, as the nation continues to achieve a greater international status, mutual distrust between China and countries such as the United States and Japan has soared. That has led them to try to contain China. Meanwhile, concerns and fears among our neighbors over our growing clout are escalating. Friction with neighboring nations over territorial disputes involving the South China Sea has appeared from time to time.

The philosophy of Deng, a leader of great wisdom, in the early 1980s was the result of a thorough consideration of all factors involved in the situation. Based on this approach, Deng also proposed the “one country, two systems” principle to overcome barriers to the return to China of Hong Kong, a former British colony. For that, he has won wide respect and praise.

The pursuit of peace and development through cooperation is the hallmark of our times. China should continue to make great strides in the first decade of the 21st century because we have embraced this idea. As far as South China Sea issues are concerned, Deng’s advice should continue to allow us to continue to achieve win-win situations with countries that have a stake in the region.

Wars are not the answer, and they actually create problems, as the United States and other Western countries have found. I believe that we can resolve disputes with our neighbors regarding the South China Sea through peaceful negotiations. For example, we have in recent years managed to define our borders with 12 countries via diplomacy.

Nationalism in China is also driven by a blind sentiment against multinationals doing business in the country. That we prosper now has a lot do with the presence of international firms in China because they have introduced new ways of thinking, advanced technologies and management techniques. Multinationals, the very embodiment of globalization, have the advantage of optimizing resources globally, and they also represent efficient production. Those who are opposed to multinationals are opposed to improved productivity. Furthermore, China is developing its own multinational firms.

Our relationship with the rest of the world is far different than it was in the past. We cannot develop without the rest of the world, and the prosperity and stability of the world can hardly be sustained without our involvement. This is the big picture that none of us can ignore.

If groups espousing parochial nationalism get their way by obstructing the policies of reform and opening up and our engagement with the rest of the world, they will only make China an inward-looking country again. If that happens, we will only fall behind again. This means that if we want to continue prospering, we must continue with reform and opening up and reject narrow-minded nationalism.

Wu Jianmin is China’s former ambassador to France and a former president of China Foreign Affairs

By WU JIANMIN Apr. 22, 2016 on USCNPM

Read more here

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/22

旧文章ID：15749

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

I recently read an article published in The Diplomat (but originally elsewhere) in which the author of the piece advocated disinviting China from 2016’s Rim of the Pacific Exercise, also known as RIMPAC. The exercise, hosted in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is the largest naval exercise in the world. It focuses mainly on the littoral nations of the Pacific Rim; however the United States invited European nations to participate in 2014. In total there were 22 participants in 2014 with 6 observers.

However, with China’s recent activity in the South China Sea, there has been a growing movement to disinvite China from joining the biannual exercise. Congressman Mark Takai (D-HI), who represents the areas near Pearl Harbor, told Ash Carter, the United States Secretary of defense and General Joseph F. Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that had introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to prohibit Chinese participation in the RIMPAC exercise if the Department of Defense failed to revoke China’s invitation.

Secretary Carter responded by saying that the Department of Defense acknowledges China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and said that the DoD was “reassessing” the invitation. However, “Carter argued that the United States does not want to exclude anyone from the regional ‘security architecture.’”(You can watch the exchange at this link).

“Should we reward China for this aggressive behavior by including them in an event meant for allies and partners?” Takai asked Carter. “China’s behavior is the polar opposite of U.S. objectives in the region.”

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter (left) and Congressman Mark Takai (D-HI)

Congressman Takai’s frustration with the invitation of China to RIMPAC is not without basis. Many see RIMPAC as a prestigious event and welcoming a Chinese presence to the exercise would be a sort of reward. In this way, excluding China would show US leadership in punishing bad behavior in the South China Sea.

In The Diplomat article, Shirley Kan supports Takai’s position and closes by saying “The United States needs to show strength with strategic signals, serious actions, and international leadership. The United States will look silly and weak after RIMPAC 2016 if the PLA is embraced only to have the regime in Beijing then claim a ‘South China Sea ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone),’ coerce a U.S. ally, or provoke collisions with U.S. or allied aircraft and ships.”

China’s actions in the South China Sea have indeed been troubling, and while it is important for the United States to work with ASEAN’s littoral parties in the region to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict and to take a strong stance against China’s assertive behavior, disinviting China from participation in RIMPAC 2016 would not be beneficial for seeking a solution to the South China Sea dispute nor US-China relations in general.

Kan is right to say that the United States must show international leadership in dealing with the crisis in the South China Sea. However, it is also important for the United States to think critically about the position that it will take in the region. The US is not a littoral party in the region and by expelling China from participation at RIMPAC; the US would only be sending the message that it is taking an “anti-China” stance in the dispute.

Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.

When it comes to taking sides, rather than outright joining the Philippines or Vietnam, the United States has taken the side of “international law.” US operations in the sea has focused mainly on “freedom of navigation operations” in which the United States has been able to take the “moral high ground” of siding with international law rather than with any particular party in the dispute. A commitment to international law shows that the United States is appealing to higher principles, many of which China espouse as well.

Certainly the United States has not shied from interpreting Chinese activity in the region as troubling and has worked with an assortment of parties including Vietnam, Philippines, and even the parties of the hypothetical Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. To American leaders, the position of the United States is, rather than on supporting allies, focused on upholding international law. However, the American position in the South China Sea is complicated as the United States is not a party on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

More than anything, however, disinviting China from RIMPAC as a means of showing international leadership would simply be preaching to the choir. The parties present at RIMPAC are already noted US allies. Most of the parties are, in fact, already working closely with the United States in the dispute as well as in other maritime issues worldwide. What does the United States have to prove to its allies by disinviting China from RIMPAC? All the United States would accomplish would be antagonizing China and making a peaceful solution even less likely.

Rather than looking “silly and weak,” the United States would be maintaining its commitment to its values by inviting China to participate in RIMPAC. The purposes of joint military exercises is not only practicing strategies to face potential common threats, but also as a way of building camaraderie between the militaries personnel of participating countries. RIMPAC provides an opportunity to bring together Chinese and Philippine military personnel without involving combat between the parties.

US President Barack Obama (center) with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

If anything, RIMPAC is the best way to practice international leadership. It gives the US a moral high ground while at the same time bringing China to the table. In the eyes of attendees, China’s continued assertiveness in the South China Sea will be taken in spite of the best actions of the international community to find a peaceful solution.

It is important to uphold international law and to take a strong stance against Chinese activity in the South China Sea. However, disinviting China from RIMPAC would only alienate and antagonize China. If the goal is to avoid bloodshed in the South China Sea, the United States cannot afford to make an enemy out of China, and as both Henry Kissinger and Harvard’s Joseph Nye have assured us, “If you treat China as an enemy, you are certain to have an enemy.”

When it comes to strategy, it is not weakness to be calculating, it is, however, weakness to be rash. Disinviting China from RIMPAC would only be a way to make an unnecessary enemy. Such an action would only make war in the region more likely and would be a failure of US international leadership.

In order to find a solution to the South China Sea dispute, China must not be made into an enemy. As for the future of US-China relations, it is important for both parties to keep open dialogue, whether in politics, business, or military. US response actions in the South China Sea must never be taken as spurred by anti-China motivations and must be inspired by the upholding of international norms and statues.

The best way for the US to show international leadership, therefore, would be by providing a place for the littoral parties of the South China Sea to conduct diplomacy rather than combat. Inviting China to RIMPAC would provide another step for diplomacy, which will be sure to appease the peacedoves. As for the “peace-through-strength” crowd, the exercises will also provide an opportunity for a show of force.

By AARON WALAYAT Apr. 25, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/4/25

旧文章ID：15748

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Since Benigno Aquino III was elected President in 2010, the Philippines shook off its label as the “sick man of Asia” and is expected to remain among East Asia’s fastest growing economies. A growing Philippines is welcomed in the region and is considered one of the few emerging economies which will emerge virtually unscathed from the Chinese economic slowdown.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino III

Despite his successes, however, Aquino’s presidency has faced mixed reception. In the midst of the Maguindanao massacre, the airport bullet scam, and the increase of Filipinos working overseas, much of the brunt of the criticism is placed on the present administration.

Even more so, the fact that Aquino, the son of the famed Filipino opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. and former Philippine President Corazon Aquino, comes from one of the country’s political clans, serves as a reminder of the alleged oligarchy that controls the politics of the Philippines.

Also, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement made between the Philippines and the United States has raised alarm from leftists. The agreement was made in the midst of the South China Sea conflict, in which the Philippines is a littoral claimant, but remains controversial in the archipelago as it poses the possibility of the return of US bases in the country.

Today, six years after Aquino’s election and at the end of his term and on May 9, the Philippines will choose between an interesting cast of candidates. The candidates include:

Former Secretary of the Interior Mar Roxas

Mar Roxas: Roxas was a candidate for President in 2010, but opted to run as Aquino’s running mate instead. However, Roxas lost the Vice Presidential election to Jejomar Binay, as the President and the Vice President are elected separately in the Philippines. He later served a variety of cabinet positions under Aquino and is currently the current administration’s favorite in the election.

Vice President Jejomar Binay

Jejomar Binay: Binay is Vice President of the Philippines and has been a strong critic of the current administration. For this reason, he is considered “leader of the opposition” of sorts. He is popular among leftists and has reached out to the impoverished vote. However, he has also received accusation of corruption during his time as Vice President and as Mayor of Makati, the Philippines largest financial center.

Senator Grace Poe

Grace Poe: Poe is a popular Senator in the Philippines. She is the daughter of movie star and former Presidential runner up Fernando Poe, Jr. She was asked to run as Mar Roxas’s running mate, but opted to run for President. However, she has been attacked by some who deem her ineligible for the office. The Philippine Constitution stipulates that a presidential candidate must be a “natural-born citizen” who has lived in the Philippines for at least 10 years before running. Poe is a natural-born Filipino, but has lived in the United States and may not meet the living in the Philippines for 10 years requirement. While election authorities have deemed Poe eligible, this has been met with mixed reception. Despite the issues with her eligibility, Poe has a slight lead over rivals in recent opinion polls. However, Duterte has inched ahead of Poe now and again.

Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte

Rodrigo Duterte: Duterte is the most colorful candidate by far. At first Duterte refused a presidential bid, however, the mayor of Davao City eventually decided to run, meeting excited reception and leading opinion polls until recently. Duterte presents himself as an outsider who has intrigued voters with his gruff image and profanity-laced speeches, even cursing out Pope Francis for the traffic caused by his visit to Davao City. Duterte has since apologized for his statements. Most controversial, Duterte has taken a very tough anti-crime stance which, while transforming his drug and crime infested city into one of the Philippines safest cities, also earned condemnation from groups like Human Rights Watch. This anti-crime stance has made Duterte incredibly popular in both his home city and nationwide and earned him the nicknames “the Punisher” and “Dirty Harry.” Some polls even have him leading over rival Grace Poe. However, Duterte has drawn the criticism of rights groups who accuse him of utilizing vigilante justice and has used “death squads” to kill suspected criminals. While Duterte has denied accusations of extra-judicial killings, rights groups are still concerned of Duterte’s promise to implement his anti-crime stance to the national level.

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago

Miriam Defensor Santiago: Santiago is regarded as the most intellectual of the candidates. She is considered popular among younger voters and was runner-up in the 1992 presidential election. However, she has not done well in recent opinion polls and there are continual concerns about her health.

What About China?

While each candidate, each has their own differences in their domestic vision of the Philippines, with candidates Roxas and Poe believed to continue Aquino’s foreign policy and economic policies, especially in pursuing closer relations with the United States. Commentator Jeffrey Ordaniel has even argued that Poe, who once held dual US-Philippines citizenship, will be the least likely to pursue an anti-American foreign policy.

On the other hand, Binay and Duterte have shown to be more willing to pursue closer relations with China. Binay was quoted as saying “China has money, we need capital.” Binay has also called for a joint venture in developing natural resources with China in the South China Sea. Binay’s call for cooperation with China may slow down Philippines defense modernization and draw attention away from Philippine claims in the region. However, Joshua Kurlantzick argues that this position would likely “prod China to become even more assertive in contested waters.”

Duterte has stated that he would pursue cooperation with China rather than having the South China Sea dispute handled by international arbitration, a policy which the Aquino administration has pursued. Like Binay, Duterte is willing to undergo joint ventures with China in the region and would “shut up” about the dispute in exchange for China building vital transportation infrastructure in the Philippines.

However, Duterte has at other times reiterated his gruff exterior, claiming that he would travel to the disputed Islands via jet ski and plant the Filipino flag himself. Duterte’s China policy is confusing has he advocates both cooperation while still keeping his confrontational image against what he sees as an affront to Philippines sovereignty. Also, while he would likely remain tough on China, he is less likely to be as reliant on the US as past Philippine presidents and was once quoted as saying that “America would never die for us.”

Neither Duterte nor Binay, while supporting compromise with China about the territorial issue in the South China Sea and criticizing the EDCA with the United States, will seek to antagonize the United States.

While the repercussions of the presidential election in the Philippines next month is sure to indicate major changes in domestic policies, there is also much potential for major change in the South China Sea issue. While Poe and Roxas will probably extend Aquino era policies, including large economic growth and a tense situation with China, Duterte and Binay could push the Philippines into a much more cooperative relationship with China, which while being good for easing tensions between in the region, would lead to greater Philippine dependence on China.

Whoever wins the election, however, it is unlikely that the Philippines would choose China over the United States. Thus, the election should be in no way seen as the United States losing the Philippines to China, however, if Duterte or Binay become President, it will be interesting to see how they handle the South China Sea issue.

By AARON WALAYAT May 2, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/5/2

旧文章ID：15747

作者：Stone May  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

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Stories about Panama papers went viral minutes after ICIJ released its reports on Monday. The leaked documents have so far implicated over 140 politicians and their relatives worldwide, among which the most notable Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Putin has been allegedly laundering through his close network of confidants at least $2billion through complicated offshore companies incorporated by a law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which is believed to be the ultimate source of these leaked documents.

Mossack Fonseca is said to have over 40 branches around the globe, and interestingly, 8 of them are in China. Then it comes at a bit surprise though, that given the supposedly great business Mossack Fonseca is getting from China and Hong Kong, there has been little light shed on how Chinese politicians may have been involved in the money laundering scandal. What we have learned from these reports about Chinese politicians is scarce, except for a brief mention of “brother in law” of President Xi, and the more high profile “Power Queen” Xiaolin Li, daughter of the former Premier Peng Li, whose family have long been suspected of corruption.

Does it mean Chinese politicians are more incorruptible than those of Russian? That’s one possible, but unlikely explanation. But one could perhaps reach a more plausible explanation when comparing the two photos below.

They are from the same story that BBC runs on the Panama papers, which implicate Xi’s brother in law, only difference, one in Chinese and the other in English. The photo of Xi in the Chinese version appears serious yet amicable, while the photo in the English version presents a much more eerie-looking and rigid stereotype image of a Chinese leader. One could argue that it’s the media’s tendency to play to English readers’ typical expectations of image for Chinese politicians. Or, it can be interpreted as BBC’s self-censorship in play, which makes it unwilling to provoke Chinese government unnecessarily.

It is perhaps the same type of self-censorship that excluded all major Chinese media from the coordinated investigation by ICIJ, a DC based non-profit for investigative journalism. The panama papers were obtained from an anonymous whistle blower over a year ago and more than 370 journalists from 100 media around the world had been since cooperating to mine these 1.1 million documents.

With few Chinese journalists on board, it’s not surprising that there’s little interest or perhaps even manpower to dig deep into the relevant documents, which could potentially implicate more politicians.

Self-censorship is very common in authoritarian regimes like former Soviet Union, and China is of no exception. Not only is there virtually no reportage by domestic media, but also people here are very wary of talking about the Panama papers online. After all, anything related to Panama papers are filtered and blocked by the Great Firewall of China. When people have to mention Xi, they normally use other codes without mentioning his name. It is such hesitation and fear that have kept the stories off the radar of most average Chinese citizens. But “rumors” are nevertheless spreading, and before long, the Government will have to respond one way or another. Unlike Kremlin, which has categorically denied these allegations, Chinese government has yet to issue any statement and has declined comments requested by ICIJ journalists.

What we now know may be just the tip of an iceberg, considering the leaked documents from the eight China based offices of Mossack Fonseca. As ICIJ dig deeper and more other media gain access to the original Panama papers, we can expect to see more stories on China rolling out.

And…yes, the story has been written in English instead of Chinese out of self-censorship. Yes, Chinese government could care less about an unknown broken English writer than a Chinese article meant for average Chinese readers.

By STONE May 2, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/5/3

旧文章ID：15746

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On March 6, 2015, the New York Times published an article by respected China scholar David Shambaugh which posited that China (and specifically the Communist Party) was heading toward its breaking point. Shambaugh cited a variety of evidences, including the fact that many rich in China are moving assets abroad and Xi Jinping’s recent push against corruption (which many see as a form of political repression).

Shambaugh’s points are well-taken. It would seem that the country is going through a series of difficulties hidden behind the veil of the Chinese mystique. Even layman are beginning to see cracks of the façade in the summer of 2015 when the Chinese stock market crashed due to continuing investment despite slow growth and weak company profits. Mixed with China’slooming real estate bubble and the demographic time bomb leftover from the one-child policy, Shambaugh’s proposition does not seem as far-fetched as his critics would believe.

This begs the question. What is China going to do about it? After emerging virtually unscathed from the late-2000s financial crisis, China’s economic juggernaut was the motor of the world. The huge growth allowed China to overtake Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 with many commentators believing it would eventually overtake the United States. Perhaps the most interesting analysis came from Michael Pillsbury, who in his book The One-Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, suggests that China’s grand strategy is to replace the United States as the world’s sole global superpower. (You can read a review of the book here and read a dissenting opinion here.)

It is a shame that the book (released on February 6, 2015) was published before being able to read Shambaugh’s analysis of China on March 6 of that year or even have a chance to interpret the stock market crash in June(again in 2015). I also find it interesting that Pillsbury argues that the plan to replace the US began in 1949 (with the Communist victory of the Chinese Civil War) and will be completed around 2049 (Pillsbury’s projection). This would mean that from Mao Zedong in 1949 to Xi Jinping today, China policy was directed toward replacing the US! Talk about consistency!

The past five generations of Chinese leadership. Listed from left to right: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.

But what is China’s endgame? What does the country want? Frankly, I think China’s goals are better reflected in another book, Orville Schell and John Delury’s Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century. In this book, China’s goal is not to supplant the United States as the world’s hegemon, but rather to seek fuqiang, a Chinese term meaning “wealth and power”. Schell and Delury trace this back to the Legalist philosophy Han Feizi who they quote as saying “If a wise ruler masters wealth and power, he can have whatever he desires.” In the long run, I believe that this is China’s goal, to crawl out of a century of humiliation and to be respected among the body of nations.

But how does Shambaugh fit into all this? I thought he was talking about China’s internal politics?

I believe that when we talk about China’s global strategy, it is important to consider China’s domestic situation as well as its national interests. I think Shambaugh’s argument has strong points. China’s slowing growth is sure to have major repercussions for China’s export-driven economy. At the same time, social tensions in the country threaten to destabilize the country stemming from conflicts arising along lines of race, class, and social group. As growth begins to slow, the perceptions of domestic inequality will become more apparent to the Chinese, especially with a hukou system that displaces families and unintentionally creating an undereducated rural population unable to compete effectively with China’s urban populations.

Some see the hukou system as barring equal opportunity for individuals designated “rural.”

Despite China’s huge population, its workforce is uneven. There are too many jobseekers clawing for scare resources with a major part of population (the rural population) underprepared to work in a 21st century economy. Divisions along class lines, along with ethnic divisions in China’s western regions, could spur future instability across the country.

Instability in China would be detrimental for the country’s future, especially in the midst of the political situation. For so long, economic growth had been a major unification factor for the nation, with China’s strong economy creating, for the most part, relative stability. However, with slowing growth, China must find a new way to prevent instability. In a recent article of Foreign Affairs, Robert Kagan argued that China’s recent push for military assertiveness in the South and East China was done to create nationalism as a means to create social cohesion. Perhaps there is some truth to this, however I do not think this is the whole picture.

With the growing threat of instability combined with a slowing economy, I believe China’s political moves, both domestic and international, are a way for the country to brace for impact. As China adjusts to a “new normal,” the country will no longer have the unifying factor of economic growth and will face major social, economic, and political challenges for the future. It is a popular stereotype (both in and out of China) to take the change of political governance well, acknowledging that while the leaders change, China, as a cultural entity, will remain. However, transitions between these periods of long peace’s involve short periods of violence, and the current Chinese administration is now doing all it can to preserve China as we currently know it.

The anti-graft campaign and power consolidation

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) with Wang Qishan, the face of the anti-corruption campaign.

No doubt public instability is worrisome. However, more worrisome are political forces that would be able to harness such unrest for their own purposes. Political opportunists possess a major threat to Chinese stability, as certain political forces could utilize public outcry to challenge the present Chinese administration under Xi Jinping. Xi, one of the Princelings, (children of China’s previous Communist Party leaders), would possibly face a hard battle against other ambitious leaders in China. Bo Xilai is a name that most commentators like to throw around, and after his fall from grace, many observers argued that this was due to the fact that he challenged Xi’s (then the incoming leader’s) power.

Later, Xi pushed a major anti-corruption campaign that targeted many of China’s leaders. This has been taken many ways, while corruption does plague the Chinese government; one observer argues that Xi is running a “selective campaign” to punish his political opponents. This has lead an assortment of commentators to conclude that Xi is consolidating his power.

While some see this campaign as a natural consequence of communism others see this as Xi Jinping carrying out a Stalinistic purge. However, by consolidating his power, Xi is setting a precedent. Although it is unknown whether Xi will step down at the expected time (Chinese leaders typically serve for ten years, thus Xi is expected to step down in 2022), however whether he does or not, Xi has already set precedent for future Chinese presidents.

Let us not forget that Deng Xiaoping was neither President nor General Secretary of the Communist Party when he led the People’s Republic of China, but rather simply the head of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Later, the three titles mentioned above (President, General Secretary, and CMC Chairman) were all held by one individual for each administration succeeding Deng: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, respectively.

Deng Xiaoping, leader of China from 1978-1989. Deng was never President of China nor was he General Secretary of the Communist Party

In fact, it was not until April 2016 that Xi Jinping added the title “Commander In Chief of the military’s Joint Operations Command Center” to his resume. Xi Jinping has undeniably established himself as the most powerful man in China and the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. However, I remain skeptical that this is purely a vanity fair. While I do feel Xi seeks to benefit from his leadership in China, I think the anti-graft push is meant to remove political opponents in order to give the country consistency.

The biggest deciding factor of whether China will benefit from this power consolidation depends on whether Xi is consolidating power in his person or in his office. If Xi is consolidating power in his person, then it is fair to be concerned of a sort of Putinesque-style of governance in China’s future. However, if Xi is consolidating power in his office, then he is setting a precedent for the future of Chinese politics, namely, that the President/General Secretary (with all of its other titles) will continue to be the most powerful political office in China. If Xi is truly making the office of President/General Secretary the unchallenged head of party and state, it will give China a sort of consistency to continue ad infinitum. If some sort of financial upheaval does arrive, China is going to need it.

National security push

Part of a cartoon warning citizens about foreign spies. In the story the girl falls for an attractive and charming foreigner who turns out to be a spy.

Have you ever worked in a non-governmental organization? I used to work at a few in my time and the biggest thing I found is that outside parties always seem to misinterpret our mission and overestimate our resources. It’s a natural thing I suppose, especially in countries that remain suspicious of foreign influence.

Foreign influence is a terrifying thing for all nations as it is an existential threat to that nation’s sovereignty. In China, the fear of Western influence is palpable. It must be noted that when I mean Western influence, I mean political influence. I make this distinction not only to relax your fears that the Chinese won’t understand your references to The Big Bang Theory and Dragon Ball Z, but also to point out the irony of China’s stronger restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

This past April, China passed a law that will place heavy restrictions on foreign NGOs. While the law does not ban them outright, the “new law will require foreign NGOs to register with Chinese police and the Ministry of Public Security before beginning operations in China. Foreign NGOs will be ‘banned from engaging in or sponsoring commercial and political activities or illegally engaging in or sponsoring religious activities.’”

The law exemplifies China’s harsh (and, let’s face it, unsurprising) paranoia with foreign influence, particularly from “color revolutions” or “social discord and eventually rebellion fostered by nefarious foreign agents, often working in the guise of nonprofits.” This is a fear shared by Russia, particularly in the 2000s, where a variety of these “color revolutions” danced around the nations of the former Soviet bloc.

“Color revolutions” that took place in the early 2000s in the former Soviet bloc. Russia has claimed that these revolutions were funded abroad through NGOs.

China has also pushed stronger national security laws aimed to defend from the machinations of “the nefarious foreigners as well as the Chinese citizens who fall under their influence” as well as “rooting out both foreigners and those who subscribe to ‘foreign values.’” The government even went so far to celebrate April 15 as “national security awareness day” in which the Chinese public was encouraged to report on suspected spies. Observers are sure to find this eerily Orwellian, made stranger by the fact that real foreign spies will probably be practicing their trade via the Internet rather than in the open air.

It is possible that China’s recent national security push is directed toward political dissent. More importantly however, this push is also aiming for dissent in two critical regions, Xinjiang and Tibet (Xizang). While Tibet is the more publically known, Xinjiang remains the more worrisome of the two provinces.

In an earlier article, I mentioned that Xinjiang is a major linchpin for China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) as it is China’s link with the Europe and Central Asia which would help “lead China’s surplus capital and industrial overcapacity into the infrastructure and industrial investments in countries along the OBOR project’s routes.”

However, political unrest in Xinjiang could threaten the effectiveness of the initiative. With a huge immigration of Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese moving into Xinjiang combined with the jobs that will be introduced into the region with OBOR, the local population (mainly Uyghurs, but also including Kazakhs and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz among others) are faced with a choice, abandon their language for practical purposes of work or defer on job opportunities to immigrating Han.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the western-most region governed by China.

Also, in the context of international terrorism, Xinjiang is also dubious, as the majority population of the province is Muslim. Islamist extremism does play a role in the region especially with the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS concerns China (although not as much as it concerns the West) and an expansive ISIS could threaten to awaken the Uyghur population. ISIS could also be attractive to Uyghurs (a Turkic people) as the terrorist group’s alliances with the Nigeria-based Boko Haram showcases that it is not solely an Arab (nor even solely a Middle East) phenomenon. Moving beyond a pan-Arab movement makes ISIS appealing, as it offers appeals to “oppressed” Muslims of all nations.

Presently, China has pushed for peace in the Middle East. This has worked to increase China’s international presence. However, ISIS also poses a threat to China’s internal security and energy security, as the terrorist group endangers China’s oil and gas producers among the nations of the Middle East. ISIS also provides a troublesome roadblock in the way of China’s OBOR Initiative, which could endanger the series of roads, railways, and pipelines intended to connect China with West Asia, Europe, and Africa. It is not unthinkable that, China would seek a stronger national security agenda as its interests are so heavily threatened within its borders and internal security. If China is preparing for instability, its national security policy is a step in the right direction.

Joint exercises

China and India held joint military exercises in 2015

Joint exercises are always a fun thing to look at, and recently, they have been used heavily as an unspoken challenge toward another nation. Think of it like one of those frogs that inflate to scare predators or those muscle-men at the beach that flex to scare away women. One recent example is an exercise made by the United States and the Philippines that was aimed towards China earlier this year. The US also conducts annual exercises with India and Japan in Operation Malabar, perhaps one of the most interesting as it hints at the old Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, taken by China as a means of containment.

China has conducted a few exercises of its own. Take for example, a joint exercise between China and India. In October 2015, China and India held a “counter-terrorism drill.” China has also joined with Russia (interestingly held in the Aegean Sea where China has a major stake in the Piraeus port) and in the Sea of Japan. China has also conducted joint exercises with Cambodia and Thailand as well as vowed military cooperation with some of the Central Asian Republics.

However, before my words make it sound like an US-China alliance race, it must be mentioned that China has (and plans to) conduct military exercises with the United States.

Interestingly, it would seem that China has focused anti-terror and maritime operations which could be aimed at combating the potential problems that China could face in OBOR and to secure the safe movements of goods (exports and imports) as well as energy along troublesome lines of communication.

International institutions

It is common to speak of US military, cultural, political, and economic power, but one aspect of power that is easy to ignore is US institutional power. International institutions form the few semblances of an international order. Today, the most powerful are the United Nations (UN) and the international economic organizations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. China is a member of all of these organizations. However China has created an institution of its own: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

This bank began as a diplomatic nightmare for the US as the closest of America’s allies (save Japan) opted to join the China-led bank. The AIIB was seen as a means of competition against the US-led organizations. However, the AIIB possessed a difference. While the US-led organizations lent capital with “strings attached” (the Washington Consensus) which required some structural adjustment to the borrower nation, the AIIB would not include these reservations.

This led some to declare that the Chinese-led institution would advocate for a “Beijing Consensus” of which a definition is yet to be found. Most try to define it as advocating China’s noninterference into other nation’s internal affairs (which was received well by dictators and strongmen).

While the AIIB was initially received coolly by the United States, Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank, later welcomed the AIIB and later the BRICS-established New Development Bank (NDB) and encouraged the institutions to work together with existing institutions to combat “extreme poverty.”

Leadership of the BRICS. Listed from left to right: Vladimir Putin (Russia), Narendra Modi (India), Dilma Rouseff (Brazil), Xi Jinping (China), and Jacob Zuma (South Africa)

These international institutions provide China with much needed “soft power” and, in all honesty, the fact that China has not included the “strings” of the Washington Consensus has helped the country’s image in the face of borrowers. To many, the fact that the US pursues international values is taken with hesitation, as most cooperators believe the US is hiding some sort of nefarious purpose. On the other hand, with China, underlying interests are not hidden, and the countries enter into contracts acknowledging that China is not in their country for purely altruistic reasons (which always draw suspicion).

The AIIB and NDB provide China with a way to become deeply involved with the world’s many nations. By creating a strong investment relationship, China becomes more and more deeply ingrained into the economic lives of other nations in various regions all over the world.

OBOR also continues to play a big role as China pursues closer involvement with nations in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe. Announced in 2013 by President Xi, the initiative is a plan to create strong economic interconnectivity with countries along the planned routes through a Chinese networks of international trade based on “existing and future Free Trade Agreements,” “new international development financing institutions” like the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, an “internationalized Renminbi,” and “new land and maritime infrastructures that connect the Eurasian landmass.” OBOR will be China’s biggest vehicle of interconnectivity and will help it in its desire to circumvent “the pressure from the United States and its allies on the east coast and protecting China’s energy security.”

Planned routes of One Belt One Road

China has also become the number one trade partner for a variety of countries around East and Southeast Asia as well as a major investor in Africa.

Frankly, I think that China’s investment into all these countries are neither purely altruistic nor a case of neocolonialism. When China makes a deal with an African nation, there is a clear trade-off taking place, with the African nation gaining an important piece of infrastructure, like a railroad which will connect landlocked Ethiopia with coastal Djibouti for economic purposes, while also helping China by giving it a way to access Ethiopia’s economy through Djibouti, which hosts China’s first overseas military base (along with US, French, and Japanese bases).

Chinese investment in Africa from 2010

Africa provides a variety of natural resources and a plethora of economic opportunities for Chinese investment and development. It seems that China has found a niche in the country that the West had failed to fill, and while the West may argue that Chinese involvement is neocolonialism, African nations will continue to work with China in order to proceed with development.

It seems in this case that China’s economy has become incredibly entwined with much of the world, and through the use of the AIIB and NDB, China will continue to be important for these nations. Should China ever come into some sort of future trouble, the nations of OBOR as well as those reliant on Chinese cooperation could not let it fail, lest face the global economic repercussions of such a disaster.

South China Sea

China’s claims in the South China Sea

In the context of the OBOR, the conflicts in the South China Sea remain the most puzzling. Earlier, when considering Chinese activity in the South China Sea, I posited that China boosted its activity in the region as a way to counter US influence in the region. ASEAN remains an uncommitted factor in the whole dispute, with Vietnam and the Philippines being strong critics of Chinese influence in the region and three others who reached a consensus with China on the South China Sea (Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos).

It is also very important not to forget China’s economic situation with ASEAN. ASEAN is “China’s third largest trade partner, with a bilateral trade volume of 480.3 billion US dollars in 2014” with both sides “negotiating to upgrade their extant China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.” All of the member states have also signed aboard the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The economic relationship between China and ASEAN is the key to China’s perceived actions of assertiveness in the region. China can afford to gamble and win as efforts of the other littoral parties in the dispute cannot afford to lose the trade and investment, both existing as well as future opportunities, with China.

China-ASEAN trade volume

Finally, China’s ambitious claims, which cover a majority of the disputed waters, are also important for China. Knowing that the situation is unlikely to lead to outright war, China acknowledges that the issue will be settled through some sort of dispute resolution. By having a de facto reach over the region, particularly through China’s defense infrastructure on artificial islands, China will enter talks with strong bargaining tools and increased leverage. Even if China does not gain control over the whole South China Sea, the area it would get from a compromise is sure to be more than if they did not assert their strength in the region at all.

Imagine bargaining with a shopkeeper for an item that costs $40. Suppose you want to spend $25. You suggest paying $15 to the shopkeeper’s shock and chagrin and then proceeds to lower the price to $35. You insist on $15 which impels the shopkeeper to verbally attack you before letting slip that he is willing to go to $30. You finally suggest meeting each other at $25 (closer to his asking price than yours) to which he agrees. Congratulations, you got exactly what you wanted. I believe that this is what China is going for in the South China Sea and in a situation where ASEAN cannot afford to have China take away its investments, it would be better to negotiate than to engage in war. Xi would agree.

Energy security

Russian President Vladimir Putin with Chinese President Xi Jinping

Around the middle of 2015, a green and wet-behind the ears undergraduate student provided some analysis of a 2014 China-Russia gas deal, the energy relationship between China and Russia, and its repercussions on international affairs (spoiler alert: it was me). In that analysis, I reiterated Bobo Lo’s declaration that the relationship between China and Russia was “convenient cooperation” and was pursued to secure permanent interests rather than permanent allies. (You can read the full text here.)

As time goes on however, the gas deal, a global game of “chicken” showing the West that Russia has customers other than Europe to export its oil and gas, seems to have favored China over Russia. Many commentators see the deal has heavily favoring China over Russia, with Russia becoming China’s “junior partner,” exporting natural resources to the East Asian giant.

China’s cooperation with Russia is made for energy diversification. Currently, China receives most of its energy from the Middle East and Africa, however, should something, for example, terror or pirates, cause trouble in the region, China will need to work with Russia to make up the difference in terms of energy. OBOR is intended to include a series of railways, roads, and pipelines to increases Chinese connectivity with neighboring countries (and their economic opportunities). With the Power of Siberia pipeline in China’s Northeast and (possibly) an Altai Pipeline in the Northwest, China will be able to access much of Russia’s oil and gas to fit its need.

Possible pipelines between China and Russia

Energy security is of major importance for China, as it requires the energy to support its export-led growth. I believe that energy security is of major importance in China’s military expansion. China has also helped develop a series of ports and projects in a variety of South Asian countries, the so-called “String of Pearls.” However, above all, I believe this to be an attempt to protect maritime security.

Take the Gwadar Port for example. Rather than being a means for China to strike against India, the Gwadar Port provides the opportunity. Currently, China is incredibly reliant on the Malacca and Lombok Straits in Indonesia. At the same time, with concern in the South China Sea as well as with Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s “sink-the-vessels” policy, as well as Australia’s stronger military presence, China needs to find alternative routes to connect the upstream to China. The Gwadar Port, therefore, provides a means to funnel in Middle East and African oil through the Gwadar Port, through Pakistan, and into Western China. Of course, there exists the danger of terror in Pakistan and Western China, but we’ve discussed this.

The Indian Ocean region

Final thoughts

In 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared the United States “the indispensable nation.” This is as true today as it was in 1998. In every global problem, whether economic, political, or military, the United States seems to be, for better or worse, involved in some way. Everyone, from neocons to non-interventionists, take this to be the fact of the matter. However, despite all of the negative aspects of such entanglement to the world, one thing remains clear; the United States is not going to be irrelevant in world affairs anytime soon.

It is this kind of indispensability, I believe, that China is seeking, at least in the economic realm. I do not believe that China wants to burn its resources on distant wars and occupations of countries. China wants to be relevant and at the center of the action. In this globalized world, nations have become inextricable to each other. Today, a local election in a middle economy can have major global effects.

Although I risk presumption (since no one can honestly know the whole truth of China’s grand strategy), I do not think it is too conspiratorial to suppose that China is seeking to be a major linchpin in the global economic framework. We often say that certain actors in a country’s economy are “too big to fail” and that the detriment of such a company failing would be economically disastrous. In a similar fashion, should a China so intertwined in international globalization meet some cataclysm, the result would be disastrous for the global economy.

The solution is indispensability. In order to counter the nightmare foreseen by Shambaugh or perhaps some other financial calamity, China is tightening up its internal power structure, pushing domestic stability, and ensuring international connectivity and fluid lines of communication. China is bracing for impact and with indispensability, the countries that rely on the giant will not (and cannot) afford to let China fail.

By AARON WALAYAT May 13, 2016 on USCNPM

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/5/10

旧文章ID：15745

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

There’s no doubt that US-China trade is becoming a hot-button issue in this election cycle. Everyone from New York businessman Donald Trump to Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders are arguing that US free trade policies have contributed to the detriment of the American economy and hurt the American worker. As recently as three months ago, the United States Department of Commerce announced it would be placing duties of up to 265.79% on Chinese steelmakers to combat alleged “dumping” of Chinese steel in the US market.

“Dumping” is the practice of selling goods below cost in order to “improperly gain market share.” It is also a practice of which the China has vehemently denied. The issue of Chinese steel dumping has caused an assortment of concerns and has even called into question whether China should be granted market economy status in the World Trade Organization.

Politicians in Europe and the United States have taken steps against the Chinese, seeking higher tariffs and duties on China to punish the country for bad behavior. Unfortunately for China, it would seem that much of the trouble has arisen from poor central planning, which devoted too many resources to steel production. This has thus concluded in an overcapacity of steel, which has rendered the entire industry unprofitable.

The Cato Institute’s Dan Pearson called for China to shut down some of its steel mill, not in order to bow to Western pressure, but “because reducing capacity would strengthen the remaining portion of China’s own steel industry.” From Pearson’s view, the appearance of dumping is not an intentional jab at international steel markets, but rather the logical consequence of China’s overcapacity.

Whatever the intentions, however, China’s overcapacity does give it an opportunity to increase its market share in steel markets, which have been met with fierce criticism from business leaders and labor groups in the United States and Europe.

“China’s government overtly manipulates its currency and subsidizes its steel industry in ways that violate international trade laws — doing everything to push the steel to market — even if that means dumping the products in the United States at less than fair market value” write Christopher Masciantonio, government affairs for US Steel and Robert McAuliffe, Pennsylvania Director of United Steelworkers. Seeing as American free trade policies seem to be at the benefit of China, leaders like Masciantonio and McAuliffe have called for the state and national leaders to protect domestic producers and to uphold the trade laws that are meant to prevent China from, in the words of Donald Trump, “raping ” the United States on trade.

Unfortunately, America’s solution to combating China’s overcapacity of steel falls into old protectionist rhetoric, which, rather than protecting American steel producers, on the contrary may hurt the US economy in general. According to Pearson, the “real cost of import restrictions is the harm they do to manufacturers of value-added products that use steel as an input” a sector which is “a much larger factor in the U.S. economy than are steel producers.” By increasing tariffs in order to try and protect uncompetitive American steel, the United States would effectively be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

In the long run (and in the big picture) higher tariffs on Chinese goods, while preserving jobs in a few sectors, would be disastrous for the US economy. Let’s take steel (or raw materials for that matter) as an example. Imagine that by creating higher tariffs, Chinese steel is marked up, making American produced steel cheaper. US produced steel, however, is not much cheaper than the price of Chinese steel, and the cost of production for, let’s say, car manufacturers rises. This would also mean higher prices for cars, extra costs which would fall down to the consumer.

Now, suppose that the manufacturer is large enough to see that it is losing money on this deal. What will it decide to do? Most logically, it would leave the United States for some other country, let’s say Mexico. In Mexico, they will be able to buy the cheaper Chinese steel (which would not be subject to US duties) and be able to produce the car for much cheaper than the manufacturers who decide to remain in the United States, given that the logistics allow it to be profitable.

Finally, and here’s the kicker, imagine that the manufacturer who moved to Mexico decides to sell the car to the American market. Compared to the US-based manufacturers, the Mexico-based manufacturer can afford to sell their product at lower prices and earning a higher profit. Where does this leave the United States? It would lead to more expensive cars, a loss of US jobs from the manufacturer who decided to move to Mexico, and the outcompeting of US-based manufacturers to a Mexico-based manufacturer.

In reality, everything from quality to consumer preference will play a role in the success of products in the US market. Regardless, boosting up tariffs for the sake of protecting US steel jobs will be to the detriment of the US economy as a whole, hurting industries that require steel as an input factor. A 2003 article published on the Wharton school website even went so far as to argue that steel tariffs “protect a few at the expense of the majority.”

The answer much ado about steel dumping isn’t an easy one. While China’s overcapacity has been to the detriment of China’s economy, the cheaply priced steel has hurt American steel producers as well. Pearson suggests that the United States should thank the Chinese for the overcapacity of steel, which has led to competitive American products that use the commodity as an input. Such a move would be a wake-up call to China’s central economic planning apparatus who would, in Pearson’s view, respond by closing some steel mills.

As the world globalizes, trade is, whether we like it or not, an international enterprise. Each day, the situation is changing, and each day, David Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage becomes shifts among countries. While the US may not be advantageous in certain sectors anymore, new opportunities open up every day thanks to technological innovation. With economic growth, there will naturally be growing pains. Protectionism, however, will serve only as a short term painkiller, the only solution is for the United States to get competitive, find its advantages, and adjust. We cannot put too much attention to bringing back lost jobs, for as Fletcher School professor Daniel Drezner reminds us, some of the jobs we are trying to get back just don’t exist anymore.

By Aaron Walayat

来源时间：2018/4/4   发布时间：2016/6/2

旧文章ID：15744