作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China and Pakistan are close allies in the same way the United States and Israel are; their mutual interests in economic development and regional stability allow them to coordinate in projects and in military cooperation. One such project they are prioritizing is the 45+ billion USD project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This project will serve as the model for Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, which aims to revive the ancient Silk Road and economically link China with more than 60 countries throughout Central Asia, Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. CPEC will connect Balochistan, considered by some to be Pakistan’s least developed province, to Xinjiang, a province in China that is also fairly low in terms of development. The project will be performed in phases, the first of which is the completion of the Gwadar International Airport and the Gwadar Port by the end of 2016. Additionally, they plan to create a fiber-optic cable to strengthen bilateral communication and upgrade the Karakoram Highway that connects the two countries. The CPEC’s connections will create a myriad of new jobs for Pakistan and China in these less developed areas, contributing to development of these regions. Additionally, the port will be able to help satisfy China’s growing energy needs, as fuels can be transferred along the highway. These benefits relate to the idea that the CPEC project, as well as the OBOR project, all are mutually beneficial for China and other parties involved. This does not mean that the project is without problems however.

Issues with terrorism, opposition from the local government, and worries about the project alienating India all create insecurity within the region about its success. This project, in part, will fight terrorism by creating opportunities for people to turn to rather than terrorism, but it still faces terrorism issues from now until these jobs are actually created. Additionally, the opposition will halt the project, as it requires mutual cooperation between China and Pakistan. Relating to India, relations between India and China have improved in the last few decades, however China working so closely with Pakistan creates the risk of polarization of China and Pakistan against India and its allies. All of these issues are not unlike other issues in areas the OBOR will pass through: security threats with terrorism, in the Middle East, and piracy, in Africa, may threaten investments in these regions that would otherwise ensure a successful initiative. Additionally, just as the CPEC threatens to alienate India, OBOR threatens to alienate the United States as China gains more influence and trade deals. This could potentially lead to an economic polarization of countries, as the USA and China compete for trade deals with different countries.

Among the objectives of the CPEC and OBOR, development is one that will have a major influence. Economic development through investment leads to the creation of new jobs. These new jobs will attract young people away from terrorism and towards the greater opportunities of work. Instead of struggling to find work after graduating from university, a young Afghani has a greater chance of finding work in a relevant field. The young Pakistani will be able to reach his or her dreams of becoming an engineer, a doctor, or a politician. The beauty of the initiative is that it not only benefits China through securing energy resources and trade deals, but it establishes cultural connections and promotes economic development in areas that really need it.

Written by Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/9/29

旧文章ID：15718

作者：Terry Lautz  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Soft power is a relatively new term, but the underlying concept is ancient. Every major civilization has used culture to represent its core values and to convince others of its good intentions. India expressed its moral principles through Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions. The Romans built a legal system that gave common standards to its far-flung empire. Traditional China cultivated the values of morality, loyalty, and respect for others and fostered unity through a common written language. The United States has constructed its social and political system around the idea that all persons are created equal. The main objective of cultural or soft power has always been to inspire admiration and create trust.

A shift occurred during the twentieth century when culture was employed by governments to enhance and defend ideologies. Fascism, militarism, capitalism, socialism, and communism appropriated cultural symbols, ideas, and beliefs to demonstrate their legitimacy and superiority. With the tools of mass communications, governments used patriotism and nationalism to increase domestic unity in the face of opposing political systems. As a result, propaganda produced dangerously distorted views of different belief systems.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, culture was no longer viewed solely as a tool of ideology; it was reimagined as an instrument of diplomacy. Joseph Nye of Harvard called this new approach soft power, which he explained as the ability to attract others without the use of force. Nye made a useful distinction between hard or coercive military and economic strength and the soft power of cultural and public diplomacy.

As globalization has increased and the world has become more interconnected, modern governments have realized the advantages of soft power. In fact, the digital revolution, mass urbanization, and international trade and investment have made soft power a necessity. And, as a complement and alternative to hard power, soft power is far less expensive than building aircraft carriers or other weapons systems.

China’s soft power

In 2007, President Hu Jintao announced a strategy to “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country” in a speech to the National Congress of China’s Communist Party. President Xi Jinping reinforced this policy in 2012, saying, “We must pay attention to the shaping of our country’s national image, focusing on bringing out the richness and profundity of Chinese history, the diversity in unity of our various peoples, the image of a great and civilized nation with a rich and harmonious culture.”

This policy represented a dramatic change from the projection of ideological power during the Maoist years. Rather than insisting that Marxism-Leninism was on the right side of history in opposition to the West’s capitalist system, the soft power approach emphasizes the benefits of mutual understanding instead of antagonism and contradiction.

China’s leaders have embraced soft power for four reasons: 1) to enhance China’s international prestige; 2) to counter fears of China as a threat; 3) to offer an alternative to Western value systems; and 4) to contribute to China’s continued social and economic development. In short, Beijing believes that a positive image of China will strengthen the nation at home and abroad.

The most remarkable and memorable expression of China’s quest for soft power was displayed in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. It was a declaration to the world that China had arrived—or returned—as a great power. The impressive mass spectacle organized for the opening ceremony of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing signaled the PRC’s arrival on the world scene. (The 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1988 Seoul Olympics carried similar symbolic weight for Japan and South Korea.) The Bird’s Nest Stadium pageant celebrated the ancient past. Hundreds of performers dressed in traditional costumes beat drums in perfect synchronization evoking an image of strength and unity based on a glorious but distant past. China’s more recent revolutionary history was nowhere to be seen.

With its newfound wealth, the PRC has invested heavily in soft power, including media (television, internet, and newspapers) and a wide array of cultural programs and educational exchanges. At the center of China’s cultural diplomacy push is a network of language teaching and cultural study centers called Confucius Institutes. Set up as partnerships with universities and various organizations in other countries, the Institutes have grown rapidly since the first one was established in 2004. Despite some controversy, they now number around 100 in the United States and as many as 480 worldwide.

While soft power is normally explained in terms of cultural diplomacy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), announced in 2014, represents a more recent and potentially significant expression of China’s growing influence. It was opposed by the United States, which feared competition with the World Bank, but 57 countries have joined, including a number in western Europe, and Canada has recently applied for membership. Combined with investments in the Belt and Road initiative, China’s soft power is quickly expanding through its economic as well as cultural policies.

America’s soft power

During the early twentieth century, cultural exchange, a key component of soft power, was largely the domain of the American private sector, especially religious groups and foundations. After the Second World War, the U.S. government played an active role in promoting cultural and educational programs around the world. This was justified in terms of Cold War ideology, and the primary objective was to cultivate friends and allies—otherwise known as “winning hearts and minds.” Understanding the language, history, and politics of enemies and allies in Asia became a national priority. The best-known efforts were the Peace Corps and the Fulbright Program. Other initiatives sponsored through the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) brought thought-leaders and opinion-makers together to discuss ideas and find common ground.

America’s rationale for engaging with Asia moved away from a confrontational paradigm to a greater focus on peace and economic prosperity even before the Cold War. The context for relations with Asia changed with increased Asian immigration to the United States; greatly expanded trade with the Asian region; the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam in 1975; and normalization of U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979.

During the 1990s, the U.S. government pulled back from cultural diplomacy on East Asia because of Congressional budget cuts, greater concerns about security overseas, and, after 9/11, increased attention to the Muslim world. By contrast with China, however, the primary source of U.S. soft power comes from its private sector, including religious and charitable organizations, museums and foundations, universities and not-for-profit organizations. And, for better or worse, America’s image is dominated by its popular culture—movies, sports, and corporate products. This can be superficial and misleading, making it difficult for Chinese citizens to understand the underlying historical, social, economic, and political forces that explain the United States. Of course, racial violence, mass shootings, and police brutality convey negative images of the United States. In addition, the inefficiency of the U.S. political system often looks dismaying. Nonetheless, the freedom, independence, and opportunity offered by the United States has great appeal.

Measuring Soft Power

Jospeh Nye’s approach to soft power emphasizes the strength of a nation’s political values, culture, and foreign policy. Expanding this definition, Portland Communications, a London-based consulting firm, has recently developed a more sophisticated and comprehensive index. An annual survey called “Soft Power 30” ranks the top 30 countries in the world based six categories: 1) the quality of a country’s political institutions; 2) the extent of their cultural appeal; 3) the strength of their diplomatic network; 4) the global reputation of their higher education system; 5) the attractiveness of their economic model; and 6) a country’s digital engagement with the world. Seventy-eight metrics within these categories are covered, ranging from the number of international tourists, overseas development aid, and global patents to a global corruption index, measurements of income inequality, and press freedom. The study is supplemented with a global poll of 10,500 people in 25 countries.

Data released in June 2016 showed the United States at the top while China ranked number 28 in the “Soft Power 30” survey. China scored relatively well in the categories of culture, enterprise, and engagement, but poorly on digital, education, and government. The United States was number one in digital, culture, and education, but ranked somewhat lower in engagement, enterprise, and government.

These findings are instructive, but do not tell the full story either for China or the United States. China’s efforts to cultivate a positive image vary considerably in different parts of the world. According to Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 2014and 2015, views are most favorable in countries that benefit from substantial trade, aid, and investment with China. Admiration for the success of China’s state-directed capitalism is another factor in some parts of the world. Last year, 79% of Russia and over half of those surveyed in various African and Latin American countries were more positive than negative, as was Australia, which sells substantial natural resources to China. Pakistan, a long-time partner, was 82% favorable and only 4% unfavorable. India was ambiguous about China with 41% positive and 32% negative.

By contrast, countries that have territorial disputes with China have extremely unfavorable views of China, overshadowing their extensive economic relations. In Japan, for example, 89% of the public held a negative view of China. In Vietnam, 74% of those surveyed ranked China as unfavorable.

Despite mutually beneficial economic ties between the U.S. and China, American opinion has turned more unfavorable (54%) than favorable (38%) during the past few years. Americans are worried about the U.S.-China trade deficit and the loss of jobs. They are also concerned with cyber attacks, Beijing’s human rights record, China’s impact on the environment, and its growing military strength. Western Europe mostly shares these concerns, although France has been more positive than negative.

Chinese admire many aspects of American culture, especially its higher education system, but only 44% of the Chinese public gave the United States a positive rating in a recent Pew Research Center survey. A majority of 54% of Chinese say the United States wants to prevent China from becoming as powerful at the United States.

Conclusion

Soft power, which is situated at the intersection between culture and power, has the potential to enhance cooperation but is also a source of competition between nations. China and the United States have very different approaches. China’s leaders believe, as Mao did, that culture should serve politics. With a less developed private sector and civil society, they tend to take a top-down approach. The United States, by contrast, has a wide range of soft power and places much more emphasis on a bottom-up approach. The multiplicity of voices can be confusing.

The success of soft power is in the eye of the beholder. From a Chinese perspective, the U.S. is envied, but it is also resented and viewed with suspicion because of the widespread belief that the United States is determined to prevent China’s rise as a global power. Beijing sees Washington’s advocacy of human rights and democracy as an effort to undermine the Communist Party.

From a U.S. perspective, China’s soft power is mixed. There is admiration of China’s rich cultural heritage and respect for its economic clout. But there is considerable skepticism over Beijing’s intentions. Washington doubts that China’s rise will be peaceful, and censorship of the internet and attacks on “Western values” have undermined Beijing’s credibility with American audiences.

But let me conclude with some optimistic news. A 2015 Pew Research Center survey shows that the younger generation (ages 18-29) both in China and America hold significantly more positive opinions of the other country than older generations. Their more positive views suggest that soft power—and especially cultural and educational exchange—offers the best hope to improve mutual understanding and enhance respect. For this reason, the frank and open exchange of views at the Young Scholars Forum at Nanjing University is extremely important and I very much look forward to our discussions.

By TERRY LAUTZ, Syracuse University, presented at the Young Scholars Forum, Nanjing University, September 2016

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/9/30

旧文章ID：15717

作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

From the countless times Vietnam was placed under Chinese rule to the modern day struggles for territory in the South China Sea, China and Vietnam have a long history of military, migration, cultural, and political interactions. Their historical relationship is riddled with cooperation and conflict: ethnic Chinese moving to Vietnam and bringing economic activity, the Vietnamese struggles against Chinese dominance, Sino-Vietnamese cooperation during the Vietnam War against America, and the Sino-Vietnamese War which froze relations for a decade are all examples of the complexities of this relationship.  Today, these two nations are at a crossroad between being enemies and allies, as China is both the top trade partner of Vietnam and the competitor against Vietnam and several other Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea. In this relationship, China means more to Vietnam than Vietnam to China, as Vietnam does not even make the list of the top 10 trading partners of China.This means that, while important, China does not necessarily need to care for its trade relationship with Vietnam in the same way Vietnam does for China. This can be seen in how China is taking a more aggressive approach in the South China Sea, and in the hesitation of Vietnam in its response.

This is an especially volatile time regarding the South China Sea, as world politics continue to trend towards nationalism and hard line policies. In other areas of the world, we can see these trends in the current election in the United States, in the British referendum to leave the European Union, in the recent Colombian decision to reject the peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and in Hungary’s recent rejection of EU migrant quotas; in Asia, we see these trends in the rise of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and in the growing tensions in the region from the establishment of THAAD in South Korea, from North Korea’s nuclear tests, and from territorial disputes. These events mean that this is an especially tense time in East Asia, and that these states will either turn towards diplomacy or eventually collide in war.

The current turn of events seems to look positive; both sides have made efforts to set aside their dispute and continue friendly ties. This includes talks of cooperation on economic, political, and cultural terms, which includes increasing trade cooperation and establishing cultural exchanges between citizens so the average Chinese citizen and the average Vietnamese citizen understand one another on a deeper level. These ideas are important in order to sustain the friendly relations between the two countries and halt the Vietnamese fears that China is trying to assert dominance over Vietnam as it had hundreds of years ago. Where these two nations failed is in addressing the issue of the claimed territories, likely because it would prove difficult to come to a conclusion of who rightfully owns what. There is still room for improvement, as both sides do not completely trust one another and the issues of the territory claimed still exists. This is sensible, given the nature of Sino-Vietnamese relations as being relatively recently restarted and historically being plagued with fears of dominance.

Written by Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/4

旧文章ID：15716

作者：William Pierce  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The theories behind international aid are constantly changing, debated and refined.  These programs and processes have clear historical foundations and influences.  From the Western perspective developmental assistance started with the successes of the post-WWII Marshall Plan. This astoundingly effective strategy to rebuild post war Europe was expanded to the global south with limited success.  Through trial and error, concepts such as sustainability, local ownership and capacity building became increasingly ubiquitous as the Marshall Plan’s triumphs were unable to be recreated.

Dr. Deborah Brautigam’s book, “The Dragon’s Gift” takes an in depth look at Chinese engagement in Africa.  Dr. Brautigam, a leading expert on Africa-China relations, spent years working in China and throughout Africa. She is a professor and director of the International Development Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Generations of Engagement

With a sovereign history not centered in European historical contexts, Chinese international aid and engagement grew through independent experiences. Chief among them is their own development familiarity and relations with regional power Japan. Due to Japan’s lack of natural resources, infrastructure in exchange for raw material agreements were commonplace and spurred Chinese industrialization.  From these successful firsthand experiences, China began to look outward, bringing its unique development model with it.

China’s attitude towards foreign aid was first outlined by Zhou Enlai in 1964 during an official African tour which produced the “Eight Principles for China’s Aid to Foreign Countries.” These concepts then highly influenced Zhao Ziyang’s “Four Principles of Economic and Technological Cooperation.” Of central importance is equality, mutual benefit and respecting sovereignty. This outlook has fostered greater regard for African leaders, referred by the Chinese as partners.  Dr. Brautigam believes in a continent that experienced harsh colonial rule, an attitude that is highly welcome.

China’s approach has been applauded by many African leaders and produced highly successful projects.  This model has also created several faux pas in the eyes of Western development experts. These include the construction of a 60,000 seat national football stadium in Tanzania. The stadium came at a 56 million USD cost and is arguably not the most pressing need for the Tanzanian people. Despite suggestions from the Chinese that the resources be allocated more efficiently, the Tanzanian decision to move forward was ultimately respected.

Dr. Brautigam describes Beijing’s nonnegotiable element for receiving Chinese assistance as following the One China Policy.  This policy states that countries seeking diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must break official relations with the Republic of China (ROC). Currently the vast majority of African countries have embassies in Beijing, as opposed to Taipei.  Of these African countries with formal ties to the People’s Republic, all enjoy some level of aid.

China’s inflexibility regarding this policy in Africa has reaped rewards.  Most notably the PRC regaining their permanent UN security council position in 1971.  This change passed with 76 votes, of these 26 were African.  China is aware that by providing support in the 1960s, African countries then voted overwhelmingly to expel Taiwan.

China’s engagement in Africa has had a strong focus on infrastructure. This was a large emphasis of the international community prior to the Millennium development goals shifting attention to eight areas including food security, women’s empowerment and climate change among others.  The desperate need for quality infrastructure in Africa is still a reality.  Currently only nine African countries have fewer than 50 electrical power cuts a year. China is filling the necessary void in electrical power along with roads and telecommunications.

Addressing Sensationalism

Dr. Brautigam masterfully dispels many common myths regarding Chinese aid while acknowledging areas of improvement. Chief among them is the belief that Chinese aid is solely a grab for resources. Continually it is shown that the Chinese presence in Africa spans many sectors including health, agriculture and infrastructure, and has a broad geographic focus incorporating all African countries respecting the One China Policy, along with deep historical roots.  Logistical issues surround shipping natural resources to China, to send money back is more commonplace.  China does have a strong presence in resource rich countries, but to describe this growing, expansive and multifaceted relationship as merely a need for resources is, at best, a partial picture.

The general notion that China props dictators, such as Omar al-Bashir in Sudan and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, through their economic presence, is also called into question. The Western track record of imposing economic sanctions is shaky at best.  Dr. Brautigam shares countless examples of sanctions not alleviating human rights abuses or adverting armed conflict.  Furthermore, while China could be more aggressive in twisting arms, their economic engagement is only a piece of a complex puzzle and hardly Zimbabwe or Sudan’s only revenue stream. Dr. Brautigam shows the presences of other entities conducting business including non-Chinese companies in many of these reported problem areas.

According to Dr. Brautigam Chinese aid is not flawless.  The concept of tied aid is more common than in Western countries.  This caveat states that a certain portion of funding must be spent in the donor country, normally on labor or materials. This arrangement has been shown to be inefficient, potentially harmful to host nations and increasingly viewed as antiquated.

Despite improvements, issues surrounding social and environment standards are rife.  These problems are often the result of Chinese ignorance of local labor regulations, lack of cultural belief in corporate social responsibility or a blend of the two. Efforts are being made to conceptualize this and labor laws are being translated into Chinese but the gap remains large.

Questions Remain

Through quotes from both African and Chinese leaders, stereotypes of Western aid being paternalistic, dismissing African leaders and coming with a plethora of attached conditions is a common theme, although Dr. Brautigam never analyzes if these descriptions are accurate. Readers may question if this portrayal is a relic of the past, a present complaint or merely an inaccurate over generalization.  Lastly, the prospect these conditions could be valuable or at times necessary is not examined.

Dr. Brautigam paints Chinese and Western aid on both extremes of the internal interference spectrum.  Can the key to positive development outcomes lie in the middle?  What if African leaders were engaged from the start, recognized for their immense local knowledge and aid negotiated through shared decision making? Could this egalitarian process impose fair and transparent regulations to everyone’s benefit?

While controversial, it is clear that Chinese engagement in Africa will continue to grow.  This involvement cannot simply be categorized as good, bad, or a grab for resources.  Like any aid model we see strengths and weaknesses. Inevitably changes and adjustments will occur over time.  What we have is developmental aid with Chinese characteristics.

By BILL PIERCE, USCNPM Contributor, October 4, 2016.

(This commentary is part of a series summarizing prominent books on China in Africa)

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/4

旧文章ID：15715

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The first US presidential debate did not really provide China watchers with fresh insight into how either Trump or Clinton is going to deal with China, but over the course of their respective campaigns, both candidates have given ample evidence of where they stand on several key issues surrounding Sino-US relations.  For all his flip-flopping on domestic social issues, Trump has maintained relatively consistent foreign policy positions with regard to China.  Meanwhile, one only needs to look back on Hillary Clinton’s track record as secretary of state to draw out her views on China.  The question for Beijing now is: who will be the better candidate to advance relations with China?

When it comes to economics, the concept of free trade has featured at length in both campaigns.  In terms of trading with China, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has stirred much controversy within both parties in the US.  However, both nominees are opposed to this trade deal.  At this point, it hardly matters to China why they oppose it, though it is somewhat important to point out that Trump disagrees with the very idea of free trade, whereas conservatives disagree with the type of over-regulated free trade the TPP proposes.  Trump’s opposition to free trade qua free trade does not conform to the conservative rationalefor why the TPP specifically should be rejected, which will surely irk the conservative bloc, because many members in his Party do believe in the underlying principle that consumers should be allowed to purchase goods from whomever they wish.  Therefore, his general attitude towards multilateral free trade, which does work in China’s favor in this particular case, might be an overarching problem for China.  Meanwhile, Clinton, who initially supported the deal, is now against it.  She cites domestic job creation and national security as important criteria for any trade agreement, and the TPP does not meet her standards.  In any case, China, by far the most notable exclusion from the pact, stands to benefit from both Trump and Clinton because both candidates argue that the TPP further threatens the middle-class.  Yet when it comes to free trade at large, a Clinton presidency might just be more in line with Chinese interests.

Trump’s apparent lack of economic acumen is also a concern.  From arguing that Mexico is “stealing” America’s domestic jobs, to threatening high tariffs on Chinese imports, Trump’s understanding of how the world economy works is questionable, and his solutions for bolstering America’s economy are also worrisome.  But what most alerts Chinese officials would probably be his claim that the Chinese are devaluing their currency to deliberately harm the American economy.  Trump’s bases his accusation on the false presumption that long-term currency devaluation leads to zero downsides for China’s domestic economy.  Problems such as creating uncertainty among its international trading partners, limiting purchasing power, and capital flight, are all problems that accompany cheaper, more competitive exports.  Chinese policymakers recognize that in order to strive for sustainable economic growth, it can no longer rely on its cheap labor and low manufacturing costs, which are achieved through currency devaluation.  In reality, the yuan has been “appreciating, not depreciating.  From 1995 through 2014, China’s exchange rate appreciated by 26%.”  Hence, on balance, the argument that “a devaluation would cost the Chinese economy more than it gains” seems much more tenable.

That said, the Republican nominee is a businessman after all.  Thus far, he has proved many times over that his ever-evolving political convictions and interests override whatever political principles he has.  So it is not unreasonable to assume that he would welcome any mutually beneficial deal between the two countries, unlike Clinton, whose past roles as first lady and secretary of state lead us to believe that grappling with China’s human rights track record will be one of her top priorities.

This brings us to the social issues.  In this area, it is possible that a Trump presidency would play into China’s hands more.  Clinton’s campaign is viewed in China as an “old foreign policy hand.”  She will certainly help carry forward Obama’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific.  That means continued involvement in the South China Sea in the name of freedom of navigation and continued scrutiny of China’s human rights record.  Everyone knows that “America’s desire for more rigorous and persistent commitment” to the Asia-Pacific will inevitably lead to more confrontation and more tension.  Indeed, Clinton’s interventionist position will not sit well with Beijing, but this is not to say a Trump presidency is without its risks in this regard as well.  Trump seems to be drawn to the strongman, as evidenced by his admiration of dictatorial leaders such as Putin and Kim Jong-un.  What that means for China is unclear at this point, but there is a risk calculation to be had here.  Would China want a foreign policy wildcard in Trump or a known quantity in Clinton?

And overall, who would China really prefer?  A nationalist and economic isolationist?  Or a foreign policy hawk, who will meddle in China’s domestic affairs, but at the same time promote globalism and free trade?  It is understood that Republican presidents are generally more likely to preserve Sino-US relations given their pro-trade and pro-business attitude.  In fact, resumption of diplomatic ties with China can largely be attributed to Richard Nixon in 1972, who looked past the two countries’ ideological differences and realized that China could serve as a key ally in containing the Soviets.  But this election cycle is an anomaly in that Trump is not your typical Republican.  On some issues, he is just as liberal, if not more so, than his opponent, which really complicates China’s risk assessment.

By Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/5

旧文章ID：15714

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Former US President Jimmy Carter was named as one of the winners of the first annual Lui Che Woo Prize – Prize for World Peace. This award, created by Macau property tycoon and casino owner Lui Che-woo, recognizes individuals who contributed to world civilization. It spans all sectors and looks specifically at innovative projects. President Carter was specifically awarded the prize in the category for “Promotion of Positive Life Attitude and Enhancement of Positive Energy,” which rewards “individuals or organizations whose behavior and achievement inspire, energize, and give hope to others.” The aim of the award is to “foster world peace, mutual respect and understanding so that people can cherish the natural resources of the earth.” In 1982, President Carter established the Carter Center in Atlanta, GA with the slogan “waging peace, fighting disease, building hope.” Since its establishment, the Carter Center has worked abroad in protecting human rights, promoting democracy, preventing and resolving conflicts, promoting racial and gender equality, and supporting fair and free elections.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/5

旧文章ID：15713

作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Rodrigo Duterte, the newly elected 16th President of the Philippines, is a controversial figure who has attracted worldwide attention to the Philippines for his outrageous statements. From making jokes about rape victims and inciting a drug war within his country to cursing Obama, Duterte has displayed his penchant for saying whatever he wants without considering repercussions from the international community. This is dangerous, especially in a volatile region such as the South China Sea. With the current territorial disputes in the region, having an unpredictable leader such as Duterte at the helm adds a destabilizing element of uncertainty to the situation. His recent statements regarding “breaking up with the USA”  confirms his unpredictability, as Duterte states that America criticizes his drug war too often and that he will make appeals to China and Russia for assistance instead. As East Asia is already becoming increasingly polarized between China and ASEAN states due to the territorial disputes, his statements weaken the cohesiveness of ASEAN in its decision making. No one can be 100% sure with whom he will side. Such a situation is reminiscent of pre-World War I Europe, during which different European states had multiple conflicting alliances.

Among the established aims and purposes of ASEAN is to “promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter”, and among the principles in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter are “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” The United Nations has additionally created a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although this is not truly global. What constitutes human rights differs around the globe: the West tends to value the individual more, thus leading rights towards this concept, while Asia and Africa tend to value societal stability, and lead the concept of human rights towards what is deemed best for the group. This issue has caused tensions between nations in the past (i.e. China and USA), and this seems to be what is at play in the Philippines right now. What we could be seeing now is a change of societal values in the Philippines from what is human rights as influenced by the West to what is considered human rights within its own country.

By Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/10

旧文章ID：15712

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On Thursday, October 6th, the Council on Foreign Relations held a discussion assessing the progress and future of the United States’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.  Invited were three esteemed panelists: Kurt Campbell, former senior State Department official in the Hillary Clinton State Department; Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr senior fellow in Asian studies at CFR; and Thomas Christensen, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the George W. Bush administration.  The future of this bilateral relationship hangs firmly in the balance.  Moving forward, expectations for the US in the region have risen tremendously; playing a key role in Asia will require a “much more integrated, much more cohesive, much more determined set of efforts.”

All three panelists agree that the “pivot” has been a largely positive maneuver in advancing Sino-US relations.  Christensen, although in favor of many of the policies the pivot entails, finds fault in the public diplomacy aspect of it.  The narrative Washington has chosen to pursue suggests the idea that “maybe we had left another region of the world, and it suggests that maybe we might leave Asia again if there’s some problem in the Middle East or elsewhere.” In his view, it creates unnecessary friction and leaves room for misinterpretation of the US’ desired role in the region.  He also dismisses any comparison between America’s relationship with China under the Bush administration and the Obama administration given China’s transformation over the last decade in terms of both regional/international stature and overall strategy.  Christensen believes that instability in the region is largely due to China’s more assertive policies since the 2008 financial crisis, which have caused problems for American diplomacy.  Reasons why China began adopting hardline policies are twofold: more confidence in foreign affairs, and greater fears domestically for the CCP.  Being more assertive in the face of perceived provocation from its neighbors has been counterproductive at times.  It has led to the destabilization of the region, which has allowed the US to improve security relations with the likes of South Korea, Vietnam, and India.  China’s belligerence towards its neighbors has played a role in affording these opportunities to the US.

Meanwhile, Economy praises the pivot for demonstrating American core values, such as “free trade, freedom of navigation, and political freedom.” She mentions the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as an example of the far-reaching impact of American principles in the region.  On the topic of TPP, Campbell explains that it serves to diminish the risk of America’s Asia strategy from being too unidimensional because it is an indication of the US’ commitment to multilateralism in the region.  Deals like the TPP signify a multifaceted approach that will involve not just a strong security component, but a commercial dynamic that will reap economic benefits between the two regions.  Therefore, the TPP is not about shipping US jobs abroad and hurting American labor, but rather about facilitating US exports to Asia.  Economy, however, tempers this optimism by pointing out that we are now seeing pushback from the CCP as it attempts the check America’s influence in the region.  Moreover, despite being more ambitious in its foreign policy, Beijing is also trying to be more insular in order to further legitimate the Party and the ideology it espouses.  As a result, since President Xi Jinping took over, he has been reluctant to openly embrace foreign ideas, foreign capital, and foreign civil society (foreign NGOs).  But she does argue that the Obama administration has successfully managed to find areas of cooperation with China by seeking out ways to “leverage Xi Jinping’s ambition,” which means that convincing Chinese policymakers to adapt and moderate is possible, albeit challenging.

Christensen concurs by reiterating the power of rhetoric and how that affected, and still affects, people’s perception of the pivot.  From Beijing’s perspective, the language used by Americans “fed very well into a narrative in China about what the United States was going to do as it pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan.  It was going to come after China.” He uses the TPP as an example: even though it was created by non-American APEC members during the Bush years, and was intended to encourage China to open up its economy further, thereby benefiting all parties, it was ultimately framed as a ploy to exclude China as it became “caught up in the pivot.”

Finally, the consensus from all three panelists is that Sino-US cooperation is a long-term commitment that will require several administrations to improve and refine.  No two countries are as engaged in an interdependent relationship as the United States and China.  For now, a good step in the right direction would be inculcating habits of cooperation, which Campbell suggests is severely lacking between the two countries.  Whether it be aid and assistance, disaster relief, and anti-piracy issues, we have done “remarkably little together.” At this stage of the relationship, “focusing on structural efforts at figuring out how we work together to solve common problems” are far more important than empty rhetoric.

Written by: Adrian Lo

[Council on Foreign Relations]. (2016, October 6). John B. Hurford Memorial Lecture: U.S. Strategy in Asia: Is the Pivot Working?[Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fQYlVq9G5g

Transcript of the discussion can be found here: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/us-strategy-asia-pivot-working/p38368

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/12

旧文章ID：15711

作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On October 6th, 2016, Dr. Yumin Zhao, Deputy Consul General of China in Houston, spoke at Emory regarding Sino-US relations from the establishment of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on January 1st, 1979 until now. Dr. Zhao separated Sino-US relations into four periods of time: 1979-1989, 1989-2001, 2001-2009, and 2009-present. 1979 to 1989 was a honeymoon period, during which the US and China enjoyed relaxed relations.  Both experienced growing tensions with the Soviet Union: China had a border conflict with Soviet-aligned Vietnam, the US dealt with a left wing insurgency in Nicaragua, and both the US and China contributed against the USSR in the Soviet-Afghan War.  During this period, both countries were just starting to explore the relation, enjoying military cooperation and increasing military trade.

From 1989-2001, signs of a rift between the two giants began to surface: the fall of Communism throughout Eastern Europe created tensions in China that prompted the government to push towards sustaining itself at the cost of the people.  Additionally, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the collision of an American plane with a Chinese plane over Hainan Island, and the Chinese military tensions with Taiwan that led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis all increased the tensions between China and the United States.  The events from this period created the image of the United States and other western powers trying to halt China from rising to world power status equal to the US and Western European nations, which is a belief that is still very popular in China.  This is the time period during which trade heavily expanded between the two nations, and China was rising in economic status.  During this time, the leaders of the two nations grew closer as well; Chinese President Jiang Zemin and US President Bill Clinton exchanged visits in 1997 and 1998 respectively.  During these visits, while they discussed policy matters, they also spent a lot of time visiting each other’s countries and growing personal connections with one another.  This is a very important aspect of the relationship the two leaders shared, as these personal relationships played a role in the leaders deescalating any tensions or situations.  This time period was mainly characterized by growing political closeness between the two nations, emerging rifts from controversial issues, and expansion of trade.

From 2001-2009, China displayed its increasing prominence on the world stage: China went from having the sixth biggest economy in the world to the third biggest during this time period (only behind Japan, which it overtook it 2011, and the United States).  The United States felt threatened by the increase in China’s status, as the US had just come out of the Cold War as the victor and sole world superpower.  The rifts in Sino-American relations were growing, and President George W. Bush’s early stance of being tough on China hurt relations, but Chinese support for the US and its War on Terror following the September 11th attacks mended relations and continued bilateral cooperation.  President Bush visited China in 2002, and his counterpart, President Hu Jintao, returned the visit in 2006. China also displayed its rise to the world by hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, which Bush also attended.

From 2009 to the present, the relationship has been characterized by increased American presence in East Asia.  In 2010, Hillary Clinton, current Presidential Nominee and then Secretary of State, gave a speech in Hawaii, during which she referenced a Pivot to Asia. In 2013, Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President, renamed it to Rebalance to Asia while speaking to the Asia Society in New York.  The US and China saw increase cooperation during this time as well.  In our modern world, the US, as the current greatest superpower, does not necessarily need to be an adversary to a growing China; they can cooperate and grow together. With this in mind, both nations have collaborated on efforts in Africa and in Latin America.  President Xi paid state visits to the US in 2013 and 2015, while President Obama visited China in 2014, on a state visit, and in 2016, on a visit for the G20 in Hangzhou.  While Sino-American relations generally look pretty good at the moment, the South China Sea is still a major destabilizing issue in relations.

Since the G20, both countries have endeavored to increase cooperation, work on issues in which they hold mutual interests, and continue expanding Sino-American relations. The two nations have opportunities to cooperate in economics and security, as well as in public health, climate change, disaster relief, and anti-piracy.  In order to do this, both countries must enhance communication, keep exchanges high, increase cooperation, and tackle their differences in culture and political systems.  Lastly, the US must become more comfortable with China’s ascendance as a global superpower, as the discomfort the US holds will only weaken the bilateral relationship and lead to increased tensions.

Written by: Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/14

旧文章ID：15710

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Soaring home prices in China’s biggest cities are becoming a cause for concern.  September marks the 17th consecutive month in which home prices have risen.  According to a private survey, home prices have gained a whopping “16.6 per cent in September against a year ago, up from August’s 13.75 per cent rise.”

Local authorities have been attempting to stem the rise by raising mortgage down payments and tightening home purchase restrictions.  According to a circular by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-rural development, “the down payment for first time homebuyers should be no less than 35 percent, while that for second home purchases should be no less than 50 percent.” Doing so serves to discourage property speculators in “second- and third-tier cities across the country.” Additionally, local authorities have also been asked to increase land supply for the development of “self-using houses,” for which the government will impose a price ceiling.  Authorities are also required to enhance supervision over “hoarding, price-rigging and other malpractices by developers and brokerages.”

Despite China’s seemingly volatile real estate market, central and local governments actually boast a pristine record when it comes to prescribing appropriate policies when the housing market becomes overheated.  Wade Shepard from Forbes highlights several ways in which China’s regulatory measures have been largely successful.

First, control of interest rates: “when they (the government) want to cool things down a little, the government charges higher interest rates on loans to developers and home buyers, when they want to heat the market up give (sic) more favorable rates.” To do this, the government must be attuned to market trends.

Second, stringent lending stipulations: an interesting fact is that Chinese homeowners are very under-leveraged.  “At 90%, China has one of the world’s highest home ownership rates, but only 18% of the country’s households have mortgages.” The government ensures that lending practices are strictly monitored and specific to the economic conditions of each city.  Furthermore, because speculation is usually done in cash and not loans, which means that in the event of a large-scale housing crash, “a domino effect of defaults would probably not resound through the broader economy.” This sort of stability is primarily due to well-regulated lending controls.  Although this is not a point that Shepard makes, the fact that China is an ethnically homogenous state also prevents laws like the US’ Community Reinvestment Act from being implemented, which can cause severe economic ramifications.  Solely focusing on individuals’ lending capacity helps to thwart irresponsible and unsustainable lending practices.

Third, strict buying conditions: home buying requirements vary from city to city – the more unsold housing there is, the lower the purchasing barriers are.  Moreover, one way the government “quells speculation in the housing market is by simply restricting the quantity of houses that people can buy.”

So what’s the problem?

What makes the “recent boom in China’s housing market appear different than the ones that proceeded it is the rise of private lending which subverts China’s highly regulated banking system.” This threatens home buyers’ lack of leverage, which acts as a safety net for the economy.  The option of private loans increases the default rate as more unqualified buyers are incentivized to purchase homes.  “An estimated $277 million has been acquired for housing via these under-regulated lenders over the past year in Beijing.”

In typical Chinese efficiency, lending authorities are already stepping up measures to regulate peer-to-peer lending.  For example, in March this year, The People’s Bank of China started to “ban real estate brokers and property developers from financing property acquisitions unless they have the licenses to do so.”

China’s housing market along with the government’s manifold regulatory mechanisms perfectly typifies the socialist market economy it works to maintain.

Written by: Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15709

作者：William Pierce  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On October 11th the China and Peacekeeping Program welcomed Ambassador Shu Zhan to The Carter Center.

Ambassador Shu, an expert on African studies, has years of experience on the continent.  He has held diplomatic posts, representing the People’s Republic of China in Namibia and South Africa.  Shu Zhan, now retired, was the Chinese ambassador to Eritrea from 2006-2009 and Rwanda from 2010-2013.

The China Program’s area of focus include promoting U.S.-China collaboration in other nations.  With China’s rising presence in Africa, and America’s historic support, the continent provides ample opportunities for collaboration in peacekeeping, public health and anti-piracy efforts.  Ambassador Shu’s visit sparked a rich discussion with Dr. John Goodman and Dr. Yawei Liu as strategies to bring China and the United States closer together were scrutinized.

One common theme is the need for Africa to take a leadership role in stating how to move forward with collaboration.  Africa must clearly describe its most pressing needs and how best the US and China can address these requests. China and the US need to see themselves as partners and assets for African governments to improve the lives of African people.

Secondly the need to discover projects for every stakeholder’s gain was emphasized. To develop a truly collaborative environment China, Africa and the US must be sufficiently motivated through benefits. While seemingly challenging many initiatives that develop a continent, improve security or increase trade help all members of the global community.

The necessary discussion was expansive in scope.  Several areas of focus which maybe ideal zones to start collaboration include anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, medical assistance and agricultural development.

The meeting also tackled politically sensitive issues like security in the Sahel region, peacekeeping and climate change.  These options maybe possible in the future when stronger trust is developed between the three players.

William Pierce holds the graduate assistantship for The Carter Center’s China Program. He is a masters student at Rollins School of Public Health, with a policy and management concentration. Mr. Pierce served in the Peace Corps, living in a Ghanaian village, carrying out public health programs from 2013 to 2015. William holds an executive position in the Rollins Returned Peace Corps Committee.  He has worked at CARE International within the new business development department, responding to U.S. government solicitations, including those from USAID.  William holds a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University at Buffalo. He speaks Hausa and Buili. 

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15708

作者：William Pierce  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Trade Not Aid: Africa’s Salvation Lies with a New Approach

The most important and innovative aspect of Dambisa Moyo’s book Dead Aid is not related to content. Think about everything you’ve learned regarding Africa and international development. Where did that information come from? Western leaders? UN officials? Rock stars? It is a curious phenomenon that African people are the least likely source of information regarding their continent.

Born and raised in Zambia, Moyo received her economics Ph.D. from Oxford University.  She has worked as a World Bank consultant and at Goldman Sachs.  Dambisa Moyo brings a refreshing African voice to the world stage and maintains international aid is actually harming Africa.

The Failed Policy

Moyo makes a strong case citing the astronomical amount of money transferred to developing countries from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations over the last fifty years. She then links this tremendous sum to the less than optimal outcomes for the African continent and notes the few examples of countries graduating out of the foreign aid system.

Not only is aid inefficient in Moyo’s eyes, but it leads to corruption, retards economic growth and cultivates dependency. Aid makes up a sizable portion of many African nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), typically 10-20%.  With this substantial amount of guaranteed cash flow, African leaders feel comfortable squandering it through offshore banks or giving favors to their cronies. Foreign aid is so guaranteed, not producing results is acceptable. Unlike direct foreign investment, with the requirement to produce returns, aid fosters complacency.

To illustrate aid’s potential economic damages Moyo cites the following example.  Imagine a businessperson in Africa launching a small operation to produce mosquito nets to combat malaria. The firm is growing and employing seven Africans. As is common in the developing world, the income from these seven people help support a large extended family as they pay school fees and other necessities. Now a foreign aid organization distributes free mosquito nets.  This reduces demand driving down price and the company is forced out of business. Jobs are destroyed and the reverberations are felt by many, harming the local economy.

The Aid Alternative

Moyo advocates that African countries increasingly embed themselves in the global economic system.  African nations can issue bonds, essentially loans or IOUs as oppose to receiving aid. This raised money can go towards infrastructure, education and healthcare. She further cites a plentiful history of developing countries issuing bonds to great success. Through bonds, African leaders will be more motivated to produce required returns or risk losing future funding opportunities and damage to their credit rating.

Despite its large population, Africa carries out a disproportionally small percentage of world trade. Some of this is beyond the continents control. Moyo cites the protective trade restrictions, especially towards food in many Western nations. Large farm subsidies keep food costs artificially low in Western countries and restrict the ability of African nations to competitively export.

OECD countries spend about $300 billion USD on domestic agricultural subsidies. This is almost three times the total aid spent. If the developed world truly wants to help Africa, removing these subsidies and creating more avenues for African countries to trade and develop local economies would be astronomically more effective.

Microloans and remittances are two concepts Dambisa feels hold great potential and are underutilized. Microloans bring individuals, often in rural areas into a more formal banking system. Small loans made between individuals of the same community use trust as collateral and allow many to grow their businesses.  This empowers citizens to grow their way out of poverty.

China’s Place

China’s growing African presence takes an equally sizable portion of Dead Aid and is highlighted emphatically. Moyo applauds the Chinese emphasis on trade, currently being the third largest trading partner on the continent, only after the USA and France.  Moyo’s highest accolades are reserved for China’s tremendous foreign direct investment.

Chinese investments, both public and private, have produced roads, pipelines, railways and power plants in an environment starved for infrastructure. In Moyo’s eyes no country has made as big an impact on the political economic and social fabric of Africa as China. The infrastructure for natural resource model is described to be understood by both the Chinese and Africans which leads to mutually beneficial results.

Shortcomings

Moyo’s mosquito net example is powerful but it is too sweeping an economic generalization. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates the direct cost for Malaria illness, treatment and premature death to be 12 billion USD.  This endemic disease then results in a still higher economic growth loss. Moyo does not thoroughly take into account improved population health and its economic effects into her analysis.  Despite the flaws in her example, the direct delivery architecture frequently used by both governments and nongovernmental organizations alike warrant stricter scrutiny.

Moyo takes on an enormous task by analyzing aid in a continent of 54 unique nations through 50 years of dynamic history. While admirable, all-encompassing generalizations of aid are made. This is especially noticeable as she relies on cold war era examples and the low hanging fruit among African leaders noticeably Idi Amin of Uganda and Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  While these individuals are part of Africa’s story, their large mention skew realities when discussing the continent as a whole.

Moyo touches upon some criticism related to the Chinese presence in African but these are fleeting and not analyzed thoroughly. Environmental concerns are mentioned via quotes by western officials complaining about Chinese business practices.  Statistics and trends related to these programs are not included nor is the African perspective shared.

African complaints regarding Chinese labor practices are at best lightly touched upon. Moyo glosses over the effects of cheap Chinese goods flooding the African markets and their effect on local businesses. This level of analysis lies in stark contrast to her through analysis and criticism of aid flooding nations with cheap or free goods.

While flaws are present, Dambisa Moyo starts the conversation by asking, can there be a better way? We would be wise to take notice of her concerns and try to hear the voice of the 1.2 billion other Africans whose calls aren’t as visible.

William Pierce holds the graduate assistantship for The Carter Center’s China Program. He is a masters student at Rollins School of Public Health, with a policy and management concentration. Mr. Pierce served in the Peace Corps, living in a Ghanaian village, carrying out public health programs from 2013 to 2015. William holds an executive position in the Rollins Returned Peace Corps Committee.  He has worked at CARE International within the new business development department, responding to U.S. government solicitations, including those from USAID.  William holds a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University at Buffalo. He speaks Hausa and Buili. 

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15707

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

This past May, I discussed the 2016 Philippine presidential election and the different candidates’ take on the regional situation. Since then, Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, the most colorful of the bunch, was elected and inaugurated as President of the Philippines.

True to prediction, Duterte has taken a much harder stance against the United States, using expletive-laced language to describe American President Barack Obama and attacking the 65-year old alliance. However, I find that I was wrong in saying that the Philippines was unlikely to choose China over the United States, as Duterte has spoken about seeking closer ties with China and Russia while placing in the hurdles for the US-Philippines alliance.

This was most clear when Duterte said he would stop a planned US-Philippine military drill. The drills took place as planned, but were since halted on Duterte’s orders. Duterte’s take on the US-Philippine alliance is surprising, as it breaks with the Philippines’ long history as one of America’s closest and most dependable allies.

Duterte, the loose cannon that he is, is not completely without reasons for his tough take against the Philippine-American alliance. The Philippines has long been seen as a dependent of the United States and rarely acts without consulting the US. In the perspective of Filipinos, a more independent Philippines would likely gain the Philippines more respect from the international community rather than their current image as the United States’ little brother. However, it is a wonder if perhaps the Philippines search for independence is a bit premature, as the Philippines should seek a more capability before becoming more independent on the international stage.

Perhaps Duterte would be able to achieve more if he, like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, takes the Theodore Roosevelt approach of speaking softly while carrying a big stick.

Duterte’s difficult human rights record and hard stance on US-Philippine alliance has led some commentators, like the Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter to argue that the United States should temporarily suspend its alliance with the Philippines, similar to the 1980s event where the United States suspended its alliance with New Zealand.

Carpenter offers three points in favor of suspending the US-Philippines alliance: (1) that the Philippine American alliance is antiquated, having been fulfilled after the Philippines independence, (2) that the Philippines claims and conflicts with other parties in the South China Sea create “headaches” for the United States, and (3) that the alliance makes the US “at least indirectly culpable” for the domestic behaviors of the Philippines under Duterte.

Carpenter offers strong arguments which ooze of President George Washington’s Farewell Address. Carpenter’s point that the United States has previously embarrassed, if not shamed, itself by supporting dictators antithetical to American values during the Cold War is well-founded, as it has led to an assortment of problems for such countries in the post-Cold War era. However, this view ignores the Philippines importance in the United States’ Asia strategy and would likely weaken America’s pivot to the region.

Suspending the venerable US-Philippines alliance would not only blot the United States image as a regional leader, but also leave a China-shaped void in terms of the Philippines future relations. The United States should be wary of losing long-established allies to closer cooperation with China, as some argued is the case with Thailand. While Duterte’s approach is troubling for the United States, America’s policymakers must move carefully and sympathetically. While recognizing the human rights issues brought up by his policies, Washington should not be so quick to throw Duterte under the bus as the United States may soon have to deal with an unconventional, bombastic, and portly leader of its own.

The major question is whether Duterte is an anomaly or the norm. If Duterte is an anomaly, then his presidency will be a healthy dose of realization that the United States cannot take its longtime allies for granted. A more independent acting Philippines combined with the opposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by this year’s presidential candidates, are a slap in the face of American engagement in Asia. However, the Duterte presidency could also lead to growth in the relationship between the United States and its Asian allies, allowing these countries to act independently with other regional actors. While this takes the United States from the center of attention, it may also encourage the region’s actors to act for its own interests instead of Washington’s interests. The big question is whether this will help or hurt the region’s stability.

If Duterte becomes a norm for the politics of the Philippines, the United States may have to take a more realistic approach in engagement in the region, as other, like-minded leaders may begin popping up across Asia. Such a phenomenon will be an existential crisis, as the United States may have to face the choice between its current, values-based order, or a more realistic (the IR theory) form of engagement in the region.

By AARON WALAYAT, USCNPM Contributor, 19 October 2016

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/19

旧文章ID：15706