作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

This past May, I discussed the 2016 Philippine presidential election and the different candidates’ take on the regional situation. Since then, Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, the most colorful of the bunch, was elected and inaugurated as President of the Philippines.

True to prediction, Duterte has taken a much harder stance against the United States, using expletive-laced language to describe American President Barack Obama and attacking the 65-year old alliance. However, I find that I was wrong in saying that the Philippines was unlikely to choose China over the United States, as Duterte has spoken about seeking closer ties with China and Russia while placing in the hurdles for the US-Philippines alliance.

This was most clear when Duterte said he would stop a planned US-Philippine military drill. The drills took place as planned, but were since halted on Duterte’s orders. Duterte’s take on the US-Philippine alliance is surprising, as it breaks with the Philippines’ long history as one of America’s closest and most dependable allies.

Duterte, the loose cannon that he is, is not completely without reasons for his tough take against the Philippine-American alliance. The Philippines has long been seen as a dependent of the United States and rarely acts without consulting the US. In the perspective of Filipinos, a more independent Philippines would likely gain the Philippines more respect from the international community rather than their current image as the United States’ little brother. However, it is a wonder if perhaps the Philippines search for independence is a bit premature, as the Philippines should seek a more capability before becoming more independent on the international stage.

Perhaps Duterte would be able to achieve more if he, like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, takes the Theodore Roosevelt approach of speaking softly while carrying a big stick.

Duterte’s difficult human rights record and hard stance on US-Philippine alliance has led some commentators, like the Cato Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter to argue that the United States should temporarily suspend its alliance with the Philippines, similar to the 1980s event where the United States suspended its alliance with New Zealand.

Carpenter offers three points in favor of suspending the US-Philippines alliance: (1) that the Philippine American alliance is antiquated, having been fulfilled after the Philippines independence, (2) that the Philippines claims and conflicts with other parties in the South China Sea create “headaches” for the United States, and (3) that the alliance makes the US “at least indirectly culpable” for the domestic behaviors of the Philippines under Duterte.

Carpenter offers strong arguments which ooze of President George Washington’s Farewell Address. Carpenter’s point that the United States has previously embarrassed, if not shamed, itself by supporting dictators antithetical to American values during the Cold War is well-founded, as it has led to an assortment of problems for such countries in the post-Cold War era. However, this view ignores the Philippines importance in the United States’ Asia strategy and would likely weaken America’s pivot to the region.

Suspending the venerable US-Philippines alliance would not only blot the United States image as a regional leader, but also leave a China-shaped void in terms of the Philippines future relations. The United States should be wary of losing long-established allies to closer cooperation with China, as some argued is the case with Thailand. While Duterte’s approach is troubling for the United States, America’s policymakers must move carefully and sympathetically. While recognizing the human rights issues brought up by his policies, Washington should not be so quick to throw Duterte under the bus as the United States may soon have to deal with an unconventional, bombastic, and portly leader of its own.

The major question is whether Duterte is an anomaly or the norm. If Duterte is an anomaly, then his presidency will be a healthy dose of realization that the United States cannot take its longtime allies for granted. A more independent acting Philippines combined with the opposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by this year’s presidential candidates, are a slap in the face of American engagement in Asia. However, the Duterte presidency could also lead to growth in the relationship between the United States and its Asian allies, allowing these countries to act independently with other regional actors. While this takes the United States from the center of attention, it may also encourage the region’s actors to act for its own interests instead of Washington’s interests. The big question is whether this will help or hurt the region’s stability.

If Duterte becomes a norm for the politics of the Philippines, the United States may have to take a more realistic approach in engagement in the region, as other, like-minded leaders may begin popping up across Asia. Such a phenomenon will be an existential crisis, as the United States may have to face the choice between its current, values-based order, or a more realistic (the IR theory) form of engagement in the region.

By AARON WALAYAT, USCNPM Contributor, 19 October 2016

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/19

旧文章ID：15706

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Liu Guoliang (刘国梁), 40 years old, is a highly esteemed Chinese table tennis player. Known for being the second man in history to win at three major world tournaments (the Olympics Games, the World Cup, and the World Championships), he is considered one of the greatest table tennis players of all time.  Currently, he is the Head Coach of the China National Table Tennis Team. In dedication to the role table tennis played in the opening of US-China relations and the role of 39th President Jimmy Carter in normalizing US-China relations, Liu wishes Jimmy Carter a happy 92nd birthday.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/20

旧文章ID：15705

作者：Paul Vizza  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Executive Summary

The South China Sea (SCS) has become a central issue in the U.S.-China relationship.  Despite widespread framing (in the United States, China, Southeast Asia and around the world) of the issue as one of contention and even a potential cause of significant conflict between the two countries, the United States and China disagree on less – at least as a matter of official, declared policy – than is commonly presumed.  Much of the friction between the United States and China over the South China Sea instead stems from the misalignment, misunderstanding or divergence of strategic assumptions and, also, from sharply differing strategic perceptions about the same sets of facts.  The key to generating lasting progress on this complex, presently “stuck” issue is to map more precisely where the diverging interests and policies actually are – and where they are not; to lay bare the little-discussed strategic assumptions made by both sides and to assess which of those assumptions are accurate and which are not; and likewise, to catalogue and air out the perceptual differences – perhaps as a prelude to evaluating the merits of the two sides’ respective perceptions and trying to generate movement on some of those perceptions.  Though the official positions of the two nations, as well as the five other SCS claimants (which are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan), are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, modest but meaningful progress, and even some degree of trust-building, on this seemingly intractable issue can be achieved by getting “under the hood” of the issue in these new ways.  EastWestInstitute’s “China, East Asia and the United States” (CEAUS) program seeks to focus on these areas in our prospective SCS-related convening and analytical work.

David Firestein, Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President of the EastWest Institute, joined students at Emory University on Monday, October 17, 2016 to discuss the strategic assumptions and perceptions between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea.  Firestein contends media in both states have framed the territorial disputes in the South China Sea as a zero-sum issue between the U.S. and China, a distorted framing that perpetuates the dominant adversarial narrative currently in place.  To effectively analyze the dispute, Firestein claims we must go beyond this conventional media narrative.

A water conduit that is home to one-third of the world’s international trade, the South China Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean, and encompasses an area of 1.4 million square miles. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines all seek claims to territory or waters in the South China Sea. While the U.S. is not a claimant in the South China Sea, the peaceful resolution of this dispute is a stated U.S. national interest.

Firestein noted that, notwithstanding the dominant adversarial framing commonly seen in the media and policy communities, the United States and China actually agree, at least as a matter of declared policy, on some important elements of the South China Sea issue:

1. Each country accepts the other as a key player in the region.

2. Both have articulated commitments to the concept of freedom of navigation, with neither side seeking to impede trade through the South China Sea.

3. Both countries state that they want to see the South China Sea disputes resolved peacefully.

This is not to say, however, that the two countries are without disagreement.  In addition to U.S. concerns about evident Chinese efforts to intimidate and its fellow claimants in some cases, the United States also has concerns about China’s so-called “nine-dash line” claim.  The nine-dash line is essentially a U-shaped boundary encompassing some 85 to 90 percent of the South China Sea; thus far, it has not been fully defined or articulated by China, and thus constitutes an ambiguous, though potentially problematic, claim in the South China Sea.

In a case brought by the Philippines challenging the legality and validity of China’s nine-dash line claim, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled on July 12, 2016 that China’s nine-dash line has no legal or historical basis. While the ruling is a symbolic defeat for China, the Court has no enforcement capabilities and China has declared it null and void.

Transitioning to the issue of the strategic assumptions which underpin U.S. and Chinese policies and actions, Firestein encourages researchers to probe the unspoken assumptions, and in this regard, he proposes a number of provocative questions. One such question: do the United States and China even want to resolve the issue, or is a solution worse than the problem?  Or is the status quo in effect the optimal scenario for one or both of the countries?

Another assumption Firestein challenges is the idea that declared national doctrine and policy represent each nation’s actual strategic intentions.  Both the United States and China, he observed, tend not to take the other’s claims about its intentions at face value; for example, the United States doesn’t believe that the airstrip that China recently constructed in the Spratly Islands is designed merely for civilian and humanitarian purposes, while China sees the U.S. pivot or rebalancing to Asia as far less benign than the United States portrays it to be in official statements.

There are also diverging perceptions around the issue of the South China Sea.  For instance, China believes history trumps law when it comes the issue of the legitimacy of its claims in the South China Sea, while the United States attaches greater importance to established international law (and in this case, UNCLOS in particular).  China sees its own actions as benign and the U.S., along with the Philippines and Vietnam, as instigators of recent tensions in the South China Sea; the United States takes exactly the opposite view, seeing China as the precipitator of those tensions.

Firestein concluded by observing that while certain the disagreements between the United States on the South China Sea are real, they are often overstated, with potentially damaging repercussions.  Though the competing territorial and maritime claims are unlikely to be resolved any time soon, Firestein believes that the United States and China are unlikely to go to war over the South China Sea.  That said, if left unaddressed, the situation in the South China Sea will continue to be a trust-drainer in the U.S.-China relationship.  With more thoughtful probing of the doctrines, policies, assumptions and perceptions, the issue can be managed better, thus generating a higher-quality status quo for all involved.

Written By: Paul Vizza

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/10/21

旧文章ID：15704

作者：Margaret Lu  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

As the U.S. election approaches, the need to review and analyze each presidential candidate is becoming an increasingly pressing matter. The backlash against both candidates due to scandals involving them is unprecedented in modern American history.  On one hand, Secretary Clinton has made questionable decisions during her extensive political career: specifically, her use of a private email server to handle governmental correspondence during her tenure as Secretary of State has been widely criticized. On the other hand, Mr. Trump has made numerous controversial statements throughout his lifetime.  The recently leaked audio involving Trump bragging about sexually assaulting women has received critical attention as well.

Below is a brief summary of each candidate’s involvement in scandal:

Republican Nominee Donald Trump

Donald J. Trump is no stranger to controversy.  In fact, much of his campaign is based on ideologies that are outside the established political spectrum.  Here are some of his most infamous controversies:

· A leaked audio tape revealed Trump engaging in lewd conversation and bragging about sexually assaulting women in 2005.

o This recording has received extensive media coverage and elicited disapproving responses from significant political (or otherwise influential) figures, including Republican House Speaker Paul Ryan and former Republican presidential nominee John McCain.  Trump released an apology statement and later defended himself by describing the speech as ‘locker room banter.’

Whether or not such an apology can be accepted is a challenge for the voter.  Some claim that this audio tape is dated and does not necessarily reflect Trump’s present character. Nevertheless, we must also acknowledge that he was 59 years old at the time of the recording, and should take responsibility for his actions and his behaviour accordingly.  There is no doubt that the behaviour exhibited in this clip is unpresidential.

· Use of Twitter

o Donald Trump is widely known for his usage of the social media platform Twitter to lash out at political opponents and develop his campaign. Such tactics have not been widely used by other presidential nominees in the past. Many of his Twitter statements are considered vulgar or offensive.

The commander-in-chief of the United States must display leadership not only domestically, but also internationally.  The fact that America’s potential future president cannot control his temperament and chooses to maintain an unprofessional presence on the Internet raises concerns about his fitness to serve as president.

Democratic Nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton

Unlike Trump, a large bulk of Clinton’s scandals can be attributed to her political decisions rather than her statements or behaviour. Clinton is often portrayed as ‘untrustworthy’ and the public often perceive her as representing the elite American class despite her attempts to connect with the general public. Below is a summary of her actions that have caused the most controversy:

· Email Controversy

o In March 2015, it was revealed that Hillary Clinton exclusively used her family’s private email server to handle official governmental communications when she served as Secretary of State. The thousands of emails sent through her private messaging systems included correspondence that would be later filed as ‘classified.’  FBI investigations recommended no charges filed against Clinton but noted that she was ‘extremely careless.’ Clinton has since apologized profusely for her actions.

Secretary Clinton’s unprofessional practices of government procedure raises doubts about her qualification to serve as President of the United States.  Her negligent actions are inexcusable and cannot be condoned. Fortunately, we must also acknowledge that there are no proven successful hacking attempts into Clinton’s private server.  Furthermore, we should also remember that the U.S. federal online system itself is not particularly secure.  In fact, there have been quite a number of successful hacking attempts into that system over the years.  The government should be recommended to revise its security protocol in order to ensure the security of classified information.

· Benghazi Attacks

o On September 11th, 2012, a coordinated attack was launched against the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya as well as a CIA annex in the same city. This attack killed and wounded many, most notably U.S. ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens. Clinton was criticized for being negligent in her role as Secretary of State and allowing the security lapses to occur.

Clinton should not have ignored the security pleas and should have taken better precautions, yet responsibility and blame should not be solely put upon her. It is also insensitive to politicize the deaths in Benghazi in order to advance campaigns.

With the evidence at hand, we can acknowledge that both candidates have shown poor judgement. One candidate has understandably made errors in judgement as a politician. The other candidate’s errors seem morally questionable and also reveal an element of immaturity. It is up to the American people to decide who they believe can best represent the interests and image of America.

Written by: Margaret Lu

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/2

旧文章ID：15703

作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Water is essential for life. It makes up 70% of the human body, as well as a portion of all of our foods. Despite its importance, it seems that our global community has only recently started to consider it in policies, and many countries have not adequately addressed issues with water such as shortages and pollution.

Two examples of this are from the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The most recent popular case in the US is the case of Flint, Michigan, during which the Flint government allowed its citizens to consume lead contaminated river water for bathing, drinking, and washing clothes. The government’s inaction to correct the issue resulted in serious health concerns for its citizens. The federal government eventually issued an emergency declaration and provided federal aid, but the settlement of all the issues has just begun. In China, a similar issue has arisen in which 311 Zhangshi Middle School students in Hunan province were hospitalized for consuming contaminated water. China’s Ministry of Education has instructed schools to get rid of substandard facilities in schools, as the amount of students complaining of sickness at school has been increasing.

Although both of these nations have a higher life expectancy than the world average, these water contamination issues create concern about a lack of government insight into the concerns of the populace. The Pingjiang government in Hunan province, unlike the Flint government, addressed their issue via social media as soon as it was discovered and are participating in the movement towards eliminating substandard facilities in its schools. In this case, the Flint government has an example it should look to in taking accountability and providing resources for its people; on a national level, the American government can look at the Chinese government and see the campaigns that are being made to continue improving the lives of its citizens (i.e. transportation innovations, adequate access to water, combating rising housing prices).

Written by: Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/2

旧文章ID：15702

作者：Kevin Sonukan  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On October 18th, 2016, we hosted the 2016 China Town Hall at Emory University. This town hall consisted of a speaker, whom at Emory was Georgetown Law Professor James Feinerman, and a national broadcast featuring Henry Kissinger. Feinerman started off by emphasizing that the basic US-China relationship is very messy, littered with positives and negatives. This is very unsurprising to him, as prior to the 1979 normalization of relations, we had 30 years of mutual enmity.

Feinerman discusses his experiences in China as a student right after the opening of relations and how worried his newly made Chinese friends were that they would never see him again after he left China. President Jimmy Carter had just opened relations, but President Ronald Reagan threatened to derecognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China. Reagan later decided against this, allowing the course of US-China relations to grow and evolve.

As with any other bilateral relationship, this relationship has not been without controversy. President Bill Clinton harmed the relationship with the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, as well as the visit by Lee Teng-hui to Cornell University. Clinton later adjusted his actions, exchanging visits to China with President Jiang Zemin. The relationship was cultivated even more by exchanges of citizens as well. Students were exchanged between both nations to study in their universities, being sponsored by the governments or companies (i.e. Coca-Cola sponsoring Chinese business students to the US). These exchanges not only created people to people connections that would ensure friendlier relations, they also helped build China’s infrastructure (which was damaged by the Cultural Revolution).

Overall, China and the US have continued to grow closer as allies throughout their bilateral relationship. There are a few key issues that still trouble their relationship. The issues are as follows: China doing what’s best for itself in terms of trade (at the potential expense of trade partners), China’s persecution of lawyers, the South China Sea dispute, and international property rights.

In the 1980s, China worked towards strengthening its economy so that its citizens could enjoy a better lifestyle. During this time, Communism had fallen throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and China was protecting itself from damage by elevating the living standards of its citizens to curb discontent. According to Feinerman, China’s liberalization of its economy peaked in 2003 in some cases, and that China has had a lot of success as the nation which moved the most people out of poverty in history. At the same time, a major issue that he brings up is that, despite this social and economic mobility, certain professionals, especially lawyers, have been imprisoned or persecuted because of the trouble they stir up. This has caused the law field in China to suffer immensely.

As far as international business and trade, Feinerman emphasized that China has rewritten economic rules that were established when China was a poor nation. This poses a problem to some already established major states in the West, but it is part of a moral dilemma regarding whether China should follow economic rules that were established to favor the elite when it has its own population to care for.

Another issue Feinerman brought up was the South China Sea; he emphasized that this territory problem is not unique in East Asia, as China also has territory conflicts with South Korea and Japan outside of the South China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea, Duterte said he would work against China, but he has recently flown into China and aligned himself with Beijing.

China still struggles with respecting international property rights. Feinerman emphasized that this issue is not one of too much concern, as states which now respect international property rights, such as Japan, Korea, and the US, all did not respect international property rights at first. What changed them is their brands becoming world players, which caused them to want their brands to get credit for their labors. Once China’s brands go global, it will likely enforce international property rights more strictly.

The second half of the China Town Hall, the national broadcast which featured Henry Kissinger, was a Q&A session. Kissinger answered questions using his experience in politics and in dealing with China. He helped promote Sino-US relations by feigning ill in Pakistan and secretly flying to China to meet with leaders and pave the way for President Richard Nixon to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. China and America both had conflicts with the USSR at the time, which provided compelling motivation for restarting relations. In his answer on important takeaways concerning Sino-American relations during his career, he stated that China and the US have different cultures, and that China has always been surrounded by enemies and worried about survival. He expressed concern with how America looks at world issues, such as a potential Sino-Russian alliance against the US. Additionally, he expressed that China is very sensitive about American intervention in their domestic affairs, and that he believes we are creating an avoidable challenge when we do this (i.e. Li Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell causing a crisis near the Taiwan Strait between the US and China in the late 90s). Sino-American relations will never be without problems, but they have been improving; in order to make things better, Kissinger has told Chinese leaders he has met with that they should not act from a position of strength and superiority, whereas Americans should not act like we are teaching them how to act. Lastly, regarding an area for Sino-American cooperation that is untapped, Kissinger stated that the Silk Road proposal to develop Central Asian infrastructure is a good place for cooperation, and that he hopes the new administration will look at this area and work towards this bilateral cooperation. He also brought up Afghanistan as another area for cooperation as well.

Overall, it was a night in which the audience was introduced to both the history of Sino-American relations and their current state. Between Feinerman and Kissinger, both men discussed their own experiences with China and the issues that they have either seen themselves or seen in the news. There is a lot of room for improvement in this bilateral relationship, but the discussions of both men show that China is a powerful ally rather than an eventual enemy.

Written by: Kevin Sonukan

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/2

旧文章ID：15701

作者：William Pierce  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Food security has always been of central concern for China. With 1.36 billion people, the world’s most populous nation only has nine percent of the total arable land. Africa, a region paradoxically plagued by food shortages currently has 60 percent of the world’s usable acreage. China’s rising political might and greater African presence spur rumors of Chinese farm land acquisition, large scale farmer resettlement and massive food shipments back to China.

Is this the reality on the continent or are other factors at play? Dr. Deborah Brautigam, a Johns Hopkins professor and author of “The Dragon’s Gift,” is a leading expert on Chinese African relations and attempts to separate sensationalism from truth in her new book “Will Africa Feed China?”

Currently – Who is feeding who?

Dr. Brautigam describes how famine has unfortunately plagued China. This reality has had monumental effects on Chinese history and politics, in different eras sparking invasions, rebellions and turmoil. The concern of food security is so paramount, the Chinese government introduced a strategic pork reserve in 2007 to limit the price fluctuations of this highly popular meat. Additionally, the Chinese government now maintains the world’s largest grain reserves.

Dr. Brautigam believes China’s experience with trade embargoes, including the U.S. embargo from 1950 to 1971 has further highlighted the importance of food reserves and independence. In 1996 Chinese leaders set the grain self-sufficiency benchmark at 95 percent of China’s grain requirements. This means China is required to produce domestically nearly all staple foods needed.

China became a net food importer in 2004. By 2012 China’s agricultural exports were worth 63.2 billion USD and imports worth 112.4 billion USD. Despite this, problems related to obesity are of greater concern than starvation.

Africa, to a much larger extent, continues to struggle with food security.  Widespread famine has occurred as recently as the 1970s with an estimated 100,000 people dying in the Sahel. Colonial influences have left an emphasis on commodity export. Despite this, African countries spend two dollars on food imports for every dollar of food they export.  Dr. Brautigam shows, to a large extent, Africa is reliant on foreign food production.

Blessed with abundant natural resources, Africa’s need to import large quantities of food stems from its lack of technology. 65 percent of plowing, cultivation and harvest operations are the product of manpower.  The vast majority of agriculture in Africa is rain fed subsistence farming and merely four percent of farmland is irrigated. In this setting, 20 percent of harvests rot in poor storage or are lost to pests.

It is more common to see Chinese grown and packaged tinned tomatoes or sardines in even remote areas of Africa than to see African produce available in Beijing or Shanghai.

Rumors Abound

According to Dr. Brautigam, the belief that China has acquired large areas of farmland in Africa appears to be more of a myth than reality. Chinese mega-projects proposed by African leaders or being negotiated by Chinese and African stakeholders are assumed to be a certainty yet frequently fail to get off the ground. Figures on Chinese acquisitions have been overstated as they move from African country to African country finally published as fact. Estimates place Chinese land acquisition at 239,365 hectares.  This is a sizable amount and has grown recently, but much less than the six million hectares frequently quoted.

Dr. Brautigam believes the idea that China wants to grow food in Africa for Chinese export appears to be a myth. From a business perspective, this would be an unusual model. With Africa struggling to produce enough food, there is a huge local demand. China’s position across the Indian Ocean makes shipping massive quantities of perishable items a challenge. These logistical realities would deeply cut into any corporation’s bottom-line.

Finally, Dr. Brautigam writes, the acceptance that Beijing plans to send displaced farmers to Africa borders on a conspiracy theory. There is no unified Chinese national policy on agriculture going out and simply no evidence of peasant export. Chinese agricultural engagement has been gradual and experimental. Chinese farm operators are people from a variety of backgrounds who entered farming as a business venture through their own personal decision.

China’s Aim in Dr. Brautigam’s Eyes

Dr. Brautigam predicts Chinese farms in Africa that grow mixed produce for the local market will increase, leading to the question: why? This is because of the unique characteristics of China’s agricultural engagement with Africa.

Chinese assistance blends aid and business. Training programs include demonstration centers, a common component in many aid plans which showcases Chinese agricultural equipment and products. These centers are an effective advertising technique which may allow Chinese firms to grow both in prestige and market share.

Using money from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce creates incentives for Chinese firms to invest abroad. Currently, most Chinese firms are not modern, not vertically integrated and have little brand recognition.  These firms need to become more sophisticated to compete globally.

Dr. Brautigam believes large Chinese firms aspire to be future John Deeres and Cargills.  At the same time the Chinese government is creating incentives for relatively small scale farmers and ventures to operate in Africa.  With these many agricultural startups, one may develop into an industry leader.

It seems that China wants to cultivate a national agricultural champion much like Huawei is in the telecommunication equipment sector; China desires an innovative firm with the strategic vision to unlock Africa’s enormous agricultural potential. This astounding feat can revolutionize global agriculture markets and create a world class company in the process.  Africa is not feeding China. It is a continent for agricultural experiments and innovation. It is the lab were Chinese brands maybe born.

William Pierce holds the graduate assistantship for The Carter Center’s China Program. He is a masters student at Rollins School of Public Health, with a policy and management concentration. Mr. Pierce served in the Peace Corps, living in a Ghanaian village, carrying out public health programs from 2013 to 2015. William holds an executive position in the Rollins Returned Peace Corps Committee.  He has worked at CARE International within the new business development department, responding to U.S. government solicitations, including those from USAID.  William holds a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University at Buffalo. He speaks Hausa and Buili. 

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/3

旧文章ID：15700

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

In August, Uber Technologies Inc. announced that it would sell its China Operations to Didi Chuxing, a Chinese ride-sharing company.  Prior to the merger, both companies had struggled to turn a profit while they engaged in a price war, with Uber unable to successfully localize to the China market.  It actually joins a long list of highly successful Western firms that have failed to tap into China’s economy.  Many companies find China’s “political structure, legal system, and regulatory rules” vexing.  Uber had lost “$2 billion in China in two years there,” and was facing severe pressure from its investors to sell off its assets in China to cut its losses.  The idea was for the two companies to come together and consolidate power in China’s ride-hailing market.  Now, “Uber and investors in its UberChina unit will take a 20% stake in the company (Didi).”

Since then, Uber China has undergone massive changes.  In terms of the app’s functionality, the latest version of Uber China is markedly different from the original app.  Firstly, the English-language interface has been removed, and foreigners will not be able to use the app unless they download the Chinese app store version of the app.  This is not usually the case elsewhere, and it essentially means there is “one service for China and another for the rest of the world.”  Secondly, Didi has removed the option for payment with foreign credit cards, which complicates matters for expats living in China who wish to use the service there.  Lastly, a region-specific support division that can usually be accessed inside the app has also been made unavailable.  Instead, users are given a customer service hotline to deal with issues they have with the app.

But that is not all.

Amid external pressure from the municipal governments of Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai, Didi has been forced to disable “carpooling, inter-city transport, and rides from 7-seaters cars from its app.”  Regulators are currently pushing for stricter restrictions on the hiring process in ride-hailing services.  According to the draft regulations, Beijing’s “transport commission is proposing to require individuals from driving for ride-hailing services to have local household registration, banning migrant workers from outside the mega-cities to operate cars for those services.”  Additionally, Beijing is also trying to mandate the use of locally registered vehicles, as well as establish an age limit for drivers.  By enforcing these stipulations on drivers, these municipal governments are hoping to “shrink the crowded capital” in urban areas.

These will be unwelcome changes for Didi.  If formalized, these proposed regulations will disqualify many current Uber drivers, thereby decreasing the total number of ride-share drivers available.  It is estimated that ride-share costs in these cities will have to double in order to for Didi to sustain profits.  It remains to be seen whether these changes will, in the long-run, lower the demand for ride-sharing in China.

Written by: Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/4

旧文章ID：15699

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

In an announcement that surprised few, China’s Dalian Wanda Group acquired Dick Clark Productions Inc. for $1 billion on November 4th, the company that runs the Golden Globe Awards and the “Miss America” pageant.  The Wanda Group is a Chinese multinational conglomerate that includes Wanda Commercial Properties, “the world’s largest real estate enterprise,” among many other subsidiaries.  Its founder and chairman, Wang Jianlin, has an estimated net worth of $32 billion, making him the richest man in China.  Adding to past acquisitions of AMC Theaters and Legendary Entertainment, the purchase of Dick Clark Productions is another major coup for Wang, who has next set his sights on owning one of the six major Hollywood film studios.

According to Wang, these acquisitions are mutually beneficial — case in point: AMC Theaters’ stock price “has risen 64 percent since Wanda bought it for $2.6 billion in 2012.”  Meanwhile, China’s box office takings are “predicted to match the US and Canada by 2018 – and to grow by around 15% each year for the next decade.”  Wang hopes to incorporate more Chinese elements into the United States’ entertainment industry as he maintains that to succeed in the Chinese market, film producers must not “disregard Chinese tastes.”  Great Wall, an upcoming film by Legendary Entertainment, in partnership with Universal, stars Matt Damon and renowned Chinese actor Andy Lau.  It will be the “first major Hollywood film, aimed at a global audience, to be set, filmed and produced in China.”

Furthermore, in conjunction with the Qingdao municipal government, Wanda has pushed forward an incentive program that subsidizes foreign TV and movie production companies provided that they carry out their productions in its “new $5 billion studio complex” in Qingdao.  Each film or television production will be allotted a rebate of no more than $18 million, and the “total amount available to disperse will be $150 million annually.”  Interestingly, rebate productions have been given three classifications, one of which requires “Chinese cultural, elements, Chinese actors and Chinese investors.”

Wang’s acquisitions, however, have led to push-back from Congress, with several members of the House urging the Obama administration to “review whether the Chinese acquisitions in Hollywood should be subject to the same scrutiny used to assess sales related to national security.”  Politicians are concerned about China’s growing influence in entertainment and view these acquisitions as the Chinese hijacking American entertainment outlets to spread propaganda and “wield cultural influence over the way China is portrayed” on movie screens.

Though Wang has done his best to deny any political agenda behind his business strategy, such skepticism is not completely unfounded especially given the new film law the Chinese government has recently passed, which will carefully screen and censor film content on political grounds.  According to the law, any content that is “deemed harmful to the ‘dignity, honor and interests’ of the country” will be banned.  It also encourages the promotion of “socialist core values.”  The National People’s Congress Standing Committee has already voiced its approval.  The implications for Hollywood remain unknown, but it does little to quell the worries of those who fear Chinese cultural elements will dominate American television and cinema.

Written by: Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/8

旧文章ID：15698

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

EWI Senior VP David Firestein joined students at Emory University’s The Carter Center on October 17 to discuss “The South China Sea: The Diverging Strategic Assumptions and Perceptions of the United States and China.”

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/9

旧文章ID：15697

作者：Robert A. Kapp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The U.S. election, after a campaign of eighteen months that at times seemed to paralyze the entire American political process, is over.  Donald Trump, a man with no government experience, little known interest in international affairs, and a checkered personal past that includes repeated business bankruptcies, repeated instances of inappropriate personal behavior, numerous insinuating appeals to ethnic nationalists within the U.S., and a record primarily of building his own “brand,” takes over the White House on January 20.

His campaign for the highest office in the United States consisted largely of strutting rhetorical demolitions of anyone in his way, most notably the boatload of Republican primary election candidates, each of whom shriveled under Trump’s colorful and humiliating assaults.  Once he entered the presidential election contest against former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose own “baggage” would have weighed heavily on her even if Trump and his minions had not carved new wounds next to the old sores and poured salt into all of them, Trump threw mixed his contentless pledge to “Make America Great Again”  together with seething denunciations of trade agreements,  American economic interdependence, and, in particular, Mexico and China, the two countries which, he told his angry audiences, were responsible for the crippling of their futures and their families’ wellbeing.

Since the election, everyone in the “commentariat” has set to work to explain how Trump won, what “went wrong” with their near-universal predictions of a Clinton victory, etc.  These post-mortems will last another couple of weeks, indigestible in their sheer volume, and will recede as news of the new leader dominates the headlines.  Indeed, everyone has begun weighing in with predictions, both respecting U.S. domestic policy changes and U.S. relations with the world.

At this early point, of course, nothing is certain.  Those politically closest to the Trump movement are happily expecting Trump to succeed in what he pledged to do during his first hundred days on the job, a now-familiar To Do list mainly consisting of actions to destroy whatever President Obama managed to achieve during his eight years in office, starting with the annihilation of the Affordable Care Act, known to most people as “Obamacare,” and proceeding through all manner of reversals of Obama’s executive orders, for example in the area of environmental protection and climate-change.

Others in the prognosticator armies, though, are beginning to moot the theme that reality is more complex for any president than campaigning, and that even with both a House and Senate controlled by the same party as the President, all sorts of legal and political barriers will prevent Trump from simply overturning the American political and economic order with a few strokes of his pen.

Meanwhile, the identities of those even now, in the early aftermath of the election, staffing Trump in arranging the famous “Transition” from an outgoing to an incoming Administration, let alone the identities of those Trump will call on to form his cabinet and the core of his executive-branch administration for the coming years, are largely unconfirmed or utterly unknown.  This is not surprising, and not particularly unique to Trump; the scramble for Who’s Who news right after any presidential election is routine.  But, given Trump’s lack of a meaningful track record in the arena of American government and policy-making, ignorance of who is providing him with decision-making advice on unfamiliar realities is deeper than it would have been under, say, Hillary Clinton, whose coteries of advisors was more widely known.

The new leader will, perhaps, have greater latitude in areas of central interest to U.S.-China relations than he will in many other sectors.  It is widely noted that the President has greater freedom of action, for example, on trade, and indeed on foreign policy more generally, than he/she often has with respect to domestic policies in which the legislative branch has a greater and more intrusive role.  For this reason, observers in the U.S. and China who focus on the complexities of bilateral relations are straining to gain early impressions of what is to come.

My own sense, as a complete outsider to the Trump phenomenon, is something like this.

1) Given Trump’s apparent lack of any sense of history, American or otherwise, we cannot expect the man himself suddenly to discover nuance or any form of empathetic interest in Chinese economic or social realities or the politics that drive PRC behavior in any sector, let alone with specific regard to the U.S. Those who advise him on China are going to have to keep it simple, and their own ideological and professional agendas will play an unusually big role in forming the leader’s sense of priorities and alternative choices.

2) The few figures who have revealed themselves to be “advising” Trump on matters related to China – and they are very few – include individuals of longstanding, sometimes fiery, hostility to the PRC.

3) That so many senior national security-focused individuals accustomed to serving earlier Republican Administrations boldly dissociated themselves from Trump during the election campaign suggests that Trump and his close associates will have to extend their vacuum cleaner far into the ranks of “the willing” to form an Asia team, not only in the State Department but across the range of relevant executive branch institutions (Defense, Treasury, Justice, and so forth).

4) All recent “Transitions” from one president to the next, especially when the incoming president is from a different party from that of his predecessor, take a long time to complete. One remembers that, when the “EP-3 Crisis” broke out in April 2001, only two months after George W. Bush’s inauguration, key appointments to top-level U.S. government positions had not yet been confirmed by the Congress. Even with Congress in Republican hands, the filling out of the ranks of the new Administration will unfold over months.

5) I am agnostic on whether Trump will try to arrange for a vast increase in tariffs on Chinese imports, as he said he would do during the campaign. Tariffs are taxes.  Someone may be able to explain to him that significant increases in the prices of products imported from China will hit struggling Americans in their wallets.  He may not, however, care.  This is an area where we may see some “pushback” from members of the Congress who belong to Trump’s own Republican Party.

6) President Xi Jinping sent Trump a dignified and positive message of congratulation immediately after the election. Chinese in and outside of government will surely be watching the U.S. under Donald Trump over the next six months to begin to form an overall impression of where the U.S. is going, in every sense, and will be considering calibrations of China’s global and bilateral stances accordingly.  What China, despite the rigidities of its political system, has proven powerfully able to do in recent decades is to adjust and amend its course in order to turn new exigencies into opportunities.  I would expect many signs of that from China, particularly if the Trump Administration turns out to be as ill-intended toward China as the candidate’s rhetoric, and the identification of those few figures known already to be his advisors on China, suggests it will.

7) There will very likely be some significant changes in the tone of the bilateral relationship.  Despite bursts of Congressional outrage over human rights violations, “rule of law” deterioration, suppression of internet communication, etc. in China, I suspect the new White House will have little to say.  A U.S. regime dominated by the inward-focused theme of “Making America Great Again” through the instrumentality of a mediagenic strongman leader, riding a wave of aggrieved popular passion, is unlikely to act heavy-handedly toward China on human rights issues.  Of course, at the end of the day no U.S. administration has done that for decades, and an argument can be made that that is the wiser course.  Whether that is a “positive” for U.S.-China relations remains to be seen.

8) Certain “contradictions” in U.S. policy-making may emerge in the short- to mid-term. For example, Trump has called loudly for much heavier military expenditures, including a significant expansion of U.S. naval power, and there is no doubt that the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a naval, rather than an Army or even an Air Force, concern.  But Trump has also been critical of what he sees as the ill-advised involvement of the U.S., especially of American military power, in a series of draining and debilitating international conflicts (mainly in South Asia and the Middle East).  He has muttered about the value of hitherto-sacrosanct American alliances, including both NATO and those in the Asia-Pacific region.  His acolytes have regularly described the Obama “Pivot to Asia” as badly designed and a failure.  Somehow – and it is likely to be through familiar lobbying for funds among the myriad interest groups both within the government and in business – the new Administration will have to come to grips with how far it is willing to go in buying and committing the muscle it seems to think it must have to confront a China that, under Xi Jinping has proven to be no friend of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the end of the day, even for a leader as inexperienced and as ill-prepared as Trump, either he or his advisors will soon confront the reality that actions have consequences, and that in a society as massively complex as that of the U.S., no matter how blinkered and how self-reinforcing the sources of information that feed the man in the Oval Office, the possibilities arising from the exercise of his prerogatives will turn out to be multiple and interwoven.   Depriving twenty million people of health insurance, for example, will hit the very social segments whose misery and anger helped propel the new leader to office.  Tax reforms that enrich the very rich and engorge large American corporations may come to be seen as inconsistent with the interests of those struggling for survival in the dying towns and humble hollows of the American heartland.  Throwing a forty-five percent tariff on Chinese imports (if Trump were able to do that) will undoubtedly engender Chinese responses.  Killing TPP – a goal that the Democratic “base” in organized labor shared with the economic nationalists whom Trump has sought to claim as his own – does nothing for the U.S. but potentially does a lot for China, with Beijing’s own multinational trade agreement proposals reinvigorated once America has walked off the stage.  As Gilbert and Sullivan once wrote,

Things are seldom what they seem,
Skim milk masquerades as cream;
Highlows pass as patent leathers;
Jackdaws strut in peacock’s feathers.

There is wisdom in the idea that every nation must see to its domestic foundations – physical, economic, social – before it can hope to advance its interests globally.  The U.S. has huge deficits to deal with:  crumbling infrastructure at all levels, vast wastage of human talent, imploding human communities across the face of the nation.  The impulse to turn to America’s internal wounds is understandable, and not necessarily a bad thing.  But, just as China dwells incessantly on its humiliation at the hands of predatory foreigners and the threat of “hostile Western forces” and the dangers of “Western values” as it goes about the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People, a Trump-led United States bent on “Making America Great Again” will find that task harder to achieve if it treats “the outside world,” very much including its gigantic Chinese global partner, as a unidimensional menace.  China and the United States alike should approach each other, in this time of political transition in both countries that will extend over the next year and more, with caution and circumspection, not with new doses of hyperbolic rhetoric or policy thrusts that fail to comprehend their likely, complex, outcomes.  At this very early point following the election of Donald Trump, the core question – likely to remain the core question far into the future – is whether a man whose entire career appears to have been focused on himself – self-advancement,  self-aggrandizement, self-enrichment and the adulation of more humble people for himself – will be able to govern in a manner that does not turn the fates of the American people, the Chinese people, and indeed the earth itself into yet another quest for his own personal elevation.

Written by: Dr. Robert A. Kapp, China Program Senior Advisor

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/15

旧文章ID：15696

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The prospect of a Trump victory had aroused the interests of China’s political establishment throughout the election cycle.  Here he was, a reality TV star, challenging the establishment, creating political enemies left and right, but most incredibly, exceeding expectations en route to the White House.  Given the unprecedented levels of political polarization between the two parties, the amount of resentment witnessed from the left following Hillary Clinton’s defeat really was inevitable.  Yet, the degree of post-election backlash and incitement all across the country is playing perfectly into the hands of China’s political elites.  Or so they think.  “What better advertisement for the stable, technocratic authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party?”  Given the progressive/regressive left’s wide-ranging grievances, from cries of the result being an affront to democracy, to questioning the merits of the Electoral College, the Chinese leadership surely must be monitoring this with a tinge of satisfaction.  A sizable contingent in China seems to believe that a Trump presidency will be a net positive for China’s political landscape domestically, at least as far as how it may affect its own citizens’ perception of the Party.  Whether people will be convinced that China’s one-party system is a more sustainable and functional alternative is arguable.  But what does a Trump presidency mean for US-China relations?

One of the most fascinating topics of discussion in this year’s election cycle was both candidates’ proposed policies with regard to Asia and China.  Hillary Clinton was a known quantity; a foreign policy hawk that has openly criticized China’s human rights abuses.  The Obama administration she worked under as Secretary of State initiated the “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific.  Trump, on the other hand, repeatedly flip-flopped on policy positions, though in fairness, he remained relatively firm with his statements on China.  His victory on November 8th came as a shock for many, but when all the furor finally subsides, China will have to face up to the reality of a Trump presidency. 

While his entire campaign run has suggested that the United States will have a potentially volatile presence in the Asia-Pacific, his foreign policy at large remains a giant question mark.  His lack of a foreign policy track record, however, does mean China watchers do not have a wealth of information on which to base their speculations.  Often times, his economic protectionist inclinations towards China have been taken at face value, when in fact China-bashing is a bipartisan exercise that tends to rear its ugly head during every election cycle – should one truly expect Trump to levy tariffs on Chinese imports and significantly weaken American consumers’ purchasing power? 

The absence of a political track record for Trump means that more attention should be devoted to Clinton’s past dealings with China, which serves as a good reference point.  The Chinese do not have a definitive idea of how and if Trump will clamp down on cybersecurity issues and react to China’s spotty human rights record.  But they have a much clearer picture of what a Clinton presidency would have entailed in this area; it would have largely been an extension of the Obama administration’s rebalance agenda.  Another factor to consider is the general belief that Republican presidents are more receptive to an economically beneficial relationship with China.  Having a commander-in-chief who respects free trade will undoubtedly be more conducive to greater cooperation with China amidst the sociopolitical tension that invariably surrounds Sino-US relations.  But Trump, by any measure, is no paragon of free trade, let alone conservatism.  His anti-globalization and pro-protectionism rhetoric supports that claim, so this general rule may not apply in his case after all.  How he decides to act will also have a bearing on how the US engages with China in the South China Sea.  In fact, the only time he has broached the subject was to take a thinly veiled shot at President Obama’s Asia policy.  When asked about China’s military expansion by way of building artificial islands, Trump responded, “Amazing, actually.  They do that, and they do that at will because they have no respect for our president and they have no respect for our country.” At this point, it is uncertain how the Trump administration will react to the perceived belligerence demonstrated by the Chinese government in the South China Sea.

For now, all we can do is wait and see how far he actually departs from his campaign position on China. 

Written by: Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/17

旧文章ID：15695

作者：Aaron Walayat  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The views expressed in this article belong entirely to the author and do not represent the views of the US-China Perception Monitor or the China Program at The Carter Center.

 As Donald Trump prepares to be sworn in as the forty-fifth President of the United States, he is currently in the process of selecting his Cabinet. This has led to an outpouring of speculation across news outlets, mulling over the names of individuals who may find themselves in key positions in the Trump administration.

Critics of Trump, before and after his election, have argued that Trump offers little in terms of policy besides the worryingly vague plan to “bomb the **** out of ISIS” and the oddly specific plan to place a “45 percent” tariff on Chinese products.” The devil is in the details, which Trump does not seem keen on working out.

This would instead mean that Trump’s Cabinet will be of particular importance under his Presidency. If Donald Trump does not intend to plunge himself into the details of his general policy outlook, he must choose his advisors and secretaries carefully; these individuals are likely to have major influence in the Trump administration.

A recent article in the National Review, the nation’s preeminent conservative magazine and one of the president-elect’s most vocal opponents, has offered John Bolton as a possible candidate for Secretary of State, the leading diplomat of the United States.

The article praises Bolton’s aversion to international institutions and treaties that “threaten our interests [and] sovereignty,” celebrates his positions that negotiations are not an end in themselves, but a means to ensure national interests and notes that Bolton would be an ideal pick to unite the Republican Party under the new Trump administration.

However, I, lowly student as I am, respectfully disagree with the National Review, as I do not believe John Bolton is the ideal choice to head the State Department.

For one, Bolton would be a huge step in the opposite direction for Trump. During his campaign, in a break from previous Republican presidential candidates, Trump loudly derided the W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq, going so far as to proclaim the Iraq War “a big, fat mistake.” On the other hand, Bolton has been a supporter of the Iraq War, even up until today. The choice of Bolton would be a betrayal to those who voted for Trump on the basis of opposition to the war in Iraq.

Furthermore, for a Trump that ran his campaign on Middle East policies involving cooperation with Russia, a Secretary of State who favors American boots on the ground would be a major turn from Trump’s less militaristic approach to the Middle East. Many Americans even voted for Trump over Hillary Clinton in fear of Clinton’s plan of a “no-fly zone” over Syria that could have potentially led into a protracted conflict. However, should Trump pick Bolton, the United States not only risks a larger conflict with ISIS, but also risks a Secretary of State who would bomb both ISIS and Iran.

John Bolton would be a slap in the face of a Donald Trump electorate tired of foreign wars. Even Republicans, like Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, have come out against the proposition of appointing John Bolton as Secretary of State. (The libertarian website Reason.com lists other reasons for opposition to John Bolton’s appointment for Secretary of State. You can read them here.)

While I disagree with many of Bolton’s policy decisions, I do find myself agreeing with the National Review’s assessment that negotiations should not be an end in themselves, but a means to ensure national interests. However, it is for the very reason that I agree with this point that I believe that John Bolton would not be ideal candidate for Donald Trump’s Secretary of State. In his place, I would like to suggest another candidate who I believe would be Donald Trump’s ideal choice for Secretary of State: Jon Huntsman.

Jon Huntsman got his first stint at political life as a staff assistant for President Reagan. Later, during the H.W. Bush administration, he was appointed Ambassador to Singapore as one of the youngest ambassadors in United States history. He served as a Deputy United States Trade Representative during the W. Bush administration, but left in 2003 to run for governor in his home state of Utah. He served two terms as Governor where he was widely popular and created a strong economy.

During the Obama administration, Huntsman was appointed United States Ambassador to China, where he was chosen for his knowledge of the region (he was a Mormon missionary in Taiwan) and his fluency in Mandarin Chinese (though his exact level of capability in the language has been in dispute). He resigned from that position in 2011 to run an ultimately unsuccessful bid for President in the 2012 election. In 2014, he was named Chairman of the Atlantic Council, a major foreign policy think tank.

Huntsman possesses expertise and strong relations with China (despite a controversial sighting in Beijing) and the Asian region as a whole further buttressed with his experience with the Atlantic Council which follows an Atlanticist outlook of deeper cooperation between Atlantic countries through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other institutions. Huntsman is also a strong advocate of trade, having served in the Department of Commerce and as a Deputy Trade Representative. Earlier this year, he and Gary Locke, his successor as Ambassador to China, coauthored an article in the National Interest that called for the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, calling it “vital” to American interests.

I know what you are probably saying: “Trans-Pacific Partnership? NATO cooperation? Why would Donald Trump choose him? Trump opposes all of those things!” While I believe that the United States should not step away from free trade policies and should choose a Secretary of State who have the proper competence and foresight to deal with the 21st century’s wide array of problems, my response will depart from the glittery world of ideology and step into the grotesque chamber of pragmatics.

Readers of Trump’s The Art of the Deal will know that Trump’s plans come not from clearly laid out policy positions (as any reader of the news could tell you), but from persuasion and leverage. Donald Trump stylizes himself as a world-class negotiator and, by keeping his plans in the dark, he hopes to use the leverage of harsh and vague policy plans to convince foreign negotiators to accept his hidden (and possibly more feasible) goals.

Trump’s international policies will likely be a hard shift from Obama-era engagement. However, if Trump is serious about cutting the best deals for the United States, he cannot afford to completely scare away potential partners before they even come to the negotiating table. What Trump needs is not a Secretary of State who is like him in every way, but a Secretary of State who is subtler than him.

Trump makes big promises on NATO, Iran, China, and trade, but how can he bring feasible change without being able to talk with these parties at the negotiating table? Trump’s iconoclastic and bombastic temperament as well as his tendency to alienate and push away international leaders are likely to be a major setback for the administration’s foreign policy. However, the selection of Secretary of State gives Trump the opportunity to turn this weakness into a strength. To the world, Trump is another unrefined populist leader chosen by citizens looking for a change, a phenomenon not unusual among many democratic countries.

Trump needs someone who foreign leaders believe they can talk to, someone who they believe will be able to work with them.

Sending in a savvy diplomat to introduce compromises and work with foreign leaders would not only be an unexpected from the State Department, it would also allow Trump to cut better deals. Trump needs is a foil to his populist image. An individual who can lull international negotiators into complacency by harkening back to softer, more temperamental, Obama-led days. This is where Jon Huntsman enters. If Trump intends to maximize his leverage, Huntsman would be the best choice to cut the best deals.

Some may argue that someone like John Bolton, who possesses policies even harder on international leaders than Trump, would make Trump’s deals seem reasonable by comparison. However, Bolton would just be seen as Trump’s vehicle abroad. He would provide an insufficient contrast to Trump, and he would not possess the same “bait-factor” that Huntsman possesses to draw negotiators to the table.

Trump needs a moderate; he needs someone who is level-headed enough to bring world leaders to the table. Trump could introduce his terms to the extreme and Huntsman could negotiate those terms to more reasonable alternatives leaning towards what Trump actually intends to accomplish. It would be a classic case of good cop – bad cop.

The future will require what Joseph Nye calls “smart power,” a mixture between “hard power” (usually characterized as military power) and “soft power” (other influential power including economic and cultural influence). While Trump has made huge promises regarding “hard power,” his presidency could hurt America’s “soft power” in multiple arenas on the international stage, and, without both hard and soft power, a Trump administration is unlikely to create change on the international stage. The Trump administration needs a Secretary of State who would provide a counterweight to the “hard power” focus of the administration; this should be someone who will reassure the international communities that it is still worth coming to the table with America.

As someone who believes the United States must take a multifaceted approach to international affairs and needs a Secretary of State who will not frighten away America’s possible partners, I humbly recommend Jon Huntsman for the office of Secretary of State.

Written by: Aaron Walayat

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15694