作者：Paul Vizza  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On Friday, November 11th 2016, a group of scholars and academics who focus on U.S.-China relations convened at the Carter Center to view Mr. Deng Goes to Washington, a documentary about Deng Xiaoping’s historic nine-day visit to the United States in 1979, and to discuss what relations between the U.S. and China might look like under Donald Trump, who will become the 45th President of the United States on January 20, 2017.

            Written and directed by Fu Hongxing, Mr. Deng Goes to Washington examines the history of U.S.-China relations, which can be traced back to Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s memorable visit to the U.S. during the administration of President Jimmy Carter.  While the underpinnings of the relationship between the U.S. and China began during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974) the Carter administration is credited with normalizing relations.  In an address to the nation preceding Deng’s visit, President Carter stated, “…That normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American people, but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.”

            During his visit Deng Xiaoping made a tremendous effort to normalize relations, emphasizing the need for communication between the nations. Through diplomacy and strong central leadership, the U.S.-China relationship developed into what is considered the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. However, President-elect Trump is often critical of China, which has many observers, including the panel assembled at the Carter Center, speculating on how the incoming Administration will view China. Below I summarize the leading assessments of the U.S.-China Relations panel.

            The discussion at the Carter Center opened with Alan Abramowitz, a professor of political science at Emory University and one of the nation’s leading election forecasters. At a Carter Center event held two months before the November election, Professor Abramowitz predicted the next president-elect to be Hillary Clinton, the nominee of the Democratic Party.  However, Republican Party nominee and businessman Donald Trump – in the biggest presidential upset in modern history, won the electoral college, and with that, the highest elected office in the United States.

            In a welcome return to the Carter Center, Abramowitz explained how he, and so many other pollsters, were wrong in predicting a Clinton victory and why Donald Trump performed so strongly, despite a litany of scandals and controversial statements. According to Abramowitz, the strongest predictors of relative performance for the two candidates were diversity and education. Secretary Clinton was overwhelmingly favored by minority populations and college graduates. Conversely, Mr. Trump did significantly better in populations with less diversity and no college education, concentrating heavily on white voters.

            While the final votes have not been counted, Secretary Clinton is projected to win the popular vote by nearly 1.5 million votes, or favored by 1.2 percent of the population. But as Abramowitz noted, two of the last five presidential elections have resulted in the winner of the popular vote losing the electoral college, “…This 18th century institution created by the founding fathers is coming back to bite us yet again, and the result is Donald Trump entering the White House.”

            Exit polls paint a picture of a deeply divided nation, and the educational divide in particular is a growing trend in American politics that has accelerated during this election. Even within the Republican party there are growing cultural and ideological divides, especially on the issues of immigration, healthcare, and the proposed wall between the U.S. and Mexico.  Upon reviewing voter demographics, Clinton won the African American vote by 80 points, the LGBTQ vote by 64 points, and non-religious affiliation vote by 42 points. President-elect Trump won the white vote by 21 points, white evangelical vote by 65 points, and overall conservative vote by 66 points. Additionally, senate elections were won in every state where their presidential candidate won the state, displaying strong partisan consistency.

            So what does this Trump victory mean for the U.S. and China moving forward? It is difficult to foretell, but President-elect Trump made numerous promises during his campaign, that if implemented, could severely impact U.S. foreign relations, such as imposing a 45 percent trade tariff with China, renegading on the Iran Nuclear Deal, and withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord.

            Professor Abramowitz answered questions from the audience about third party candidates, and how other potential candidates would have performed against Trump. Abramowitz notes that support for third party candidates dropped off closer to the election, but that it’s too soon to know whom these voters supported, which may be part of the answer to the puzzle of how the polls were wrong.

            When asked how Senator Bernie Sanders or Vice President Joe Biden may have fared against Trump, Abramowitz said it is an impossible scenario to predict. He questions how Senator Sanders would have held up as a general election candidate since he never had to endure the rigors of a sustained attack from GOP candidates. Abramowitz speculates a more mainstream candidate such as Vice President Joe Biden, due to his working-class qualities, may have had more appeal to white voters, a demographic that voted overwhelmingly for Trump. In the end, only time and further review will reveal the intricacies of this election, but as for U.S.-China relations under a Trump presidency, Professor Abramowitz predicts, “It’s going to be a wild ride.”

            Next to speak on the topic of U.S.-China relations was Mr. Zhou Zhixing, a distinguished political commentator who is the founder, president, and editor-in-chief of both Leaders and Financial Digest, two increasingly prominent journals in China. Additionally, Mr. Zhou is the founder of Consensus Net, a digital platform for political debate within China.

            Mr. Zhou began by questioning whether President-elect Trump possesses the same courage and vision as Deng Xiaoping, and whether he will carry the torch to enhance U.S.-China relations.  Mr. Zhou claims the election of Trump reflects numerous social issues the U.S. government has been unable to adequately address, such as unemployment and social welfare. Instead of analyzing polls and predicting elections, more effort should be placed on whether the American people and international community can trust President-elect Trump’s campaign promises, and what can be done to fix the divide in this country.

            Mr. Zhou claims that despite the overall negative attitudes towards Mr. Trump from Chinese-Americans, many still voted for him because of his reputation as a pragmatic business man, and because he is prone to isolationism; a policy that would allow China expanded international influence. However, due to the sudden and unexpected victory of the presidential race, many Chinese people don’t know much about Mr. Trump besides his real estate businesses.

            For this reason, Mr. Zhou advocates for open channels of discussion to enhance understanding and improve bilateral relations between both the people and leaders for both countries. While there has been communication between the U.S. and China since 1979, it has mostly been for collaborating information rather than building a relationship. Mr. Zhou contends it is imperative for leaders of two countries to build friendships, as seen with Deng Xiaoping, so they may better communicate on core issues and cut through strategic subtlety. Mr. Zhou encourages the U.S. and China to define their super power relationship, and make their intentions known. While hesitant, Mr. Zhou notes that Trump could potentially be a strong president for U.S.-China relations, quoting the proverb, “To replace a person is similar to replacing a knife.”

            Next to speak on the topic of U.S.-China relations was Henry ‘Hank’ Levine, senior advisor for Albright Stone Bridge where he assists clients as they enter and grow in the Chinese market. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia, Mr. Levine draws on decades of experience as a U.S.-China market expert.

            According to Mr. Levine, there has been a significant turn towards the containment of China in the U.S. policy community, arguing that U.S.-China relations are perhaps the worse since President Nixon’s years. Mr. Levine contends China is viewed as a threat to the United States, and instead of engaging with China, policy makers now advocate containing its growth. Mr. Levine provided six factors from a U.S. perspective that perpetuate a containment line of thinking:

1) China’s military growth over the years, while overstated, is perceived as threatening

2) The anti-trade/anti-globalization wave experienced across the U.S. accuses China as a leading participant of the alleged damage caused by globalization

3) Growing anxiety among multinational companies that the Chinese government interferes in a method advantageous to China and harmful to U.S. competitiveness

4) The deteriorating human rights situation among minority populations in China has played into the narrative that China is wicked

5) President Xi Jinping’s assertive stances on international issues such as the South China Sea

6) President Obama and his current advisors have lost the strategic vision and desire to manage U.S.-China policy that predecessors such as President Nixon and Henry Kissinger valued.

            In an effort to challenge the narrative driven by the containment policy, Mr. Levine argues that the U.S.-China policy conceived in 1979 has resulted in the last 40 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity in the East Asia region. Additionally, Mr. Levine disputes the notion that China is, “Out to conquer the world,” citing the enormous amount of cooperation displayed by China on the international stage. Mr. Levine concludes that while the containment voices are growing, they are wrong and destructive, and only through smart policy can both countries avoid turning a beneficial relationship into one of true hostility.

            The event concluded with closing remarks from Shannon Tiezzi, managing editor of the online international affairs magazine, The Diplomat. Prior to her work with The Diplomat, Ms. Tiezzi served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, a non-partisan, non-profit organization that promotes a greater understanding between American and Chinese policymakers.  While at the U.S.-China Foundation, Ms. Tiezzi also hosted the China Forum, a televised educational program that discusses contemporary issues relating to China with a diverse panel of experts.

            According to Ms. Tiezzi, President-elect Trump views China in almost exclusively economic terms, which is unsurprising since he’s a business man with no previous political experience. Ms. Tiezzi agrees Trump is likely to follow a U.S. policy of containment towards China, but is uncertain on whether he will keep his campaign promises to label China a currency manipulator, abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and Japan.

            Ms. Tiezzi notes that China is not unfamiliar to receiving reproach from U.S. presidential candidates, and that China has developed a perfunctory attitude over the years towards this criticism. However, President-elect Trump is a reputed iconoclast affirmed to shake the Washington foundation, and must be taken seriously no matter the absurdity of his claims.

            Ms. Tiezzi argues that President-elect Trump has not said anything of substance on his policy in Asia, and that she is skeptical of his threat to withdraw U.S. troops. According to Ms. Tiezzi, Mr. Trump did not fully consider the repercussions of his responses in an interview about U.S. military alliances abroad, comparing him to President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, who recently rescinded support for U.S.-Philippines alliance.

            An unlikely area of potential boon for the U.S.-China relationship may dwell in Trump’s stated lack of interest in human rights. The president-elect has advocated for the use of torture and killing of families associated with Islamic terrorism, and is unlikely to condemn China for any human rights violations or treatment of minority populations. It is also likely that Mr. Trump’s attention will focus primarily on U.S. involvement in the Middle East and countering ISIS terrorism, allowing China greater influence in Asia.

            However, a Trump presidency threatens the greatest source of cooperation between U.S.-China in previous years: The Paris Climate Accord on climate change.  President Obama and Xi Jinping have both agreed on climate change policies and emissions reductions, an agreement President-elect Trump has vowed to eliminate. As such, what was once an effective means of diplomacy may now become a source of confrontation and diplomatic chill.

            Moving forward, Ms. Tiezzi claims Mr. Trump faces a steep learning curve, and will likely rely heavily on his political advisors. That said, Ms. Tiezzi believes we can expect a return to previous U.S.-China patterns as witnessed under President Reagan, President George H. Bush, and President Clinton: pledged tough policy towards China in their first two years, followed by a return to normalization.

Written by: Paul Vizza

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2016/11/29

旧文章ID：15693

作者：Adrian Lo  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Early this month, the Politburo drafted China’s 13th Five-Year Plan.  In it, the government announced a nationwide “social credit system” that will supposedly “strengthen the establishment of a national population-based information repository and improve the social credit system.”  It sounds fairly benign on the surface, and thus far details on it are scant, but experts predict that its implications go beyond a “financial credit system like the ones used in the U.S. and other developed countries.”  While someone’s credit rating will have a bearing on their business prospects, it will also affect their access to social institutions and privileges.  And besides just compiling one’s credit rating, the system taps into their social life as well. 

At an individual level, according to Wall Street Journal reporting “based on government blueprints, state-media reports and interviews with architects of the plan,” not only will the algorithm take into account one’s financial behavior, it will also consider social factors such as shopping habits, filial piety and volunteer activity.  Further, whether one is fit to access luxury hotels, travel abroad, attend schools, will also be determined by their rating.  Meanwhile, at the government level, the State Council explains that the system will help stamp out corruption among Party officials, be useful in tax collection, determine individuals’ creditworthiness, etc. 

If carried out, the government will use Big Data to compile profiles for 1.4 billion citizens.  Big Data refers to “extremely large data sets that are analyzed by computers to reveal patterns and trends, especially in human behavior.”  Such a system will certainly be unprecedented.  But in the government’s attempt to create model citizens out of everyone and punish delinquent behavior at an all-encompassing national level, it has raised concerns about the invasion of privacy and the ethics behind the government monopolizing the right to define morality.  It is important to point out that Big Brother is not a foreign concept in China.  Extensive public records of citizens used to be kept under the Maoist regime; profiling as a means of screening workers operated in conjunction with the hukou system.  As the country has veered further from a planned economy, however, such a draconian measure no longer seems necessary. 

The government’s insistence on mass surveillance is trickling down to the provincial level; there are several pilot cities that have been rolling out surveillance schemes.  In Yangjiang, Guangdong, for instance, officials addressed food safety issues by seeking data “on the behavior of businesses to analyze and show the results to consumers.”  The data will then be made accessible to customers.  While many in the food industry have supported the system as it provides transparency, they want to make sure the systems are foolproof before officially implemented.  A vegetarian restaurant’s health rating was “erroneously downgraded” by the system and it immediately saw a drop-off in customers.  The reliability of the system will be another consideration.  China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, announced last year that developing the system would require the services of the country’s largest e-commerce and social media firms.  But if not properly executed, innocent citizens could suffer drastic consequences. 

Unlike in the United States, any negative public reaction towards nontransparent profiling can be effectively tamed by the government.  It is unlikely that a social-credit system will engender as much internal dispute as the United States federal government’s No Fly List, which has long been deemed unconstitutional by the ACLU due to the lack of due process for U.S. citizens.  The issue, though, is the increasing encroachment on civil freedoms by the Chinese government.  The effort to clamp down on corruption and social ills has come at the expense of personal liberties.  The government will have to consider if such a trade-off is truly worth the pursuit.

Written by: Adrian Lo

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15692

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Dr. Abramowitz is one of the nation’s leading election forecasters. At a Carter Center event held two months before the November election, he predicted the next president-elect to be Hillary Clinton, the nominee of the Democratic Party.

In a welcome return to the Carter Center, Abramowitz explained how he, and so many other pollsters, were wrong in predicting a Clinton victory and why Donald Trump performed so strongly.

A panel discussion followed right after.  Here, the panel discussed the future direction of U.S.-China Relations under the Trump administration.

The panelists were: Mr. Zhou Zhixing, a distinguished political commentator who is the founder, president, and editor-in-chief of both Leaders and Financial Digest, two increasingly prominent journals in China. Additionally, Mr. Zhou is the founder of Consensus Net, a digital platform for political debate within China; Henry ‘Hank’ Levine, senior advisor for Albright Stone Bridge and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia; and Shannon Tiezzi, managing editor of the online international affairs magazine, The Diplomat.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15691

作者：Paul Vizza  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

         On Friday December 9th, the South Korean 300-member National Assembly voted 234-56 in favor of the motion to impeach President Park Geun-hye. This decision comes after weeks of unprecedented protests in Seoul, sparked by reports of Park’s wide-ranging misuse of power. South Korea’s Constitutional Court is expected to soon ratify the vote, thus securing her impeachment. The next leader of South Korea will be in a position to redirect the country’s political agenda, with Korean relationships toward the United States and China at the forefront. The implementation of the American-made Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense [THAAD] system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles upon radar detection, is a multifaceted issue integral to this trilateral relationship.

            If the court supports the impeachment, Park will be formally removed from office, and a presidential election must be held within 60 days to elect a successor for a full five-year term. If fewer than six judges vote in support of the impeachment, Park is immediately reinstated and permitted to complete her five-year term through February 2018. Despite Park appointing six of the nine judges, the court is expected to vote in favor of her impeachment given the severity of the charges. There is strong speculation that United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, will run as a nominee for Park’s conservative Saenuri Party; however, Park’s corruption and pending impeachment will almost guarantee a landslide victory for the main liberal opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea’s (DPK) frontrunner, Moon Jae-in, in the ensuing election.

            South Korean national security is threatened by an increasingly aggressive North Korea. This year alone, North Korea conducted its fifth and most successful nuclear test, and made significant progress on the capabilities of its ballistic missiles.  China opposes THAAD due to its ability to intercept radar signals and conduct electronic surveillance in the region, thus inadvertently challenging China’s military strategy in a go-to-war scenario with the United States. In instances of hostile engagement between the U.S. and China, THAAD would detect missiles directed toward critical U.S. air and naval facilities on the islands of Okinawa and Guam, denying China a missile first strike capability against the U.S. The next leader of South Korea must reach a precarious balance in building relationships with the U.S. and China without alienating one, or provoking economic retaliation from the other. While traditionally allied with the United States, in recent years South Korea has placed more reliance on China’s role in mediating North Korea, an unsuccessful endeavor that has produced no tangible outcomes.

            Park’s ruling conservative party pursued THAAD in alliance with the United States as a result of recent North Korean nuclear provocation, and China’s inability or unwillingness to reign in Pyongyang. However, plans for THAAD implementation are still an estimated 8-10 months away, and with a likely future ruling Democratic Party, THAAD and stances on international relations with the U.S., China, and North Korea are at risk of being reversed. 

            As the main liberal opposition party, the DPK disagrees with the Saenuri Party on a number of issues, including their anti-THAAD position. The DPK’s primary concern with THAAD is economical

            Moon has not explicitly stated if he would reverse THAAD; however, he argues South Korea requires a more, “balanced diplomacy” with China and the U.S.; THAAD skews that balance in favor of the U.S. In August of this year Moon implied THAAD implementation should be reviewed, tweeting, “The government [South Korean] should make all-out efforts to convince China and prevent a worsened bilateral relationship, even if THAAD becomes real.”          

            However, one fundamental question that must be asked, “Is China capable of deterring North Korea?” Evidence from the G20 Summit hosted by China earlier this year suggests otherwise. During the Summit, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles 600 miles into the Sea of Japan as a display of military prowess. Traditionally, out of respect for its greatest ally and economic lifeline, North Korea would avoid inflammatory behavior that would embarrass China, but despite condemnation from the UN and numerous countries, North Korea expressed no regret, and instead committed to furthering its missile capabilities.

            For all the failures of her administration, President Park made tremendous efforts to improve relations with China. Similar to the DPK, Park hoped to foster stronger relations with China through diplomacy. Toward this goal, Park rejected the initial proposal to implement THAAD upon taking office in 2013, despite strong encouragement to accept from the United States. Additionally, Park visited Chinese President Xi Jinping six times while in office, and much to the chagrin of the United States, attended a military parade in Beijing in 2015 alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin. Only after exhausting diplomatic efforts, and with no signs of China attempting to reciprocate these efforts by assuaging North Korean did Park consent to THAAD

          If elected, Moon Jae-in and the DPK have an opportunity to guide South Korea in a direction with more political transparency and stronger economic relations with China. However, economic progress should not be at the expense of losing momentum toward greater national security, especially as North Korea improves its nuclear capabilities and China’s declining influence over the North may be a smokescreen that bears no promise. It is in South Korea’s best interest that THAAD be implemented, and remain employed as long as the possibility of an attack from North Korea remains likely. It is in everyone’s best interest that China assumes a larger role in easing North Korea’s aggression and nuclear ambition.

Written by: Paul Vizza, former Army Officer with a degree in International Affairs from American University. Mr. Vizza was stationed at Camp Casey, South Korea from 2014-2015.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15690

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The current state of Sino-U.S relations is in flux and with it are the old norms which used to govern the relationship between the two great powers. Since his nomination, President-elect Trump has taken a strong stance against perceived threats to U.S. job security and economic prosperity by Chinese actors. Alongside a possible 10% import tariff on Chinese products, Mr. Trump has gone as far as to appoint staunch anti-Chinese persons into positions of power such as the long time China hawk Peter Navarro to head the new National Trade Council. While his tough talk may be perceived negatively in Beijing, neither taxation nor political appointments are seen as being “deal breakers” for the CCP to maintain diplomatic ties with the United States. More worrying, perhaps, may be the fact that those issues that the CCP has signaled in the past—such as reestablishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan—could trigger a de-normalization of relations.

The most troubling development to arise from the President-elect’s actions is the complete and utter disregard for theMandatory Guidance from the Department of State Regarding Contact with Taiwan and the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, which was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on April 10, 1979. The law, which affords Taiwan statehood in all but name alone, has created a space in which the U.S and China can work together while still retaining prior American commitments to Taiwan. Deliberately or not, by accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-Wen on December 3rd (arranged by lobbyist and former senator Bob Dole), Mr. Trump has put in question U.S. adherence to the One-China policy, and jeopardized the stable relationship Washington and Beijing have cultivated for the past 39 years.

The new administration’s aim in drawing these new hard lines against the Chinese is to test how hard (and where) they can push their counterparts in Beijing, but the ramifications of these tactics have manifested themselves tangibly. The seizure of the Slocum G2 Glider drone off the coast of the Philippines on December 16th, and the subsequent January 11th movement of the Liaoning (辽宁舰) Aircraft Carrier through the Strait of Taiwan, can be seen as a direct result of these actions. In regards to the first incident retired Chinese army general Yue Gang has been quoted as saying, “We were hitting back, militarily but indirectly, at President Elect Trump’s messing with the One-China principle” (Source).

While the American executive branch has begun to acquire significantly more power in the past 20 years, it does not have the power to reinstate formal relations with Taiwan. As outlined in TRA, this duty would fall in the hands of Congress, which makes the January 8th meeting between Tsai and Texas representative Ted Cruz even more unsettling. Vocal discontent over the meeting has appeared across Chinese social media, alongside heavy interpretation regarding the gift of a clock from Mr. Cruz to President Tsai, which in Chinese culture traditionally symbolizes the recipient’s death in the near future. In contrast, the uneventful nature and lack of high profile meetings on Tsai’s return visit through San Francisco January 18th indicate that as the inauguration grows closer the Trump administration has begun to notice where China has drawn its line.

Currently, only 22 nations recognize Taiwan as an independent state, primarily in Latin America. It is an official policy of the Chinese government to have neither trade nor diplomatic relations with those countries. The Trump administration may feel that the U.S.-China relationship is “Too Big to Fail,” and therefore miscalculates the non-negotiable nature of the One-China policy. The importance of the economic and strategic relationship between the two countries cannot be disregarded, however, and neither can the two identical statements issued by the Chinese government after the December 3rd call and January 9thmeeting, which explicitly warn of the damage such a path would cause.

It is in the best interest of the United States to remain neutral on the issue of Taiwan so as to not endanger future engagement with China over issues like North Korea, climate change, and piracy. By overlooking these broader implications in order to flex U.S might, the nuanced, fragile, and interconnected reality of the Sino-American relationship is ignored. If America is to build off of President Carter’s legacy in the Asia-Pacific, we must learn to pick our battles wisely and place geopolitical security above shows of power.

Daniel Grober is one of the current interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15689

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Let us take a moment for us to mourn, The Transpacific Partnership (TPP) is dead. While Seasoned Asia hands and casual onlookers alike had seen the writing on the wall for a better part of the last year, to put it bluntly, people lost their minds. Sen. John McCain, blasted the decision saying the pullout “will have lasting consequences for America’s economy and our strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region”, as Sanders supporters and Trump Voters alike celebrate over the win. There are however eleven other partner nations that do not wish to see nine years of negotiations go to waste. Australia and New Zealand for instance have taken the leadership role upon their shoulders, Japan has begun to implement a contingency plan of their own, and China is working to market itself as the most viable partner to fill the void. To Paraphrase Mark Twain “The Reports of Its Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated” 

The Australians are divided. On one side you have those who see the decision by the Trump Administration to back away from the signature deal of Obama’s Pivot to Asia as a blessing. Much like in the U.S, conservatives within the Australian government see the creation of an Asia Pacific free trade zone via the TPP as being detrimental to keeping jobs in the country. To them, the backing out of the U.S created an opening where Australia can do the same with little political repercussions. Domestically, the government has gone quiet on the deal, with the latest update to the official TPP website being two days after President Trump won the election.

On the international level however Australia is still being vocal about their commitment to multinational Free Trade Deals with the Trade Minister Steven Ciobo being quoted as saying there are “gains that Australia, Japan, Canada, Mexico and other countries want to keep hold of. Which is why a number of us had a conversation about a possible TPP 12 minus one.” The main concern of the Australians is inversely the main reason why President Trump wishes to proceed outside the realm of the TPP.  To all parties involved, if the U.S starts utilizing bilateral negotiations with TPP counties there is a high likelihood deals made would grant the same concessions that the TPP would have to the U.S without providing those benefits to other countries.

In order to circumvent this reality Japan and New Zealand have both signaled that they would place their diplomatic efforts into an another venue, with the latter’s Prime Minister Bill English stating “We’ve got this RCEP(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership)agreement with Southeast Asia, which up until now has been on a bit of a slow burn, but we might find the political will for that to pick up if TPP isn’t going to proceed.” To those who may be unfamiliar, the RCEP is a proposed Free Trade Agreement between the ten ASEAN members, China, India, South Korea, Australia, and Japan.  In essence, this proposal would create a free trade zone in Asia Pacific just like the TPP, but differs due to looser restrictions on issues such as the environment and labor while also including China.

Japan is the surprise actor in this equation. Traditionally, liberal economic practices are not the norm for the Japanese one way for them to stave off the economic stagnation stemming from an ageing population is through neoliberal global engagement. In a press conference January 24th, 2017 Shinzo Abe spoke publicly stating “I believe President Trump understands the importance of free and fair trade, so I’d like to pursue his understanding on the strategic and economic importance of the TPP agreement tenaciously.” Elements within the Abe Government are now moving with plans to more heavy RCEP because they recognize that in essence without the U.S the deal is “Meaningless” even though it would mean granting the Chinese greater access to markets within the region.  

There is no doubt after President Xi’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos Switzerland that China aims to take the place of the United States when it comes to supporting free trade in Asia. In a world without TPP the Chinese are the most obvious beneficiary, and as Eric Altbach former deputy assistant US Trade Representative for China Affairs so eloquently said “It’s a giant gift to the Chinese because they now can pitch themselves as the driver of trade liberalization.” While China already has its own tools such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the China Import Export bank (China Exim) to facilitate soft power in the region it has begun lending its support to the RCEP. This would unequivocally solidify their role as the largest economic player and partner in the Asia Pacific.

While Free Trade Agreements are inherently economic in nature, the implications of U.S abandonment of the TPP permeates deep into the realm of foreign policy. One of the main aims of China’s exclusion from the TPP was to pressure them into aligning with the international status quo on issues such as the South China Sea, the environment, and intellectual property. In the past the Chinese have changed their behavior in order to gain entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to negotiate a Code of Conduct with the ASEAN states. With China set to become more connected than ever by the RCEP President Trump has removed a valuable tool for norm creation from the table. Coupled with the hard lined rhetoric, disregard for the One China Policy, and Trump’s choice of advisors, the U.S is beginning to back itself into a corner.  Time will only tell as we wait for events to unfold.  

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/1/25

旧文章ID：15688

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

With the U.S withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and the Chinese refusal to adhere to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling over the Philippines claim to the South China Sea (SCS) there is much debate as to who will take the reins in Asia Pacific. In his new article “Handing the initiative to China” John Fitzgerald (Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Social Investment and Philanthropy Impact at Swinburne University of Technology) lends us his insight on the subject, and points to China as the future superpower in the region. As the piece goes to suggest however this transition may not be beneficial for Australia. It could in fact be very dangerous.

Fitzgerald observes that the Chinese are thrilled with President Trump, and as long as he continues to “undermine the rules-based international order and throw alliance partners into a spin” they can deal with occasional saber rattling tweet. The gap left behind by a U.S withdraw from the region has created space for China to enter and to begin to offer themselves up as the new leader of liberal international order in the region. This is something the Chinese have been wanting for some time, and the author denotes that “Beijing aspires to refashion the regional political order…The new order it envisages would see political authority operating along a vertical axis of hierarchical deference to a lead actor, rather than along a horizontal axis of pluralist interaction.” In essence, a tool to achieve their own ends.

With China now set to be the leading power in the region, Fitzgerald views the communist State as one who “promotes obedience to authority ahead of freedom, champions hierarchy over equality, and demands submission of individual and community interests to those of an authoritarian state.” Much along the vein of “see something say something” Fitzgerald finds it necessary for Australia to call out “China as readily as we do the US when its behavior threatens the values and principles that underpin our security and wellbeing as a nation”, and to not succumb to the inevitable pressures that will come out of Beijing for the island nation to accept their new status quo.

Most notably, Fitzgerald strikes out at the audacity of the Chinese to rewrite history to fit within their own narrative. An example used is Zheng He, who’s famous maritime voyages of the 15th century are the basis not only for the claim in the SCS but also the underpinnings of Chinese involvement in Africa, as being a worrisome sign for Australia. As he points out, in a 2014 “Gavin Menzies, published a book entitled 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, which claimed that Zheng He discovered America, New Zealand, Australia and other places besides.” In the eyes of the author, if China is allowed to act with impunity in shaping history to their own gains, it might not be long until Australia finds itself being considered part of the historic Chinese empire.  

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15687

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Yawei Liu (刘亚伟) joined The Carter Center in 1998 and has been the director of its China Program since 2005. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2014, the associate director of the China Research Center in Atlanta, and an adjunct professor of Political Science at Emory University. He co-authored Obama: The Man Who Will Change America (Chinese language, 2008).

He is the founding editor of www.chinaelections.org, www.chinatransparency.org, and the U.S-China Perception Monitor. Since 2012, he has organized an annual forum on U.S.-China relations.

Yawei earned his B.A in English literature from Xian Foreign Languages Institute (1982), M.A. in recent Chinese history from the University of Hawaii (1989) and Ph. D. in American History from Emory University (1996).

All views expressed are that of Dr. Liu and do not reflect the position of The Carter Center or President Carter.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/2/1

旧文章ID：15686

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

News of US President Donald Trump’s reportedly brusque phone call to the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, as well as his inflammatory comments regarding an Obama administration refugee resettlement deal with Australia, have shocked many commentators and policy-makers alike. In reality though, these responses are consistent with Trump’s broader repudiation of traditional protocols and etiquette, a trend Australia would be wise to heed when dealing with the new administration and pursuing its own interests abroad.

According to the Washington Post, Trump candidly expressed his dissatisfaction with the US’s agreement to accept 1,250 refugees from Australia’s own detention centres, calling it “the worst deal ever” and accusing Australia of attempting to export “the next Boston Bombers”. Following this, Trump turned to Twitter to express his frustration and disbelief, calling the agreement a “dumb deal”. Candid indeed, but undoubtedly Trumpian in tone, and not so surprising a reaction when considered in light of his recent executive order, which specifically ordered the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions to the US.

Nonetheless, the fact that criticism and disagreements between leaders that would normally be kept behind closed doors (something Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull himself maintained in a press conference) has been so widely publicised is itself surprising. Surprising too is the stark contrast in tone with the official account of the phone call. But then again, Trump has a tendency to not adhere to the traditional ‘normal’ in both domestic and international politics. It has been his rallying call, that he will not repeat the same mistakes as his predecessors that have led to the current malaise (real or otherwise) As some commentators have noted, the leak of the phone call’s contents and related commentary, however unprecedented, is unlikely to seriously damage the US-Australia relationship. Rather, it should galvanise Australian policy makers to become more proactive and interests-based whilst expanding its relationships with other nations.

However, if such slights were to continue along with other significant changes in policy, it is reasonable to expect that countries like Australia will be more hesitant about engaging with the US. Trump’s opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is one such change. Cumulatively, these actions could lead Australia to pursue initiatives without the US. Already, Australia has hinted that it is open to China and Indonesia joining the TPP and it is also participating in negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – a deal that China endorses. Given China’s economic importance to Australia, deepening this relationship would be increasingly attractive. Moreover, a 2016 Lowy Institute survey found that an equal percentage of respondents considered either the US or China as having the most important relationship to Australia. Continued slights could sway public support in favour of China, which in turn would affect the actions of Australian leaders towards the Australia-US alliance.

In turn, China will likely seek to capitalise on any perceived rift between the US and Australia, especially given the importance of Australia to the US’s recent ‘pivot to Asia’. The most visible manifestation of this is the contingent of 1,250 US marines stationed in Australia’s northern city of Darwin, which though often couched in terms of disaster relief, has been interpreted as a counter to China’s growing regional dominance. Moreover, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has travelled to Australia for the fourth Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue – an opportune if serendipitous moment to strengthen the Sino-Australian relationship, potentially at the expense of US regional strategy.

Given the unpredictability that President Trump has brought to international affairs, Australia can no longer just rely on abstract and sentimental notions of shared values to sustain its close relationship with the US –the now infamous phone call between the two leaders is a testament to this. Instead, it should consider this a wake-up call to pursue its interests proactively and pragmatically, not just with the new US administration but with its international relations in general.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT FEB. 8, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at the Carter Center’s China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15685

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Since their ascension into the U.N and acceptance into the World Bank and World Trade organization, China has striven to take a greater role in the international community. One such mechanism for which the Chinese are undertaking to achieve this endeavor is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financing institution which differs from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to its sole focus is on infrastructure. As of its official founding on January 16th2016, the 57 contributing member countries to the AIIB have raised over 100 billion dollars of authorized capital between them, with China being the largest shareholder with 26.6% voting shares followed by India at 7.5%, Russia at 5.93%, and Germany with 4.5%. The United States has not signed onto the bank, and it has been adamantly opposed to the operation citing concerns over the threat of possible abuse by China. The following is an overview of the AIIB, the concerns the U.S has, and the Chinese response to these worries. 

Asia is in trouble, with the harsh truth of the matter being that “between now and 2030 an estimated $90 trillion will be required to meet infrastructure demands across the continent” according to Forbes.  Currently, the AIIB has pledged to invest 50 billion dollars into infrastructure globally by 2020 to close this deficit, and the official AIIB website reports that as of February 2017, 9 projects had already been approved in Oman, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan in the energy and transportation sectors. According to an Economist reporter who goes by his initials S.R., in the same period the Japanese Asian Development Bank (ADB) is set to contribute $160 billion and the World Bank will also contribute $223 billion towards infrastructure investment.

According to New York Times reporter Jane Perlez, much of the reluctance from the U.S to join the AIIB is based around the idea that “China will use the bank to set the global economic agenda on its own terms.” Some have characterized the bank as a “practical application of Xi Jinping’s One Road, One Belt vision” like those business analysts at China-Briefing.com, and others such as Nicholas Firzli of the Paris think tank World Pensions Council (WPC) echo this concern, seeing the bank as a “political tool for China to pull countries in Southeast Asia closer to its orbit.” The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi saw this occurring in the case of the Philippines who, after the United Nations Court on the Law of the Sea ruled in their favor against China, seemed to turn towards them rather than away. The idea here is that by expanding their reach in the region Beijing could influence the actions of those the bank lends to, or may lend to in the future.

In contrast, Chinese are adamant that there is no ulterior motive behind the AIIB with the Global Times Hu Weijia reporting that “Beijing has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of subverting the global order”, but “US may have opted not to join the AIIB because of fears that the bank would threaten its own dominion in the region”. Calls for the United States to join have appeared in the China Daily and the Global Times, with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang is quoted as saying “China wants to work with others to uphold the existing international financial system… and is ready to continue to play our role in building the current international financial system.” As noted by Takatoshi Ito from the Center of Japanese Economy and Business, the structuring of the AIIB means that the addition of the United States would dilute the voting power of China. Towards that aim, in the same piece Ito also observes that “China has continuously modified the core architecture of the AIIB, such as lowering its own shareholder percentage, and has attempted in various ways to call for nations to join the AIIB.”

China does not reject that it is trying to craft a new international order through projects such as the One Belt One Road initiative with its stated goal to “link China with countries around the world through existing infrastructure and new projects with the aim of increasing global interconnectedness and communication.” While AIIB may not be explicitly in place to help bring this dream into fruition, the connection between China and the projects the new bank will finance is unavoidable, as is the reputational boost it will receive from them. In the eyes of the United States this brings up concerns over the influence this could give China to exert their will over smaller states in Asia, or as the Chinese see it usurp the United States as leader in the region. The question begs, can the Chinese put to rest U.S concerns over the AIIB and their grander geopolitical goals so that both parties can work together in shaping the future?

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/2/9

旧文章ID：15684

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

True to form, US President Donald Trump has upheld his election promise to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a regional trade deal between 12 Asia-Pacific countries that, if implemented, would be the largest and most ambitious trade deal to date. However, with US withdrawal the deal is unlikely to survive, at least in its current form, providing an opportunity for the second-largest economy of the region, China, to capitalise on this opening to its advantage. But firstly, what is (or more likely was) the TPP, and why was it so significant?

Concluded between 12 states in the Asia-Pacific in February 2016, the TPP would, according to Georgetown University’s J. Robert Vastine, have represented the most significant development in international trade since the WTO’s Uruguay Round in 1994. Significantly, the world’s second-largest economy – China – was not party to the negotiations, yet was given the option of joining in future. Cumulatively, the deal represented states comprising approximately 40% of the global economy. Yet this alone was not what made it ambitious. The deal went further than previous trade agreements, establishing not only a reduction in trade barriers between nations, but also mandating a much higher standard, for example, of labour, environmental and intellectual property law amongst signatories. To come into effect, at least 6 of the 12 states acceding to the deal and representing at least 85% of their cumulative GDP are required to ratify it. The US constitutes 60% of the cumulative GDP, and so without its ratification, a major drawcard and driver of the agreement is lost and any hope of salvaging it would require renegotiation.

The 12 states involved in negotiations of the TPP

Understandably then, this places China in an ideal position. With US credibility and reliability in the region diminished and the Trump administration’s nativist and protectionist rhetoric, the world’s second-largest economy is ideally-placed to fill the political and economic vacuum left by the US and take responsibility in driving the future of international trade. Indeed, China already appears to be repositioning itself in line with this role. In a press conference following Trump’s decision, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying avoided commenting on the TPP, but emphasised China’s commitment to “open, transparent and win-win regional free trade arrangements…[that take] into full account the differences and diversities among regional economies”, and highlighted China’s efforts regarding the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP – more on this below) as evidence of this. President Xi Jinping of China offered similar comments in his inaugural speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, which has been interpreted as an implicit rebuke of the new administration’s protectionist worldview.

It is against this background that the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has become prominent. Given the US is now unlikely to ratify the TPP, with Trump officially withdrawing the US from the agreement and the US Congress indicating it would not ratify it, many states have in fact been turning to China for a replacement. The RCEP is a more limited trade deal: it,too, aims to reduce tariffs, but calls for relatively lower regulatory standards than the TPP. Similar to the TPP though, the world’s largest economy – the US – is not party to the negotiations: only ASEAN and the six countries with which it has free trade deals are involved.

The 12 states conducting negotiations for RCEP: The 10 states of ASEAN as well as China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

Despite its lower ambitions, RCEP could serve as a blueprint for the direction of trade in Asia if negotiations prove successful. Though officially an ASEAN-lead effort, the deal in turn give China significant influence over the direction of regional trade in the future, such as in outlining the structure and scope of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, an agreement amongst APEC members that would trump both the TPP and RCEP in size if it were ever to come to fruition. Moreover, regional states may be more inclined to concede to China on other regional issues if in return they are allowed access to the lucrative Chinese domestic market. This is even more likely when the traditional economic guarantor of the region – the US – is less engaged, leaving regional states little alternative. Ultimately, this diminishes US influence in the region to the detriment of US regional strategy and to China’s benefit. To some extent this relative strategic shift is inevitable and commensurate with China growing economic and political prominence, as Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, notes, stating that:

“the relationship between the world’s two richest and strongest states will always be competitive; the question is whether that competition still allows them to trade and invest with each other, cooperate to solve shared problems, and contribute to maintain a stable international order”.

It is understandable that China will begin to take on more responsibility commensurate with its position; the question is the degree to which regional powers like the US will accommodate this change.

Of course, all of this is at the moment speculative, and assumes that negotiations to conclude the RCEP will succeed without a hitch (and no other complications will arise), which is by no means assured at this point. According to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, significant disagreements still exist on matters concerning the structure of tariffs and which regulations to include, as well as on how to construct a deal that standardises the myriad bilateral trade agreements that already exist amongst participating states. Similarly, the difference in domestic economies between relatively open countries like Australia and the relatively conservative, like India and Indonesia will need to be addressed. Moreover, participants must also overcome any underlying strategic distrust deriving from others areas of disagreement, including those in the East and South China Seas.

Even though the TPP now seems unlikely to come into effect, it was by no means the only regional trade initiative on the table. On the contrary, the RCEP, though less ambitious in scope than the TPP, would nonetheless represent a significant development in regional and international trade. The questions facing negotiating states now is whether they wish to conclude a trade deal without the US, and concomitantly, to what degree they are willing to accommodate China’s related resurgence in Asia.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT FEB. 14, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at the Carter Center’s China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15683

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

President Donald Trump has once again utilized the telephone, this time to engage with Xi Jinping of China. Similar such instances have had a varying degree of ramifications on geopolitical stability. The outcomes of these interactions have ranged from a very positive talk with President Vladimir Putin on security to fairly abysmal in the case of hanging up rudely with the Prime Minister of Australia. Of particular significance was the President’s call with Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen. This call threatened to destabilize the American relationship with the Peoples Republic of China by disregarding the One China Policy. However, the fire of this fear has been quenched as of last Thursday. with President Trump’s affirmation to the Chinese leader that he would indeed adhere to the policy. The following is an overview of the U.S and Chinese perception of why this shift might has occurred, as well as its implications on the future of U.S China relations.

The official White House statement after the call labeled the conversation as being “extremely cordial”, with the reasoning being of course that “President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our “One China policy.” There has been some contention as to which One China Mr. Trump has re-subscribed to, with the Financial Times reporting his saying “he would abide by the diplomatic formula that Beijing and Taipei agreed in 1992”. Under this arrangement  both sides agreed that there was only One China, but interpretation of this decree was up to both parties involved. The official White House statement was not specific on this matter, and neither was that put out by Beijing via Xinhua News. 

The U.S media presents a few possible reasonings behind the change in Trump’s stance towards the One China Policy. The New York Times has characterized the move as a “significant reversal” and that the shift was “designed to put an end to an extended chill in the relationship between China and the United States,” and repair damage to the relationship caused by President Trump, such as his appearance on Fox News Sunday where he can be seen saying “I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘One China’ policy.” In terms of motivation, Cheng Li of the John L. Thornton China Centre of the Brookings Institution feels the shift occurred because “improving US relations with China and Russia is part of Trump’s global strategy.” Simon Denver and Philip Rucker of the Washington Post also take a similar stance that the US needed to interpret the “One China policy” as a baseline necessity to conduct business with China, and they observe the true case for the shift being the realization that “relations would never get off the ground without endorsing the One-China idea.”

Chinese news sources have been quick to praise President Trump on his change of mind, with the Global Times declaring that “Trump has stopped openly challenging China’s core interests, and instead showed respect to Beijing,” and it is widely reported President Xi has expressed his pleasure about the exchange. In an Op-Ed published by CNN Zhang Baohui of Lingnan University pointed out that, “adherence to the One China principle has at least removed a short-term obstacle to Sino-US relations” and sets the stage for future collaboration on issues such as trade and North Korea, but cautions that the U.S should “refrain from using the principle to pressure Beijing on the trade front.” Li Haidong at China Foreign Affairs University also takes the positive high ground, seeing Trump’s revised stance on the One-China policy as being a result of “revolving discussions within the Trump team on China policies and the end of the team’s internal divergence.”

By looking at these statements one could gather that Chinese opinion on Trumps newfound adherence to “One China” may well be a Win-Win for both Washington and Beijing.  This is not the case however, and some Chinese academics such as Asia Pacific analyst Zhong Feiteng at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences see Trump’s motivation as not being wholly altruistic. Zhong himself views the move as being domestically motivated by Trump’s necessity to fulfill promises of increased economic prosperity in the U.S. More negative still is the idea put forth by Shi Yinghong of Reming University, who observes China as being the winner in this situation because as he notes, “Trump lost his first fight with Xi” and he will be looked at as a paper tiger or zhilaohu (紙老虎), something that at first seems threatening but folds in on itself when opposed.

The Chinese and U.S perception as to why President Trump has shifted his stance on “One China” differ, but the fact cannot be ignored that it was necessary. Both sides agree the one China policy is the baseline for the United States and China to return to normalized relations. There was a threat to this relationship by President Trump’s actions in breaking protocol in relation to Taiwan since winning the nomination in November 2016. While it may have taken the new administration time to reach this conclusion through a term of pushing and testing the Chinese resolve on the issue, what matters is that both parties seem to have made it back to the same page. The road ahead may be fraught with challenges, but at least for now the U.S and China will be walking a path which has been worn by the hard work of its diplomatic predecessors, and no longer into the dark of the unknown.

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15682

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Editor’s note:

General Jin Yinan, an influential professor at the National Defence University in China, and Christopher Jin, Silicon Valley resident and a social media critic with a huge following, have engaged in an interesting debate online on the current status of the United States.

This debate is significant for two reasons. First, Chinese leaders and elite have always held a different perception of the United States and its leaders, and this peculiar perception inevitably influences their analyses and decision making. Whether General Jin’s perception is representative of the Chinese elite, however, remains to be seen.

Second, there is limited space in China to discuss its own politics. The American election, its spectacular outcome and the unfolding drama have provided a rare opportunity for Chinese intellectuals to conduct a virtual exercise in political participation, allowing them to reflect more on the merits and deficiencies of democracy and where China should be in the coming decades.

Uscnpm.org will continue to bring more of the Chinese debate on American politics to our readers because they indirectly highlight China’s own current political constellation.

The following is a summary of General Jin and Christopher Jin’s original arguments, a transcript of which can be found here (in Chinese).

      Beginning with an anecdote of his travels to the US, General Jin Yinan contends that the US is a declining empire with dilapidated and crumbling infrastructure and a politically divided population. Trump’s anger, he contends, should not be directed at China. Rather, he should be angry at the elites of American society for having caused these problems.

Despite this, Jin is still critical of Trump, claiming that he is the most unqualified president in modern history with a temperament ill-suited to handle a population as large and diverse as the US’s. In addition, he has challenged or broken every rule or convention of American politics; it is these actions that have caused the US to decline. Again, he reminds us, this was not China’s doing. Indeed, although China could have protested his reckless and aggressive actions, such as his phone call to President Tsai Ing-wen, they refrained; there was in fact a greater response from the US community. Trump’s motives for conducting the call are also opaque – suggesting it may be evidence of Trump placing his own personal wealth above national interests, given his business interests in Taiwan.

In a bold conclusion, Jin claims that 9/11 and 11/9 – the date of Trump’s election – are on par as the two most terrible days in America’s 21st century history.

General Jin Yinan

    Where General Jin was concise and to the point in his denunciation, Christopher Jin rebuts and offers further points to support his defence of the US. He disagrees that the US is in decline and that Trump is incompetent. He points out that whilst US infrastructure is aging, it is complete, and has been so for decades (unlike China’s). Moreover, the quality of American production exceeds that of China’s, which allows it to last for much longer.

From an economic perspective, although China’s GDP is growing faster than that of the US’s in absolute terms (at 6.7% in 2016), it has slowed down considerably since 2007 (at 14.2%). The US, on the other hand, entered into a recession following the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, but in the 3rd quarter of 2016 its GDP grew at 3.2%, for an annual growth rate of 1.9%. Though the second largest economy in the world, China’s GDP per capita is still far behind that of developed countries like Japan, the United States, and European nations. In addition, the source of China’s impressive GDP growth rests largely on the back of its infrastructure boom, the value of which depreciates over time. Though high speed rail and glittering skyscrapers may look impressive, it is not a stable base upon which to grow an economy. So even though China’s growth may look impressive, the structure of its economy belies its fragility, with an overreliance on infrastructure development, raw material production, and growth of state-owned enterprises. Instead, Jin suggests that a better indicator of the health of an economy derives from a state’s average income, wage gap, levels of education and research, environmental quality, and social cohesion.

Turning to American culture, Jin posits that the greatest attribute of Americans is their constant dissatisfaction with current circumstances (or sense of crisis as he describes it). Elaborating, he states that even if everything is working well, Americans are willing to complain, question, and critique anyone and everything, including presidents and leaders, as a means to expose and denounce corrupt or depraved activities. Although protests and demonstrations may look chaotic and disruptive on the surface, American society is in fact very stable (something he suggests General Jin has chosen to neglect). He attributes this political and social stability to the US’s respect for democracy (specifically, the three independent branches of the US government that act as counterweights to one another) and the belief that one can support or protest without fear of reprisal.  In a similar vein, Jin suggests that the values of US films embody this curiosity and desire to improve. He concludes that many Hollywood blockbusters tell stories of discovery and exploration, of questioning, critiquing and invention, whereas Chinese films are focus more on political intrigue, and historical recounts of dynastic infighting. 

On the subject of education, he disagrees with the assertion (presumably of a certain group of Chinese commentators – they are not mentioned) that English is the source of China’s own decline, contending instead that it is China’s gateway to the rest of the world. More broadly, he decries the heavy emphasis on rote learning Chinese poetry and literature, stating that Chinese culture is itself not infallible.

Finally, Jin asserts that Trump is no worse than Obama, implicitly urging readers to give Trump time to mature as president, citing his business acumen, ability to win despite expectations to the contrary, and similarity in age to Ronald Reagan when he was elected as reasons. He reiterates the welcoming nature of the US, describing it as a melting pot of people from over 130 countries across the globe; the US is a country that welcomes anyone with talent and dares to tell the truth, to make mistakes and adjust, to value fair competition, and even to critique.

Christopher Jin

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15681