作者：  来源：

Editor’s note:

The following is a summary of an op-ed by the North Korean expert Ding Dong exploring the possible motivations behind and ramifications of the death of Kim Jong-Nam, Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother. The original can be found here (in Chinese).

      Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim-Jong-un, has died on the way to hospital shortly after being attacked by an unidentified woman of North Korean appearance in Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur international airport.

Discussions over who would want him dead abound, yet the most likely suspect for many is his half-brother and current leader of North Korea: Kim Jong-un. As has been shown repeatedly, the Kim family’s dynastic rule over North Korea has necessitated ruthless purges of competing sources of power, even if this competition is from a family member. In North Korea, power and influence come at a cost, and Kim Jong-un has shown himself to be just as ruthless as his forebears.

Indeed, Kim Jong-un would have reasons to have his half-brother killed. Though long-estranged from the centres of political power in North Korea, Kim Jong-nam was in fact originally touted as the successor to his late father Kim Jong-il until his excessive lifestyle resulted in his younger brother, Kim Jong-un, assuming the position. Moreover, although North Koreans may appear outwardly compliant with Kim Jong-un’s approach, growing resentment over the heavy-handed rule of the Kim regime (as well as the generally low living standards) could increase over time amongst average citizens and the elite, leading some to eventually search for an alternative leader that is far from the political centre: Kim Jong-nam. It is out of fear of this possible outcome that Kim Jong-un may have had his half-brother killed, and why he continues to rely on and encourage such ruthless tactics to maintain control in the face of dwindling domestic support.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un

Alternatively, some have suggested that the assassination may have been on the part of the US or South Korea, perhaps as a step to eliminate the Kim family and its dynastic rule. This, however, is unlikely to be the case, because the primary objective of the US and South Korea is not to eliminate the Kim dynasty, but to end the regime’s nuclear ambitions and achieve a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Having Kim Jong-nam killed would not help achieve this objective, and would likely damage both states’ international reputation as well as give the Kim regime an opportunity to bolster its own political standing. Similarly, Kim Jong-nam’s death did not elicit a strong response from South Korea, suggesting that his death was not considered significant. Additionally, culpability in his death could damage relations with both China and Russia, who, as stakeholders on the Korean Peninsula, would like to see someone from the Kim family as the DPRK leader in a new regime. With the death of Kim Jong-nam, this is now less likely.

Finally, the official DPRK version of events was that Kim Jong-nam died of indigestion – effectively an admission of guilt. What is more, when considered in light of the missile test that took place the previous day, it suggests that the Kim regime is facing both domestic and international challenges to his leadership and the regime in general. Combined, these actions are likely to diminish the US’s patience and goodwill in its policies towards North Korea. It is thus incumbent on all interested parties to agree on a peaceful process to remove Kim Jong-un from power as soon as possible. In the event that a peaceful resolution cannot be brokered, it would be prudent for China and other stakeholders to consider all possibilities and contingencies in dealing with the Korean Peninsula, including the removal of Kim Jong-un, if necessary, especially if it will enhance the security and stability of China and its borders.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15680

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Stop me if you’ve heard this one. Two female assassins walk into a Malaysian airport and commit fratricide on behalf of the so ascribed Hermit King. Yes, I know, we shouldn’t joke about the North Korean Kim regime. It’s as serious a matter as any when nuclear war is involved. In the United States policy makers have been grappling with how to handle the situation since the initial nuclear test in 2006, with the usual modus operandi being to pay the regime off with food aid and pass the problem down to the next guy. As the Kim regime continues to consolidate its power through both this latest assassination and the testing of a Pukkuksong-2 intermediate range missile on February 10th, the question of what to do has once again come to the forefront of American foreign policy. With the apparent failure of the Obama administrations Strategic Patience doctrine attitudes in the United States have shifted. Now more than ever the call for the China to do more in containing their atomic neighbors to the East through sanctions can be heard coming from Washington, with little regard to the challenges facing the Chinese in doing so. It can be so very easy to pass one’s problems along to another without truly understanding the rock nor hard place you are placing them between.

Up until recently the Chinese have resisted the call, but due in part to these recent developments and the reaffirmation of the One China Policy by President Trump, Beijing has opted to enact U.N backed sanctions on North Korea’s coal industry for the next year. Sanctions are the proverbial stick, a powerful economic tool in the arsenal of policy makers to curb unwanted actions by states, but the line between success and failure is very thin. Infectiveness in these programs is bred through a lack of will by the international community to commit to enforcement, and a haphazard targeting approach allowing space for the target to maneuver around the intent. In defying logic, overly effective sanctions are also not helpful. By applying too much pressure through heavy, blanketed sanctions on a country you can often impose high costs to the average citizen, and back said government into a corner. The latter is what led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, when U.S pushed too hard with an oil embargo on the Empire of Japan. While North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities cannot reach the United States, China and our Asian allies sit merely a stone throws away from Pyongyang. By no means am I saying that China is in the cross hairs of North Korea’s nuclear arms, but proximity is as important to Chinese-North Korea relations as it is to your choice of pharmacy, or perhaps even friends.  

One factor contributing to China’s reluctance on taking a stronger position on North Korea is the treaty obligations between the two. Since 1961 with the signing of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty China has been bound to the principles of “mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” The basis for this relationship came from both ideological solidarity, as well as the position it afforded in staving off the U.S and its allies in the region. One leading theory is that China is still dependent on North Korea because it creates this so called “buffer zone between it and democracy, capitalism, and US forces”, for example the 29,300 U.S troops stationed in South Korea, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile deterrent system stationed there. The collapse of the North, and subsequent formation of unified Korea backed by the United States may not be in the best interest for China as these perceived threats encroach closer to its boarder.In any event, whatever the reasoning be it ideological or strategic, the fact cannot be denied that the role played by China in the North Korean economy goes a long way in maintaining the DPRK.

Currently, the dynamic of the North Korean relationship with China can been described as being based on mutual necessity and dependence rather than mutual benefit, with 70% of its trade volume in 2014 ($6.86 Billion), 90 percent of its oil, 80 percent of its consumer products, and 45 percent of its food through trade and aid with the Chinese. Policy experts such Admiral-Mike Mullen along with the new Secretary of State Rex Tillerson see this fact as granting China high levels of influence over the Kim Regime and its actions, which it does, but it also places China in a predicament. In implementing these new sanctions, the U.N goal will be to limit North Korea’s coal sales 7.5 million tons a year, a scary figure as China alone imported 22.2 million metric tons in 2014 from the state. In following the recommendations of the international community by imposing these new sanctions on North Korea the Chinese risk kicking out the proverbial pedestal and destabilizing the whole country, and as anyone who has ever had a truly unruly neighbor knows, sometimes their problems become yours.

It is pivotal that the U.S recognize Chinese concerns and reservations behind increasing sanctions in this context. Let us take out for a moment the nuclear component from the question and envision what the collapse of North Korea would mean for China. Liaoning province has the largest border with the DPRK.In its city Dan dong, it is suspected that over 200,000 persons fleeing North Korea have already crossed at that point. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “the specter of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into China is a huge worry for Beijing,” who already is having issues dealing with those who have arrived, much less the thousands more who will come with an increase of sanctions on the state. The lack of infrastructure to deal with the displaced would place a large amount of economic and social strain on the border region, leading possibly to domestic unrest. The sheer amount of displaced would also invite the scrutiny of the international community, NGO’s, and human rights organizations who have taken issue with Beijing’s treatment of fleeing North Koreans in the past.  

As time progresses it becomes clear that the United States will continue to persist in its claim that China must do more to help contain North Korea, and that leaders in Beijing will take measures to appease them to a degree. Unwillingness by the Chinese to place greater sanctions on the DPRK is not merely based on its position as a strategic hold point for the U.S backed South Korea, but more seriously for the ramifications a destabilized North Korea would have on them domestically. In so being, it truly is not in China’s best interest to pull the economic leg out from under the Kim regime and risk the cup of its neighbors flowing over unto it. While it is so very easy to place the responsibility onto others, the United States must see the position China in as it works to comply both with the requests of the international community on one hand, and its domestic concerns on the other. Sometimes it seems things just boil down to location.  

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. All view’s  expressed in this article are his alone and do not reflect the opinions of the Carter Center, it’s China Program, or President Carter himself. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/2/20

旧文章ID：15679

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

If the basis of normal U.S China Relations is the “One China” Policy, its father is Deng Xiaoping. With his famous “Reform and Opening Up” policy of 1979, Deng is accredited with bringing China out of economic isolation and back into the international sphere, laying the foundation for its status as the world’s second largest economy today. Deng died on February 19th 1997, and this year marked the 20th anniversary of his death. With tensions between the United States and China on the rise since Donald Trump was elected president, it is interesting to note that there was no mention of the anniversary in the United States. This is not the case in China.

On the China side there are mixed responses. Official News outlets such as Xinhua or CCTV are mute about the anniversary but local, urban, and online media outlets have been going all out in their commemoration of Deng’s Political and strategic legacy. Southern Metropolitan Daily, Caixin Weekly and the English edition of the Global Times have published numerous commentaries highlighting the importance Deng had on shaping China’s future and its relations to the U.S. An exception on this front is a commentary published by China Youth Daily, who instead opted to release an article discussing the strategic thinking of Deng. 

There was also coverage of the varying ways Chinese citizens are gathering to celebrate the life of the departed leader in places such as Shenzhen and Sichuan. The Global Timesreleased an in depth article looking at the long lasting implication of Deng’s life and deeds, and the opinions reflected in the article can be seen as representing the overarching feeling of the Chinese towards Deng. In the piece, Dr. Yawei Liu of our own Carter Center was quoted as saying that “Without Deng’s courage and determination, Sino-US ties wouldn’t have been normalized in 1979, as there were still a lot of obstacles and difficulties at that moment”, and we can see this attitude being echoed through the halls of the Chinese internet as well.

On the web, the Chinese netizen response to the anniversary was less subdued. On China’s social Media outlets such as WeChat and Weibo were abuzz with a variety of articles on Deng Xiaoping. One such poignant take was that of commentator Chen Jibing who hits the nail on the head as he tries to explain why there is a huge need to remember what Deng Xiaoping had done for China: Without liberation from the past ideological shackles brought about by Deng there would be no reform and opening up, and without the same kind of expansion of thought it is difficult to have another period similar to it. After his passing people should remember what we are going to inherit from Deng Xiaoping is not the restrictions and taboos he had imposed when he was alive but his courage and wisdom to break through old restrictions and taboos during his time. That Deng Xiaoping did not paint the frame, but with courage and wisdom broke through it.

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15678

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, if successful, would significantly alter global trade across Eurasia. Yet given the vast scale and scope of the project, China alone is incapable of seeing it to success. Indeed, China will need the input and support of other nations if it is to manage the gargantuan task of standardising and/or establishing cross-continental connections of any sort. Thus, it is important to understand where these other nations stand on the idea, and whether they (will) support it or not. The following is a partial overview of some of these perspectives.

Many of the links for the Silk Road Economic Belt will travel through Eurasia. Russia, as the historical power of the region, has appeared largely receptive of OBOR, seeing it as an opportunity to revive its flagging economy and promote its own reputation and initiatives, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).  In 2015, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin both agreed to coordinate their respective EEU and OBOR economic initiatives, and just recently Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov met with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to discuss preparations for upcoming presidential meetings and cooperation in other multilateral fora. Nevertheless, there are some in Russia who fear that the success of OBOR will negatively affect Russia’s influence in the region, especially if Beijing chooses to engage with the region bilaterally instead of the through the EEU or other multilateral organisations. Whilst this is true to some degree, commentators have noted that Russia is well-suited to act as the security guarantor in the region given its strong ties to Central Asia and experience in guaranteeing security. The other Central Asian states, meanwhile, have all generally welcomed the idea.

Foreign Ministers Wang Yi of China and Sergey Lavrov of Russia met recently at the 2017 G20 Foreign Minister’s meeting in Bonn, Germany.

In Europe, the end of the Silk Road, there are mixed responses to the initiative. A December 2016 report from the Brussels-based Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations has compiled analyses of the OBOR perspectives of numerous European Union (EU) members. The most positive and concrete responses appear to be in relation to the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) – a Chinese-led organisation indirectly and unofficially related to OBOR that many European states have opted to join. The decision to join, however, was made by individual national governments, not as a collective though the EU. Additionally, national level responses have been mixed, with a greater level of support and interest from local governments keen to capitalise on the development potential of attracting Chinese investment, with national-level responses (and the response of the European Union) characterised more as reactive, piecemeal, and uncoordinated. Despite this, there are indications that this is gradually changing. The president of the European Commission (EC) Jean-Claude Juncker has stated in an interview that he cannot see any reason for European initiative to not collaborate with OBOR, and that both China and Europe can benefit from greater cooperation. European businesses, too, despite their respective national government’s stance, have been eager to capitalise on the opportunities afforded by OBOR. A greater response is likely from European governments as more concrete OBOR proposals and projects are put forth.

In contrast to the generally neutral or positive responses of Europe and Eurasia, the US has been at best hesitant and at worst critical of China’s global initiatives like OBOR and the unofficially related AIIB. The US has so far not joined the AIIB despite many of its traditional allies, like Australia and the UK, doing so. It has cited fears over sub-par regulatory standards on, for example, environmental protections and anticorruption, and how China may gradually reorganise the global economy to the detriment of US interests as reasons for its hesitation. However, there have been conflicting reports over how the new Trump administration views OBOR and AIIB, with some suggesting Trump’s scepticism for multilateralism would curtail his interest and support, and others concluding that it would serve as an opportunity to improve Sino-US ties and improve US infrastructure. As of yet, Trump himself has not commented on either the AIIB or OBOR.

On the campaign trail, Donald Trump consistently criticised China in his remarks.

India, as a partner in one of OBOR’s projects (the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor) is unlike the US or Russia: although it is one of the founding members of the AIIB, it has remained largely neutral and silent on the OBOR, despite many of the proposed routes passing through or close to areas of strategic interest to India (such as the Indian Ocean and Pakistan). However, in March 2016, various Indian government ministers gave an implicit rebuke of OBOR, expressing concerns over China’s increasing cooperation with Pakistan through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, the motives and beneficiaries of the OBOR initiatives, and the negative effects that could ensue from such unilateral actions. India, though not strictly averse to OBOR, would be concerned if it appeared the majority of the benefits would accrue to a single country. India is supportive of the AIIB, for example, because it views it as a cooperative and inclusive initiative, but less so for OBOR.

Given its sizeable economy, Japan could prove to be a significant partner in OBOR success. Yet perhaps unsurprisingly given its chequered history with China, Japan has not immediately offered open support for either the OBOR or the related AIIB. Like the US, the Japanese government has in the past been generally sceptical of the AIIB due to a perceived lack of transparency in its management and concerns about its governance, yet has been careful to not reject it outright, suggesting that cooperation between the AIIB and the Asian Development Bank is desirable and possible if there was enough congruence in standards and regulations. On the OBOR initiative in general, Japan has been cautious, reserving judgement until more concrete proposals are offered. Indeed, some commentators have drawn comparisons with OBOR to Japan’s own regional infrastructure initiative – the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure – suggesting it is an implicit counter to China’s more evocative-sounding One Belt One Road plan that takes advantage of Japan’s better record of producing high-quality projects.

Japan and the US under the previous Obama administration both notably declined to join the AIIB, a Chinese-led initiative, citing concerns over its governance and regulatory standards.

Clearly, the international response to OBOR has been mixed, with those regions directly targeted by the initiative – like Europe, Russia and other Central Asian states – generally either neutral or positive about its prospects (in spite of some concerns over regional influence and the exact nature of the plan). Conversely, those that are not directly targeted – like Japan, India, and the US – are overall more sceptical due to concerns over the motives, likely beneficiaries and standards of its various projects, and the possible erosion of their status in the region and the world. Whether or not these perspectives of OBOR change (for better or worse) will depend largely on the nature of its future efforts, as for the moment OBOR is still very much in development without a proven track record.

Further reading: http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT FEB. 28, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern in the Carter Center’s China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/2/28

旧文章ID：15677

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China. By Julian Gewirtz. Harvard University Press; 389 pages; $39.95.

In the early 1980s, China’s economists faced a steep learning curve. Unfamiliar with the latest trends in economic theory, they sought to revitalise their economy beyond the strict limitations of a centrally-planned system. They devoured translated editions of foreign economic textbooks, and invited foreign economists from all over the world to present their ideas of economic theory. At a presentation by James Tobin, the Chinese economists were amazed at his ability to offer policy recommendations after only a cursory glance at a set of data. In the face of conservative opposition, it was their fortitude and initiative to implement these new ideas that enabled China to experience such impressive and sustained economic growth.

Julian Gewirtz’s book traces the ideological debates that characterised the political struggles of these Chinese reformers. In particular, the efforts of Zhao Ziyang, Chinese Premier from 1980-1987, are highlighted. Zhao actively sought and acted upon the advice of international economists from the likes of James Tobin despite latent suspicion of Western economic theory amongst more conservative leaders. Other notable economists like Janos Kornai and Ota Šik, who both hail from states with planned economies, were generally more well-received given their greater consideration of the fallibilities of planned economies and the limitations of rapid reform.

Through the lens of China’s economic reform, Gewirtz presents an insightful account of the dynamic history of economic thought in China that is an invaluable resource for gaining a better understanding of how China managed its astounding economic reform.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15676

作者：Alec Nash  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

President Trump calmed nerves in Asian Capitols this month after a string of firebrand comments on the campaign trail. He confirmed to Beijing that the United States would respect the “One China Policy.” He took Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe on a golfing trip to his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. When North Korea performed in another nuclear-capable missile test during the trip, he assured Prime Minister Abe that the United States “stands behind Japan, its great ally, one hundred percent.”

On the campaign trail, then-candidate Trump’s promises suggested a pivot away from Asia. During the campaign, he promised, on his very first day, to pull the United States out of talks for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, label China, and possibly Japan, as currency manipulators, and to substantially reduce American military expenditure in Asia. As president-elect, he provoked uncertainty on both sides of the Taiwan straight when he suggested he might use the “One China Policy” as a negotiating point when reevaluating U.S.-China trade relations.

For now, observers might be forgiven to think that the passions of the campaign have calmed. After all, presidents since Nixon have backed off from their hawkish words on China after taking office.

Nonetheless, the White House still believes idealistic Obama and Bush Administration policies that sought to create a more peaceful world through engagement and trade have failed. President Trump has made it clear he will use the Department of Commerce and the Foreign Service to make sure the United States gets the most lucrative “deal” from its relationships with other countries, a strategy often called “transactional diplomacy.” Leon Hadar, former Fellow at the Cato Institute, argues the Trump Administration has no grand vision for the world, but seeks to approach policy issues on a “case-by-case” and “cost-effective” basis. Hadar argues the forty-fifth president is not a “raving isolationist,” but rather a “shrewd businessman” who wants to exert pressure on Beijing to take action on currency devaluation and decrease the trade deficit.

President Trump shaking hands with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Washington, D.C. Trump has reassured Japan that the US is firmly committed to the security of Japan and “stands by Japan…one hundred percent”.

Despite the fact that many Republican and Democratic members of Congress hope to act as a “moderating influence” on the President, confidence in idealistic, liberal internationalist foreign policy has eroded in the Republican and Democratic Parties. With the disintegration of the policy of engagement, Capitol Hill is unlikely to oppose this shift from transformational to transactional diplomacy. Particularly in foreign policy towards China, both Republicans and Democrats advocate a hardline approach towards China in the economic and political realms.

As a Congressional Intern last year, I had the privilege of attending a hearing in November hosted by the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific that sought to grill the Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia policy. First proposed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011, the “Pivot to Asia” promoted solidifying existing American alliances in East Asia with Japan and South Korea, seeking out new partnerships in Southeast Asia, and engaging with China in areas of common interest. In Foreign Policy magazine, Secretary Clinton stated that the United States should “work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.” Clinton’s State Department assumed that constructive engagement over points of agreement, like combating climate change and terrorism, would press China to “take important steps toward reform,” such as ending discrimination against foreign firms, removing preferences for domestic companies, and putting an end to policies that disadvantage international intellectual property.

The Members of Congress on the Subcommittee from both parties lacked confidence that the pivot to Asia had been successful. Congressman Matt Salmon of Arizona, Chairman of the Subcommittee, asserted that after many years of trying, “[the United States’] posture in Asia is not what we hoped for when the pivot was introduced.” Despite attempts at constructive engagement, he argued, American hopes that China would turn towards democracy after years of interaction through trade and investment from the West had not come to fruition. Mr. Salmon, who had long advocated for the power of transformational diplomacy, told his colleague Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a Congressman infamously opposed to warming US-China ties since his election to Congress in 1989, “I will say to you, with egg all over my face, I was wrong.” 

Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on his trip to the US. Trump has reassured his Chinese counterparts that he will respect the One China Policy, reversing previous suggestions that he would do otherwise. The One China Policy is often cited as the political basis of US-China relations, and so Trump’s reassurance eased the tension that had been mounting between the two states.

Salmon’s admittance of defeat is important, even if only symbolically. After serving as chair since the 2014 midterm elections, the Arizona Congressman planned to retire at the end of the 2016 Congress. Salmon brought a wealth of experience on China to the Subcommittee. Once considered the Pivot’s key ally in Congress, he supported engagement short of appeasement with China and was one of the only members of the Tea Party Coalition to back the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Salmon was one of the only fluent Mandarin speakers on Capitol Hill, having worked as a Mormon missionary in Taiwan in his youth. In his first stint in Congress in the 1990s, he supported granting China permanent most-favored nation trade status. He personally negotiated with President Jiang Zemin for the release of UCLA professor Song Yongyi ahead of China’s admittance to the WTO in 2000. Salmon would proclaim at the time, “this breakthrough is proof that engagement [with China] works.”

Perhaps Congressman Salmon no longer thinks engagement with China works. While the November hearing was the last meeting of the Subcommittee Salmon would chair before retirement, the fact that he, one of the last China idealists in Congress, admitted the policy of constructive engagement was a failure shows a broader shift on the part of Congress.

There are many other signs that what China Hand Jim Mann called the “China Fantasy” has disappeared in Congress. Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are more willing to pursue legislation that challenges Beijing on human rights, the economic policy, and foreign policy than to promote engagement wherever possible. Even Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has praised President Trump’s plan to label China a currency manipulator. Last December, Senator Schumer also pressed then-Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew to expand the oversight capabilities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) following Dalian Wanda Group’s acquisition of a string of Hollywood film companies. The Democratic Leadership has much in common with the Administration when it comes to trade policy.

As the idealism of the post-Cold War era fades, the Administration’s foreign economic policies, void of any strategic vision, might be one of the only areas in which the two parties can agree. President Trump’s characteristic transactional diplomacy fills the void left by the death of the “China Fantasy”. The President still promises to pivot to Asia, but for the sake of making a good deal for his constituents rather than for the sake of a safer world.

Alec Nash is a 2016 graduate of Emory University and a contributor to uscnpm.org. You can find him on Twitter @alechnash.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15673

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On March 2, 2017, The Carter Center’s China Program hosted an event discussing the theme of “One Belt One Road: Risks, Challenges, and Opportunities for US Companies”.

Dr Yawei LIU, the director of the China Program and the moderator of the event, and Mr. Ralph CHOW, the Regional Director of the Americas at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council began the event with some introductory remarks.

Following this, a panel discussion and Q&A session was held with Mr. Deyou TIAN, Minister Counselor at the Washington Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Mr. Nicholas KWAN, Director of Research at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council and Mr. Henry YU, President of the Hong Kong Association of Atlanta and Chief Operating Officer of Asian Investors Consortium.

Finally, keynote speaker Mr. James N. SUCIU, President of Global Sales and Marketing for General Electric Energy Infrastructure and Vice President and Officer of the General Electric Company, offered some remarks over lunch.

The presentations of Dr. Liu, Mr. Kwan and Mr. Yu, and Mr. Suciu are available below.

You can also find a recording of the event on the US-China Perception Monitor’s Facebook page.

Yawei Liu

Nicholas Kwan

 

Henry Yu

James N. Suciu

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/3/2

旧文章ID：15672

作者：Alec Nash  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On January 9, Jack Ma, founder and chairman of the Alibaba e-Commerce Group, travelled to Trump Tower in New York to meet with then-president-elect Donald Trump and discuss his strategy to create a million jobs in the United States. While Mr. Ma planned to enter the American market for a number of years, selling his market entry strategy as a job-creation mechanism corresponded well with Donald Trump’s presidential mission to create jobs in the United States.

American observers approached this promise with skepticism. Market Watch warned, “don’t be fooled by the latest billionaire meeting at Trump tower… Alibaba won’t create one million jobs in the U.S. as promised, at least not directly.” CNN called the promise “vague and misleading” as it promises stimulating business through trade rather than jobs directly with Alibaba. Indeed, an Alibaba spokesman later confirmed to Market Watch that these would not be corporate jobs.

The suspicion levied against Jack Ma’s striking promises may be warranted. Nevertheless, Alibaba has a strong track record of expanding small businesses, including rural small businesses, and helping them connect with global markets. Prior to Alibaba’s success, few small- and medium-sized Chinese businesses had access to platforms in which they could enter global markets, says Dr. Penelope Prime, director of the Atlanta-based China Research Center and professor of international business at Georgia State University. “Before…you had to be in South China with the base of the global supply chain,” Dr. Prime argues, “All of a sudden, all of these [smaller] companies around China could be part of the game.” Small and medium sized businesses outside of trading hubs, using Alibaba’s online services, can sell their products to larger domestic and global markets.

Expanding market access in China has gone from a corporate strategy to a national policy. According to Quartz Media, the national government, in an effort to promote poverty alleviation, has provided assistance to so-called “Taobao villages” to produce unique goods that would once have been produced in massive, urban factories. Alibaba states that about two hundred small villages once considered impoverished by Beijing are now selling over $1 million USD worth of goods online per year.

The macro-level results are telling. According to the China e-Commerce Research Center’s 2016 annual report, the Chinese e-Commerce industry directly employed 2.85 million people in 2016, up from about 1.8 million people in 2011. The Research Center also estimates that 21 million people from other industries were employed in related to the e-Commerce industry, such as logistics and communications. While the report does not clarify how these jobs are related to the expansion of the e-Commerce industry, the increase in logistics and communications jobs certainly coincides with the Chinese e-commerce boom in the last five years. 

Can Alibaba have the same kind of impact in the American economy? Will “Taobao towns” spring up in Ohio, Michigan, or Wisconsin? The barriers to entry for Alibaba into the American e-commerce market are steep, argues Prime. Mr. Ma would face staunch competition from deeply entrenched corporations like Amazon and eBay.

Alibaba’s edge lies in its capacity to enable small and medium sized companies to access the Chinese market, something only larger corporations could do in the past. Alibaba’s marketplace platforms have the potential to help American small businesses export to Chinese and global consumers. “There’s a tremendous demand in China for good-quality products [among the middle class],” Prime argues, “People would prefer, with lots of products and especially those you consume, whether it’s vitamins, medicine, or food, to get those products from outside of China. That’s a huge potential market that Alibaba could connect.” Given the tainted milk and baby formula scandals in 2008, Mr. Ma’s reported interest in the American Midwest is particularly noteworthy.

Nonetheless, the massive number of counterfeit products on Taobao and other Alibaba marketplaces poses a challenge to the company’s expansion in the American market. Last year, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) put Taobao back on its list of “notorious markets” for counterfeit products. The proliferation of counterfeit products on Alibaba’s sales platforms disproportionately affects small businesses. According to the USTR’s notorious markets report, “while recent steps set positive expectations for the future, current levels of reported counterfeiting and piracy are unacceptably high.” Despite removing, according to the Alibaba Group, nearly 380 million counterfeit listings from 2015 to 2016, the USTR report asserts that company programs for intellectual property protection remain out of reach for small- and medium-sized businesses.

The New York Times reports many small businesses allocate a disproportionate amount of time and resources to removing underpriced copies of their products. For instance, counterfeiters have listed tables copied from Phoenix, Arizona-based furniture-maker, Vintage Industrial, for around $50 on Alibaba’s platforms. Vintage sells the same tables for up to $3,000 in the United States. While a larger company might have a legal team to file paperwork and pursue action against counterfeiters, Vintage’s founders Greg and Sim Hankerson struggle to remove counterfeit listings on their own. Alibaba will need to work more closely with American small businesses to guarantee that their IP will be protected if they list their products on the company’s platforms to sell to Chinese consumers.

Mr. Trump’s election did not sway Alibaba to expand its presence in the American market. Jack Ma’s intentions to bring Alibaba to the United States have been clear ever since his IPO on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014. If nothing else, Mr. Ma sought to show his affinity with Donald Trump’s presidential “brand”: a focus on rural economies, job creation, and small businesses. If the United States and China are in for a bumpy road in trade relations, Alibaba’s political connections will prove to be extremely useful as they expand in the American market. Nonetheless, small businesses will be interested in selling products on Alibaba’s platforms only if they can be guaranteed their intellectual property will be secure.

Special thanks to Dr. Penelope Prime, Professor of International Business at Georgia State University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business and Director of the China Research Center, for contributing to this article.

Alec Nash is a 2016 graduate of Emory University and a contributor to uscnpm.org. You can find him on Twitter @alechnash.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15671

作者：Daniel Grober  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Has anyone looked at a map lately? The pace of Chinese infrastructure investment has been ramping up around the globe, and in 2015 alone China pledged to invest $60 billion USD into African infrastructure. China and Africa have long linkages, and the African bloc is often credited with securing China’s recognition internationally over Taiwan.  Closer to its own boarders China has begun to embark on the ambitious endeavor to reconstruct the historic silk road through their One Belt One Road initiative, which can be divided into two parts The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. While investment in Africa and the OBOR project are presented and often viewed in silo, they are inexorably linked. There is no better example of this than the newly completed Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (AADR) which spans 470 miles (756km) from Sebeta to Nagad in Djibouti City (completed on January 10th 2017), and the Gwadar port project which provides a key point of connection from Pakistan into the Horn of Africa.  

To make short of the question of whether the AADR falls under the umbrella of OBOR, the answer is yes. Some may tote there is a difference, claiming infrastructure aid in Africa is broad, encompassing a multitude of countries and sectors small and large, while OBOR “will focus on some significant projects” to connect Eurasia to China. According to the Chinese, One Belt One Road is seen overarching project meant to help reshape the international system by connecting China to the rest of the world. Investments in Africa are not cast in this light, but the reality of the situation is that they do work to facilitate the same tangible goal of OBOR to weave China more thoroughly into the web of the world. Even if it is not framed as such, the AADR and infrastructure projects like it strive to expand not only Chinese soft power globally, but also construct the physical points of connection necessary for Chinese economic and trade goals to be fulfilled. To deny that AADR is part of the One Belt One Road project is to foolishly succumb to the semantics of names and arbitrary boundaries. The geography of the situation makes these connections nearly unavoidable.

In its current stage OBOR is working to construct six economic corridors, with the first already underway, much to the ire of the Indians, in Pakistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC as it is more colloquially know, consists of a multitude of projects valued at over 50 billion dollars by the Chinese which work to enhance the connectivity of trade between the two counties starting at the border of Pakistan and China in the Xinjiang region. It has been said that out of this amount that “18 billion is currently in the implementation phase while another $17bn worth of projects is in the active pipeline.” These investments in Pakistan aim to increase Chinese energy security in the coal, wind and gas sectors as well as improve the transportation infrastructure throughout the county. Most important to the question of the AADR is the Gwadar port, which sits upon Indian Ocean, allowing for improved access to the Gulf of Aden and goods coming to and from Djibouti. Being the main port of call in the region AADR will cut travel cut travel to Djibouti down to 12 hours from the previous 3 days, and will act as an important piece of the puzzle in connecting African, Asian, and Eurasian markets

In conjunction with the Adidas Ababa-Djibouti railway, the port in Gwadar can be observed deliberately placed to better facilitate ties between South East Asia and the African Horn. Wu Yuping, business manager of China Overseas Port Holding Company (which owns the facility) agrees with that assessment, and has described the Gwadar project as “being the marine transit point for regional transshipment, storage and transportation.” To make this a reality Wu and his team look to overhaul the port station by the end of 2017 to handle over one million tons of cargo a year via a 1.02-billion-dollar investment to enhance the capacity of the facility. This modernization will consist of installing new container berths, grain and oil terminals, and a 2,292-acre special economic zone to the adjacent. It’s significance in linking the AADR to the One Belt One Road Initiative as it sits mere 1525 nautical miles (a six-day journey) from the port facilities in Djibouti where the railway ends. As investment across Eurasia and Africa grows so will the significance of Gwadar and its ability to process, store, and route goods to and from the Horn of Africa, increasing the linkages of trade even further.

While the new Ethiopian- Djibouti railway does not officially fall within the scope of One Belt One Road, when viewed in conjunction with the Gwadar port it still works towards facilitating the same goal, a more thoroughly connected China to the rest of the world. In Africa there are many infrastructure projects that are not seen as being part of OBOR, but should. Aside from AADR there are plans in the works for the Chinese to construct railways linking Kenya to Sudan and Uganda to Burundi, not to mention that the Tanzara railway built by China in the 1970’s is still in place. With a few modernizations and linkages, we could feasibly in the next 20 years see Chinese financed railroads sprawl across the African continent leading all the way down into South Africa. These passages, laden with goods going to and from China will all make stops along their travels, to the port of Djibouti, Gwadar, and beyond. As the saying goes, the shortest distance between two points is a line.

Daniel Grober is one of the Spring 2017 interns at the Carter Center’s China Program. All view’s  expressed in this article are his alone and do not reflect the opinions of the Carter Center, it’s China Program, or President Carter himself. You can follow him on Twitter @Daniel_Grober.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15670

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Enveloped in smog and following Premier Li Keqiang’s promise to “make our [China’s] skies blue again”, the city of Beijing shut down its last coal-fired power plant, making it the first city in China to be run entirely on cleaner energy sources. Less than two weeks later, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to review or repeal a raft of Obama-era environmental policies, stating that it is about “bringing back our [American] jobs, bringing back our dreams, and making America wealthy again.” In the past, consensus on addressing climate change and other environmental issues were a high-point in Sino-US relations, yet this consensus looks likely to fall apart under the new administration.

Cooperation between the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases has been one of the stronger and more harmonious aspects of the US-China relationship, and has served as a strong example to the rest of the world to seriously act on climate change. In November 2014, China and the US jointly announced, amongst other things, their goals on diminishing their greenhouse gas emissions, and announced their determination to establish a meaningful agreement at the 2015 United Nations Climate Conference in Paris. Both leaders reiterated their commitments a year later in a joint statement during Xi Jinping visit to the US capital. At the 2016 US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, over a third of the strategic outcomesaddressed prior accomplishments, initiatives launched, or planned future cooperation on the environment, energy policy, and climate change. Later, in Hangzhou, China for the 2016 G20 summit, the US and China both announced they would be ratifying the 2015 Paris climate change agreement. Collectively representing 38% of global emissions, their ratification represented a significant step towards implementation of the agreement, which required 55 countries constituting 55% of global emissions to ratify it before it came into force. This convergence of US and Chinese positions and subsequent cooperation has been attributed as a key driver spurring global efforts to address climate change. However, the difference in import of the recent Chinese and US announcements suggests that they may now diverge.

A worker presses the stop key of coal-fired generating units at China Huaneng Group’s Beijing Thermal Power Plant in Chaoyang District of Beijing, capital of China, March 18, 2017. Coal-fired generating units of the power plant were shut down on Saturday. It marked the proportion of electricity generated in Beijing by clean energy reached 100 percent. (Xinhua/Zhang Chenlin)

On March 18, Beijing shut down its final coal-fired power plant, turning to cleaner energy sources like natural gas for power. This move comes on the heels of a report submitted by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the recent government legislative sessions held in Beijing, in which he announced that an additional 50 gigawatts of coal-fired power capacity, on top of the 120 gigawatts from 2016, would be closed down, halted, or postponed in 2017. This report marked the first time a clear figure on the degree to which coal power capacity would be reduced was included, and can be seen as the government’s attempt to address the coal power sectors burgeoning overcapacity problem, not to mention the more immediate and noticeable problem of the pollution choking China’s cities during the winter months. Moreover, it complements China’s already world-leading investments in cleaner and renewable energies as it attempts to reconfigure its economy to clean energy production and achieve its social and environmental goals.

The contrast with the US announcement is striking. The Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth signed by President Trump directs, amongst other things, for the US Environmental Protection Agency to re-evaluate former US President Barack Obama’s Clean Power Plan, which would have effectively prevented new coal-fired power plants from being built and significantly helped the US achieve its aforementioned reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, the intent of the order was clear at the ceremony, where President Trump spoke at length about how the order would revive jobs in the coal industry, as well as make the US energy independent. During the presidential campaign, Trump promised to cancel the Paris climate agreement, although a senior administration official, in a background briefing to the executive order, stressed that the administration’s position on the agreement was still being discussed.

U.S. President Donald Trump holds up an executive order on “energy independence” during a signing ceremony at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters in Washington, U.S., March 28, 2017. (Xinhua/REUTERS)

So what does all this mean for Sino-US cooperation on climate change, and for global action in general? Following the announcement of the executive order, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang assured reporters that China would continue to honour its commitments and obligations to address climate change “no matter how the climate policies of other countries may evolve” – an understandable position given the significant environmental issues facing China presently. However, if this divergence continues and widens it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect of US-China cooperation. In a roundtable article by the Chinese environmental policy website China Dialogue, canvassed experts were clear that the effect would mostly be symbolic, although some of the canvassed experts expressed concern that the US reversal in attitude may dampen global investment and support for renewable technologies, pressure that could be felt in China, too. If the US continues to weaken or abandon its efforts to address climate change, it will cede leadership to China and other countries in driving global climate change efforts, and opens up another rift in the US-China relationship on an issue that requires global and widespread consensus and cooperation.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT MAR. 31, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern in the Carter Center’s China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15669

作者：Yawei Liu  来源：The Diplomat

It will take two dreamers, without outside-the-box thinking, to make breakthroughs in the US-China relationship, writes Dr Yawei Liu.

In his recent article for The Diplomat, Dr. Yawei Liu, director of the Carter Center China Program, identifies five areas in order of increasing difficulty that Presidents Xi and Trump could feasibly announce progress and cooperation on during their upcoming meeting in Mar-a-Lago, Florida.

Firstly, and most easily, Trump and Xi can coordinate their efforts to address development, peace, and other global challenges. Given their existing cooperation in areas such as climate change, peacekeeping in South Sudan, and cybersecurity, this should not be too difficult to find agreement on.

Secondly, Liu identifies the South China Sea issue as a potential area for progress. Acknowledging that this may seem surprising, he maintains that if both leaders are sincere about seeking common ground and proceed to halt any provocative actions, progress can be achieved.

Thirdly, though there are disagreements on trade, there are nonetheless numerous areas ripe for cooperation, including the ongoing negotiations for the bilateral investment treaty, and the use of Chinese investment for US infrastructure renewal.

Fourthly, and Liu notes consensus here will be more difficult, is resolving the problem of North Korea. He asserts that both the US and Chinese criticisms of the other are unjustified, and that any discussion on the issue must consider what it would take for the US and DPRK to begin direct negotiations.

Finally, Taiwan. Though each country faces obstacles in ameliorating the relationship, there are steps that each can take. The US, for example, could reduce or stop selling arms to Taiwan, and China, for its part, could stop deploying missiles aimed at Taiwan.

These areas are only realistic if both Xi and Trump can be bold and assertive in imagination and execution, but “both Trump and Xi are very well-qualified dreamers who are determined to improve the lives of the people they lead and make their nations great again”.

The full article can be found here on The Diplomat website.

Feature image credit: AP Photo/Files via The Washington Times

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15668