作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China scholar Feng Chongyi has returned to Australia after being held in China for questioning by Chinese authorities. News of Feng’s detention arrived as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was completing his visit to Australia. During the visit, a slew of bilateral trade agreements were finalised and deeper education links forged, with some analysts, like former Australian ambassador to Beijing Stephen FitzGerald, contrasting these along with China’s rhetoric on global free trade with US President Donald Trump’s protectionist leanings. Feng’s detention comes amid a growing debate over whether Australia should continue to align its interests and efforts with the United States – its traditional ally – or should instead seek to engage more so with China – the regional and growing power of the Asia-Pacific. China, for its part, has been trying to cultivate its image abroad as a global and responsible international power, yet actions like the high-profile and mysterious detention of an international scholar are unlikely to garner much international support or prestige, no matter how hard China tries to woo its neighbours.

Chinese state media, too, emphasised the increasing cordiality of the Sino-Australian relationship as based on free trade, cooperation, and opposition to protectionism. Here, it is telling that economics and free trade are cited as the prosperous basis of Australia-China cooperation. In the past, Chinese state media outlet Global Times has repeatedly disparaged Australia as a “paper cat” as a way to criticise Australia’s position on the South China Sea. This contrasts sharply with the more recent rhetoric describing Australia as part of the US and China’s “common circle of friends”. This divide implies that the relationship between China and Australia, at least at the moment, is more transactional in nature, and as suggested in Chinese state media, based largely on the significant amount of trade that occurs between the two (China is Australia’s largest trading partner). Thus, relations that could have ramifications beyond purely that of economic interests are less strong and more contested, and stymy any attempts to establish closer ties between the two countries (see, for example, the last minute decision to withhold ratification of an extradition treaty with China).

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) Professor Feng Chongyi (centre) at Sydney airport upon returning from China. Image credit: ABC News: Lily Mayers

It is within this context that Feng Chongyi’s unofficial detention resides. Few details have been released explaining the professor’s delayed return from China. Reuters news agency reported Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang as stating that the delay was “in order to safeguard China’s national security”. Feng, too, has declined to describe in any great detail why he was detained due to fears of the repercussions this could have on associates still in China. According to the head of the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), Rory Medcalf, Feng’s delayed return to China is a blunt “signal of intimidation to Chinese Australians not to criticise Communist party interference in Australian domestic affairs” – a frequent concern voiced by Professor Feng.

Disagreements such as this illustrate the limits of China’s soft power and the small likelihood that Australia is strategically realigning itself with China. Although China clearly possesses an attractive economic heft, differences in political and legal systems complicate any efforts to successfully deepen the relationship. Nick Bisley, Asia expert from Australia’ La Trobe University, describes the Sino-Australian relationship as a “high-value but not a deep relationship”. Indeed, David Shambaugh, in an article for Foreign Affairs, reports that China has pledged to invest approximately USD$1.41 trillion worldwide by 2025 (for comparison the US’s Marshall Plan would have cost USD$103 billion in today’s dollars), and is spending USD$10 billion every year to enhance its international image and soft power through investment in media, publishing, education, arts, sports, and other initiatives. For comparison, the US spent just USD$666 million on public diplomacy in fiscal year 2014. As Shambaugh pithily notes, “for all the billions of dollars China is spending on these efforts, it has yet to see any demonstrable improvement in its global image, at least as measured by public opinion surveys”. Actions such as the quasi-detention of an international scholar counteract any perceived gain that could arise from China’s substantial economic investment and global outreach. Suggestions that Australia is thus seeking closer engagement with China at the expense of its traditional US ally is misplaced, a position acknowledged and accepted within Chinese policy circles (see here for the original Chinese-language article, or here for its reference in an English-language overview).

The CCTV building in Beijing. In December 2016, CCTV relaunched its foreign language CCTV International media platforms as China Global Television Network (CGTN).

Moreover, Australia’s relationship with the US is, to use the lexicon of Nick Bisley, both high-value and deep. The US is the largest foreign investor in Australia, with AUD$860.3 billion (USD$651 billion) worth of investments in 2015. The Chinese mainland (excluding Hong Kong) ranks seventh, with AUD$74.9 billion (USD$56.58 billion). For comparison, although China is Australia’s largest trade partner with AUD$142 billion (USD$107.4 billion), the US ranks third with AUD$40.6 billion (USD$30.7 billion). Similarly, the US-Australia has been formalised in areas beyond the economic sphere, such as in the form of the security alliance established in the ANZUS Treaty, which remains in force between Australia and the US.

Although China has invested significant amounts of funding into bolstering its international reputation, its efforts to do so are hampered by key differences and disagreements between it and other states, a conundrum demonstrated by the Australian response to the unofficial detention of the international scholar Feng Chongyi. As alluded to elsewhere on this website, this does not mean that Australia is necessarily wedded to the US – there is still an ongoing debate about how Australia should position itself between the US and China. But suggestions that Australia will act purely with regard to its economic interests are overstated. China may have sizeable economic clout, but there is more to soft power than cold hard cash.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT APR. 7, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

Feature image credit: Luo Jie via Alfred Snyder

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15667

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

After leaked news from a Politico subsidiary reported that Chinese Premier Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump will officially meet for the first time for a daylong meeting. The two leaders will convene at the Trump National Golf Club at Mar-a-Lago, the 126-room, 110,000-square-foot estate located in Palm Beach, Florida. As both American and Chinese political enthusiasts begin to squirm in profound excitement, the question on everyone’s mind is what should we expect? To derive what might be on the horizon it is beneficial to look at the outcomes of some of Trump’s other meetings with foreign leaders to get a better sense of how events might unfold. Since taking office in January 2017, Shinzo Abe, Angela Merkel, and Theresa May are just a few of the leaders who have come to pay “homage” to the new American President. In these meetings President Trump can be seen as placing emphasis on trade and security, issues he hung his hat upon during the election campaign. As he has always said the President is a business man, and in this regard, security and economic concerns seem to hold the same weight.

It seems that, in line with past policy, Japan will retain its position as the focal point for America’s Asia policy. The primary goal of the meeting held with President Abe in early February was to reaffirm U.S commitments to Japan which the President had claimed too expensive in the past. While beginning at the White House, President Abe was able to experience the full presidential treatment, traveling with Mr. Trump to the same Palm Beach resort where the April meeting will be held. During that same time, North Korea deemed it necessary to perform a ballistic missile test which “traveled 500 kilometers (310 miles) before landing in the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea”, putting into perspective the imminent threat the rogue state presents to U.S Asian allies. In a the President was quoted as wanting to work with Japan on issues of “freedom of navigation and of navigation, and defending against the North Korean missile and nuclear threat” , adding that “on the economy, we will seek a trading relationship that is free, fair and reciprocal, benefitting both of our countries”, a reference no doubt to the Trans Pacific Partnership in which the U.S. will take not part.

As was the case with Japan, President Trump’s primary issues brought out in his meeting with Chancellor Merkel of Germany were security based, and focused on the issue of NATO. The most important outcome of this dialogue was a clarification of the administration’s position, with Trump stating that he holds “strong support for NATO, as well as the need for our allies to pay their fair share for the cost of defense.” This of course is referring to his view that a disproportional amount of that organization’s defense budget has been supported by America in the past, and that those other nations involved should contribute the 2% of their GDP required by the treaty, which only 5 out of the 28 countries are currently doing. This is indicative of the transactional nature that Mr. Trump seems to have taken in regards to international affairs, and falls in place with his “America First” strategy. During the meeting Trump was adamant that “on trade with Germany, I think we’re going to do fantastically well” but that “negotiators for Germany have done a far better job than the negotiators for the United States”, emphasizing the need for deals in regard to automobiles and automobile production to be reworked.

In the case of Theresa May’s visit to the White House, Trump pulled back on previous statements asserting that the United States would withdraw from NATO, signaling that he was “100 percent committed to the deal.” The two presidents committed to maintaining the “ special relationship”, and pledged increased bilateral trade after the invocation of the Treaty of Lisbon’s Article 50, which “gives any EU member the right to quit unilaterally, and outlines the procedure for doing so, officially removing Britain from the E.U.” As exemplified by his staunch support for the Brexit movement and opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a bilateral approach to trade seems to be the direction the American president is leaning towards. On security, stronger collaboration on the transnational security threat posed by I.S.I.S. was discussed, and deemed a priority for both countries in regards to foreign policy.

Since the announcement the President has taken to Twitter, his usual modos operandi for communicating with the public, stating that “the meeting next week with China will be a very difficult one in that we can no longer have massive trade deficits and job losses”, indicating that a conversation may be had about the trade barriers Trump discussed during the campaign. North Korea also seems to be a topic President Trump wishes to broach with Premier Xi. In tradition with recanting his previous statements during meetings with foreign leaders we could expect Trump to do the same on North Korea and his claim that the Chinese need to more to keep the country in check. In an interview with Financial Times President Trump has already said Chinese support is not necessary to deal with the Kim Regime, and that the U.S would take a unilateral route if need be. As April 6th approaches, nothing is certain, but if the past is any indicator trade and security have and will continue to be at the forefront of Trumps mind during the Mar-a-Lago summit. I wonder what will wind up next on the negotiation table.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/4/7

旧文章ID：15666

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On April 5, 2017, Emory University, in conjunction with the Atlanta Confucius Institute and the Emory Institute for Developing Nations and the Halle Institute, hosted Zhong Jianhua, the former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa and the former Special Representative on African Affairs of the Chinese Government, to speak about the One Belt One Road initiative. Peppered through with anecdotes from his time spent within the Chinese political apparatus, what occurred was a conversation about the new wave of Chinese globalism that has begun to emerge in Africa. Consisting of five economic corridors over land and sea, OBOR aims to connect 65 countries with a population of 4.4 billion people who have a gross annual GDP of USD$23 trillion. In Africa, the level of Chinese investment has grown exponentially in the last 15 years. In 2016, China pledged to invest USD$60 billion specifically in African infrastructure projects.

The Ambassador worked hard to present the issue in a way that highlighted the Chinese perspective, citing that China does not forget the support of African countries for the PRC’s ascension to the U.N. Security Council. It was not so long ago the Ambassador recalled that the now second largest economy in the world was little more than a developing neighbor to the Soviet Union. Taking his post in 1977 two years before Deng Xiaoping’s famous Reform and Opening Up, Zhong witnessed this transformation firsthand. Through this, he describes the beauty and struggle that comes with development, and the plethora of lessons gained because of it.  In his mind, China wants to lend their experiences to other developing nations, to help when asked, and bring what they can to the international stage.

On the other hand, he identified that often these relationships are transactional: nothing is free.  Drawing from the Chinese saying “I develop, you profit” (我发展，你发财), Zhong elaborates on the concept of “win-win” engagement, or mutually beneficial relationships that China aims to deliver. When asked a question from the audience about whether the quality of Chinese goods coming into Liberia was an issue, Zhong explained that by coming into markets the Chinese are breaking cycles of poverty. Cheap textiles for example make it easier for locals to purchase new goods, and canned food allows people to eat. People don’t like inferior goods, and will not purchase them; markets will naturally react and poor quality products will not be sold. In so being, the issue will correct itself and uplift all those involved.

One thing that was emphasized by the former Special Envoy was the idea that programs need to be initiated for and led by those countries they directly involve. Since 1956, China has adhered to the principle of noninterference. There is no cookie cutter solution to conflict, and in his former position the Ambassador learned this quite well. Being directly involved in the peace process after the civil war erupted in South Sudan, he spoke about the necessity for contextualization, and the need for conflicts to be handled through local, culturally-appropriate means. Put simply, you cannot ask for people to abandon their ways, nor can you ask people to forget their history. Peace and development can only be secured when all parties are on board and all have something to gain.

By way of conclusion, Amb. Zhong suggested that we are sitting on a precipice of change. As One Belt One Road continues to expand and the Chinese method seems to be taking root, countries no longer want to deal with a West that will try and oust their leaders and change their ways. Rather all parties should seek a compromise, a “win-win” solution for all parties involved. If countries like the U.S. and China wish to help, they will have to do so understanding that they can only offer help – it is up to the other if they wish to take it.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/4/7

旧文章ID：15665

作者：Alec Nash  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

1. 1. “We have developed a friendship”

Neither candidate in the 2016 American elections could be described as “friendly” towards the People’s Republic of China, but the language President Donald Trump has used throughout the years to describe China throughout the years has been antagonistic at best, and vulgar and hostile at worst.

The tone of the long-awaited meeting was entirely different than the vicious statements of the campaign. The visit possessed all the pomp and circumstance of a state visit of a foreign leader. Cameras caught no signs of hostility between the two leaders. President Trump would say he and President Xi “have developed a friendship”, and that “long term, we are going to have a very, very great relationship.”

David Dollar, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution: “Most importantly, the atmosphere was polite and respectful, compared to the heated rhetoric of the campaign. Trump characterized his relationship with President Xi as ‘outstanding.’ It seems less likely than ever that the U.S. would start a trade war with harsh protectionist measures, though there may still be some in the administration who would like to go that route.”

Song Guoyou, Deputy Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, in the Paper called attention to the three greatest successes of the visit: the establishment of a congenial, personal relationship between Presidents Trump and Xi, reaching a common understanding on a number of macro-level and strategic issues in the bilateral relationship, and opening the line of communication between the two leaders in order to avoid potential conflict.

For a right-wing view… read Gordon Chang, lawyer and conservative national security pundit in the American Interest: “Trump, in a few short hours, put Xi in his place, cut the ambitious autocrat down to size, and maybe pushed the Chinese state in better directions.” To Chang, the meeting was expected to be a “well-laid Chinese trap” which became “a debacle for Xi” after the American president purposefully humiliated the Chinese leader by arriving late, receiving a “perfunctory gesture of welcome,” and being upstaged by the American strike on Syria. “Xi’s failure to respond to Trump, to fail to defend his country’s interests in Syria, is bound to have consequences back home,” Chang writes, “the Chinese supremo built a career by looking strong and dominating opponents, but Trump, Xi’s opponents will say, humiliated China.”

1. 2. Overshadowed? Reading the Syria conflict’s role in U.S. China relations

President Trump announces the US missile strikes on a Syrian airfield on April 6, 2017 (Image credit: PBS NewsHour)

On Thursday evening, soon after the Chinese and American delegations parted ways, President Trump announced he had launched a targeted strike of 59 tomahawk missiles on Syrian government airfields in response to the chemical weapons attacks on civilians earlier in the week. The missile strike, the first direct  military action by the United States against Bashar al-Assad’s army of Trump’s presidency, dominated news coverage for the next several days, shifting national attention away from the Mar-a-Lago summit.

Some American commentators thought China would be “shaken” by the military strike, while Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told reporters that President Xi “understood that such a response was necessary when people are killing children.” But given Beijing’s web of relationships with the government and rebels and Syria, as well as with Sunnis and Shiites in the Greater Middle East, President Xi’s response to the changing Syria crisis will likely be far more nuanced.

China’s Syria Calculus: China’s level of concern about Syria is not the same as Russia’s. Nonetheless, “there are several reasons why the Sunni-Shiite divide is of particular concern to China,” wrote Gal Luft, Senior Advisor on the White House Energy Security Council, in Foreign Policy magazine last year. Most important of which is that “a restive Middle East” stands blatantly in the way of the development of the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.

In an effort to curb sectarianism, “Xi has sought ways for China to inject itself into the Syrian crisis, inviting both the Syrian Foreign Minister… and the head of [an] opposition group… to high-level meetings in Beijing in an effort to promote peaceful resolution.” … “Chinese diplomacy, active as it may be, has no chance of overriding centuries of bad blood between Sunnis and Shiites… But China can help keep the flames under control” with joint Sunni-Shi’a-China economic initiatives along the Belt and Road.

1. 3. Looming threat of North Korea

North Korean soldiers march in step during the military parade commemorating the 105th birthday of the DPRK’s first leader, Kim Il-Sung. (Image credit: EPA via BBC News)

North Korea, according to Kevin Rudd (Paywall), former Australian Prime Minister and president of the Asia Society Policy Institute, is “the problem that dwarfs all other [priorities]”. As Pyongyang progresses towards enhanced missile range and warhead miniaturization, Washington believes “business as usual” on North Korea is no longer a viable solution, and will put pressure on Beijing. Xi’s government deeply understands the threat posed by North Korea’s missile development, but continues to insist that instability on the peninsula will be a greater problem.

Backgrounder: Tristan Volpe, Nuclear Policy Program Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes: “North Korea’s steady development of nuclear weapons raises the question of why Pyongyang used its underlying nuclear program to pursue coercive diplomacy at all. North Korean decision making is notoriously difficult to estimate, but the historical record suggestions that the Kim regime long desired nuclear weapons to offset conventional inferiority.”

Wu Si-Ke, Foreign Affairs Committee Member of the CPPCC: “It is worth notice that Pyongyang has adopted nuclearization as its foremost goal precisely because of its sense of insecurity deriving from US policies… Over the years, North Korea has had to make difficult choices between preserving national security, political power and developing economy and improving people’s livelihoods. Its single-minded pursuit of nuclear capabilities, at the price of the national economy and people’s livelihoods, is sinking the country into a dangerous, unsustainable whirlpool.”

Recent: On Wednesday, Only days after leaving the United States, President Xi called (Paywall) Donald Trump, urging a peaceful solution to the Korean nuclear issue. Will Washington move towards more frequent and open communication with Beijing?

1. 4. Trade war averted, for now

United States Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross address to employees on March 1st 2017. Secretary Ross leads the US trade team. Following meetings with his Chinese counterparts, he agreed to a 100 day trade plan

Trade is a lifelong obsession for President Trump, who criticized presidents from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama for failing to protect American workers in trade deals. Prior to his election, candidate Trump told supporters he would immediately leave negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, put multilateral trade organizations like NAFTA and the WTO “on notice,” place tariffs of up to 45% on Chinese-made products, and immediately label China a currency manipulator.

But since taking office, President Trump has elected to take on trade at a slower pace. At the Mar-a-Lago summit, Presidents Trump and Xi agreed on a one hundred day plan to address trade fairness through a series of negotiations, leading the Financial Times (Paywall) to proclaim, “trade war averted:”

“For the many people who had been worried earlier this year that America’s famously impetuous president might set off a trade war with China, the result was encouraging…Mr. Ross, who is leading the Trump trade team, went in to the meetings with priority areas that he wanted to discuss. The Chinese surprisingly responded with the idea of the 100-day plan, embracing a staple of American politics since Franklin Roosevelt promised a rapid response to the Great Depression.”

As “low-hanging fruit,” the Chinese side offered to eliminate a 13-year-old ban on American beef and raise investment caps in the preliminary US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty. These concessions alone may not be significant enough for the Trump Administration, but they show a baseline of respect for its interests.

On what America can do next: Li Bin, Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University and Senior Fellow with the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, estimates from an analysis of American trade deficits with other trading partners, that “if the United States were to liberalize its export barriers against China to the same level as those applicable to France, U.S. exports to China would increase by $45.7-$76.0 billion, at a growth rate of 82.1-137.59%, thereby narrowing the U.S.-China trade deficit by 20.28-33.74%.”

It is difficult to fathom that today’s Congress would remove these political barriers. Last year, Members of Congress in both parties, from backbenchers to the Senate Minority Leader, called on the Justice Department to investigate Dalian Wanda on the pretense that their American acquisitions represented “foreign propaganda influence over the American media.” A Congress that firmly believes China is a threat even in the entertainment industry will be far more willing to levy tariffs and push the White House to label China a currency manipulator than to reduce political barriers to exports.

Recent: On Wednesday, Trump tells the Wall Street Journal he will not name China a currency manipulator this year.

Overall, Trump and Xi made substantial, necessary progress in US-China relations last week. The fact that the two presidents could start off their relationship cordially is significant progress from last year in and of itself, but the two sides will need to use that baseline of trust to resolve a number of issues in the relationship. The true test will whether or not the two nations can improve the level of mutual trust and resolve longstanding bilateral disputes, while simultaneously dealing with tumultuous political climates at home and abroad. In President Trump’s own words, “nobody knew it could be so complicated.”

Alec Nash is a 2016 graduate of Emory University and a contributor to uscnpm.org. You can find him on Twitter @alechnash.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/4/17

旧文章ID：15664

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Taiwan: a country with which the US recognises no legal official representative nor maintains diplomatic relations. The relationship was rocked recently when President Trump accepted a phone call from Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen and then made the explosive claim that the US should not be bound by the One China Policy without receiving concessions from China in return, thereby threatening the working basis of the relationship between US, China, and Taiwan. To China’s and many others’ relief, he later reaffirmed his administration’s support for the policy. In spite of these developments, US commitments and connections to Taiwan remain manifold. Officially unofficial, US relationships with the island span cultural, economic, and political ties, and it is within this contradiction that the contested One China Policy rests.

On April 12th, 2017, the Georgia Institute of Technology (GIT) hosted a workshop exploring the past and future of the One China Policy. Joining the discussion was Jay Taylor and Steven Goldstein from the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, and John Garver, Professor Emeritus at GIT’s Sam Nunn School. Dalton Lin, also of GIT’s Sam Nunn School, served as moderator. As prefaced by Dr. Goldstein, so complicated and nuanced is US engagement in Cross-Strait relations that differing perspectives and opinions inevitably arise, a fact on display during the workshop.

Jay Taylor elaborated on the origins of the One China Policy. Officially, the Mainland and Taiwan have been experiencing a 55-year ceasefire, throughout which the sovereignty of Taiwan has never been settled. Recently, Cross-Strait relations have warmed under Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016), yet these have cooled since the election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen. Nonetheless, Tsai has tacitly continued with her predecessor Ma’s stance on Cross-Strait relations, thus making it more difficult for the DPP to advocate for Taiwan independence. Here, Taylor recommends that she should signal to the PRC that she endorses the status quo, but also highlight that she is both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Following the resumption of the Chinese civil war in 1949, the US was initially resigned to allowing Taiwan to reintegrate with Mainland China, yet this changed with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. Following this, there was no official relationship between the US and China until the agreement of the 1972 Shanghai Communique, which though did not clarify the sovereign status of Taiwan, did clarify the position of both the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on this issue and their relationship in general. In doing so, the US and PRC détente initiated a substantial shift in regional geopolitics as both countries perceived a common threat in the Soviet Union. A gradual warming of relations between the Mainland and Taiwan followed, culminating in the 1992 consensus, in which the two sides agreed that there was only one China, but did not specify what this meant.

Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon shake hands during the latter’s visit to China in 1972. During the visit, the US and China released the Shanghai Communique, in which the two governments pledged to work towards the normalisation of their relations. The Communique also document the Chinese and US positions on the issue of Taiwan.

In his concluding remarks, Taylor mentions that he is not confident that the US would uphold its commitments to defend Taiwan should there be a war, citing the US public’s fatigue with war. Personally, he can envisage Taiwan as an independent state, but that it is only possible in some undetermined future.

In contrast to Taylor’s remarks, Steven Goldstein suggested that the US would uphold its defence commitments to Taiwan, as a failure to do so would negatively impact US’s relations with other states in Asia. Goldstein sought to clarify the distinction between America’s One China Policy and PRC’s One China Principle, stressing that although there is rhetorical consensus on a “One China” Policy, this consensus in fact masks a more volatile and unstable relationship.

PRC’s One China Principle is based on historical texts, including treaties brokered with Japan that identified the island of Taiwan as under PRC sovereignty. The current separation is thus due to the interference of the US in Chinese domestic affairs. In addition, under the 2005 anti-secession law, the PRC reserves the right to use force to resolve the division should Taiwan move towards independence or if all other solutions are exhausted – both ambiguously-worded conditions. Under this status quo between de facto and de jure independence, the PRC stipulates that international states cannot have official relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, nor can Taiwan be admitted as a member of international organisations that require statehood as a condition of acceptance.

Steven Goldstein emphasises a point. Seated from left to right is John Garver, Jay Taylor, Steven Goldstein, and Dalton Lin.

Goldstein continues, describing the US conception of the One China Policy. The basis of US-China relations eventually would rest on three communiques that referred to the status of Taiwan: the 1972 Shanghai Communique of 1972, the 1979 communique establishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and the US and ending US diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and the 1982 communique on US arms sales to Taiwan. These communiques satisfied PRC requirements for establishing diplomatic relations, including ending diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC), that the PRC is recognised as the sole legal representative of China, and that the US withdraw all its forces from the island of Taiwan and terminate its Taiwan defence treaty. Despite acquiescing to these conditions, US relations with Taiwan would continue due to the legislation of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which though not strictly a defence treaty, mandates amongst other things continued arms sales to Taiwan.

Summarising, Goldstein states that the US Policy and Chinese Principle agree that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, and that the ROC is not a sovereign legal entity and therefore cannot be supported in international organisations. The two positions disagree, however, on whether the island of Taiwan is a part of China and, similarly, the status of the government on Taiwan. In recognising the government on Taiwan as a non-entity, the US has been able to maintain ties to the island and speak publicly on Taiwanese issues. Finally, Goldstein stresses that adhering to the One China Policy benefits not only China but also Taiwan, as it is under this status quo that the Taiwanese people have been able to peacefully prosper for so many years. Trying to alter this relationship will only invite instability and a deterioration of the current relationship.

As the third speaker, John Garver offered an international perspective on the One China Policy. He notes that China has expended much economic and diplomatic energy to convince international states to adhere to the One China Policy, citing recent meetings between China and the Philippines, the Maldives and Bangladesh as evidence. With larger states, too, China has sought agreement. In securing Russian support in 1996, the language used to express agreement was much more sophisticated and legalistic as fitting Russia’s greater global influence – it is, for example, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In securing public support from these and other countries, China is thus more likely to have support should conflict over Taiwan occur.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen during the former’s visit to the Maldives in September 2014. Xi is the first Chinese head of state to visit the country since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1965. (Image credit: AFP via LiveMint)

Two other powerful countries that China has courted are Japan and India. Japan’s position on the One China Policy, according to Garver, is similar to that of the US, in that it acknowledges the Chinese position regarding the concept of One China and the status of Taiwan but does not recognise it – a key distinction in diplomatic language noted by many of the panelists. In contrast, India’s position was historically quite close to China’s. However, more recently there has been reluctance amongst Indian leaders to offer support for China’s territorial claims to Taiwan without reciprocal Chinese support for India’s own territorial claims (some of which concern disputed territory with China) – a Chinese “One India Policy” in exchange for an Indian One China Policy.

In questions following the workshop, panelists noted the deliberate strategic ambiguity in US policy rhetoric on Cross-Strait relations. The US will not specify how it would respond to a Chinese offensive on Taiwan, and although contingency plans are created they struggle to identify how a war would end. Ultimately, strategic ambiguity is preferred over more definite statements, as this avoids falling into the Obama Administration’s red line dilemma. In response to a question over the potential consequences of Indian support for the Chinese position on the One China Policy (and presumably the resumption of any conflict or disagreement over the Taiwan Strait), China would be freer to expand its navy beyond the Western Pacific, potentially impinging on the interests of India and other states.

If nothing else, the GIT workshop served to highlight the nuances and contradictions inherent within the One China Policy such that consensus on how US-Cross-Strait relations will evolve is difficult to achieve, a fact evident between panellists and one they could all agree on.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15663

作者：  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Image Source: The Strategist, June 30th, 2016

Since the Mar-a-Lago Summit in early April: questions about how the Sino-American relationship will congeal under the Trump administration have been brought to the forefront.  Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State under President Obama, gave his thoughts at a recent event held by The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in conjunction with The Carter Center. The topic: where can the United States and China work together in Africa in the realm of security.

Having been instrumental in formulating the new American policy toward China known as the “pivot” , Mr. Campbell is uniquely adept at gauging the current landscape of the bilateral relationship. As he sees it, between these great powers a “habit of collaboration does not exist”, and that “there are no two countries in the world that have this much interdependence that are so uncomfortable with interdependence.” Take, for instance, the makeup of President Trump’s team of China advisors. On one side of the spectrum you have Peter Navarro, China skeptic with one eye always on the watch for the proverbial dagger in the back, and on the other you have many retained Asia hands who see conflict between the U.S. and China as-not in fact inevitable. The Chinese side is as evenly divided, points out Campbell, citing the variety of reactions  of Xi’s entourage when news of the U.S. bombing of a Syrian airport was revealed over the most lovely piece of cake.

Photo by Bryan Niegel

If the Mar-a-Lago Summit is any indicator, there seems to be a shift in the usual pattern of relations as well as a disconnect within both sides’ perception of the relationship. As Mr. Campbell points out, for the first time in recent memory it seems that China, instead of the United States, was the party who put the global agenda on the stage for discussion. Xi’s main striking points were narrow, specific, and revolved around possible collaborative efforts in Asia and Africa, even offering to contribute to the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. The Trump team came in with broad goals that characterizes the relationship as being one sided, with China coming out as the victor within the trade arena. The question then becomes how can the ingrained competitiveness of the relationship,this focus on winners, losers, and transactions be rewritten and a foundation for fruitful engagement be lain in its wake?

Some inhibiting factors that Campbell points out that have been impeding collaboration have to do with the difference in how foreign is aid is determined in  the U.S. and China. For instance, the US agencies that deal with foreign aid – Department of State and United States Agency for International Development – have no choice to collaborate with the Foreign Ministry of the Peoples Republic of China – a ministry that divides control over finance with the Ministry of Commerce, making consensus difficult to achieve. Alongside this is the reality that China is willing to align on some issues but not necessarily willing to collaborate, that the United States continuously shifts its priorities at least as often as it switches administrations, and an inherent desire exists for both sides to have the other conform to their strategies. These factors combined lead to Mr. Campbell’s depiction of “implementing and developing cooperation with U.S and China in Africa as one of the most difficult tasks”, but not an impossible one.

The disconnect in perceptions highlighted on both sides show fractures on both sides of the aisle, between hard and soft liners on all sides. Those willing to work together, and those more nervous than ever before about what the future may hold. Campbell, however, is optimistic. The U.S. and China have worked together in the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy, and talks are in place to expand this success to the Gulf of Guinea. Other areas of collaboration have been suggested in the Lake of Chad region in Nigeria, as well as transitional threats in the Horn of Africa. Over time, the “habit of collaboration” will form, in fact it must. As Campbell put forth, If the United States and Soviet Union could put aside their grievances and work on issues of common cause, so too can the U.S. with China.

A video recording of the event in its entirety can be found below:

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15662

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

By all accounts, President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 6th and 7th was a resounding success, if for nothing else than the predicted friction and fireworks did not eventuate. Though tentative, progress was made. President Obama’s Security & Economic Dialogue is set to be expanded to incorporate legal and cultural tracks under a reformulated US-China Comprehensive Dialogue. Both sides agreed to develop a 100-day plan to fast-track bilateral trade relations, and Xi invited Trump to visit China.

Perhaps the most drastic and surprising outcome was on the drastic reversal in Trump’s perspective on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Prior to the meeting, Trump tweeted that “North Korea has been behaving very badly…China has done little to help!”. Following the meeting though, Trump was much more circumspect. In comments published in the Wall Street Journal, Trump admitted he had assumed that China had “tremendous power” over North Korea, but after speaking with President Xi about Sino-DPRK relations, he “realized it’s not so easy” (The full Wall Street Journal article can be accessed here behind a paywall, or a free summary from The Hill can be read here).

In light of North Korea’s April 15th military parade and its two recent (failed) missile tests, not to mention its existing nuclear capabilities, it seems appropriate to consider these events in the context of wider Sino-DPRK relations. What did President Xi (likely) tell Trump that impressed him so dramatically? How do recent events fit into this? And where does this leave the Trump administration’s North Korea policy?

A celebration of China-DPRK relations in North Korea. Image credit: Roman Harak via Flickr

Despite words to the contrary, Sino-DPRK relations quite often have masked inner disagreement and turmoil, limiting the influence that China has over the nation. Stretching back to the Korean War (1950-1953), China provided significant military assistance to its North Korean ally, reciprocating the support that Kim Il-sung, then leader of North Korea, provided in China’s own war against Japan in the late 1930s. However, relations between the two countries would be tested in the mid-1950s as Kim Il-sung consolidated his position in North Korean politics with the removal of numerous China-friendly members of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK, the current ruling political party of North Korea) who had criticised what they perceived as Kim’s growing cult of personality. Consequently, holdover Chinese troops were withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula and Pyongyang established itself as more independent from China. This was exemplified in the 1961 Sino-DPRK Mutual Aid and Friendship Cooperation Treaty, which presented the DPRK as an equal to China.

Following this, the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s over the direction of global Communism allowed the DPRK to extract more concessions from the two Communist heavyweights for its own benefit, firstly with China (during the USSR’s de-Stalinisation campaign) and then with the USSR (during the Chinese Cultural Revolution). With an increasingly hostile Soviet Union on its border, China also began to see North Korea as a crucial ally.

Ideological divides grew between the DPRK and China in the 1970s and 1980s, as China refused to offer support for DPRK calls to unify the Korean Peninsula following Communist military victories in South-East Asia (in Vietnam and Cambodia). In addition, China began to reform its economy under Deng Xiaoping. Stronger relations with South Korea, too, were sought and eventually normalised in 1992. Whereas North Korea wished to adhere to its ideological roots, China was more willing to accept the stability of the status quo and begin integrating itself into global affairs, much to its benefit. Moreover, any personal rapport that was established between leaders was by now lost as younger generations began to replace the first generation of leaders.

Juche Tower in Pyongyang, North Korea. Juche is the official state ideology of North Korea conceived by Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s first head of state. The ideology stresses self-reliance as the means to achieve true socialism.

At this point, any political or ideological affinity that China once shared with the DPRK had since been largely curtailed, along with any leverage or influence it might have held as a result. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China became DPRK’s primary economic support, providing crucial aid to North Korea as it grappled with natural disasters and widespread famine in the 1990s.

Currently, Sino-DPRK relations are strained by the North’s continued development of nuclear weapons and missile technology, as well as China’s gradual alignment with the positions of the international community on North Korea. China would prefer a more stable and denuclearised Korean Peninsula, but is unwilling to wield its economic leverage too forcefully lest it jeopardise further the relationship with its erstwhile ally and set in motion a raft of unintended and undesirable consequences (see herefor an overview of China’s predicament).

Herein lies China’s conundrum and most likely the crux of what was explained to Trump. Although the Sino-DPRK relationship is often camped in rosy rhetoric, it belies a reality in which both sides are increasingly dissatisfied with the other and China actions are constrained by its own conflicting priorities on the Peninsula. It agrees with the US objective of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, but disagrees on how to achieve it. Whereas the US and Donald Trump have signalled they are more willing to use forceful and coercive methods to achieve their aims, the Chinese have traditionally been more amenable to a diplomatic solution, as exemplified by their convening of the Six Party Talks.

US President Donald Trump (L) sits with Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) during their  meeting at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. During discussions, Xi reportedly impressed on Trump the complexity of the Korean nuclear issue. / AFP PHOTO / JIM WATSON via South China Morning Post

Thus, the most recent missile launches are likely to only further strain China’s relationship with North Korea and further limit the options available to the Chinese on mitigating the fallout with its neighbour. Indeed, the decision in February to ban all coal imports from North Korea is suggestive of the growing impatience with the North’s continued belligerence. As the DPRK moves closer to establishing functioning nuclear missiles, the calls for more concerted and coercive action will grow, making it more difficult for China to remain committed to its preferred strategy of diplomacy and negotiation.

It would appear as though Trump has begun to appreciate some of the complexities within which China finds itself. Trump’s usually blustery comments have been tempered somewhat post-summit. In an April 28 tweet following North Korea’s failed missile test, he acknowledged China’s opposition to a nuclear North Korea by remarking that “North Korea had disrespected the wishes of China”. Earlier, he commented that “[China is] working with us [the US] on the North Korean problem”, noting too that “China is very much the economic lifeline to North Korea”, and that “nothing is easy”, albeit with qualifications. Indeed, with the decision to eventually send US naval ships to the Sea of Japan, the Trump administration appeared to contradict the President’s apparent change of heart with the manoeuvre.

The countries that participated in the Six Party Talks chaired by China. Though progress towards denuclearisation was made, ultimately the talks have been unsuccessful in resolving differences. Clockwise from top-left: China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, USA, (in centre) North Korea. Image credit: Business Korea

So where does this leave Trump and his administration? Regardless of how he proposes to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, he will have to weigh North Korea’s growing nuclear threat against the options available. On the one hand, in applying coercive and possibly military pressure, he must contend with the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding region. This would likely curtail North Korea’s nuclear ambitions but would also lead to the loss of many lives. It would also be difficult to predict the aftermath of such a course of action and what, for example, would become of the North’s nuclear weapons and facilities and the state of North Korea. Would it be reunified with South Korea in something akin to the reunification of Germany? If so, under whose leadership would this new state be: Seoul or Pyongyang? How would China and other regional states respond to this?

On the other hand, in pursuing a diplomatic approach, he would likely avoid the mass casualties that a full-scale conflict would entail but would have to be prepared for the possibility that negotiations fail and the North continues to develop its weapons program. In pursuing this approach, he would have to consider what it is that he could offer North Korea in return for their denuclearisation, the positions of other concerned stakeholders, and, similarly, what he is willing and unwilling to compromise on. Would sanctions relief suffice, or perhaps a peace treaty with the US and South Korea? North Korea has proven remarkably resilient in spite of the former (helped admittedly with Chinese humanitarian assistance), and the latter has been a regular request of the DPRK regime but has been refused by previous administrations until verifiable denuclearisation has occurred. Would something similar to the 2015 agreement with Iran be feasible? Trump himself has criticised this agreement, yet given his reversals on other positions, he may at least be open to considering this. Regardless of which diplomatic approach he chooses, he will have to offer enough incentive for the North to abandon its nuclear program, which from their perspective is the only thing guaranteeing their security.

Much like the Chinese, then, this leaves Trump in the unenviable position of having to decide between a few unideal options. If nothing else, it is crucial that he communicate clearly and liaise frequently with relevant stakeholders to ensure there are no accidental or disproportionate responses from misinterpreted policies, remain open to the merits and deficiencies of all possibilities and the concerns of other stakeholders, and refrain from making rash and needlessly provocative statements which will only heighten suspicion and inflame tensions. If Trump really has been impressed by the gravity of Xi’s remarks in Mar-a-Lago, then he would do well to comport himself similarly in the face of this complex and looming global challenge.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT MAY. 5, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

A significant proportion of the research conducted for this article was drawn from the following two sources. For further reading on the Sino-DPRK relationship, see this special report from The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program and thisCouncil of Foreign Relations Backgrounder by Eleanor Albert. See also this informative account of the Chinese perspective on the Korean nuclear issue written by Fu Ying for The Brookings Institution entitled The Korean nuclear issue: Past, present, and future.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15661

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

“To open the rusty lock of the Korean nuclear issue, we should look for the right key” surmises Fu Ying, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in a paper published by The Brookings Institution. Beginning with the end of the Korean War and finishing with the April 2017 Trump-Xi meeting in Mar-a-Lago, Fu presents a well-written and informative historical narrative of the Korean nuclear issue before offering some suggestions on how best to resolve this stubborn and long-standing dispute.

In her capacity as Director-General of the Asian Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Fu experienced first-hand the complexities of the North Korean nuclear issue. A common refrain of hers throughout the paper is the ability of each party to come to some form of consensus, only for that trust to be degraded as agreements are left unfulfilled. Parties often appeared to have found the right key only to then disagree on how to turn it.

In the 1980s, as North Korea began to construct a plant to produce plutonium, the US pressured the USSR to force North Korea to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this the US and USSR were successful, yet the USSR failed to provide the agreed-upon equipment to the North, and the North refused entry to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in violation of the NPT.

In June 1993, the US and DPRK conducted three rounds of talks which led to the signing of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to end the construction of its two graphite-moderated nuclear reactors in return for two light water reactors and heavy fuel oil. Though work on implementing the agreement did begin, it was delayed and ultimately never carried out in full. Nevertheless, in 1994, former US President Jimmy Carter travelling to Pyongyang and met with then-leader Kim Il-sung. Carter confirmed that North Korea was willing to negotiate with the US, prompting the Clinton administration to favour negotiation over a more coercive approach.

Former US President Jimmy Carter with former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. President Carter travelled to North Korea in 1994 in a (successful) attempt to avert war over the North’s nuclear weapons program.(Image credit: History News Network)

Towards the end of the Clinton administration, tensions had eased to such a degree that discussions were held on a process to normalise diplomatic relations and to organise a presidential visit to North Korea. However, with the 2000 US election imminent, Clinton was unable to see these plans through to fruition, and the incoming Bush administration was much less open to negotiations. Moreover, in October 2002 evidence was found of North Korean efforts to develop uranium-based nuclear weapons. The Bush administration deemed the North to have violated the Agreed Framework and suspended bilateral talks, with North Korea similarly accusing the US of reneging on its commitments under the agreement.

Following this impasse, the US requested China’s assistance in resolving the nuclear crisis, which led to the formation of the Three-Party and then the Six-Party Talks (6PT) chaired by China. In total, six rounds of the 6PT took place between North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Russia, and Japan from August 2003 to October 2007. Though the talks did achieve some successes, the agreements were frequently marred by delayed and failed implementation of obligations and disagreements over the conduct of participants.

Relations between the DPRK and US continued to deteriorate under the Obama administration, with the North conducting nuclear and missile tests and the US conducting military exercises with South Korea. Nonetheless, the two parties were able to release the February 29 ‘Leap Day’ Agreement in 2012, in which North Korea suspended nuclear and missile activities and would refrain from hostile actions, work to improve relations, and provide food aid. Even so, disagreement on how to interpret this document quickly followed as the cycle of testing, sanctioning and protesting gathered pace.

Fast forward to the present, and the Trump administration has stated that the era of strategic patience – the policy employed by the Obama administration – is over, and that “all options are on the table” in responding to North Korea. According to Fu, anti-North Korean sentiment is growing in the US, and a harder approach to North Korea appears to be coalescing. The THAAD anti-missile system has been completed in South Korea, and Trump has put increasing pressure on China to curb its neighbour’s nuclear ambitions.

Fu Ying, former Vice Foreign Minister of China.

With this in mind, Fu canvasses three possible futures for the Korean nuclear issue, the first two of which she is particularly critical. Firstly, if the approach currently favoured by the United States of ratcheting up coercive measures against the regime continues, the downward spiral of intensified sanctions in response to continued North Korean nuclear and missile bellicosity will make it increasingly difficult to consider options beyond acquiescing to North Korea’s demands or taking extreme actions with unknown consequences. Both parties are determined to achieve their goals and are unwilling to trust or compromise with the other.

Secondly, Fu briefly considers and then dismisses the possibility of DPRK regime collapse, which she describes as a goal counterproductive for easing tensions on the Peninsula and unrealistic in the short-term due to the stabilised domestic situation in the North.

The third and final possibility is that negotiations between concerned parties begin anew. This is Fu’s key to the rusty North Korean lock whose potential outcomes she is most hopeful and optimistic. Noting the relative success of previous negotiations, new talks will create conditions for addressing mutual concerns and for stabilising the situation. However, she warns prospective participants against approaching negotiations without considering developments since the last round of talks. In addition, Fu suggests that the best way to resolve the issue is to start with China’s proposed “double suspension” approach, in which both the US and DPRK simultaneously suspend antagonistic activities to allay the security concerns of the other. For the DPRK, this is its nuclear and missile activities, and for the US, its military exercises with South Korea.

Fu concludes with an allusion to Chinese science-fiction novel The Dark Forest, by Liu Cixin. “Only through dialogue can mutual security be achieved. In this way, we may help wrestle the Korean Peninsula out of its current vicious cycle and prevent Northeast Asia from turning into a Dark Forest”.

You can read Fu Ying’s paper in its entirety here.

For related articles on the Korean nuclear issue published by the US-China Perception Monitor, see also Daniel Grober’s analysis of China’s conflicting priorities on the Korean Peninsula, and Justin Elliott’s commentary on the current state of affairs in US-China-DPRK relations.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT MAY. 11, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15660

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China is gearing up to host its Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing on May 14-15. The forum is intended to provide a platform for discussion on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), an initiative that aims to improve global connectivity with large-scale investments in infrastructure projects. At the moment, these projects are focussed on developing both land and sea route connectivity along paths. Despite its ostensibly laudable goal, some countries have been reluctant to endorse OBOR for fear that it will only to advance Chinese interests (see here for an overview on some international perspectives on the OBOR initiative). As such, there are some noticeable absences from the upcoming forum in Beijing. Although the focus of the forum has been announced, there are questions over what, if any, results the forum could actually achieve. Nonetheless, in a press briefing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the forum will represent “the highest level of international conference held by China” since the project was announced in 2013, suggesting that there are high hopes for a successful forum, whatever that may entail. To begin to discern what indeed that may entail, who is attending the forum, what will attendees be focusing on, and what are some of the likely outcomes?

Who is attending?

G20 heads of state at the 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou, China. The 2017 OBOR forum in Beijing is China’s next opportunity to showcase its international credentials. Only six G20 heads of state (from Argentina, Italy, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, and China) are attending the forum.

As well as China, at least 28 heads of state (29 with Kyrgyzstan) expected to attend, the majority of whom are from either Asia or Europe. Other countries that are expected to send official, albeit lower-level, representatives include the UK, France, Germany, and Japan.

India will also be sending an official, albeit low-ranking, representative to the forum despite its reservations about the project. India – a country that has been identified as a key country in one of the six proposed land-based economic corridors (in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor) – is concerned about the planned China-Pakistan Economic Corridor development projects in the disputed territory of Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan claim.

Interestingly, only two African nations – Ethiopia and Kenya – are sending representatives to the forum. This is despite the potential for the OBOR Initiative to support projects to help meet African infrastructure needs. Justin Yifu Lin, former economist at the World Bank, argues that OBOR could bolster African economic growth through the transfer of China’s labour intensive industries to Africa. The positive input of China on African infrastructure, too, has been noted. The hesitation of many, it would seem, lies in the general concern that OBOR is not as win-win as China claims that it is.

The US has so far not indicated that it will be attending. This is unsurprising given the Trump administration’s distaste for multilateral agreements (see, for example, Trump’s position on NAFTA and the TPP). It limits the potential impact of the OBOR initiative due to the resources and influence that the US’s sizeable international development and foreign aid programs could contribute.

Aside from government representatives, Foreign Minister Wang, in the aforementioned press briefing, added that “officials, scholars, entrepreneurs and people from financial institutions and media from 110 countries, and 89 principals and representatives from 61 organizations” are also expected to attend, with over 1200 representatives expected in total. Undoubtedly there is a large base of support, yet this is diminished somewhat by the smaller attendance of official government representatives.

Notable attendees include UN Secretary General António Guterres, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim and International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde. These are all high-profile individuals from global organisations; their participation undoubtedly adds credibility and prestige to the event in spite of the absence of wide government representation from the international community.

What is the focus?

Workers install wires on a Golden Bridge of Silk Road structure on a platform outside the National Convention Center, the venue which will hold the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, in Beijing, April 18, 2017. (Image credit: Associated Press via Voice of America)

In his press briefing held on April 18th, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified the theme of the event as “strengthening international cooperation and co-building the ‘Belt and Road’ for win-win development”. Within this theme there are to be four outcomes that will be the focus of discussions.

Namely, participants will be encouraged to establish more consensus on the goals and principles of OBOR cooperation between participants; to identify the direction or areas of cooperation; to work towards the implementation of projects; and to strengthen and simplify policies and initiatives that will facilitate OBOR project implementation and success.

Again, although the forum is billed towards strengthening international cooperation and there are members of the international community expected to attend, there are some notable absences. India, as already mentioned, is not attending. Nor is the US, which has sizeable foreign aid and international development programs.

What are the likely outcomes?

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (centre) and Foreign Ministry officials outline the goals and expectations of the OBOR forum in a press briefing on April 18, 2017. (Image credit: Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China)

Even with these expected outcomes, some commentators, like George Magnus, have expressed scepticism that the forum or the Belt and Road Initiative will realise its lofty ambitions. Given that many projects labelled as under the auspices of OBOR predate the initiative, the likelihood of any ground-breaking proposals being announced is not high, especially without similar improvements in supporting architecture, such as legal and investment frameworks. In fairness to the upcoming forum, this is what its fourth outcome hopes to address.

Nonetheless, China, through the above press briefing with Wang Yi, announced it was expecting to sign cooperation documents “with nearly 20 countries and over 20 international organizations”, as well as nearly 20 action plans with their governmental counterparts. How far-reaching or substantive these agreements will be is, again, unknown, and results beyond announced agreements and a forum statement are unlikely to be readily apparent in the short-term.

Other analysts have described the forum as an opportunity for China to take the lead in the face of protectionist rhetoric emanating from the Trump administration, and at the same time limit the repercussions should the Trump administration follow through on its numerous threats to China, such as beginning a trade war. Trump has, however, discarded many of these policies already, so it is unlikely that something like a trade war would be pursued (see here for an overview of statements and policies made by the Trump administration concerning China).

Finally, Chinese state media has reiterated Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s assertion that the forum will be a “win-win” for global development. Xinhua News, for example, has published a commentary emphasising that benefits will accrue to China and especially others from the initiative. Even though phrases like ‘win-win’ have by now become hackneyed and trite from overuse, China’s constant reiteration of the benefits of the OBOR plan suggests that it is very keen to convince the rest of the world of its benign nature. Judging by the expected attendees of the forum, it has been somewhat successful on this front. The forum, then, will provide an opportunity for China to reassure attendees like India and sceptics like the US that OBOR is indeed mutually beneficial for win-win cooperation.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT MAY. 11, 2017

Justin Elliott is a Spring 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15659

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

A commencement speech given at University of Maryland by an exchange student has gone internationally viral in just a matter of days, but with viral fame came backlash. Folks from Shuping Yang’s homeland, China, disagreed with a number of political references and points that she made during her speech about freedom of expression and differences between America and China. Below is an article translated from NTDTV.com, one of the first Chinese articles to come up in a quick search about Shuping Yang’s speech, as well as some trending comments about her from the popular site Weibo.

Female Chinese Foreign Exchange Student Discusses “Freedom” at Commencement, Caught in a Cross fire. Public Full Speech Text (Video)

“The air here is very fresh and sweet”

A female exchange student studying in America said at her commencement ceremony: “The moment I got to the airport and took a breath, I experienced freedom.” This young lady was studying abroad at the University of Maryland, and also discussed her college experiences with another type of fresh, sweet air: the air of freedom of speech.

On May 21st in America, Chinese exchange student Shuping Yang graduated from the University of Maryland. During the commencement ceremony, she wrote a letter filled with intense emotion, narrating her feelings towards the fresh and sweet American air and the profound influence of freedom of speech. During her speech, Shuping Yang said “People often ask me ‘Why did you come to the University of Maryland?’. I always answer, ‘Because of the fresh air.’”.

“Every day at University of Maryland, I was encouraged to express my own thoughts on controversial topics, question the professor’s opinions, and could also go online and give my professors a score.”

She also mentioned participating in a rehearsal of a student play Twilights: Los Angeles, (1992). The student actors during the rehearsal process openly discuss the Los Angeles race riots that occurred in 1992 that revealed emerging issues of racial and gender discrimination. This made her feel something completely unexpected and fresh.

Shuping Yang said: “I was very surprised, I had never thought that I could discuss topics like these openly before. This was also my first time experiencing a political play that inspired an audience to critique their thoughts. I had a strong desire to discuss these stories all along, but I once thought only the government had the ability to tell those stories, the ability to define what was true.

She expressed that from this she came to understand a truth: democracy and freedom of speech were really not naturally just coexisting, freedom and fresh air were both things worth trying hard to pursue for everyone. Shuping Yang has a major concentration in theater and philosophy, and minors in German. At her commencement ceremony presentation, she gained zealous applause from professors and students for her position. However, in mainland China after the video of her speech was put online, she unexpectedly suffered the outright condemnation of Chinese internet users.

A group of some students allied with the Chinese government who study abroad in America spread a message criticizing the speech, saying that she “put Chinese students in an incredibly awkward position”. Additionally, many mainland Chinese internet users have used a very similar style to criticize Shuping, advocating that “the moonlight overseas is more round than in China” (an idiom basically meaning “the grass is greener on the other side”).

However, there are also friendlier people on the internet who have put forward that Shuping Yang’s speech unintentionally stung at the self-respecting beliefs of the Chinese people who believe “family quarrels cannot be solved outside the home” (a metaphor for not critiquing your own country with people who aren’t from there). People therefore develop some disgust, yet can be understanding. But, the fresh air that Shuping Yang’s commencement speech expressed as well as the ideas about freedom and freedom of speech that she looked forward to are not only her authentic feelings, but actually many Chinese people share those ideas as well. Only because the way she delivered her speech and the venue were considered inappropriate, do they deny her overall message. This fear attitude of not doing something because of the risk is evidently not sensible enough.

As noted in the translation of the above article, there have been some folks who are sympathetic to her views, and understand where she was coming from. But on the whole, response in mainland China has been largely negative. What exactly was meant by “sweet air” has also been up for debate, because while it could be viewed as just a metaphor for freedom of speech, some people are taking her comment about air quality literally and comparing pollution between the two countries. On both home computers and mobile phones, the search for Shuping Yang has soared an incredible amount in the past few days, as shown by the Weibo data analysis below. The people most likely to search for her name or mention her on Weibo in mainland China are those who are male and 25-34 years of age:

As noted in the translation of the above article, there have been some folks who are sympathetic to her views, and understand where she was coming from. But on the whole, response in mainland China has been largely negative. What exactly was meant by “sweet air” has also been up for debate, because while it could be viewed as just a metaphor for freedom of speech, some people are taking her comment about air quality literally and comparing pollution between the two countries. On both home computers and mobile phones, the search for Shuping Yang has soared an incredible amount in the past few days, as shown by the Weibo data analysis below. The people most likely to search for her name or mention her on Weibo in mainland China are those who are male and 25-34 years of age:

Most of those searching for her and are engaging in this topic are young mainland Chinese adults, and the sheer volume of searches demonstrates the extraordinary amount of press her speech has gotten, as well as the amount of conversations topics like free speech and nationalism have sparked.

Below is a small translated excerpt of one of the most popular comments about Shuping Yang on Weibo by Vivi莹莹, with over 12,000 likes, 5,000+ comments, and almost 2,000 reposts.

“China has some bad aspects, but you exaggerate in order to meet the tastes of Americans. You receive their applause but you have lost the respect of others”

Other comments from other Weibo users also show more indignance: “”How can a Chinese make such comments on her motherland while speaking to a bunch of foreigners, we overseas students always pay attention to protecting our country,” and have even looked into information about her family as part of a “human flesh hunt” (人肉搜索), a discrediting practice that consists of putting revealing personal information online, known colloquially in English as “doxing”. Posts by people who are trying to find out her family’s income, her personality, and more are becoming increasingly popular.

This online Weibo statement was supposedly made by Yang Shuping, and in it there is an apology for potentially offending people and asking for the personal attacks to cease.

This issue raises larger questions about nationalism in both countries, as well as what freedom of speech and censorship really mean in a digital age.

ANY POTENTIAL ERRORS DEVIATING FROM THE QUOTED CONTENT OF SHUPING YANG’S SPEECH REFLECT DIFFERENCES CREATED IN TRANSLATION RATHER THAN TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS. ALL HYPERLINKS IN THE TRANSLATED TEXT ARE THOSE TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE. (FEATURED IMAGE CREDIT: YOUTUBE) By GRETCHEN TRUPP MAY. 25, 2017

Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/5/25

旧文章ID：15658

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Last week from May 14th-15th, delegates and dignitaries from all over the world gathered in Beijing to promote and discuss the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation. First discussed in 2013 as “one, belt, one road” (OBOR) and then further unveiled in 2015, the action plan for the BRI plans to join the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The creation of the Belt and Road Forum in 2017 builds off of these predecessors for this multi-continental project proposal drew representatives from over 100 countries (India notably declined, claiming joining would violate state sovereignty) to discuss the possibility of streamlining and giving modern infrastructure to ancient global trade routes. As Xi Jinping noted in his keynote speech, China will continue to invest in countries that will allow the road’s construction and will give 60 billion RMB to the participating nations. Many reporters and authors have speculated about the reasons for this large investment, some citing increased opportunity for trade and more investment in China’s economy.

There has also been some discussion surrounding the rhetoric and framing of OBOR terminology. Translating 倡议 (how OBOR is typically described in Chinese sources) into English as a “strategy” versus “initiative” can potentially frame China’s reasons for this initiative as politically and economically self-serving or as more of a collaborative approach for the betterment of the world. The language around OBOR has now undergone a shift in English to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but news sources still use both interchangeably. Regardless of this framing, there remains a camp who argue that forged historical and cultural connections will be “used to gain regional influence”.

Online interest in the “One Belt, One Road” initiative (OBOR) has skyrocketed as this initiative was popularized by discussion leading up to and following the forum, as shown by the statistics below. Western social media has responded with a deluge of content since the Forum. Hashtags like #BeltandRoadForum, #OBOR, and #OBORSummit contain everything from news sites retweeting links to live coverage an informative graphics on representation at the forum, as well as political cartoons reacting to the Forum’s outcomes. A simple track of a hashtag (#OBOR) as shown above illustrates the primary sources of conversation as well as sentiment of the content. Most of this content (coming primarily from Twitter) was largely more neutral than the previously cited news articles and op-eds. Social media content outside of these sources (BBC, Reuters, The Diplomat, etc.) is generally not viewed as more biased than established online news primary sources, and is thus sometimes ignored. But, social media posts and even the creation of meme content is proven to be effective participation in political issues.

While most of the tweets were relaying factual information, a few tweets demonstrate nuanced political engagement and commentary on India’s decision to abstain from the Forum. Promotional campaigns such as this video have also been spreading from various Chinese-run news sources as a positive effort to market the initiative to a wider foreign audience.

During the forum 68 countries and international organizations reached agreements to further the Belt and Road, showing a very positive response to the project on a global scale. Increased news interest by laypeople using social media sites like Twitter also demonstrates that the forum achieved its goal of promoting the BRI, as more people have been discussing the BRI online after the forum than when they had previously unveiled the project goals. Post-forum, articles featuring policy critiques, main takeaways, and ideas for the next steps of the initiative saturated Western news sites and other types of online political media. Some skeptics claim that the Forum had no tangible result besides celebrating the project (despite the aforementioned agreements with over 60 countries), and desire a more “tangible” result. One main concern is that going forward China needs to address accusations of the initiative being overly China-centric in terms of who reaps the benefits, since actual structural plans are not yet solidified.

Worries that economic factors will complicate and potentially hurt nations other than China has made a few countries hesitant to fully commit to supporting the initiative. The more critical commentators call the OBOR an “audacious vision for transforming the political and economic landscapes of Eurasia and Africa over the coming decades via a network of infrastructure partnerships.” The United States announced that delegates led by Matthew Pottinger would attend only a few days before the conference itself (after an important trade deal took place), which was considered a very significant move by the U.S. government.

The next forum for the Belt and Road Initiative will be held in 2019 as part of the 2030 Agenda, which as noted by the President of the UN General Assembly in the Plenary Session of the Belt and Road Forum aims to “end global poverty, [achieve] gender equality and [overcome] environmental degradation”. With both support and opposition from many sides, there could indeed be a rocky road ahead for the Belt and Road Initiative.

FOR FURTHER READING ON ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE BRI/OBOR, PLEASE REFER TO THIS ARTICLE. FOR VIDEO COVERAGE OF THE OPENING REMARKS AND THE EVENING GALA, PLEASE REFER TO THESE VIDEOS.

By GRETCHEN TRUPP MAY. 25, 2017 Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15657

作者：Ruka Wang  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

On Monday, May 22, the New York Times revealed that China had killed or imprisoned at least a dozen C.I.A. informants in the country from the end of 2010 to the end of 2012. Ten current and former anonymous American officials had revealed the previously unreported significant intelligence breach. The breach had the effect of “crippling intelligence gathering [in China] for years afterward.” The article does not mention when the New York Times obtained the information about the intelligence breach.

The first official Chinese reaction was Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s comment during the Regular Press Conference on the same day. Hua stated that while she was “not aware of the details of the report,” China has been “handling organizations, personnel and activities that endanger China’s national security and interests” as authorized by law. The People’s Daily, an official Chinese Communist Party (CPC) newspaper, reported on Hua’s statement, which emphasizes the legality of China’s actions in protecting its own national security.

While Hua and The People’s Daily sought to emphasize the legality and legitimacy of China’s act of dismantling of C.I.A. spying operations, some voices in China took on nationalist and even jingoistic bents. The Global Times, an English-language official CPC newspaper known for its nationalist tendencies, presented the C.I.A. killings episode in an article titled “NYT’s spy in China story full of narcissism.” The Global Times argued that if China had really succeeded in dismantling the C.I.A.’s spy network without the U.S. knowing, the event should be considered a “sweeping victory.” The article claimed that China has the capabilities to dismantle another C.I.A. spy network if a second attempt were made to set it up. It stated that China’s anti-espionage activities are “just and legal” under international law, while the C.I.A.’s espionage is not. The Global Times also noted that the NYT story could be “a piece of American-style imagination based on ideology.” The responses by Chinese internet users on platforms such as Sina Weibo has included similar nationalist rhetoric, with users sharing comments along the lines of “Strike hard against spy traitors, protect the country’s security!” and “Well done! Good on you China.”

How can American audiences better understand the anti-American sentiment in China that is often picked up by Western media? What implications do these voices have for Chinese foreign policy and U.S.-China relations? Two key ideas can help American audiences better understand the origins and implications of China’s nationalist official and popular rhetoric.

Primary school students show “Never Forget National Humiliation” banners in 2014 in Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province. (Image Credit: Xinhua News)

The first idea is that popular nationalism in China is deeply rooted and that its militaristic implications may or may not agree with the official state position. International relations scholars such as Thomas Christensen, Susan Shirk, Peter Hayes Gries, and Zheng Wang have observed that the CPC turned to nationalism after China’s economic reforms in the 1970s had undermined the persuasiveness of communism as a unifying ideology. The CPC deliberately cultivated a form of nationalism based on China’s “national humiliation” narrative through propaganda, textbooks, museums, public histories, and other channels. The nationalist criticisms that erupted among Chinese around the world in response to incidents like the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and to perceived slights of China today are evidence that nationalism has become genuinely ingrained at the popular level. But nationalism does not necessarily translate into support for the ruling regime. Nationalism could also enable citizens to band together and overthrow a ruling regime that they are dissatisfied with. CPC leaders, like most authoritarian leaders, are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of their rule. They highly prioritize maintaining “social stability” (which is another term for “protest prevention” or “regime survival” in China) and closely track the over 100,000 protests that occur in China each year.

Dai Bingguo speaking about China’s core interests during the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009. (Image credit: People’s Daily Online)

The popular nationalism that was born from the CPC’s nationalist legitimation strategies, then, directly contributes to hawkish political commentary. Chinese analysts have found that China’s media is skewed toward nationalism because the CPC incentivizes media outlets to propagate nationalist messages and because the Propaganda Department strikes down liberal commentary. The Global Times article uses nationalist rhetoric that echoes China’s narrative of “national humiliation” and its associated political legitimization and popular mobilization strategies. The idea that military victories over the Western developed powers are great triumphs has been in place since the early days of the People’s Republic of China. The appeal to the legal and moral legitimacy of China’s actions evokes its opposite: the illegitimate, immoral bullying of China by the advanced industrial powers from the mid-nineteenth century to when China began to “stand up” for itself in 1949. International relations scholars such as Zheng Wang, Peter Hayes Gries, and William Callahan find that this perception of being bullied or treated unfairly by foreign powers continues to impact CPC decision-making today.

Scholars such as Jessica Chen Weiss have observed that the CPC has been able to choose between supporting hardline, nationalist positions and avoiding them in favor of more moderate positions. Since the CPC relies on popular nationalism for political legitimacy, the CPC leaders’ choice between endorsing hard-line nationalist views, taking on more moderate views, or even censoring militant nationalist views (such as in the case of the censored warmongering comments about the ruling on the South China Sea) depends on how pressured Party leaders feel to appeal to or satisfy domestic sentiments. In the case of the NYT report on the C.I.A. informant killings, the CPC was able to share a firm but moderate statement—one that signals China’s reasonable willingness to cooperate with other states and adhere to international law. But it may also be the case that China may one day take on more extreme rhetoric or actions.

The second idea is that China genuinely feels threatened by the United States and its neighbors, as a result of purely realpolitik considerations, its historically influenced interpretation of international relations, or a combination of both. In the episode of the C.I.A. informant killings, this perception of foreign threats has dominated the official state response.

China has been stepping up its anti-espionage activities in recent years and has increasingly been employing anti-espionage methods that involve mass participation. In November 2014, China instituted a “counter-espionage law” that provided a clear legal definition of espionage for the first time. In November 2015, China instituted a national hotline for reporting suspected espionage—a move that is considered by some to echo the neighborhood-level mutual policing of the Maoist era. On China’s inaugural National Security Education Day on April 15, 2016, the Chinese government released a poster that warned Chinese female government workers about the dangers of dating handsome foreigners who are secretly spies. The poster was aimed at educating government employees about protecting classified information and reporting suspected espionage. It has appeared on the bulletin boards of local governments. One year later, the Beijing National Security Bureau released new whistleblower ad campaign featuring a 4-minute animated video on how to spot and report spies. The video depicts spies as foreigners with robber masks persuading children to steal government secrets. Successful whistleblowers can receive up to 500,000 yuan ($72,460), which is nearly six times that of the average 2015 wage of 85,000 yuan ($12,300) in Beijing.

A panel from China’s National Security Education Day poster in 2016. The comic warns Chinese female government workers about the dangers of dating handsome foreigners who are secretly spies. (Image credit: China Law Translate/South China Morning Post)

The April 2017 video may encourage distrust of foreigners and fan the flames of nationalism. Analysts have noted that the new anti-espionage campaign could put foreign journalists and nongovernmental organization (NGO) employees at risk. Li Fan, founder of the private think tank World and China Institute, stated that that the new campaign could indiscriminately target and fuel mistrust of foreigners. He also commented that the video could make Chinese people more cautious to speak with foreign media. The instructions reminded Li of the Cultural Revolution, during which neighbors and family members were encouraged report one another.

But China genuinely considers espionage to be a severe threat. China has detained numerous foreigners suspected of espionage and has faced several high-profile defections in recent years. As a rapidly rising power with massive economic clout, China is aware that officials and analysts in neighboring countries and the United States consider the country to be a threat. The United States and China’s neighbors attempt to improve their security by building up their militaries and exercising diplomatic caution, which in turn makes China less secure in a conflict spiral known as “security dilemma.” China’s perception of international threats may be compounded by the historical perception that aggressive foreign states have tended to treat China unfairly.

What can the American public and policymakers infer about Chinese reactions to foreign developments that vary significantly in hawkishness, then? For one, the Chinese popular and Party media reactions are often much more nationalist and war-inclined than the official state reactions. But the Chinese has previously supported the hard-line nationalist position, such as by allowing anti-American protests like it did in 1999 after the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. While it would be unlikely for China to support anti-American sentiment today (in face of the mounting importance of U.S.-China cooperation), tacit state support of some forms of popular nationalism would not be not unimaginable. It is best to consider China’s official state reactions and popular reactions as related to one another, since CPC leadership both benefits from and is constrained by popular nationalist sentiment.

American audiences should also consider China’s strict handling of suspected espionage activity in the context of the tremendous insecurity that China faces on both the international level and the domestic level. Increased efforts to engage in dialogue about security issues are necessary to improve the mutual understanding between the United States and China. While the NYT article about the C.I.A. informant killings may increase tensions between the two countries—especially among domestic audiences—it may also help promote U.S.-China dialogue on security issues.

(Featured image credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China)

By RUKA WANG MAY 25 2017

Ruka Wang is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/5/26

旧文章ID：15656