作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The following article has been translated from the Chinese news site Sina Daily News. It reveals key reactions and commentaries from Chinese officials to China’s 2018 RIMPAC (Pacific Rim Joint Military Exercises) invitation by the United States, and provides necessary information about how the U.S.-China relationship is being marketed abroad in the wake of increasing tensions.

AMERICAN NAVY ALREADY INVITED CHINA TO PARTICIPATE IN 2018 PACIFIC RIM MILITARY EXERCISES AS WELL AS A PLANNING MEETING According to a May 29th American Defense News Website Report, on Monday the American Navy confirmed that they had already sent out an invitation to their Chinese counterparts to participate in the “Pacific Rim” Allied Military Exercises, which are to be held in 2018.

The 3rd Fleet spokesperson from the American Navy, Ryan Perry, responded on Monday, noting that the Americans already invited everyone from countries that participated in “Pacific Rim 2016” Allied Military Exercises to continue to participate in the forthcoming 2018 military exercises.

Perry indicated that the Pentagon sector already expressed that they could invite China to the military exercise preparation meeting that will be held in June in San Diego (US).

If this is the final planned exercise, this will be the third time that the Chinese Navy has participated in the Pacific Rim military exercises.

The Defense News website describes the background surrounding this invitation as a “tense situation”. According to a press release by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense on the 25th of May, the American “Dewey” guided missile destroyer entered the Chinese Nansha Archipelago and related adjacent sea areas around the island and reef without permission. Chinese navy “Lizhou” Missile Frigate and “Luzhou” Missile Frigate spotted the ship and investigated, carrying out a disciplinary warning to drive the American Naval vessel away.

Spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense Guoqiang Ren responded to this incident on the 25th, saying that China possesses indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Archipelago as well as nearby ocean areas. Regarding American military’s display of muscle-flexing, pushing forward with the militarization of the region will easily trigger unforeseen naval and air aggression. Chinese troops expressed resolute opposition to continue jointly advancing serious negotiations.

“Presently, the relationship between the militaries of both nations is situated in an important period of development. We believe that to keep a steady and healthy Sino-U.S. relationship that allies with our common interests, we must both make great efforts to cooperate. We demand American forces adopt practical steps to amend their mistakes in order to rectify and develop the military relationship between the two countries at an increased capacity. The American military’s current conduct regarding their mistakes will only urge the Chinese military to further build up their strength, steadfastly defending their country’s safety and sovereignty.” In a routine press conference also held on the same day, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kang Lu, said that “the related actions of American troops harm Chinese sovereignty and safety interests, and could very easily trigger unforeseen incidents with navy and air forces. The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with and resolutely against this expression of force.”

Kang Lu further noted that currently, under collaboration between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea dispute is cooling off and abating, and not at all breaking the appeared positive development of the situation. But, the aforementioned American aggression seriously obstructed the progress of the discussions, and harmed international affairs yet produced no benefit for America itself.

The “Pacific Rim” joint military exercises are initiated and held by the United States as international exercises for the largest militaries, and began in 1971. Since 1991 it has changed into a biennial exercise, with a purpose of promoting Pacific Ocean coastal nations to protect ocean thoroughfare safety, and reach unification in response to maritime unconventional safety and danger capabilities.

Since 1998, China has begun dispatching diplomacy observers to participate in these exercises, and in 2014 for the first time incorporated actual guests to participate. From June 30th to August 4th in 2016, “Pacific Rim-2016” exercises were held in Hawaiian islands and California as well as nearby areas. 27 nations participated, including America and China. The Chinese military presence in the exercises was particularly strong due to the presence of a guided missile destroyer boat from Xian, a missile frigate from Hengshui, a comprehensive naval supply vessel from Gaoyou, a “peaceful ark” hospital vessel, as well as a comprehensive submarine rescue ship. Additionally, 3 ship-based helicopters, one land battle platoon, one diving/underwater platoon and a remaining 1,200 soldiers also participated in the exercises. During these exercises, China and the U.S. naval ships and vessels drilled together on issues such as maritime counterterrorism and anti-piracy.

THE NOTICE ABOUT THE RIMPAC INVITATION REFERENCED IN THE ARTICLE CAN BE FOUND HERE.

Translated by GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE. 1, 2017 Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/1

旧文章ID：15654

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China’s recently completed “Hualong One” (华龙一号) is now the world’s largest nuclear power  plant construction project, and is advertised as safer and more environmentally friendly than nuclear domes and reactors of the past. Marking a new development in nuclear technology, Hualong One represents China’s increased push for nuclear power sophistication and expansion of nuclear energy. This project has the potential to make around 30 billion yuan (approx. 437 billion USD) as an original and innovative Chinese export as China’s nuclear efforts go international. Both Argentina and France have already made agreements with China this year to have their own “Hualong One” power plants constructed, as one of the latest “Made in China” commodities.

This video clip as well as the one above illustrates the new safety features of the Hualong One, such as a double outer shell for increasing general workplace safety and efforts to prevent disasters such as the explosions of the Fukushima Daichi power plant in 2011. With increased concerns of breakdowns and explosions, the safety and viability of a new nuclear power plant is under more scrutiny than ever before.

This latest nuclear project right is on track for the development plans that China laid out earlier this year, which includes increasing exports of nuclear power-related products, completing current nuclear power structures, as well as beginning construction on new reactors and plants both on the coast and inland. In addition to the most recent Hualong One, as of April this year China has also put a floating nuclear power plant in the South China Sea. But why does there seem to be such a big push for new nuclear power structures coming from China, especially when worldwide use of nuclear energy has been falling?

One driving force stems from the large amount of pollution that coal-powered plants produce in China that create unsafe air quality. This problem is usually combatted by wearing different types of surgical masks that filter out harmful particles in the air. This has now become a daily reality for people living in large cities, and so some people monitor the daily air quality index (AQI) using cellphone apps that rate the air quality on a 0-500 scale (where 300 and above represent human health hazards). Data presented in the 2010 Global Burden of Disease Study links about 1.2 premature deaths in China to air pollution. Chinese documentaries such as “Under the Dome” have gone viral in the past few years as the push for healthier environments and clean energy gain more global traction. Coal and other fossil fuels accounted for around 70% of Chinese electricity production in 2015, and the demand for a decrease in the use of all fossil fuels as well as growing economies in China and a need for energy to be closer to developing sites have made the push for nuclear energy a part of formal government policy. China’s growth of cities in just the past 20 years has been astounding, with some cities growing by over 1000%. With such an intense and large expansion of multiple cities throughout the country, there will be an increasing demand from the citizens of these expanding cities for electricity. Building more nuclear reactors and power plants can meet that energy demand, and increased safety means they can be built closer to human populations to provide quicker access to that energy with less potential risks.

Other potential factors driving these nuclear expansions include economic and military gains for China. Estimates have put the return on nuclear power at approximately 4% greater than the returns on coal and gas-powered plants, making nuclear energy the more economically favorable option. Projects such as the recently launched floating nuclear power plant in the South China Sea “[provide] an inexpensive source of electricity and fresh water for both military and economic gains, as well as [ensure] China’s strategic dominance in the South China Sea”. Having cheaper sources of energy that are easy to access can effectively meet the worldwide increasing demands for electricity, as well as legitimize China’s sovereignty in highly contested waters. The aforementioned deals with Argentina and France regarding Hualong One would also be in an incredibly large source of revenue for the government.

The Unites States is currently the largest producer of nuclear power in the world, but this is likely to change by 2026. Nuclear power appears to be following the global trend and stagnating in America, partially because it takes up to 25 years to get a new reactor approved in the U.S., as opposed to the mere 2 years that a Chinese nuclear reactor can be approved. The actual energy amount of nuclear power in the United States that is used for electricity is lower than that of China’s in general. Nuclear energy accounts for only 19.7% of U.S. electricity production as of 2016. This slowing phenomenon is most likely also due to several problems and closure risks with existing older power plants around the country (the average age of a reactor in the United States is 35 years old). Public support for nuclear energy in the U.S. has also dwindled, especially since the Fukushima Daichi power plant explosion. Renewable energy is also becoming more increasingly affordable in the United States, leading to even more closures of power plants across the country. This reflects a general trend in the decline of fossil fuels as the most viable and affordable energy source, as harnessing wind and solar energy is even becoming more affordable than coal and natural gas.

Even with all of this focus on renewable energy sources and an overall worldwide decline in nuclear energy use, the International Energy Agency predicts that in the future, world nuclear capacity will start and continue to grow again. As the environmental conditions on this planet change, different nations will look for alternatives to the finite and harmful potential of fossil fuels. Despite various serious risks involved with creating and maintaining a nuclear reactor, the amount of accidents is dwindling as advances in safety and technology are made. New nuclear technology such as Hualong One represents an opportunity for economic growth, while simultaneously meeting the increasing energy needs of China’s population as cities continue to expand. Perhaps China is looking to get ahead of this projected nuclear curve and work to reduce coal emissions while promoting newer, cheaper, and safer ways to acquire energy.

MORE INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR POWER IN THE WORLD TODAY CAN BE FOUND HERE. 

(FEATURED IMAGE CREDIT: 中国广核集团有限公司)

By GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE 2, 2017

Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15653

作者：Ruka Wang  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

America’s Withdrawal From the International Scene and China’s Increasing Leadership

Despite facing pressures from Pope Francis to German Chancellor Angela Merkel to keep the United States in the Paris Climate Accord during the 43rd G7 Summit last weekend, President Trump has announced his decision to withdraw from the agreement. This decision is only one of several recent inward-looking international positions taken on by the Trump administration. During the May 24-25 NATO meeting in Brussels, Trump declined to affirm America’s commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which outlines the principle of collective defense. Trump also accused NATO members of “chronic underpayments” to the alliance despite the fact that all members have met their formal payment requirements. Trump also called the Germans “very bad” on trade and allegedly threatened to stop the import of German cars, echoing his trade policy agenda’s emphasis on standing up to “unfair” trade practices and his administration’s claim that Germany is depressing the Euro to increase the competitiveness of its exports.

Each of Trump’s withdrawals from America’s international commitments appeared to prioritize some of America’s domestic interests over global, cooperative issues. Trump emphasized that while the environment was important to him, the Paris Climate Accord would be bad for (oil industry) jobs in the United States. Trump’s claim that NATO members “owe” the United States money and that the United States has been paying an unfairly large portion of NATO’s costs is unfounded in legal terms, as the U.S. is supposed to pay 22 percent of the costs according to a formula based on national income. Gary J. Schmitt, a scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, argues that Trump “doesn’t care whether [his statement is] technically accurate.” Trump’s conspicuously rough demeanor at Brussels—which included him shoving the Prime Minister of Montenegro aside—accompanied his consistent and intense demands for greater payments.

While Trump has not stuck to all his campaign promises, these recent inward-looking moves show that Trump is sticking to the promises that are linked to his core political supporters. The coal industry has pushed hard for Trump to roll back Obama’s climate change policy, and Trump’s coal-state Republican supporters were especially eager to get the United States to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. At a rally in April 2017, Trump reiterated the claim that “our government rushed to join international agreements where the U.S. bears the burden while other countries get the benefit and pay nothing.” In his trade policies, Trump emphasizes the protecting “American workers” whom he claims represent the core of the country. Since America’s low-skill workers are experiencing hardship as a result of competition from international trade, “job protection” translates into thinly veiled protectionism.

Trump meeting with European Union Leaders in Brussels on May 25. (Image credit: The New York Times)

China has been stepping up to the plate on the issues of climate change, globalization, and free trade and has been making efforts to cooperate with other states. Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Europe from May 31 to June 2, which includes the 19th EU-China Summit, aims to deepen cooperative ties and to stem the tide of protectionism. As demonstrated in the May 14-15 Belt and Road Forum, China is also willing to pay massive costs of the Belt and Road Initiative to advance global trade and international cooperation. At the World Economic Forum in Davos in early 2017, Xi lectured Trump on the dangers of protectionism for global welfare and the importance of combating climate change for future generations.

President Xi Jinping speaking at the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2017. (Image credit: EPA)

It appears, then, that while the United States has been retreating from its responsibilities as the global hegemon and a contributing member of the liberal international order, China is willing and able to assume the mantle of global leadership. But is this really the case?

Some questions that a global citizen may wonder about are: Is America’s retreat from an international stage just a blip under Trump, or will it be a long-term trend? What are the effects of U.S. retreat for the world? If China were to become the new global leader, would it support the world order that the United States has created and led or would it impose its own? What does America’s retreat mean for current U.S.-China relations?

Why America’s Retreat May Be A Long-Term Trend

While Trump’s presidency will only last for eight years at most, the impulses that demand social and economic protection and a rejection of international cooperation are the product of larger, structural changes that cannot be reversed without adverse effects on global welfare. The world has witnessed a new wave of right-wing populism, from Trump’s election to the popularity of France’s Marine Le Pen and Brexit. Populism can be qualitatively summarized as a movement or ideology that is driven by (1) the frustration of the “true people” of the nation about what they perceive to be the loss of economic and social status despite their honorable, historically-linked identity, (2) a feeling that the “true people” are being disregarded or exploited by the establishment elites, and (3) socioeconomic inequality in which the “outsiders” and disingenuous elites are perceived to get the better deals. Populism is linked with globalization its resultant economic, demographic, and social effects.

A Trump rally at the Pennsylvania Farm Show Complex and Expo Center in April 2017 to celebrate the President’s first 100 days in office. (Image credit: AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)

In a nutshell, trade increases the overall economic welfare (or prosperity) of every state that is involved. But it does harm some segments of the populations within states. Because of factor price equalization, international trade contributes to the falling wages and increased unemployment of low-skilled workers and increased inequality in developed economies like United States and Europe. The demands of populism are for the state to withdraw into itself: To protect industries at the cost of overall welfare, to “build a wall” between itself and its neighbors, to prioritize the interests of the “true people” at the cost of international cooperation, and to reject the “establishment elites” and their manners in favor of the rough, honest ways of the people. These impulses have translated into protectionist trade policies and migration quotas in the past—which strongly echo the Trump Administration’s promises.

The social and economic forces that drive America’s inward retreat will last unless policy steps are taken to alleviate the immiseration of low skill workers. The solution to address the economic inequality and social dislocations is not for America to withdraw into itself in the face of its international commitments. Such a policy would prevent those low-skill workers from moving into more competitive industries and would reduce national and international welfare. The solution is to find a way to address the social and economic dislocations under globalization through policy, such as by offering better trade adjustment assistance.

The Consequences of an Inward-Oriented America for the World

The consequences of a continued American withdrawal from its international commitments could change the international order as we know it. The United States has played two important roles since the beginning of its ascendancy after World War II: It has acted as (1) the global hegemon that the world needs to maintain free trade and other public goods and as (2) the leader of the current international order that is characterized by rules-governed international cooperation, free trade, and a pro-democracy and human rights lens.

Free trade, collective defense, and a clean environment are public goods. Public goods are subject to the free rider problem: All states have an incentive to not contribute their share to provide the good and to free ride on the contributions of others. The free rider problem can be easily located in everyday life. Suppose, for example, that a large group of neighbors all want the public good of a clean and pleasant park. Each neighbor says that they will work in the garden, mow the lawn, and clean up the trash. But each neighbor has an incentive not to put in their share of the work. They think that even if one person shirks from the task and does not work, others will take care of the park well enough and would not notice the shirking. The shirker thinks that they would be able to enjoy strolling in the clean park anyway. The overall outcome, then, is an unclean park.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Morgenthau at the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference on July 8, 1944. (Image credit: The World Bank)

The solution to the free rider problem is to have a hegemon (the richest and most powerful state) take on the leadership role of providing the public good. The hegemon offers to take up the time-consuming and expensive task of monitoring its neighbors directly or by establishing international institutions. It has an incentive to do so because it benefits most from the public good—by virtue of its size and influence—and it can afford to do so. The United States has acted as such a hegemon to uphold international free trade and finance by playing key roles in the creations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (which is now enshrined in the World Trade Organization) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States’ role in NATO and in global climate cooperation has been similar.

While the United States’ relative decline in military and economic power points to the possibility that it may no longer be a global hegemon, its has been a leader in upholding the rules and norms of free trade, global climate protection, and collective security in the form of NATO. America’s international retreat, then, has the effects of (1) directly harming the provision of those public goods, (2) suggesting to other states that it is okay to retreat from international treaties and rules, (3) signaling to the international community that American promises are not credible. But perhaps most importantly, America’s retreat tells ambitious challengers and allies alike that the rules-governed, cooperative, free trade, and pro-democracy international order spearheaded by the United States is fragile.

The World Under China’s Leadership

China’s increasing commitment to international institutions may signal that China seeks to replace the United States as the global leader in both bearing the material costs of global initiatives and in championing the norms of international cooperation. But if the United States were to decline in its global role (either as a result of populism-driven policies under Trump or in the long-term as its economic and military power eventually declines relative to those of other states), it is not clear whether China will support the current international order. International relations scholars Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu argue that a rising power like China may become (1) a supporter who pays their share to maintain the existing international order, (2) a shirker who free rides to gain the benefits of the existing order without paying, or (3) a spoiler who seeks to tear down it down and replace it with their vision.

China’s willingness to pay the Belt and Road Initiative may indicate that it is unlikely to be a shirker. China’s material support for and advocacy of the Paris Climate Accord, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the protection of free tradecould be interpreted as support for the existing liberal, rules-governed, and cooperative international order and a disinclination for shirking. But China’s support of the U.S.-led order could also be interpreted as the rising power buying time for itself to grow stronger, seeking to improve its reputation, increasing its soft power, and finding opportunities to criticize the United States and challenge the legitimacy of its leadership role.

World leaders at China’s Belt and Road Initiative Forum on May 14-15, 2017. (Image credit: The Astana Times)

Schweller and Pu observe two long-term Chinese visions of the future international order. The first vision seeks to install a new Chinese order that emphasizes the superiority of Chinese traditional philosophical views over western ones, the failure of the American “empire” to maximize “the interests of all people,” the superiority of China’s political and social system to those of democracies, and a better international future based on China’s collective welfare-focused datong (Great Harmony) social model. One philosophical view of the world that is believed by many Chinese is the concept of tianxia (all under heaven), which emphasizes the the unity of all peoples (under the benign guidance of superior Chinese ways.) The second vision that Schweller and Pu identify advocates for the continuation of the current liberal, democratic, and cooperative order but in a more inclusive form and on a larger scale. This second vision finds it in China’s interests to eventually democratize.

What do China’s recent foreign policies show about its inclinations for the future? Despite China’s liberal initiatives and moves to expand and deepen free trade and to support international institutions, China has also demonstrated behavior that is not in the spirit of the current liberal, rules-governed, pro-democratic order. The most blatant rejection of international norms is China’s refusal to abide by the South China Sea ruling against its territorial claims and its continued unilateral actions in the South China Sea. This behavior suggests that China may be inclined to cooperate only when it is convenient and will disregard international rules and norms when its core interests are challenged. China has also recently moved to effectively censor all non-state news media. China’s closed capital account, overproduction of steel, and resource misallocations under its state-directed economy remain challenges to full financial and economic liberalization. China’s continued moves against political and economic liberal reforms are signs that it will resist integration into the liberal, democratic international order.

The Present & U.S.-China Relations

Where do America’s potential retreat from the international stage and the uncertain implications of China’s rising global role leave us?

President Trump and President Xi on a walk together at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. (Image credit: AP Photo/Alex Brandon)

The United States should re-evaluate its behavior of pulling back from its leadership roles, putting pressure on other states to pay more for institutions and alliances, advancing protectionist trade policies. President Xi is right in identifying that much of the backlash against globalization may be misplaced. While globalization does hurt certain segments of the population, the remedy is not to reverse trade-induced welfare increases, but to address the inadequacies in America’s social safety net. Improved social assistance could help low-skill workers move up the skill ladder and join more competitive industries in the long run.

The uncertainty of a future under China means that America may be better off hedging its bets on the relative stability of the present. America’s retreat from its international commitments affects the material resources available to cooperative institutions, America’s credibility as a leader and an ally, and the stability of the liberal, democratic, rules-governed international order. These international considerations are not divorced from domestic concerns. They could impact America’s national security, its natural environment, and its economic wellbeing. America should engage China in more dialogue to learn more about China’s inclinations for the future and to help China address the challenges that it faces—which are largely in the domains of its economic and political institutions. It is on the United States to not pull back from the world and to help rising great powers like China integrate peacefully into the international order.

Ruka Wang is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2018/4/3

旧文章ID：15652

作者：Abigail Chen  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The colossal Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a China-heavily funded economic development strategy that focuses on connectivity among countries primarily between the China and the rest of Eurasia. It consists of the land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and oceangoing “Maritime Silk Road” (MSR). During the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) held in Beijing from May 14 to 15, 2017, China-Russia cooperation over BRI in Central Asia was warmly discussed.

The special friendship between Beijing and Moscow is visibly displayed in Xi and Putin’s speeches, when both leaders reiterate their commitment to globalization and free trade. On a rhetorical level, the two countries are united by their stance against the isolationist “America first” foreign policy increasingly expounded by the Untied States administration.

Of long-term significance, China and Russia also announce a range of bilateral arrangements concerning Central Asia at the summit. That includes the signing of trade agreements, the creation of the China-Russia Regional Cooperation Development Investment Fund, and the development plan of connecting BRI with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

President Xi Jinping of China speaks during a briefing on the final day of the Belt and Road Forum (Image Credit: REUTERS/Nicolas Asfouri)

It ought to be underlined that the lack of clarity as to the BRI economic scheme is ostensible in Chinese official rhetoric. Whether any forms of Chinese foreign direct investment in Russia or Central Asia can be called a BRI project remains vague. In addition, the summit communiqué announced the ambitious creation of a China-Russia Regional Cooperation Development Investment Fund, which encompasses “a total scale of 100 billion yuan and the initial scale of 10 billion yuan” to smooth cooperation between China’s Northeast and Russia’s Far East. The proposed China-Russia fund is a clear statement of the opportunities that both countries’ leaders saw in the priority areas of cooperation (energy; infrastructure investment; transport). Yet in fact, Beijing started discussions with Moscow about a Russia-China investment fund in September 2015, when the Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang met with the Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev of Russia. This delay in solidifying the logistics has drawn concerns about the ability and willingness of the two states to fully implement these ambitious financial agreements.

Furthermore, while Russia media outlets glorify the achievements of BRF, Russian analysts critically assess the potentials of these cooperation projects. There is an overall perception that the interaction of the Chinese and Russia delegations at the BRF is defined largely by political showmanship and symbolism. Addressing the lack of substantial agreements between Russia and China on BRI, Vita Spivak at Carnegie Moscow Center comments that the only comparatively concrete economic result of the BRF for Moscow is the establishment of China-Russia Regional Cooperation Development Investment Fund noted earlier. Moreover, the lingering suspicion about China’s hidden geopolitical agenda for BRI is common, as China is growingly entrenched in what had been Russia’s sphere of influence. Optimism on the Chinese side is equally limited. Chinese critics argue that the Russian state has repeatedly failed to instigate the most basic preparatory efforts for signed investment projects, citing the case in which Russia never fulfilled its promise made in 2007 of building its part of the 2.2 km bridge across the Amur River.

Indeed, power differentials, incompatible strategic visions, and the very little mutual understanding between the Chinese and Russian public discourse remain impediments to Sino-Russia cooperation.

Map of Central Asia illustrating Silk Road Economic Belt projects in Central Asia (Image Credit: SIPRI/Christian Dietrich)

First, the current dichotomy of economic strengths between China and Russia casts doubt on the countries’ ability to establish an effective trade alliance over BRI. One significant imbalance is the gradually expanding discrepancy in the countries’ trade relations. At present, China is Russia’s largest trading partner, comprising $88 trillion in combined export and import volume in 2015. Conversely, Russia’s share in China’s foreign trade remains small. From a structural perspective, Russia is also challenged by its growing dependency on China’s resource policy. At present, China imports 550,000 barrels of oil per day from Russia or 27 million tons per year, making Russia the largest crude oil exporter to China. As reported by Forbes, this asymmetry is only set to compound as the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline will be connected to Northeast China and the pipeline connecting Siberia’s Chayandinskoye oil and gas field to China materializes by 2018. This is starkly contrasted by China’s diversified source of funding through maintenance of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and future Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) development banks. Given these facts, just as BRF lays clear that Russia is only a “junior partner” with China in BRI, the bilateral trade relationship is hardly interdependent.

Second, the aggressive posturing of BRI in Central Asia inevitably sparks concerns about its conflicting interests with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Launched in 2011, EEU aims at consolidating Russia’s control over the other former Soviet states and cementing a multinational bloc under the Kremlin’s leadership. Through enhancing the synergy between EEU and OBOR, Russia aims at promoting “Greater Eurasia”, a grand international cooperation idea first announcedduring the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Analyses argue that by preventing Central Asian states from being absorbed into rival regional blocs such as those created by BRI, EEU serves Moscow’s political agenda of preserving its regional dominance in Eurasia. Hilary Clinton famously once called EEU an effort to “re-Sovietize”. On the Chinese counterpart, BRI represents a grand economic vision but not geopolitical strategy – a fact and intention that the Chinese side has repeatedly articulated. For instance, Xi stresses that China welcomes Russian participation only “so as to make them new platforms for the development of the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination”. Although China and Russia have begun talks on EEU-BRI integration since 2015, finding practical means and models harmonizing these two projects remains a challenge.

A third factor is the mutual skepticism seen in the Russian and Chinese public discourse. The 2016 Valdai report highlights the superiority complex that Russia harbors vis-à-vis Asia and China. This mentality is only aggravated by obvious worries about the detrimental consequences of Chinese investment, such as increased Chinese migrants and environmental issues. Although Putin reassures domestic audience that Beijing intends not at usurping the Russian economy, Russia’s strategic “pivot” to the East is very much compromised by uneasiness about China’s rise.

There is no doubt that the partnership between Russia and China has become substantially closer with the instigation of BRI. As Putin comments:

“As for the People’s Republic of China, the level, nature, and confidence of our relations have probably reached an unprecedented level in their entire history”.

That said, the divergent economic interests, competing geopolitical visions, and lack of mutual appeal can potentially jeopardize the progress of Sino-Russia BRI cooperation in Central Asia. The benign management of the two countries’ overlapping interests so far is a result of the strategic nature of their cooperation. Russia desperately needs the Chinese investment to rectify an economy plagued by Western sanctions, lower oil prices, stagnant productivity, and obstacles to diversifying exports; China feels that in order to advance its massive economic diplomacy program, it needs Russia as an ally to maintain international legitimacy. Some experts predict a future “division of labor” in Central Asia: “China would be the bank and Russia would be the gun.” In that sense, the strengthened partnership between Russia and China is simply one out of necessity.

The proposed new rails, roads and pipelines of BRI are sure to stir unease over the close yet tense relations between China and Russia in Central Asia. At this time, a new strategic scenario in Central Asia seems to be emerging. The biggest challenge faced by both sides is to find a compatible structure of comparative advantage in BRI and avoid unnecessary risks and conflicts in the region.

By ABIGAIL CHEN JUNE 7, 2017

ABIGAIL CHEN is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/7

旧文章ID：15651

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The views expressed in this article belong entirely to the author of “Why is McCain so Anti-China?” and do not represent the views of the US-China Perception Monitor or the China Program at The Carter Center.

During his speech below on May 30th at the Alliance 21 Lecture , John McCain referred to China an “economic miracle” and stressed increasing alliances between multiple nations, including Australia. But, he gave a rather harsh statement about China’s continued growth and power that has brought about a swift critique of the Senator’s rhetoric. Here is the contentious quote that has garnered much press attention:

“THE CHALLENGE IS THAT AS CHINA HAS GROWN WEALTHIER AND STRONGER, IT SEEMS TO BE ACTING MORE AND MORE LIKE A BULLY. IT IS REFUSING TO OPEN MORE OF ITS ECONOMY SO THAT FOREIGN BUSINESSES CAN COMPETE FAIRLY. IT IS STEALING OTHER PEOPLES’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. IT IS ASSERTING VAST TERRITORIAL CLAIMS THAT HAVE NO BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. AND IT IS USING ITS TRADE AND INVESTMENT AS TOOLS TO COERCE ITS NEIGHBORS”

In addition, in John McCain’s recent recommendations given a few months ago for the 2018-2022 defense budget call for increased U.S. military spending to counter China’s rising global influence as well as strengthen the U.S.’s presence in the South China Sea. He has stressed peaceful solutions to these issues before, but his recent incendiary comments have brought about a variety of negative responses from Chinese news media sites that will make it potentially difficult to cooperate with China in the future. McCain does not represent all of the U.S. government, which is known by China—but he is certainly a loud voice with a sway in public opinion. With someone as militarily and politically influential as John McCain calling for more military exercises in the South China Sea specifically to counteract China, this signifies that the some members of the United States are once again calling claims of sovereignty into question and voicing their distrust in the government. While these exercises are supposedly going to be held to combat China’s “militarization” of the islands, China has rejected the claims McCain has made regarding the militarization of the South China Sea islands. In addition, this budget (as well as the budget for the fiscal year) has also been accused of spending too much on the continued increase of the military as a whole.

This usage of “bully” to describe China’s actions can particularly imply that China’s presence in the South China Sea is unfounded, and by using this language McCain gives China a very negative connotation in the American media. As an especially public figure, these accusations can carry a lot of weight and can negatively influence people’s impressions of China. This negative language has begun to turn on him however, as appalled news outlets and internet users respond to McCain’s attack on China. Notably, several Chinese Media outlets on such as Junshi Xilu and M4 describe McCain’s statements as “verbally abusive“, and categorize his intensely negative claims about China as “false accusations“. Most Chinese sites, social and news alike, are incredibly unhappy with the manner in which McCain portrays China in his speech. His demonstrated fears of China militarizing the islands in the South China Sea and becoming too strong have also been described as “Cold War Thinking“. This ideology suggests that McCain’s worries are not based on fact, but on fears and speculation of the United States losing power at the hands of another country.

In addition to news sources, Chinese social media has recently shown an increased interest in the Senator, with over 27,000 mentions of his name on the day of his speech, as shown in the above graph. While the upward spikes reflect more general occasional trends that increase every so often, the most notable and highest media spike was on the 30th (the same day as his lecture). A general increasing trend in the following day displays that this his comments have certainly made some waves across China. Other Chinese news sources have since described McCain as anti-communist and even anti-Chinese due to his comments. Hua Chunying, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, also notes that McCain’s claims about China violating International Law in the South China Sea are unfounded, and that the laws themselves can be very confusing. China stands by the resolution that they have sovereignty over the islands, despite McCain’s comments that reveal his skepticism towards this claim. While China does have its own view on sovereignty that is sometimes not in accordance with international law, McCain’s continued have the potential to put U.S.-China relations on incredibly shaky ground. Other news organizations such as Reuters and the CATO Institute have declared that these comments will “escalate tensions”, and that in terms of foreign policy he is “worse than Bush”, respectively. 

This is not the first time McCain has expressed anti-Chinese views or been overly cautious of China’s development. Historically, McCain has wanted to work with China and has supported the One China Policy, but supported political reforms so that they would become a “non-threatening great power”, and claimed that a lack of spying led to Chinese nuclear development. Additionally, in his 1999 position papers, he called China the “primary threat to American interests and values”.

It seems these days the United States and China are locked in a tense relationship that currently does not show signs of improving. Already existing tensions in the South China Sea have been exacerbated by McCain’s comments, as well as the U.S. continuing to conduct exercises into the South China sea with the approval of other nations. The new $640 billion fiscal defense budget (if approved) shows that the United States will continue to strengthen its military even more, despite being one of the largest in the world. Other events such as Trump announcing that the United States will back out of the Paris Climate Agreement while China confirms increased involvement further widens the rift between the nations. Even though individual cities and states have offered to work with China and the EU to try and uphold the Paris agreements on their own, there could still be a chance that these initiatives are blocked. Comments such as the ones discussed above by John McCain will surely be on China’s mind as it moves forward to the future, with or without the United States as an active ally. Hopefully as time goes on, tensions will be smoothed and the U.S. and China will work together for mutual understanding and cooperation. The U.S. China relationship has been improving for some time under former President Obama, but this new administration has brought about many changes in policy and thinking that have caused the relationship to hit a rough patch. Whether the content of McCain’s comments are only his own or reflect the views of other in power, it’s hard to say.

From his anti-China outbursts and the very title of his defense budget, “Restoring American Power”, it becomes clear that McCain is very afraid of America losing power. Even though the U.S. spends more money on military than China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the U.K, India, France, and Japan combined, McCain still insists that America is “not spending enough” and is thus losing their stance as a global power. He appears to buy into the myth of American superiority— an idea that places America at the pinnacle of ideals like democracy and tout America as the “leader of the free world”. At the 2004 Republican National Convention he encourages the audience to “take courage from the knowledge that our military superiority is matched only by the superiority of our ideals”. McCain has also called America “the greatest force for good in the history of the world” at the 2008 presidential debates. These comments as well as his “Cold-War Thinking”, reflect perceptions that the U.S. is a superior, morally sound global power. A nation like China who is growing stronger and is gaining more stake in global affairs could potentially undermine that power. A nation with different ideals and government structure gaining influence could be a driving force behind McCain’s desire to strengthen the U.S. military. American democracy rewards people like John McCain, and if a nation that doesn’t espouse the same ideals is rising to global power, they become a threat to American power and therefore American ideals. McCain’s anti-Chinese outbursts seem to stem from these deep-rooted fears, which are greatly influencing his policy decisions. These policy and military decisions, depending on their approval, will then impact Sino-U.S. relations in pertinent yet unforeseen ways. If he truly wants to strengthen U.S. ties with China and cooperate for mutual benefit, perhaps he should first examine where his anti-China fears that affect his policy stem from.

(FEATURED IMAGE CREDIT: UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTER) By GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE. 8, 2017

Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/8

旧文章ID：15650

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The American government has been increasing the pressure on China to take greater action against North Korea’s missile test launches. North Korea has been in the process of developing and testing nuclear weapons for the past 14 years or so. This article aims to shed some light on the historical precedence for actions between the U.S., China, and North Korea today. Since 2016 many missile launches and tests have been conducted with various results. Despite condemnation from many nations, the volume and impact of the tests does not appear to be abating. The missile launches have gotten to such a volume that even the United Nations Security Council decided to increase targeted sanctions on North Korea. This decision to levy sanctions was only recently agreed upon by both the U.S. and China, who have disagreed on sanctions in the past. As they persist with nuclear development, North Korea has vowed to make a missile that has the ability to reach U.S. soil. A recent test of the Pukguksong-2 ground-to-ground missile using solid fuel was a success and has led Kim Jong-un to order a mass production of the system. This development is quite pertinent as solid fuel missiles are harder to detect, because they can be quickly transported and launched without needing to fuel them at a specific, identifiable location. While this recent missile does not yet have the projected ability to reach Guam (the closest U.S. territory), this test still gives North Korea valuable information about nuclear weapons that will help further develop its technology. As shown in the graphic below, all of North Korea’s previously tested missiles have ranges that would not be able to reach any land that the United States occupies. This figure also gives predictions for North Korea’s nuclear weapons that are still in development or untested, and those and projected to have a much greater range.

While North Korea’s missile launches have been escalating in scale for the past year, it is now an even higher priority for important members in the U.S. government, with an increased number of visits to the region in the hopes of curbing North Korea‘s plans. While there seems to be some current reasons for China’s involvement, there are a number of previous events that have culminated in the Unites States looking to China for help as the main influencer on North Korea. Currently, both China and the U.S. want the Korean Peninsula to be free of nuclear weapons. At the moment there is no official dialogue between the U.S. and South Korea, and China has very little dialogue with the DPRK, if any. The current lack of dialogue between the U.S. and South Korea is significant as they are historical allies who typically are communicating and sharing strategies with each other. China also has a large stake in the region and would benefit from maintaining relations, economically speaking. China as of right now “accounts for about 90% of North Korea’s trade”, but North Korea’s growing ties with Russia could change that figure.

Image Credit: Free Malaysia Today

Since the United States (along with many other countries from the UN) first defended South Korea when foreign troops invaded, the relationship has been rather rocky. The two countries currently have no diplomatic relations, and the historic embargos and current sanctions show that the countries do not plan on forming an alliance soon. With the recent passing of Otto Warmbier, who was flown home comatose from a North Korean jail on “humanitarian grounds”, public and political opinion of North Korea has sunk even lower. Trump has condemned North Korea for this treatment and described the regime as “brutal”. Three U.S. citizens and six South Koreans are still being held by the DPRK.

Previously in early May, Donald Trump expressed a desire to meet with Kim Jong-un if North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear and missile plan. While the U.S. would agree to a security program if the current plan was scrapped, without this firmly in place the legitimacy of the DPRK would be called into question. While North Korea appeared to desire further bilateral relations, the likelihood of accepting any proposals from the U.S. has dropped due to increasing tensions. Aside from the United States’ 4,018 active and inactive nuclear warheads, they currently have no other bargaining power or sway with North Korea. The U.S. cannot seem to control North Korea on its own. In looking to other nations, a close and powerful country with economic might comes to mind—China. But why would the United States push China so hard if they don’t currently engage in meaningful dialogue with the DPRK? China holds some economic power and influence over North Korea, as previously referenced regarding trade. But China’s influence also extends beyond the purely economic sphere. China has spent a recent period of its long history in various types of involvements and agreements with North Korea. (Further information on a more extensive timeline, the source for the following events, and more information on the U.S.-South Korea alliance can be found here and here.)

As nation separate from South Korea, North Korea (breaking away as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) was only established as recently as 1948, and the PRC (People’s Republic of China) was established the following year. After the Korean war, China provided aid to North Korea, and both countries signed a treaty to promote cooperation between the two nations. But, in 2003 North Korea withdrew from a different international agreement called the NPT, which was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and conducted their first nuclear test later on that year. In 2009 China and North Korea declared a “year of friendship”, which was meant to promote more mutual peace and cooperation. However, in 2013 China very intensely condemned North Korea’s increase of nuclear tests, and has been fairly critical since in both social media and on official terms.

In 2016, Premier Li Keqiang and former President Obama met to discuss the impending threat of North Korea as well as South Korea’s planned deployment of 6 US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to counteract its northern neighbors. While both countries did not want North Korea to increase its nuclear power, China also did not want THAAD to be installed in South Korea because of the potential to also surveil China’s actions. During this time China also “placed Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company, on the border with North Korea, under investigation for ‘serious economic crimes in trade activities’” between the company and North Korea. This further signified China’s displeasure with the nation’s recent actions and serves as a warning of further action. The completed THAAD is not in its operational stages, but two launchers have already been recently installed in South Korea and are live. South Korea will not yet allow the undeployed four launchers to be installed until further notice. South Korean companies, Lotte in particular, have been punished by China following the decision to allow THAAD in South Korea in the first place, on the grounds that it could represent a security threat to China. It appears that this is a concession to China rather than a rebuff of America, and an increased effort to make sure that THAAD is compliant with Korean laws.

Despite the historical precedence of cooperation and aid between the two countries, outside of acting as a political influencer and source of trade, relations between China and North Korea are on the decline. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-Un have not actually met face-to-face because of political differences. Even though tensions are mounting, maintaining at least some semblance of relations might still be advantageous for China. Many Chinese decision-makers as well as the DPRK itself claim that North Korea acts as a buffer between China and the U.S., who are allies with South Korea. Others imply that this conflict actually benefits North Korea by allowing Kim Jong-un to “exploit tensions [between China and the United States] and build up his nuclear arsenal”. This implication seems to explain why Kim Jong-un was so upset after Xi and Trump met in Florida.

These conclusions appear to be coming into fruition after North Korea declared in May that the United States, by sending a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Korean waters, was pushing them to nuclear war. This has prompted a response from Chinese Foreign Military spokesperson Geng Shuang, who has called on both parties “to remain calm and exercise restraint, stop irritating each other, work hard to create an atmosphere for contact and dialogue between all sides, and seek a return to the correct path of dialogue and negotiation as soon as possible”. North Korea has also expressed dissent with China for approving the expanded sanctions on North Korea.

There is a significant yet complicated historical and economic relationship between China and North Korea. Economic intervention can put China in a position to influence Kim Jong-un with regards to nuclear development, but whether this is good or bad for China it is hard to say. Attempts at Sino-DPRK allyship will potentially further strain the ties between America and China, and also deplete China’s resources. On the other hand, potentially being able to restrain North Korea could bring the U.S. and China closer together towards a common goal. The current relationship between China and the U.S. As well as the current volatile administration gives Kim Jong-un some power in that he can exploit the growing tensions for his own benefit. The increased tensions between China and North Korea could also make it harder for China to exert or even desire to exert their influence over the region. Especially after America’s partially-active THAAD launchers in South Korea and increased military presence in the area, continuing to push China has not seemed to result in largely tangible actions. Outside of the U.N. sanctions and the reprimanding of both the U.S. and North Korea for their actions, the situation remains mostly unchanged. While there is significant historical reason to seek China’s influence, current events seem to suggest that the relationship between China and North Korea, as well as China and the U.S. are becoming more strained. Despite the recent strife with North Korea over the death of Warmbier, China is still committed to “resolving the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue and consultation”. Perhaps the invitation for Ivanka Trump and husband Jared Kushner to Beijing later on in the year will help pave the way for further cooperation between China and America. President Trump, however, seems frustrated about China’s inability to pressure the DPRK. On his personal twitter account he recently made this statement about China and North Korea:

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/877234140483121152?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.uscnpm.org%2Fblog%2F2017%2F06%2F21%2Fu-s-pushing-china-curb-north-korea%2F

Perhaps this signals a change in former foreign policy, and this new administration will seek a different method of halting North Korea’s nuclear development.

By GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE. 21, 2017 Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/21

旧文章ID：15649

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Studying abroad can be an incredible and rewarding way to complete one’s education, and can help students succeed in the long run. In both the U.S. and China many programs exist whose sole purpose is to send students to study in another country. These programs laud the innumerable benefits of foreign language and culture exposure, and the potential job opportunities gained from marketing an experience abroad. These benefits also extend past the purely personal gains– studying in another country can have international influence as well. When students go abroad, particularly to pursue education, they are seen as ambassadors of their nation. What students say and do abroad can reflect and shape others’ attitudes about the student’s home country. Therefore, both Chinese and American students studying abroad as future leaders and influencers have the ability to shape Sino-U.S. relations through an international education. Both the United States and Chinese governments have recognized this, and co-launched the 100,000 Strong Initiative in 2009, meant to increase the diversity and opportunities of U.S. students studying in China. Studying abroad represents a set of wonderful opportunities for both Chinese and American students. But issues of wealth, educational pressures, and cultural differences can bring challenges to international students. Going abroad for educational purposes also represents something different for students from both countries and is actualized in a variety of ways.

THE NUMBERS

For American students looking to go abroad, China has been one of the most popular options for the past 10 years. According to the State Department for the 2010/2011 academic year, China was the 5th most popular place to study for American students, and the growth pattern shown in the chart below confirms this. Many aspects of studying abroad all influence where a student chooses to spend their time. Location, courses, language, and culture all play a role. Cost is also a major factor influencing whether or not Americans choose to study in China as part of their education. China is generally considered a cheaper place to live and study as opposed to the United States, and a good place for students who are strapped for cash to spend a semester. While currently this is true in some sense due to the weight of the dollar against the yuan, there are some cost disparities to study abroad in China as well. For public Chinese universities it will cost around 3,300-10,000 USD per year. While this is generally cheaper than public universities in America, these costs can differ, especially if a student works with a study abroad program or through their own university. Regardless of financial status, going through accredited university programs means students would just pay their regular expenses. However, American students are less likely to go for multiple years, which can bring down costs even more. Most American students only study for a year or a semester abroad, as opposed to the standard four years of undergraduate education. While the number of U.S.-based students studying abroad in China has been rapidly increasing for the past ten years, it is currently on a decline. Concerns such as pollution, future job opportunities, and differing study abroad options (usually for less than a year) all have contributed to the recent drop in numbers.

Chinese students, on the other hand, are coming to America in ever-increasing amounts to pursue their education. According to the Institute for International Education, there are approximately 124,000 Chinese undergraduates (and about 204,000 in graduate school) in the United States currently, making them the largest group of international students at 31.5%. Both overseas and domestic marketing have made studying in the U.S. a viable option. Subway walls are plastered with SAT and ACT testing advertisements by organizations that train Chinese students to take the two major college entrance tests required by most U.S. colleges. This encouragement from their home nation as well as other pressures have definitely influenced the influx in study abroad students.

Cost, however, is not necessarily a driving force. Most Chinese students tend to pay more money to study abroad than their U.S. counterparts, and contribute significantly to the economy. “In the 2014-2015 academic year, Chinese students pumped $9.8 billion into the U.S. economy through tuition and fees“. A quick internet search will reveal that most information about visas and preparation are most enrolled in undergrad and graduate programs for at least a full year, usually for the longer duration of the degree or program, meaning that they will continue to spend money to study in the U.S.. The revenue also encourages campuses to advertise and provide resources to welcome and attract potential international students. This large influx has contributed to various Chinese student organizations on various campuses for international students as well as Chinese Americans looking for community.

There can be significant variation in the costs of tuition for Chinese students studying in America (where tuition is regarded as incredibly expensive), as shown in the above table. This is exacerbated by the fact that most international students who have to pay tuition and other expenses like visas are ineligible for federal aid on account of their status as an international student. While there are some scholarships avalible and increasing amounts of lower and middle-class Chinese families send their children to community college, many Chinese students who study at prestigious institutions in the United States come from affluent families. This influx of wealthy students who often display their wealth in material ways has shaped the perception that most international students come from high-income backgrounds. Despite efforts by lower/middle-income international students, this remains a pervasive image in American students’ minds. This issue also hold true for American students studying in China—while there are many scholarship opportunities, white students households with higher incomes are overly represented in study abroad.

MOTIVATIONS

Despite potential cost inhibitions, many different factors persuade both Chinese and American students to seek some time abroad. The motivations to for a Chinese student to study in America and vice versa are quite similar at the core, but carry some stark differences as well. For Chinese nationals, there is an urge to escape the gaokao, the intense two-day exam held only once a year that determines whether or not a student goes to college and where they are able to study. Studying abroad also gives these students the freedom to choose area of study, and some view it as an investment that will help their entire family in the future.

While American students still have to take the ACT and SAT, studying abroad provides language skills and career opportunities harder to come by in the United States without international experience. A study on millennials studying abroad shows that current young adults tend to look for growth-related experiences, which can make them likely to turn to study abroad in their college years.

BENEFITS

Studying abroad gives students exposure of a different culture, people, and history and allows them to introspectively examine the origins of their own beliefs as well as critique their ideas of normalcy. The Chinese idiom for which this article is named (“学然后知不足”) aptly sums up responses from both Chinese and American students who study abroad in the other respective country. Changes in opinions as a result of going abroad are common among both Chinese and American students.

In the above survey conducted by Foreign Policy, most American students who study in China said that they returned with more favorable perceptions of China than when they left. While all surveys have their limitations, this still represents a contingent of American students that have been changed by studying in China. Foreign Policy also conducted a similar survey for Chinese students studying in the United States. Most reported being more open-minded, idealistic, and liberal as a result of their experience, but note that college in the U.S. is more academically rigorous than in China. Some students (both American and Chinese) have come to support China instead of oppose it in their years abroad. Historically and even to this day the Chinese government fears that studying abroad will fill Chinese students with too much “Western thought”. But these fears do not seem to represent any real threat to China, as an overwhelming takeaway from Chinese students was that the West has many great ideas, but not all of them are a fit for China.

HARDSHIPS

Despite all of the benefits to be gained from studying abroad, there are also various difficulties— the previously discussed costs being an inhibitor on both sides. Issues such as language proficiency, cultural differences in work style, and the availability of resources all contribute to some Chinese students in America feeling isolated and frustrated with their abroad experience. The same can be said for American students having to go through their own period of cultural adjustment in China as well. For American minority students, studying in China brings a different set of challenges as they face marginalization and stereotyping from both in their home country and abroad as well.

Unfortunately, reports predict that the overall number of international students coming to America will fall due to President Trump’s immigration policies. Other limitations to study abroad also follow claims that the Chinese government is wary of Chinese students getting exposed to “Western Ideology”, such as Shuping Yang’s controversial speech in which she describes the U.S. air as clean and the speech as free, receiving backlash from Chinese netizens both at home and abroad.

Falling numbers of U.S. students studying abroad have also produced initiatives that encourage study abroad and collaboration between the two nations, and stress the importance of student ambassadors. But the numbers are still dwindling, partially due to more American students having a negative perception of China and the country’s politics. Many programs are also unable to meet the needs of students with specific college requirements to fill. American students applying for jobs and internships that could have been aided by study abroad can also find themselves facing competition from Chinese students returning from studying abroad opportunities in the United States. It is important for the future of both nations to send cultural ambassadors to each other’s countries, and study abroad presents an environment that encourages students (the future leaders) to open their minds and hearts to people despite their differences.

By GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE. 22, 2017 Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/22

旧文章ID：15648

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

While Donald Trump does certainly have his share of ardent domestic support and opposition, how does his rhetoric and image translate overseas? In particular, how do Chinese netizens and news sources feel about Donald Trump, his policies, and by extension, his family members that are now part of the administration? Both the United States and China have enormous global influence, and future collaboration and alliances between the two nation will depend on how Trump himself treats China, as well as public and state opinions. China only has one ally on paper, North Korea (DPRK), and future international relations are in a precarious position under the current administration.

Actually getting Trump’s rhetoric to translate into other languages represents a problem in and of itself—his confusing speech style relies on innuendo and often ungrammatical sentence structures to appeal to and persuade mass audiences. His speech is similar to that of past demagogues, and his credibility comes not from facts, but from an “honest”- sounding speech style, which he does by reading and subtly addressing the emotions of his audience. When taken out of an American context (such as the infamous “locker room talk” speech), these speeches can get lost in translation, particularly for non-Western audiences. Even native English speakers have trouble comprehending his rhetoric. This gap in understanding is good for Trump, because it allows his supporters to fill in the blanks with whatever they want (and thus “understand” him) while Trump can be intentionally vague and avoid repercussions. Many translators are faced with the dilemma of either changing the content and making Trump’s speeches “sound smarter”, or they risk their translations being viewed as lower-quality if they mimic his speech style in their respective languages. When these vague comments from Trump get translated into Chinese, they are usually more on the literal side of the translation in order to keep their disjointed feel. This can be quite difficult, especially in the case of Trump’s vulgar comments. How his rhetoric is translated can affect local perceptions of Trump—if his comments are mistranslated, it will cause a gap in understanding that could potentially be disastrous.

Throughout his campaign process, Trump was known for mentioning China numerous times—and not always in a positive light, which did not go unnoticed by the Chinese public. A popular opinion with many Chinese netizens regarding these comments is that Trump and his administration just do not understand China. In addition to his anti-China comments, his speeches were also called “abusively racist and extremist” by the Global Times, and he was referred to as “big-mouthed, anti-traditional, abusively forthright[…] a perfect populist “. Prior to the election, he was referred to as a “joke” in an article by Beijing Review. The Chinese site “Today’s Topics” was also discussing the possibility of a Trump presidency, with very mixed opinions. He was deemed “controversial”, and referred to by the nickname “big mouth” throughout the article. The article discusses everything from his insensitive and offensive jabs at pretty much every marginalized group to his many mentions of China. At the end they conducted a poll to see whether or not Chinese netizens thought Trump would become president, and the results were incredibly divided:

Chinese site Today’s Topics poll conducted in 2016, prior to the 2016 election. Image source: 今日话题

Domestic and international citizens alike watched the election unfold to the current outcome. Some Chinese officials were reportedly supporting Trump because he appears to be “less interventionist and less imperialistic than the previous administration“. Others were happy because Trump signified some of the many flaws of American democracy, and his desire for isolationism would take the U.S. out of affairs in Asia. Time described the election as follows: “what better advertisement for the stable, technocratic authoritarianism of the Chinese Communist Party than an America so divided that half the electorate failed to recognize how disenfranchised the rest of the nation felt?“. However, this does not mean that all Chinese citizens were overjoyed with the election results. On the day that Trump was inaugurated, the Weibo account “This is America” (@这里是美国) reposted the viral video below from the news site Global Times of Chinese children discussing their views on Trump and his policies. 

Some children remembered him for his facial expressions, while others discussed his daughter Ivanka. Many of them disagreed with his proposed policies, such as the wall on the border of the United States and Mexico. One of the children notes that the construction of the wall itself isn’t feasible and that it represents a “crude way [to solve] a problem”. Online responses ranged from approval to dissent, expressing that these children represent a hopeful view of the future while others disagreed with the children’s attitudes.

Since the election and inauguration, Trump has received mixed reviews in the Chinese media. The Chinese-language Financial Times recent Weibo post about Trump’s tweets about China, one of the most popular comments is a critique of him, translating to “The world is not America, and America also doesn’t get the final say [in matters of international affiars]“. A recent video of Trump saying he doesn’t want “poor people to control the economy” in response to a question about the richness of his cabinet is currently gaining some press attention. Some Chinese commenters on Weibo cannot believe he would even say this out loud, while others are in agreement with the statement, but not necessarily the delivery. One person even said that “poor thinking will only make the country more and more poor”, while another advocated a proletariat revolution. On the whole, however, most of the comments on the variety of news and media sites discussing this agree with Trump’s harsh rhetoric. Sina Finance recently published an article critiquing Trump’s position on having a rich cabinet, citing recent psychological research from UC Berkeley claiming that rich people are more likely to lie and deceive others and are more narcissistic, while poorer people are more shortsighted. Whether the research itself is credible or just an overgeneralization, the opinions voiced in the piece showcase some disagreement with Trump’s position on the matter.

The question-and-answer website Quora, which gets around 100 million visitors every month, posed the question: “Do educated mainland Chinese like Donald Trump?“. The most popular answer, with 3.1K views, claims that on the whole, they do for some of the following reasons:

“[Educated mainland Chinese people are] more understanding to populist movements and more sensitive to the class-divide narrative, therefore it is easier for them to resonate with Trump’s stance on the American working class. When the US Quora users are enraged with Trump’s anti-progressive claims and behaviors (on immigration policies and on respecting women), Zhihu[the Chinese equivalent of Quora] users see through this and focused on Trump’s boldness in pointing out the root problems in economy.”

As Foreign Policy notes, to many Chinese people, Clinton represented a corrupt politician (an “archetypal villain” in Chinese politics) while Trump represented the “people’s champion”. The way his supporters were described invoked images of Chinese archetypal working class (“hard work, honesty, and plain spokenness”), making him more sympathetic to large swathes of the population.

Ivanka Trump and her family. Image Source: US Weekly

Most media energy is focused on Trump, but other members of his family share the infamous limelight as well. While his wife Melania has not received a lot of press attention one way or the other, the general reaction to Trump’s daughter Ivanka has been largely favorable. She acts as her father’s assistant and is beginning to have a bigger role in international relations. Her material wealth, success, and status are very appealing to young Chinese adults, especially mothers. She is known on Weibo as a ‘goddess’, and viral photos and videos of her circulate on miaopai (similar to YouTube). She is viewed as intelligent and devoted to her family. There are some critics, however, who don’t think that she is a good role model to others—but the fact that her daughter Arabella, who was taught by her nanny to speak Chinese endears her more to the public. Xinhua news agency even referred to Ivanka as ‘elegant’, showing a favorable preference from this state-run news site. Her favor with the Chinese public as well as her husband’s dealings with China are likely going to help smooth relations between the two nations in the future, and potentially ease the tensions currently brewing over issues such as North Korea’s nuclear development and the South China Sea disputes.

Chinese views on Trump, his policies, and his family can hardly be defined as clearly for or against the current president and his establishment. Many responses are mixed, mirroring various American reactions to Trump. Most other English-based news sites, however, paint Chinese people as largely supportive of Trump and his policies, and ignore the nuance of dissent that rears its head in both Chinese social media and news sites.

In the past Chinese officials have  publicly voiced their displeasure with Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate accord (particularly due to Trump’s claims of climate change being a Chinese hoax), there is still some polite effort in Chinese news to keep the overall public opinion of Trump positive. This past week at the first U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in Washington, both nations are moving forward with plans to fully denuclearize North Korea and increase military exchanges. Some speculate that some of Trump’s tweets prior to this meeting served as a way to guilt-trip and further pressure China to act. In a statement from Xinhua news, the meeting was described as “constructive and fruitful”, and there are high hopes for Trump and Xi’s meeting in July.

By GRETCHEN TRUPP JUNE. 27, 2017

Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/3   发布时间：2017/6/27

旧文章ID：15647

作者：Ruka Wang  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

China’s impressive infrastructure projects have been the subjects of both international praise and criticism. A recent New York Times article about the debt-ridden Chishi Bridge seems to have rekindled longstanding concerns about the future of China’s economy. The country’s infrastructure feats are often afflicted with corruption, debt, and poor construction. The collapse of a $12 million Chinese-built bridge in Kenya and the “straddling bus” investment scam this week are just two recent examples. Other varieties of China’s infrastructure resource misallocations include China’s modern ghost towns and unused airports and factories.

Two major causes of China’s inefficient infrastructure investments are systemic corruption and an attachment to an increasingly unviable development model. The resulting inefficiency, debt, and unproductivity paint a grim picture of China’s future economic and political stability. As China increasingly takes the lead in international projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), political fragility and stymied growth in China could have global consequences.

Infrastructure investment as a hotbed of corruption

Literature on China’s infrastructure and other fixed-asset investments often discuss the country’s rampant corruption. Infrastructure investments continue despite low returns because “construction has become and end unto itself.” Government-backed loans and close ties with construction companies provide incentives for local governments to undertake construction projects for private gain, feeding a cycle of corruption and misallocation. According to a 2014 party report, “officials in the provincial transportation office, high and low, racked their brains for ways to get their claws into expressway projects.” Chen Mingxian, a Hunan transportation official who led the highly praised Chishi Bridge project, received $4.4 million in kickbacks in two years for giving construction contracts to favored companies.

In reaction to the collapse of a bridge in Harbin in 2012 (which was one of many of China’s countless and constant infrastructure failures), local residents immediately pointed to corruption. Zeo Niu, a college junior in Harbin, noted that the practice of using substandard materials while charging for high-quality materials is commonplace. Niu quotes an analogy from her uncle, who runs a construction company: “If the central government wants a steel bar, it should be 10 centimeters. When it comes to the province, it will be 8 centimeters, and when it comes to the city, it will be 5.”

China’s deeply embedded system of corruption, which is reinforced by its heavy state hand in the economy, may be to blame for its addiction to unproductive infrastructure projects. In his influential book China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay, Minxin Pei reveals that crony capitalism—an economic system in which capitalists gain rents from politicians—is endemic to China’s purposefully-crafted institutional environment. According to Pei, the Communist Party of China (CPC) embarked on reforms in the 1980s that sought both greater economic efficiency through partial liberalization and the preservation of party loyalty. The resultant administrative decentralization and partial property rights reforms became the necessary conditions for Chinese-style “collusive corruption.” The former provided government officials with an environment safe for corruption and the latter provided opportunities to privately benefit from state-owned property.

The large contracts and the abundant opportunities for cost inflation and skimping on quality materials make infrastructure projects easy targets for rent-seekers. Of the fifty cases of “Outsider-Insider Collusion” (in which both officials and private businessmen are involved) that Pei investigated, twenty-eight cases were in the infrastructure and construction sector and thirty-four were in the real estate sector.

A collapsed entrance ramp in the northeastern city of Harbin. (Image credit: Frank Langfitt/NPR)

Unproductivity in infrastructure investment

China’s post-1978 development model has primarily relied on two growth drivers: (1) fixed asset investment mostly in infrastructure and (2) low-wage manufacturing for exports. China’s infrastructure investment is the highest in the world. According to a 2016 McKinsey report, China’s rate of infrastructure investment (about 8.6% of its $11 trillion GDP) is nearly twice as much as India, the next largest spender, and over three times as much as the US and Canada. “It’s very important to improve transport and other infrastructure so that impoverished regions can escape poverty and prosper,” President Xi Jinping stated in 2013.

But are China’s infrastructure and other fixed asset investments actually productive drivers of economic growth? Researchers at the University of Oxford find that in over half of China’s infrastructure investments, the costs of the projects have been greater than the benefits generated. Only 28% of the infrastructure projects were “genuinely economically productive.” Economists at the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic regulatory agency, have also observed high waste and inefficiency in China’s fixed asset investments.

In the short run, a construction boom contributes to growth. But when projected benefits fail to materialize, the debt accumulated leads to economic and financial problems. The University of Oxford researchers estimate that China’s economic losses in infrastructure projects have equaled about one third of its $28.2 trillion debt. A careful analysis of the economic data of China’s infrastructure projects reveals that China’s rapid economic growth may instead be a result of economic competition generated by the liberalizing reforms of the 1980s.

Why China’s infrastructure investment strategy isn’t working

According to developmental economists, when a NIE reaches a middle level of per capita income (usually about $11,000), the benefits that the country has been reaping from the typical developing-economy growth strategies of capital accumulation, low-wage manufactured exports, and rural-urban migration begin to run out. This phenomenon is known as the middle-income trap.

Fixed asset investment yields rapid growth for economies in the early stages of development that lack such physical assets. While China’s infrastructure investment was considered insufficient in 1997, many scholars argue today that China has already accumulated enough physical assets to arrive at a point at which continued infrastructure investment is no longer economically efficient. Atif Ansari, one of the researchers of the aforementioned Oxford study explained that “‘Build it and they will come’ is a dictum that doesn’t work, especially in China, where there’s so much built already.” China is also reaching the Lewis Turning Point, a point during which China’s surplus of rural labor will be depleted and labor wages will increase, eroding China’s competitive advantage in cheap, labor-intensive manufactured exports.

Scholars like David Shambaugh and David Dollar point out that although China’s current development strategy has transformed China’s once-developing economy into a newly industrialized economy (NIE), changes in development strategy are necessary are necessary to escape the middle-income trap and achieve a “developed” economy. The country would need to “rebalance” to a new growth model that would instead rely on domestic consumption, the services sector, and innovation.

Chinese leaders observe escaping the middle-income trap to be a necessary but difficult task. China’s Development Research Center of the State Council finds that only thirteen of the 101 post-1960 middle-income countries were able to move into the higher income club, “including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, Mauritius, Singapore, and Israel.” The rest faced economic stagnation, recession, or got stuck at middle-income levels.

Ordos City in Inner Mongolia. (Image credit: Michael Christopher Brown for TIME.)

Stuck between unproductivity and a harder place

The CPC’s prioritization of regime survival has preserved China’s systemic corruption and rigid, capital investment and cheap export-oriented growth model. China’s current growth model allows the CPC to maintain a heavy state hand in the economy and to rely on personal loyalty networks (guanxi). The political willingness of the CPC to take a leap from and possibility reverse its familiar and safe strategy is a determinant of the country’s ability to change its growth model. A new growth model based on consumption, services, and innovation would require changes to China’s existing institutions—institutions that have been demonstrated to be decently effective and comfortably illiberal to leaders who are constantly insecure about the regime’s survival.

China’s biggest challenges may be fostering competition, innovation, and a sense of economic security that would spur consumption. In the seminal book Why Nations Fail, political economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson show that “inclusive economic institutions” (which truly enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage efficient investments) are key to the economic success that illiberal NIEs like China desperately need.

But inclusive economic institutions require inclusive political institutions, which distribute power widely and establish “law and order, the foundations of secure property rights, and an inclusive market economy.” Both are necessary for the innovation that would allow China to move up the income ladder. According to Acemoglu, China’s current growth is not sustainable because China is reluctant to establish a genuinely inclusive market economy and to move away from informal politics. Such institutional reforms would weaken the party state’s political control—which relies on guanxi and corruption.

But President Xi Jinping does not seem to be inclined toward liberal reforms. Instances of President Xi’s increasingly authoritarian moves in just the past month include the removal of Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou (who is still missing), the new ban on livestreaming on popular social media sites, and the shutdown of non-government news programs “without licenses.”

Implications for China and the world

Institutional decay could threaten China’s political stability. In Crony Capitalism, Minxin Pei observes that collusive corruption has already spread to China’s judiciary and regulatory agencies. Gloomy economic prospects, corruption, and repressive government policies have led to mass discontentment in the form of protests. In 2010 alone, China saw 180,000 protests, riots, and mass demonstrations. And as China increasingly takes on international leadership roles, political instability in China could impact international cooperation and institutions.

China’s infrastructure investments have grown hand-in-hand with its national debt, and the majority of China’s investments since 2000 have been fueled by debt. The debt build-up and monetary expansion that results from China’s unproductive infrastructure investments puts China at greater risk for a financial and economic crisis. Since China’s economy is deeply intertwined with the rest of the worlds, a crisis in China could lead to a global crisis.

As China tries to export its infrastructure-oriented growth model through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it could be exporting its corruption and development challenges as well. The $12 million bridge that collapsed in Kenya was built by a subsidiary of the state-owned China Railway Group Limited. Infrastructure investments abroad could perpetuate or even expand corrupt practices. Infrastructure investment is not a miracle development strategy. An over-reliance on infrastructure could entrench infrastructure-oriented development at the cost of building strong, inclusive institutions that would sustain long-term growth.

China already knows that it faces significant institutional and strategic challenges. President Xi Jinping commented in 2014, “the tasks our Party faces in reform, development, and stability are more onerous than ever—and the conflicts, dangers, and challenges are more numerous than ever.” President Xi’s focus on cracking down on corruption reflects a sound assessment of the greatest dangers to China’s future stability. But top-down, after-the fact-remedies such as removing corrupt officials cannot change the fact that corruption is endemic to political and economic institutions. While liberalization may be impossible in the foreseeable future, China could experiment with moderate reforms that would formalize political relationships to a greater extent and establish more oversight at the local level. The United States and the other countries could help China by supporting potential reforms with an eye toward maintaining political stability.

By RUKA WANG JULY 7 2017

Ruka Wang is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/2   发布时间：2018/4/2

旧文章ID：15646

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Expressions of nationalistic sentiments have been growing on Chinese social media recently, a phenomenon that could work both for or against the Chinese government.

In January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president on the island of Taiwan. In response, thousands of mainland Chinese internet users leapt over the Great Firewall of China into Tsai’s Facebook page to marvel at the wonders of the Mainland and warn against Taiwanese independence (which her Party – the Democratic Progressive Party – is known to lean towards).

Putting aside the irony of the fact that, in order to succeed, these people were forced to undermine the very systems and institutions of the society they sought to promote, the Diba Expedition, as it has come to be known, stands as one of many recent high-profile expressions of Chinese nationalism.

The instigator of the expedition had humble beginnings. Many of the netizens came from an online forum originally dedicated to the Chinese soccer player Li Yi. Also known as Diba, the forum members were notable for their high level of organisation in implementing the expedition. People were assigned specific tasks, such as collecting photos and liking posts, and were asked to remain polite and reasonable in their postings – at least some members seem to have heeded this.

In contrast, the Little Pinks (小粉红), another online group that has been associated with the Diba Expedition, have no such compunction in their online activities. So-called because of their beginnings in a non-political chat group spruiking a pink background, the moniker was originally hurled as an insult at members as the forum gradually became more political and stridently nationalistic in its discussions before being appropriated to describe highly impassioned and nationalistic youth.

With social media as their platform, these impassioned netizens have wielded their collective clout to champion the PRC and censure anyone who dares to suggest otherwise. Indeed, a common thread through many of these events lies in the (perceived) slights to the integrity of China’s territory and character. Mainland backers of a Chinese film came under fire for casting a Taiwanese actor – Leon Dai – who appeared to support Taiwanese independence. Succumbing to the pressure, Dai was eventually replaced. American singer Lady Gaga faced a backlash after she met with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. French cosmetics company Lancôme dropped Hong Kong singer Denise Ho to placate calls to boycott the company due to Ho’s suspected support of Hong Kong independence. Australian Olympic swimmer Mack Horton was deluged with comments from Chinese netizens after calling Chinese swimmer Sun Yang a drug cheat.

Somewhat surprisingly, these displays of nationalistic fervour have been tolerated and even praised by Chinese authorities. State-run media such as The People’s Daily expressed approval at what they deemed the simple patriotic expressions of members. The Communist Youth League, too, offered (gendered) praise, urging readers to protect the girls.

Nevertheless, praise and endorsement have been less forthcoming as displays of nationalism have moved into the real world. Following the Hague’s tribunal ruling rejecting China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, nationalist sentiment migrated from the internet to protests in front of KFC restaurants (which were seen as a symbol of US interests). Despite tolerating moderate public commentary online, the protests have been criticised as “irrational and disruptive…[to] the social order”.

Jessica Chen Weiss, associate professor of government at Cornell University, surmises that “[the] Chinese government is likely to suppress grass-roots expressions of nationalism when it wants freedom to manoeuvre and to signal reassurance”. In other words, censorship is only likely to occur to prevent opinions and policies deemed inimical to Chinese domestic and international interests from becoming the only publicly-acceptable course of action. This is why the vast majority of censored social media posts on the South China Sea ruling were not, in fact, just against the government’s position (although these were still censored). Rather, they consist of extreme versions of the Party line, espousing a strain of ultra-nationalism that would threaten the interests of the government should it become mainstream.

Herein lies the dilemma of nationalism in China. On the one hand, nationalist rhetoric can serve as a simple shortcut for harnessing public opinion to bolster government positions. On the other hand, this rhetoric can galvanise public opinion to such a degree that it can backfire if government actions fail to live up to the rhetoric. The English writer George Orwell asserted that nationalism manifests as a desire to gain something, often at the expense of others. China, and indeed all countries for that matter, would do well to remember this.

(Featured image credit: Associated Press/The Wall Street Journal)

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT JULY. 7, 2017

Justin Elliott is a contributor to www.uscnpm.org based in Melbourne, Australia.

来源时间：2018/4/2   发布时间：2017/7/8

旧文章ID：15645

作者：Abigail Chen  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

Afghanistan is at the crossroads of the “Heart of Asia”. Because of its geopolitical centrality, the country has been a focal point for invasion and wars. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Afghanistan was a proxy battleground for the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Since the 2000s, the country has captured international headlines for its domestic terrorism and instabilities. Beyond the headlines, in fact, Afghanistan security has emerged as one of the few areas of genuine bilateral cooperation in the often-fractious U.S.-China relationship.

Following the 2014 withdrawal of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) combat forces from Afghanistan, China took a more pro-active role in Afghanistan affairs. Beijing began to regard the vacuum in Afghanistan as a greater security threat than the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the U.S. came to see the Chinese aid as an effective means to stabilize the country rather than freeriding on the U.S. security provisions.

In fact, Washington and Beijing have a considerable convergence in their security and economic interests toward pursuing stability in Afghanistan. For China, the Xinjiang region shares a border with Afghanistan. Key considerations for Chinese leaders therefore include the ethnic Uighurs’ splittism and terrorism in the region due to instability in Afghanistan. Moreover, an acceleration of Chinese diplomacy on Afghanistan manifests in the colossal Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At its core, BRI encapsulates the Chinese vision of reshaping the geo-economic order in Eurasia through promoting regional connectivity. In a significant shift from President Trump’s anti-globalization rhetoric and Washington’s earlier wariness, at the May BRI summit in Beijing, U.S. diplomats said their country was ready to participate in the BRI projects. Matthew Pottinger, the top Asia policy adviser in the Trump administration, also disclosed that the “American Belt and Road Working Group” would serve as the vehicle for creating partnerships between U.S. companies and BRI.

On the other hand, the U.S. has reoriented its Afghanistan policy focus from military commitment to economic engagement. In May, the Trump administration resuscitated the ‘New Silk Road’ initiative (NSR). Proposed by Hilary Clinton in 2010, who was then the Secretary of State, NSR is a U.S.-led regional architecture focused on Afghanistan and its neighbors. Its core programs include the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline. Both U.S and China have included Afghanistan in their regional integration framework. Yet compared to the scale of investment in China’s BRI, the U.S. has yet to mobilize capital to jumpstart many of its ambitious NSR projects.

Washington and Beijing have hosted or participated in numerous bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral meetings on searching for political settlement in Afghanistan. Yet most cooperative behaviors between them consist of indirect coordination. So far, the most visible joint endeavor are the projects on agriculture, training of health workers, and training of diplomats. The U.S. and China should improve operational coordination and explore new avenues to best support Afghanistan.

Currently, the challenges to long-term stability of Afghanistan are diverse. They include: a precarious security environment; shrinking economic growth; the recrudescence of terrorist groups such as the Taliban; and worsening Afghan-Pakistani relations. These issues create ample room for U.S.-China collaboration.

GDP Annual Growth Rate in Afghanistan reached a record low of -2.40 percent in 2016 (Image Credit: TradingEconomics.com)

Both governments should identify and emphasize the most promising cooperative fields – Investment, energy, counter-terrorism, and regional stability – to become easily understood symbols of their collaboration. Specifically, highlighting one or two major headline initiatives at a time can help mobilize domestic support. The following are some aspirational projects:

First, Washington and Beijing can work together to facilitate the peace process in Afghanistan. Both China and US, along with Afghanistan and Pakistan, are members of the new Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) focused on the peace process. As the negotiation is at its nascent stage, the US and China should focus on establishing mechanisms for holding more formal, consistent discussions. These dialogues should aim to involve other stakeholders like Russia and representatives of the Taliban. China’s unilateral efforts to negotiate with the Taliban through the Political Office in Qatar, however, have not yet yielded concrete results. Moreover, Pakistan is China’s long-term ally and India is enjoying a “never been stronger” relationship with the U.S. Through carefully applying their diplomatic leverage, U.S. and China can work together to bring these two important countries to the negotiations.

Pakistan Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to discuss economic cooperation and bilateral crisis management between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamabad June 2017 (Image Credit: AFP)

On combatting terrorism, U.S. and China should increase their operational coordination and explore a security mechanism designed to manage potential conflicts along the Silk Road. In July 2016, China delivered the first batch of military equipment to Afghanistan. It contained, among others, logistical equipment, parts for military vehicles, ammunition as well as weapons for the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). In February this year, the U.S. war commander in Afghanistan called for several thousand new troops to break the Afghan “stalemate.” Looking forward, Afghanistan can be a pilot area well suited for China, and US to test their broader counter-terrorism strategies.

U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis looks out over Kabul as he arrives via helicopter at Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan April 24, 2017. (Image Credit: Reuters/Jonathan Ernst)

Second, U.S. should join China in supporting Afghanistan’s economic connectivity and development. China is committed to $100 million in BRI investments in Afghanistan. Although as noted earlier, the direction of Trump administration’s NSR is uncertain, a decline in the costs of transport and communications will surely benefit American investment. Towards a more connected Afghan economy, both countries should prioritize sharing lessons and pooling resources on their infrastructure projects.

A third area of U.S.-China cooperation in Afghanistan lies in local capacity building. The annual U.S.-China Training Program for Afghan Cooperation and Reconstruction is a joint initiative that provides training for young Afghan diplomats, health and agricultural workers. In 2016, for instance, the joint Training Program for Afghan diplomats provided opportunities for 15 entry-level Afghan diplomats to receive training in diplomacy. These trilateral partnerships function as a significant confidence-building measure between U.S. and Chinese officials working on Afghanistan. They are also less costly, easier to operate. As such, U.S. and China should consider extending these joint initiatives to other areas. Importantly, assistance from Washington and Beijing must take a capacity-building orientation and follow an “Afghanistan propose, Afghanistan lead” model.

The U.S. session of China-US joint training program for Afghan Cooperation and Reconstruction was held at the US State Department on December 9, 2016 (Image Credit: Embassy of the P.R.C in the U.S. )

There are, admittedly, factors creating frictions between Washington and Beijing. For example, China questions the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to subsidize Afghanistan and the US remains suspicious of China’s geopolitical agenda. However, Washington and Beijing should not view pursuing security and stability in Afghanistan as a “zero-sum” game, a mindset that has previously been a barrier to more widespread bilateral cooperation. While tensions between the two countries in other areas continue to nourish distrust and undermine cooperation, U.S.-China collaboration in Afghanistan has the potential to strengthen the bilateral ties.

By ABIGAIL CHEN JUNE 7, 2017

ABIGAIL CHEN is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/2   发布时间：2017/7/9

旧文章ID：15644

作者：Gretchen Trupp  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

The latest G20 Summit, an annual meeting of international leaders from 20 countries and international organizations, convened last weekend from July 8-9th in Hamburg, Germany. Important areas of discussion for the 12th meeting of these global leaders included climate change and sustainable development, the global financial system and its growth, counter-terrorism, the spread of digital technology, health issues, anti-corruption, and women’s economic empowerment. While there were many notable meetings taking place, the actions of the current US President and his administration in and out of the meeting settings did not go unnoticed on social media. Trump left to meet with Indonesian Prime Minister Joko Widodo during a G20 meeting, and drew heavy criticism online when his daughter Ivanka sat in his place instead of an actual, high-ranked official, as is precedent. Trump has been accused of nepotism in the past, and so this incident has certainly added fuel to the fire. Notably, there was also tension between the US and France on matters of climate change, and between the US and China over the production of steel. Surprisingly, relations between Xi and Modi (the Prime Minister of India) were better than cordial, despite previous threats of war and strife. The meeting itself was also controversial. During G20 50,000 anti-capitalist protestors gathered to protest the G20 Summit. One of the goals of this protest was to “bring our criticism of the G20 and our alternatives for fair global policies onto the streets” according to Thomas Eberhardt-Koester with ATTAC, a leftist group opposing neo-liberal globalization. There were injuries sustained by both police and protestors, with the latter group being attacked with a water cannon.

CHINA’S ROLE IN G20

Historically, the United States has taken a leading role in the Summit, but due to its increasing protectionist and isolationist policies, China has emerged instead as a global leader alongside Germany. Last year, China hosted the G20 summit, and this year China’s role had a similar impact, supporting free trade and international investment. “According to Chen Fengying from China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China was expected to outline possible solutions to questions of globalization and sustainable development.“ Championing the system of globalization, Chinese leaders have been present and active at numerous global meetings and projects leading up to this summit. As shown in the chart below from the World Bank, China currently sends the largest amount of delegates to G20:

Initiatives such as the BRI and Made in China 2025 will play an important part in global economies and development in the coming years, and China’s progress and cooperation with these countries will work towards the goals that the last summit set forth. Initiatives led and funded by China have the potential to revolutionize and implement cooperative projects that take place on a global scale. As an emerging global leader, China has also been promoting innovation-driven growth alongside their proposed initiatives from the last G20 summit. At this conference, they were pushing for the implementation of policies and expansion agreed upon in the Summit that China hosted in 2016. China is one of the key dominating nations at G20, and the action plan from the 2016 summit demonstrates their economic and political prowess and influence.

XI AND TRUMP’S MEETING

Trump was described as having a “face like thunder” as Xi spoke on trade during a lunchtime meeting, setting a grim tone for their interactions. During their meeting Trump and Xi discussed trade issues, with Trump declaring that “trade, as you know, is a very, very big issue for the United States now. Because over the years and — it’s really been over a long period of time many things have happened that have led to trade imbalances. And we’re going to turn that around. And I know that with China in particular which is a great trading partner, we will be able to do something that will be equitable and reciprocal“. Xi and Trump also continued their fraught discussion on North Korea, with Tillerson stating that the “expectations [for China] are unchanged” and described the relationship as “uneven”. At their meeting Trump expressed gratitude for current efforts on the North Korea nuclear issue. The need for stronger ties was emphasized, and both countries have agreed to increase communications with each other. While the meeting lasted for an hour and a half, the White House press briefings on the President’s meetings with G20 leaders was surprisingly void of any particular mention of the meeting between Trump and Xi, and instead focused on issues with Syria and the meeting with Putin, and only mentioned China when the conversation about Russia involved North Korea. Chinese and US officials are scheduled to meet again on July 19th in Washington to follow up on issues of the economy and trade. Trump described the meeting with Xi in the tweet below:
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/883761448064864257

Although Trump seems optimistic, analysts are doubtful that this coming meeting as well as the G20 meeting will produce tangible solutions, especially given the US’s previous history of anti-Chinese rhetoric and policy as well as Trump’s twitter tirades.

G20 RESULTS

While most of the media coverage has been surrounding the conflicts that arose during the meetings, the summit was able to agree and lay out many different initiatives for various nations to work on in the coming year. Key resolutions that were reported by Xinhua include continuing to expand and deepen the concept and implementation of structural reform in multiple countries, which was originally decided on at the Hangzhou Summit in 2016. Leaders will also be enhancing economic toughness and market competition as well as economic cooperation. The Summit leaders also committed to keep trade and investment markets open and transparent, as well as working to share information that is mutually beneficial between countries. The leaders are standing by their climate change policies such as working to reduce marine litter, and strongly noting the US’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Also on the agenda is “Enhanced equal access to the labor market, property, quality employment and financial services for women and men”, investing more in growth and development in the African continent, the G20 Initiative for Rural Youth Employment, countering corruption in politics as well as in customs, and efficient use of resources. Fighting protectionism and creating clearer international trade rules is also issues that were focused on in detail during the meetings, according to German leader Angela Merkel. While these are all noble pursuits, critics of G20 says that the group has problems with representation and fails to meet the agreements that are proposed at meetings.

THE FULL 2017 G20 LEADERS’ DECLARATION CAN BE FOUND HERE. IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS AND ACTION PLANS FROM THE 2017 G20 SUMMIT CAN BE FOUND HERE.

(FEATURED IMAGE CREDIT: RASYONEL HABER) By GRETCHEN TRUPP JULY. 12, 2017

Gretchen Trupp is a Summer 2017 intern at The Carter Center China Program.

来源时间：2018/4/2   发布时间：2017/7/12

旧文章ID：15643

作者：Justin Elliott  来源：US-China Perception Monitor

As much as China may insist that it is resolutely non-interventionist and different from other historical great powers, actions like the opening of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti belie a shift from a low-profile to a more pragmatic foreign policy that asserts and protects China’s interests abroad.

A ship carrying Chinese military personnel departs a port in Zhanjiang, south China’s Guangdong Province. (Wu Dengfeng/Xinhua News Agencyvia AP)

On July 11th, China sent ships carrying military personnel to its first international base in Djibouti. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that the base is intended to support Chinese soldiers and ships in the region by replenishing food and fuel supplies, thus “[enabling] China to better perform the international obligations of the UN escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters as well as humanitarian relief, help with Djibouti’s socio-economic development and allow China to make greater contributions to the peace and stability of Africa and beyond”.

Chinese officials and state media have been careful to avoid describing the base as a military base. Commentary on the state media outlet Xinhua addressed this explicitly, emphasising that “the Djibouti base has nothing to do with an arms race or military expansion, and China has no intention of turning the logistics center into a military stronghold”, and describing foreign media interpretations to the contrary as “completely unfounded”. Indeed, even when the base has been described as a military base, it has been qualified with a delineation between those for operational or combat roles and those for logistical support.

However, as implied to in the opening paragraph’s quote from Geng Shuang, officials have been willing to admit that the base is meant to enable China to better protect its overseas interests. At a press conference of the fourth session of China’s 12thNational People’s Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that:

“I think [China’s overseas interests are] the key to understanding the matter [of the base in Djibouti]. Like any major country that is growing, China’s overseas interests are expanding. At present, there are 30,000 Chinese enterprises all over the world and several million Chinese are working and living in all corners of the world. Last year, China’s non-financial outbound direct investment reached 118 billion U.S. dollars and the stock of China’s overseas assets reached several trillion U.S. dollars. So it has become a pressing task for China’s diplomacy to better protect our ever-growing overseas interests.”

This comment is remarkable given China’s historical position towards its foreign relations, but is nonetheless exemplary of the shift that has been occurring in China’s foreign policy. In the early 1950s, China and India agreed to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the preamble of an agreement between the two nations (which can be found here as No. 4307). Specifically, the five principles were mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. Pursuing a foreign policy centred on these principles left China unencumbered by the ideological strictures limiting the Soviet Union or the US, thus allowing China to pursue economic relations with a wider range of foreign states and direct more resources to its own internal development than to its external security (which was still by no means secure, what with US opposition and the more proximate clashes with India and the Soviet Union, for example).

Indeed, this policy of non-intervention and focus on economic development would continue during China’s period of economic reform and liberalisation, perhaps best exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s idea of a low-profile foreign policy (or 韬光养晦). As a result, China has enjoyed considerable success, drawing millions out of poverty and becoming one of the largest economies in the world. Yet as its economy has grown and its international stature has risen, there has been a concomitant growth in the scope of China’s international interests. So much so, in fact, that China has on occasion had to compromise on its long-held policy of non-interference in favour of a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy.

This shift away from a foreign policy based on strict non-intervention can be seen in China’s contributions to the UN. Although originally opposed to UN peacekeeping operations on principle, China now frequently supports resolutions calling for non-consensual interventions. Indeed, China has now become the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops of all five permanent Security Council members, and in September 2015, President Xi Jinping pledged to create a standby force of 8,000 peacekeepers and committed $1 billion towards a UN peace and development fund.

In particular, though, where China’s peacekeeping troops have been stationed is significant. China deployed its first, and to date largest, contingent of combat troops in South Sudan, where China has significant investments in the nation’s old reserves and has worked to resolve that country’s civil war. This arguably constitutes interference in a state’s internal affairs, albeit with international multilateral support, suggesting that when China has significant interests in a region (in this case: oil investments and Chinese nationals working on them) its idealistic principles of non-intervention are less compelling motivations than the more tangible benefits of a more pragmatic approach.

It is in this context that the new base in Djibouti should be viewed. Given China’s sizeable investments on the African continent, measures to protect its interests abroad (which have helped sustain China’s impressive growth) are likely to continue, even if this may at times conflict with China’s older principle of non-interference. Combat-oriented or otherwise, the support the base provides allows China to better project and sustain its forces abroad, helping contribute to the region’s peace and stability, which in turn helps safeguard its own interests in the region. The Djibouti base is situated at the Mandeb Strait, a strategically significant waterway for China’s and the world’s energy and resources. Keeping this location secure (for example, from piracy) helps maintain the stability and prosperity that China has experienced over the last few decades as it has reformed its economy.

As a result, it is perhaps not so surprising that international observers have been wary of China’s new base. When viewed in light of its actions elsewhere, it would appear that China is following the path laid out by many great powers before it and expanding its ability to project its forces abroad. What may have been a foreign policy committed to non-intervention is gradually giving way to a more pragmatic, realist approach, where China is increasingly inclined to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to protect its own interests.

By JUSTIN ELLIOTT JULY. 19, 2017

Justin Elliott is a contributor to www.uscnpm.org based in Melbourne, Australia.

来源时间：2018/4/2   发布时间：2017/7/19

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