本文是《纽约时报》专栏作家弗里德曼写的时评，3月9日上线，英文标题是“Trump Has No Idea How to End the War With Iran”。3月10日，该报中文网站发表了该文的中文译文，特转发供读者参考。他的观点其实跟本站专栏作者KS Liu的观点一致，即现在是结束冲突的最好时机。点击题目查看该文“如果今天美伊停火，双方都可以宣布胜利”。弗里德曼3月2日在《纽时》还发表了一篇题为“如何思考特朗普对伊朗发动的战争”（How to Think About Trump’s War With Iran），该文没有中文翻译，我把英文原文附在本文之后。
1996年9月，我第一次访问德黑兰。我下榻在霍马酒店，之前是喜来登酒店。我当时在文章中写道，大堂门上方有一块标牌，上面用英文写着：“打倒美国”。盯着那块牌子时，我记得自己心里在想：哇，这可不是涂鸦！它是牢牢固定在那儿的。这玩意儿可不容易拆下来。
20世纪90年代末是伊朗的一段转瞬即逝的开放时期，我也因此拿到了签证。当时我满怀希望，认为伊朗年轻人想要加入世界经济的明显渴求最终能战胜那些把口号钉在墙上的领导人。但事实并非如此。那些文字根深蒂固，难以撼动。
如今，由特朗普总统和以色列总理内塔尼亚胡发动的对伊战争已经打了一个多星期。我最大的疑问是：如果“必要之事”其实是“不可能之事”该怎么办？如果伊朗的转型确实如战争支持者所言那般重要，但其难度又远超战争策划者的理解，该怎么办？
诚然，没有什么比推翻德黑兰的伊斯兰政权更能改善伊朗、黎巴嫩、伊拉克、叙利亚、加沙、也门和以色列民众的前景了。
但如果这个政权已经如此深地嵌入社会——嵌入到市长办公室、学校、警察局、政府职员、银行系统、军队和基层准军事组织之中——以至于尽管它失去了大多数伊朗人的支持，却无法在不让这片约六分之一个美国大小、拥有9000万人口的土地陷入混乱的情况下被移除，该怎么办？如果伊朗伊斯兰威权政权唯一的快速替代品不是民主，而是史诗级的动荡，又该怎么办？
没有什么比这件事更能说明该政权的根深蒂固：战争之初最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊被杀死后，其子穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊刚刚接替了他的位置——据称又是一名强硬派。
因为这场战争让我和许多人猝不及防，我正带着谦卑的心态摸索前行——试图思考最好和最坏的情况，因为我们谁也没有经历过这种局面。
在我思考时，时局告诉我现在特朗普和内塔尼亚胡应该见好就收，至少目前如此。为什么？
首先，显而易见，特朗普和内塔尼亚胡发动这场战争时，脑子里根本没有任何清晰的收尾计划。
我怀疑，内塔尼亚胡可能乐见伊朗变成一个大号的加沙，通过不断地“除草行动”来维持局面，即定期清除那里的威胁，就像他在加沙所做的那样。正如《国土报》军事分析家阿摩司·哈雷尔所言：“几个月前，内塔尼亚胡将以色列描述为现代斯巴达。但为了维持其军国主义身份，斯巴达需要永久的军事摩擦——这种摩擦也能让其统治者维持权力——不论国家为此付出多大代价。”
让以色列与伊朗、哈马斯和真主党处于战争状态能让内塔尼亚胡拖延他的腐败案审判，并躲避因未能阻止2023年10月7日哈马斯入侵而设立的调查委员会。（如果你觉得这太阴谋论了，那说明你还不了解内塔尼亚胡。）
至于特朗普，在谈论伊朗的“次日计划”时，他的表态完全是东一榔头西一棒子——他说的一些荒谬且自相矛盾的话，暴露出这位总司令完全是走一步看一步。今天说要政权更迭，明天又说不；今天说不在乎伊朗的未来，明天又说要对选择该国下一任领导人有发言权；今天对谈判持开放态度，明天又要求“无条件投降”。
中东分析师胡赛因·伊比什简洁地总结了特朗普的伊朗战略：“逻辑是这样的：美以负责轰炸和摧毁资产。然后（此处填入一些东西）伊朗人将确保（此处填入一些东西）政治变革，从而实现（此处填入一些东西）美国的战争目标。”
如果一家公司的领导者在毫无预警的情况下开始了一项激进的新商业战略，然后在接下来的一周里用五种不同的方式描述了该战略的目标，你会投资这家公司吗？这是一个显眼的红色警报。
尽管如此，特朗普和内塔尼亚胡似乎确实显著削弱了伊朗的核能力，以及通过海军、空军和导弹投射力量的能力。鉴于已有太多人死于掌控这些权力的政权之手，这对伊朗人民和该地区都是好事。现在的明智之举是暂停，看看我所说的“后天”会发生什么。
那才是真正的政治博弈开始的时候。也就是说，如果美以宣布已经实现了大部分军事目标，准备停止攻击——前提是伊朗也停手——那么活下来的伊朗领导层在“明天”肯定会向世界和国民宣布：“我们教训了他们——‘大撒旦’和‘小撒旦’联手也奈何不了我们。”
但到了“后天”，我敢打赌德黑兰统治精英内部会爆发激烈的争论和内斗。民众、商人和政权内部改革派的声音必将质问强硬派：“看看你们给我们带来了什么灾难。如果这就是伊朗伟大的胜利，那失败长什么样？我们失去了积蓄、经济、环境、大部分军队以及所有邻国的友谊。我们还有什么未来？”
想想我们现在已经看到的发生在伊朗内部的争斗：伊朗总统与强硬派军方之间，正围绕伊朗是否应该攻击阿拉伯邻国、迫使这些国家向华盛顿施压停止战争而发生分歧。等到战争结束、伊朗为其极端行为付出真正代价的时候，伊朗人民与政权之间以及政权内部未来可能会出现什么样的局面，谁也无法预料。
诚然，谁也不知道这种后天政治一定会以换将或者换旗告终。但这种方式成功的几率绝不亚于仅仅把德黑兰和贝鲁特炸成废墟，然后指望一场民众起义就此爆发。
我们已经看到伊朗的一座海水淡化厂遭到轰炸，而作为报复，伊朗袭击了巴林的一座海水淡化厂。如果这种趋势蔓延，人们很快就会面临缺水。伊朗变成比阿亚图拉政权已经造成的状况更严重的环境灾难的可能性是非常现实的；到那时，那里将变得不再适合人类居住。
《纽约时报》周一一篇文章中有一段关于德黑兰战争气氛的描述，令人不寒而栗。
“德黑兰的一位数字创业者佩曼担心，代价已经太高了。像许多接受采访的伊朗人一样，他说他整天呆在家里，无法工作，只能看着破坏不断加剧，心中越来越恐惧和不安。他想知道，在警察局被炸毁的情况下，当地人如何能防止哪怕是小规模犯罪——更不用说在如此严重的破坏之后，任何一个政府如何能接手管理这个国家。”
佩曼告诉时报：“如果我们将来还要生活在伊朗，无论我们有什么样的政府，我们仍然需要制度体系。”
伊朗政权是一个耻辱——对自己的人民、对邻国以及对以规则为基础的国际秩序而言，它都是一种威胁。我祈祷它能够尽快成为历史，而且付出的代价能够保持在一个合理范围内，并释放伊朗人民为人类作出贡献的巨大潜力。
但是，无休止地轰炸，摧毁越来越多的军事和民用基础设施，然后仅仅寄希望于追求民主的伊朗人——在几乎没有互联网沟通、在公路上移动都可能致命的情况下——靠自己推翻这个牢固的杀人政权……好吧，请告诉我历史上哪儿发生过这种事。
我的猜测是，这个政权只能从内部高层瓦解，而这个进程只有在停火之后才会开始。
特朗普—内塔尼亚胡“持续轰炸”的策略，最好的结果也许是启动这一进程；仅仅是让伊朗转入一个更好的轨道，使其对本国人民和邻国的威胁降低点，那就已经是一个重要成就。该战略最坏的结果则是：无休止的空袭把伊朗彻底摧毁，使其变成一个任何人都无法治理的烂摊子。那将是一场无法估量的灾难。
How to Think About Trump’s War With Iran
To think clearly about Middle East wars, you need to hold multiple thoughts in your head at the same time. It’s a complicated, kaleidoscopic region where religion, oil, tribal politics and great power politics interweave in every major story. If you are looking for a black-and-white narrative, you might want to take up checkers. So, here are my four thoughts on Iran — at least for today.
First, I hope this effort to topple the clerical regime in Tehran succeeds. It is a regime that murders its people, destabilizes its neighbors and has destroyed a great civilization. There is no single event that would do more to put the whole Middle East on a more decent, inclusive trajectory than the replacement of Tehran’s Islamic regime with a leadership focused exclusively on enabling the people of Iran to realize their full potential with a real voice in their own future.
Second, this will not be easy, because this regime is deeply entrenched and is hardly going to be toppled from the air alone. Israel has not been able to eliminate Hamas in Gaza after over two years of a merciless air and ground war — and Hamas is right next door. That said, even if this U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran does not lead to the uprising by the Iranian people that President Trump has urged, it could have other, unanticipated, beneficial effects, like producing an Islamic Republic 2.0 that is much less threatening to its people and neighbors. But it just as easily could result in unanticipated dangers, like the disintegration of Iran as a single geographic entity.
Third, we must remember that the timing of the end of this war will be determined as much by the oil markets and the financial markets as by the military state of play inside Iran. Iran is on the edge of economic collapse, with a currency worth little more than wallpaper. Europe has become much more dependent on liquefied natural gas from the Persian Gulf to run its economies, since phasing out purchases of natural gas from Russia. A sustained burst of inflation caused by higher energy prices would anger Trump’s base, many of whom already don’t like being dragged into another Middle East war. There are a lot of people who will want this war to be short, and that will affect how and when Trump and Tehran negotiate.
Fourth, we must not let this war to bring democracy and the rule of law to Iran distract us from the threats to democracy and the rule of law posed by Trump in America and by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. Trump wants to promote those ideals in Tehran, even as his ICE agents operated for two months with limited regard for legal restraints in my home state of Minnesota and as he floats ideas about restricting who can vote in our next election. If the war in Iran enables Netanyahu to win the Israeli elections planned for this year, it will be a major propellant to his efforts to annex the West Bank, cripple the Israeli Supreme Court and make Israel an apartheid state, which would be a major blow to American interests in the region beyond Iran.
Life as an opinion columnist would be easy if every war you had to take a stand on were the American Civil War and every leader were Abraham Lincoln. But they are not, so let’s dig a little deeper into these four thoughts on Iran.
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While you’d never know it if you listened to the campus left in recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the biggest imperialist power in the region since 1979, cultivating proxies to control four Arab states — Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen — and undermining liberal reformers in all four by promoting sectarian divisions.
Just the weakening of the Tehran regime, thanks to Israeli and American hammer blows over the past two years, has led to the downfall of the Iranian-bolstered Assad regime in Syria and enabled Lebanon to escape the vise grip of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia, which in turn has given space for Lebanon’s most decent government in decades — one led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun. That is why the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is being quietly or loudly celebrated across the region.
Also, the Iranian people are among the most naturally pro-Western in the region. If that impulse is allowed to surface and spread, and replace the divisive, radical Islamist poison propagated by the Iranian regime, we have the possibility for a much more inclusive Middle East.
As the Lebanese Emirati strategist Nadim Koteich put it to me: It is not for nothing that one of the most popular chants of anti-regime protesters in Iran has been: “No Gaza, no Lebanon. My life for Iran.” Many Iranians have been sickened to watch their resources squandered on militias fighting Israel. It is also no accident, Koteich noted, that Iran has just launched rockets against airports, hotels and ports of the modernizing Arab Gulf states.
“They are attacking the infrastructure of openness and integration and the Abraham Accords — it was the old Middle East attacking the new Middle East,” Koteich added. Khamenei’s death, hopefully, “is the death of Khamenei’s idea that the Middle East should be defined by resistance and not inclusion and integration.”
Hopefully it will also end the double game practiced by Khamenei and his predecessors like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — who served as Iran’s president from 2005 until 2013 and was also reported dead from an Israeli-U.S. airstrike — that Iran has the right to openly shout “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” and then claim that it also has the right to be treated like Denmark, or to enrich uranium for “peaceful” purposes.
Trump and Netanyahu finally called out that game.
As for the idea that the Iranian people will now come together and topple the regime, it is hard to see that happening anytime soon without a clear leader and a common agenda.
The Iranian analysts I speak to say the more likely outcome is a kind of Islamic Republic 2.0, in which leading regime reformers — like Hassan Rouhani, who served as the seventh president of Iran from 2013 to 2021, and has been an increasingly outspoken critic of Khamenei’s hard line, or the former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator Javad Zarif — press the surviving leadership to negotiate a deal with Trump. That deal could be one that gives up Iran’s nuclear program and accepts limits on its proxy wars and ballistic missiles — in other words, whatever Trump wants — in return for an end to economic sanctions and regime survival.
Such an Islamic Republic 2.0 regime might then be able to oversee a transition to a real Iranian democracy again. But Trump could also face accusations of throwing a life preserver to a dying regime that recently killed at least 6,800 protesters, according to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency, and likely many more. In other words, starting this war was relatively easy. Ending it will not be.
Such a deal might be tempting to Trump, though, to avoid a prolonged war, a recession triggered by soaring oil prices or the disintegration of Iran. Which is why I was not surprised to hear Trump tell The Atlantic: “They want to talk, and I have agreed to talk, so I will be talking to them.”
As this column has noted before, in the Middle East the opposite of autocracy is not necessarily democracy. Often it is disorder. Because when Middle East dictatorships are decapitated, one of two things happens. They either implode, like Libya did, or they explode, like Syria did.
Persians are only around 60 percent of Iran’s population. The other 40 percent is a mosaic of minorities, mainly Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs and Baloch. Each has links with lands outside of Iran, especially Azeris with Azerbaijan and Kurds with Kurdistan. Prolonged chaos in Tehran could lead any of them to split off and for Iran to, in effect, explode.
Iran has witnessed the collapse of governments or the fall of rulers throughout its history. Every time, “Iran stayed intact,” said Koteich. “For the first time I am not sure it will stay intact.”
If you want to see $150-a-barrel oil, that kind of Iranian disintegration would take you there. Iran’s oil exports of 1.6 million barrels a day, which go mostly to China, would be taken completely off the global oil market. Some 20 percent of all global oil trade moves through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran can shut down. Insurance rates for oil shippers are already skyrocketing, and some 150 tankers in the Gulf are reportedly frozen in place.
Meanwhile, over in Beijing, President Xi Jinping has to be wondering how his weapons systems would stack up against the U.S.-supplied ones to Taiwan, having seen U.S.-made fighter planes and smart missiles easily evade or destroy Iran’s Russian-supplied antiaircraft systems and assassinate much of Iran’s national security elite in their homes and offices. Maybe this is not the week to invade Taiwan — or even next week.
It might be a good week, though, for Beijing to look at all the Iranian people spontaneously dancing in the streets to celebrate the death of Khamenei and ask itself if the People’s Republic of China should have been propping up his regime with oil purchases all these years. Maybe it should have been on the side of the Iranian people.
It is way too early to predict how this war will affect two critical 2026 elections — one in Israel and one in the United States.
For Trump it is simple. He does not want to see the word “quagmire” in any headline with his name in it ahead of the midterms in November. As for Netanyahu, I could imagine him calling for early elections to use the downfall of the Iranian regime to keep himself in power. But victory over Iran could also complicate his politics. Netanyahu has notched short-term military defeats over Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Iran, but he has not translated a single one of them into long-term diplomatic or political gains. To do so would require him to agree to negotiate again with the Palestinians based on a framework of two states for two peoples.
The opportunity for Israel could be enormous: If the Islamic Republic of Iran is either toppled or defanged, I have little doubt that Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and maybe even Iraq would feel much more comfortable normalizing relations with Israel — on the condition that Netanyahu does not annex Gaza or the West Bank, but agrees instead to a plan for separation and a two-state solution. Would Netanyahu rise to that opportunity? Would Israeli voters punish him if he doesn’t?
But I get ahead of myself. I expect by Wednesday there will be at least three more points competing in my head to make sense of it all, because this is the most plastic, unpredictable moment in the Middle East since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Everything — and its opposite — is possible.
