作者：阎学通  来源：国观智库

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　　冷战后美国霸权过渡时期已经结束，取而代之的是两极化的回归，而中国作为新兴超级大国已逐渐成为两极势力中的重要组成部分。与危言耸听者所暗示的相反，这种两极化不会引发战争，反而会将中美关系导入不稳定的和平期。
　　中国未来十年外交政策的重心是维持国内经济增长，而非取代美国成为世界首要大国；因此，中国外交决策将努力避免与美国公开对抗；在经贸领域，中国将加快市场开放进程，支持自由贸易体系。
　　中美之间爆发直接军事冲突的可能性较低，但是爆发代理人战争的可能性会大大增加。此外，中美竞争将在争夺消费者市场、技术创新、产业升级等方面加剧。

　　作者：阎学通，清华大学国际关系研究院院长
　　来源：外交事务（Foreign Affairs），January/February 2019 Issue

　　The Age of Uneasy Peace 
　　Chinese Power in a Divided World

　　In early October 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence delivered a searing speech at a Washington think tank, enumerating a long list of reproaches against China. From territorial disputes in the South China Sea to alleged Chinese meddling in U.S. elections, Pence accused Beijing of breaking international norms and acting against American interests. The tone was unusually blunt—blunt enough for some to interpret it as a harbinger of a new Cold War between China and the United States.
　　Such historical analogies are as popular as they are misleading, but the comparison contains a kernel of truth: the post–Cold War interregnum of U.S. hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to return, with China playing the role of the junior superpower. The transition will be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, affair, as China’s rise sets the country on a collision course with the United States over a number of clashing interests. But as Washington slowly retreats from some of its diplomatic and military engagements abroad, Beijing has no clear plan for filling this leadership vacuum and shaping new international norms from the ground up.
　　What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S. Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the economic and technological realms. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism.
　　WHAT CHINA WANTS
　　China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power— an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council.
　　It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out live Trump’s tenure. But the global fall out of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like.
　　At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse— and the world’s second-largest economy— was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part.
　　Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.
　　Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.
　　NEW RULES?
　　Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China.
　　In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms.
　　Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical.
　　To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay— chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a red line for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries.
　　Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not forever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea.
　　Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: Wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs— in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership.
　　BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE
　　Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the risk of a direct war between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war.
　　Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures.
　　In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization— no matter what path the United States takes. Other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence.
　　China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economics lump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers.
　　Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S. Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive—and expensive—network of alliances. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states.
　　For some time to come, then, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization.
　　This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process— the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo, for now—it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion—and will avoid putting these benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.

来源时间：2018/12/19   发布时间：2018/12/18

旧文章ID：17663

作者：叶君  来源：澎湃新闻

　　【编者按】
　　北京时间1978年12月16日上午10时，中美双方同时发布《中美建交公报》，宣布两国于1979年1月1日建立外交关系。40年弹指一挥间。澎湃新闻联合上海市美国问题研究所、复旦大学美国研究中心，跨越大洋两岸，对话40位重量级人物。他们有当年建交的推动者、亲历者和见证者，更有40年风雨关系的参与者、塑造者和思考者……

　　包道格对中国的认知最早可以追溯到他的孩提时代。在宾夕法尼亚一个小城长大的他，小时候经常去家旁边的传教士培训学校游泳。学校漂亮的中式建筑外观引起了他的好奇和兴趣；也正是在那里，接受亚洲语言文化教育的传教士们一遍一遍地对他说：“你一定要去中国，去中国！”
　　作为在越战时期成长起来的一代美国青年中的一员，包道格也因为这场旷日持久的战争对中国这个“敌人”产生了浓厚的兴趣。他说：“中国就像一个巨大的谜题，让人着魔。一旦陷入其中，就难以自拔。”大学期间便开始专攻中文和亚洲文化的他，不顾家人的反对，毅然走上了中国研究之路，其职业生涯也长期以中国为中心，一度成为华府高层对华决策幕后的一员要将。包道格参与并见证了中美外交风雨的诸多历程，对两国关系的未来，他也有颇多期许。
　　中美建交伊始，一个美国外交官在北京的见闻
　　澎湃新闻：1980 年您曾在美国驻华大使馆短暂工作过一段时间。对当时北京这座城市印象如何？
　　包道格：我非常清楚地记得我是1980年6月15日第一次来到北京。对我而言，那段岁月充满了美好的回忆。我喜欢拍照，相机镜头下的北京城非常漂亮，这里的人民也很上照！他们怀着一个开放的心态，对外界充满了好奇。我记得北京的胡同里经常能看见卖爆米花、磨剪刀的小贩，很有意思！
　　我在哈佛的老师费正清20世纪30年代曾在北京生活，他在回忆录里描写了老北京的生活乐趣，1980年我在这里也体会到了这座城市的魅力。
　　澎湃新闻：那时中美建交刚满一年多。两国关系的正常化对人民生活有什么影响吗？
　　包道格：中美建交对普通百姓的影响一开始还不那么明显。要说对当时中国社会影响最大的，我觉得是恢复高考，这让经历过“文革”的一代人获得机会重回课堂。社会上突然涌现了一大批有才识的年轻人，有的去了英国、有的去了美国，当然也有很多在中国的大学里重新学习深造。我和很多这样的青年有过交流，他们对未来充满了希望。

包道格曾在里根政府国家安全委员会任职。

　　澎湃新闻：作为一个美国青年外交官，您对中国官员的印象如何？
　　包道格：那段时间我接触比较多的是冀朝铸，他毕业于哈佛大学，英语说得非常棒——或许比他的中文还好！他后来几次担任中国驻外大使，还曾担任联合国副秘书长。
　　我们当时刚刚从一个联络处转变为一个大使馆，卡特政府非常坚定地鼓励美国代表团访华，所以我们一年365天几乎天天都有接待任务。冀朝铸作为中国官方代表，经常要设宴款待美国来的客人。北京烤鸭虽然好吃，连吃50顿也要腻了，可冀朝铸几乎每天晚上都要吃！
　　冀朝铸，还有另一位官员，韩叙（他后来也担任过中国驻美大使），他们能力都非常强，人也很好。当时中国官员中有过国外留学、生活经历的人还相当少，所以他们这些人肩上的担子很重。
　　澎湃新闻：您在大学期间就学过中文，了解过中国的历史文化。首次来华的亲身经历有没有加深您对中国研究的兴趣？
　　包道格：当然，这段经历很有启发性，愈发加深了我对中国的热情。当年，我去爬过泰山、峨眉山，还去过四川成都等多地的名胜古迹。这些地方不仅有着深厚的中国文化底蕴，在中国近现代史上也曾书写篇章，让我对中国几个世纪以来的文化脉络和历史沿革有了直观的体会。让我印象特别深的是有一次骑着自行车去居庸关。那里的一处塔洞壁中有一块古体文字碑，其中包含两种已经失传的文字。我在读研究生时学到过，但还是头一次亲眼看到。这是这两种文字留在世上仅有的痕迹，石碑镌刻下的还有中国的古老文明。我之所以很早就选择研究中国，一大原因就是被中国博大精深的文化所吸引。
　　追忆白宫岁月，与两国领导人的亲密接触
　　澎湃新闻：您曾在美国国家安全委员会工作长达7 年，直接参与美国亚太政策的制定，和里根、老布什总统过从甚密。您是如何向他们提供对华政策建议的？如何评价两位总统在中美关系发展史上的作用？
　　包道格：我是里根总统第二任期后期才进入国安会的。我认为里根总统在推动中美关系方面最大的成就，一个是1982年中美签署《八一七公报》；另一个是他1984年的访华之旅。我当时只是参与了一些基础文案工作，并没有直接陪同总统，发挥的作用不大。
　　要知道，里根总统在竞选时也打过“反华”牌，他曾表示当选后要和北京断交、恢复与台关系。从结果来看，我觉得，与其说是里根改变了中美关系，不如说是中美关系改变了里根。他当选后，国务卿黑格等人纷纷建言，试图改变总统对中国的看法。里根后来也改变了立场，1984年赢得连任后马上访华，取得了很好的效果。可见，里根也逐步认识到他的仕途命运和中国的命运是紧密捆绑在一起的。
　　澎湃新闻：那么老布什总统呢？
　　包道格：布什总统上任后的第一年，两国关系急转直下。我们花了大量的时间和精力应对这一问题。早在中美建交之前，布什总统就曾于70年代担任美国驻北京联络处主任，他对中国和中国人民都饱含深情，他希望尽可能地维护中美关系。但是随着苏联解体，美国国内对中美关系的定位产生了巨大争议，两党中都有反华声音，尤其是民主党中很多人企图瓦解两国关系。最后的结果是，政府各层对华合作项目资金锐减。我们几乎每天都在和国会抗争。虽然布什总统维护中美关系的决心非常坚定，但那一两年还是非常艰难，鲜有成效。直到1992年邓小平南方谈话之后，我们终于迎来了重建两国关系的契机。
　　澎湃新闻：您提到了邓小平，对他印象如何？
　　包道格：我有幸和多位总统和世界领导人有过直接接触，老实说，大部分领导人也不是那么有趣的。邓小平不一样。我第一次见到他是1979年他作为副总理访美，那是中美建交后的一大盛事。华盛顿的冬天很冷，天空中飘着雪，我记得我当时陪同卡特总统、邓小平副总理等人一起在白宫花园里参加典礼。在欢迎仪式快结束前，两位领导人和在场的记者和观众都进行了交流。但他们中和观众目光接触最多、直接交流最丰富、最焕发光彩的不是东道主美国总统，而是邓小平！在此后和他的会谈中，我发现邓小平是一个非常干练、高效的领导人。他虽然年纪大了，听力也不好，但是非常善于掌控全局，非常有主见，目标明确，总能使会谈富有成效。他个人魅力很强，虽然个子不高，但给人印象深刻，让人敬佩。
　　见证台海风云，“新三角”需要“新思维”
　　澎湃新闻：您从2002 年开始出任美国在台湾协会台北办事处处长，到2006 年卸任，这期间虽然台海风云不断，但总体上来说，台湾问题的稳定促使中美关系相对稳定。您觉得您在其中发挥了多少作用？
　　包道格：我在台湾的任期从一开始就不顺利。当时，共和党和民主党两党内都有不少人抵制对华关系，希望由“亲台”人士担任这一职务。我到台北的第一个周末，陈水扁就在民进党集会上提出了所谓的“一边一国”论。我们对此毫无准备。从某种程度上来说，陈水扁促使我们改变了工作作风。我上任后，制定了一套舆情系统，定期向华盛顿汇报台湾动态和民意变化。美国和台湾“断交”后，台湾在美国的受关注度大幅下降，很多人都不知道台湾发生了什么事。我觉得必须要改变这种状况，所以我发动在台协会员工们检索、翻译、汇编相关新闻资讯，让华盛顿掌握台湾社会的真实现状。几年下来，美国政府得以对台湾形势有了更客观的认识，在制定对台政策，尤其是向陈水扁施压方面，也更有据可寻。
　　澎湃新闻：2003 年温家宝总理访美时，小布什总统发出反对台湾民进党政府推动“公投”举动的最强硬声明，称美国“反对任何来自中国或者台湾意图改变目前现状的单方面决定”。这是您给出的建议吗？
　　包道格：我没有直接参与撰写总统的声明，但是我可以说，如果不是我及时定期向华盛顿汇报台湾社会的真实情况，美国总统就不会发出这样的声明。也正是从我们上报的信息中，华盛顿方面才了解到台湾岛内，台湾人民中就有不少人反对公投、反对陈水扁，这不是中国大陆单方面的态度。我觉得建立一套系统的汇报制度，向我的政府提供公开信息和内部情报，对决策制定者是很有帮助的，我对此也感到很骄傲。
　　澎湃新闻：或许也正因此，您曾经受到台湾某些媒体的强烈抨击，这有没有使您动摇在相关问题上的立场？
　　包道格：从来没有。被人攻击或谩骂当然不是什么愉快的经历，但那些恶意中伤我的人并没有客观的事实根据，他们这样只是自找难堪。而我有足够的数据、信息来支撑我的观点，我也得到了总统强有力的支持，所以我从来没有觉得自己做错了什么。
　　有一次我和常驻华盛顿的在台协会主席意见不合，在总统面前争论了起来。最后，总统对我说：“我不喜欢含糊其辞。你去告诉陈水扁：我不仅不支持‘台湾独立’，我完全反对‘台湾独立’。”所以回到台湾后我就约了和陈水扁见面，我把总统的话告诉他，他听了之后怒不可遏，说：“台湾不是你们的州，也不是他们的省。台湾不会被边缘化，也不会变得微不足道……”这是他当时的观点。后来他因为贪污洗钱被起诉判刑时，他却说“说到底台湾不过就是美国的第51个州”，他所做的一切只不过是听命于美国。所以你看，他的观点和立场一直在变，取决于怎么样说对他最有利。
　　澎湃新闻：台湾问题一直是中美关系中最敏感的问题之一。您觉得台湾会如何影响中美关系的未来？
　　包道格：我觉得关键问题是我们如何避免使之成为彻底颠覆两国关系的敏感因素。过去三十多年来，我们总体上还算成功，没有因此产生大的正面冲突，但是我们也经历过几次危机。
　　我们正在经历全球局势的重要转变。冷战后，以美国为主导的单极世界格局已经发生变化。现在俄罗斯仍然希望施加影响，但国力基础已经减弱；欧洲变得更趋于内向化发展；中东仍然处于巨大动荡中；中国在慢慢崛起，印度也有可能紧随其后，新的国际格局架构存在诸多变数。过去的一套战略思维已经不适用于今天的世界，我们必须改变。我们必须给中国一席之地，我们必须让俄罗斯规矩起来，我们必须让欧洲更有担当，也许我们也能找到改善中东乱局之策。这一切不是美国仅凭一己之力就能做到的。美国在经济和军事上占绝对主导地位的日子已经一去不复返了，但我们也不是一蹶不振，我们仍然能在国际事务中扮演重要的角色。
　　我们面临着一个新的三角关系，因此政治家们和外交家们都需要好好思考，如何避免台湾问题在新形势下成为中美冲突的诱因。

小布什总统任期内，包道格曾出任美国在台湾协会台北办事处处长。

　　中美未来合作，亟需寻找新的粘合剂
　　澎湃新闻：尼克松总统曾说：让中美走到一起的是防范苏联威胁的共同需要，而能让两国关系维持下去的是经济合作。但现在我们面对着贸易不平衡等问题，经贸竞争尤其激烈。您怎么看这个问题？
　　包道格：尼克松总统的话在一定的历史时期是对的，但已经不适用于当下的两国关系。我在政府任职时，每年的一大工作重心就是保护中美贸易关系。根据美国的法律，我们有“贸易最惠国”一说，每年要通过立法更新。1989年之后，国会对中国态度非常强硬。每次我们都要展开激烈的争论，告诉他们：如果不给予中国“贸易最惠国”待遇，不仅会损害美国本土企业的利益，也不利于让中国加大力度参与国际经济事务。这一问题几乎每年都是一场恶战，直到2000年国会通过了给予中国“永久性贸易最惠国待遇”的法案，此后中国也顺利加入了世界贸易组织。
　　确实如尼克松总统所言，经贸关系一度是维持我们关系的粘合剂。但是现在，经贸关系已经开始成为我们的重大分歧点。过去，如果中美关系发生了危机，商界人士还有可能跑去游说，要求国会保护两国关系，但现在不太可能了。我们正在失去维持两国关系的粘合剂，或者说基石。
　　澎湃新闻：那现在有什么领域可以成为新的粘合剂吗？
　　包道格：恐怕还没有，我们需要寻找新的合作点。奥巴马总统曾提出中美合作与竞争共存，他曾试图在环境保护、第三世界危机治理、难民和人道主义救援等领域寻找中美之间新的合作点，但并不成功。我们可能尚未找到新的粘合剂，但我们必须学会允许中国在经济、军事等各方面强大起来——因为这势不可挡。美国在继续维护亚太地区利益的同时，不能让中国的崛起成为两国的冲突点。这不仅是在亚太地区的竞争，完全可能在未来几十年成为全球性的竞争。
　　澎湃新闻：中美建交40 周年之际，正值特朗普总统执政第三年和习近平主席第二任期的第二年。您觉得对两国领导人来说，是否存在历史或战略机遇，为中美关系的未来勾画新蓝图？
　　包道格：我认为有。正常情况下，我认为美国总统、国务卿或者国家安全顾问会在40周年之际推出一些加强双方未来合作的大纲领，但在特朗普政府内似乎没有这样的人。所以这个重担就落在了中国头上。习主席在十九大上的讲话充满自信、雄心勃勃，我希望中国会将这份自信和雄心运用到处理国际事务上，推出为外部世界所接受的方案，因为在我看来，这不会出自华盛顿方面。
　　澎湃新闻：2013 年您在接受媒体采访时曾说：今后10 年是中美两个大国是和平共处还是走向冲突的试验期。现在时间已经过半，您现在如何评价两国关系的未来？
　　包道格：我认为过去几年形势并不好。奥巴马总统提出过“亚太再平衡”战略，我把它叫做“NATO”——并不是因为这和北大西洋公约组织有什么类似之处，而是因为政府“只说不做”（No Action Talk Only），不仅没有促成什么实质性的变化，反倒让中方认为美国在刻意遏制中国。实际我们只是一味地抱怨，但在处理南海、朝鲜半岛、东海问题等方面没有成效。我们需要新的思维。我们要找到方法让两国领导人一起讨论如何让中国崛起的同时不损害美国的利益，在新形势下我们怎样处理与盟友和邻国的关系。我认为我们需要大战略大思维。
　　澎湃新闻：您会给两位领导人提什么建议？
　　包道格：我觉得我们应该开诚布公地加强交流，比如在朝核问题上，近五六年来中美头一次做到了如此坦率地交换意见。美方总是误以为中国能解决朝鲜半岛的一切问题——这导致了一些错误的政策方向，制造了不必要的紧张局势；中国总误以为美国试图在半岛问题上给中国制造麻烦，来制衡中国的发展和影响力。双方高层需要进行更好的沟通，要敢于正视我们的意见分歧，找到更好的应对之策。
　　澎湃新闻：您认为中美会陷入“修昔底德陷阱”吗？
　　包道格：我并不认同这一观点，我觉得这一概念已经不再适用于当今世界。拥有核武器的国家不会轻易陷入战争。当今世界的问题不少，但最大的问题不是中东的反恐战争或种族斗争——虽然很不幸的是，这些在未来几十年会把我们长期牵扯进去；最大的问题也不是朝核问题——我认为我们能用传统的遏制和威慑途径或找到新的办法来解决；最大的挑战是如何避免让中国的崛起及其对周边国家产生的影响损害美国的利益，如何避免诱发中美军事冲突。如果我们能做到这点，我们就能迎来巨大的成功。

来源时间：2018/12/19   发布时间：2018/12/17

旧文章ID：17657