作者：薛力  来源：《世界知识》2017年第17期

　　本文发表于《世界知识》2017年第17期（8月28日出版），为地心力说专栏的第9篇，编辑删去了少量文字。关于“一带一路”与东盟的关系，至少可以写两篇学术论文，也有刊物约稿并催促。可是，俺老是觉得准备不足，动不了笔。借上月初到马尼拉开会之机，促“技己”动笔写此小文，窃望就此开始动笔完成两篇稿债。两位主编海涵则个。——薛
　　今年是东盟成立五十周年，因此，8月份在马尼拉开锣的东盟系列会议，通常会增加与此相关的环节或内容。8月初在马尼拉举行的“东盟五十年：前进的道路”算是系列外长会的预热与配套会议，与会的东盟国家代表都是前部长、前大使、著名学者，以及东道国的现任财政部长与外交部长。让人印象深刻的是，这些东盟精英们除了谈及东盟五十年来的成就外，还高度关注两个问题：东盟下一步该做什么？东盟如何保持在亚太区域合作中的中心地位（centrality）？
　　历史地看，东盟成就巨大：东盟国家形成了比较明显的地区认同，彼此之间发生大规模战争的可能性已经很小（柬埔寨与老挝近日的边境事件是个典型例子），2015年底建成了东盟经济共同体，正致力于建设社会文化共同体与政治安全共同体，许多东盟国家之间做到了互免签证，东盟成为国际公认的地区组织，以东盟为中心构建起了亚太地区合作框架（典型如东盟地区论坛、东亚峰会、东盟+6、东盟+3、RCEP谈判进程）。这在50年前很难想象。
　　但东盟也面临一些挑战：经济上，成员国经济发展高度不平衡，区域内贸易依存度才25%左右，经济总量才中国的四分之一；文化上，不同文明的6亿人口不容易形成深层次的身份认同，各国对国家认同的强调远远超过地区认同；安全上，一些成员国与区域外国家的关系更为紧密，一些成员国互不信任或存在领土争端；进一步整合的动力不够强大，最为积极推动东盟整合进程的是新加坡、马来西亚与泰国，这三国经济相对发达，希望在一个更大的市场中发挥自己的比较优势，而人口最多的印尼、菲律宾与越南三国积极性还不够，特别是，成员国中经济实力最为强大的印尼并不愿意、也不敢大力推进东盟成员国的整合进程。始于奥巴马时期、特朗普上台后加剧的美国对外战略收缩也减弱了东盟的整合力度。更重要的是，崛起的中国在继续支持东盟推进地区整合的同时，也开始构建以自身为中心的地区机制，特别是在经济领域。
　　下一步东盟该做什么？推进经济整合依然是重心，大部分成员国的主要任务是发展经济，彼此间经济领域的竞争性大于互补性，因此，在经济共同体的基础上继续推进经济合作（如协调货币与财政政策），将涉及关键经济主权的让渡，目前还很少成员国做好了这种准备；文化上，“强化对东盟的认同、弱化国家认同”是一些与会代表的主张，但不争的事实是：大部分东盟成员国还处于巩固民族国家的过程中，很难推行“削弱国民国家认同”的政策；安全上，不干涉成员国内政的传统很难突破（非盟与欧盟都可以向成员国派遣维和部队，这对东盟来说还是遥远的事情），一些成员国对域外国家的安全依赖短期内也改变不了；在安全问题上共同发声只能选择性进行（如杜特尔特4月份以东盟轮值主席国的身份在朝核问题上呼吁美国谨慎行事，不要堕进金正恩的圈套），但如果涉及与一些成员国的重大国家利益，则很难让成员国牺牲自己的利益而服从东盟的统一立场（典型如南海问题）。
　　可见，无论是经济共同体的深化，还是政治安全共同体与社会文化共同体建设，都将面临越来越大的困难。
　　东盟的“中心地位”主要来自一些地区合作框架。但这种中心地位不是来自东盟本身的实力，而是来自互不信任的若干大国的推举，加上东盟相对超然的地位。也就是说，位居中心地位的东盟实际上只能起到大国间关系协调员的作用，而难以主导或推动大国关系的改变。如果大国的政策发生重大变化，东盟的这种中心地位被弱化乃至丧失是必然的。美国的战略收缩意味着对东盟的支持力度将下降。中国更注重的是一带一路建设。印度、俄罗斯、澳大利亚、韩国等对强化与东盟的合作感兴趣，但未必愿意听从东盟的领导。以东盟主导的RCEP为例，很难想象日本、印度、中国三国会间未来几年会签署自贸区协定。即使未来16个国家签署了RCEP，以东盟的体量与整合程度，也很难保持中心地位。
　　总之，度过五十岁的东盟，成员国的整合进程将进入深水区，保持其亚太地区合作中的中心地位也将越来越困难。更好的做法是：不纠缠于“中心地位”，审慎推进安全共同体与社会文化共同体建设，让成员国致力于自身的发展，在此过程中，更多强调自己的“协调员”角色与在某些方面的引导作用，淡化“中心地位”意识。毕竟，随着力量对比的变化，亚太整合进程将依赖于多重驱动力，体现为“多匹马共同拉车”，而不是某个国家或组织始终坐在驾驶席上。大小国家都有望在某些方面发挥领导作用。东盟可以依据自身情况确定一些领域与议提发力并充当领导者。

来源时间：2017/9/2   发布时间：2017/8/28

旧文章ID：14012

作者：薛力 程章玺  来源：解放军报

来源时间：2017/9/2   发布时间：2017/9/2

旧文章ID：14011

作者：SEAMUS McGRAW  来源：纽约时报中文网

　　在德克萨斯州贝城他的办公室里，我们围坐在一个杂乱堆着东西的桌子边，面前是一盘烤肉，这个老年犹太稻农和我一边吃一边聊德克萨斯州、犹太法典和天气，不知不觉到了傍晚。
　　“他们肯定告诉过你，如果你问我时间，我会告诉你如何制作手表，”老人笑着说。
　　他们确实告诉过我。一字不差。事实上，那正是我2016年初去见他的原因，因为德州沿海稻米种植地区当时仍然没有完全摆脱长期恶性干旱的影响。他们告诉我，哈斯凯尔·西蒙(Haskell Simon)在德克萨斯州生活了90年，对自然和我们所创造的世界之间那种复杂的相互作用拥有深刻的了解。
　　他没有让我失望。在几个小时的时间里，他讲述了数年来的严重干旱已经是个灾难，但是糟糕的运气，不周全的规划，猖獗的人口增长，这些因素组合到一起，让情况雪上加霜。
　　所以，当“哈维”(Harvey)飓风抵达德克萨斯州东南部时，哈斯凯尔·西蒙是我想到的第一个人。这不仅仅是因为我担心他的安全——虽然我也担心——而是我知道他可以给我提供我需要的视角。
　　他没有让我失望。
　　“我们没事，”他告诉我。“我们躲了这一劫。运气很好。”
　　他难过地说，其他数以百万计的人们运气就没有这么好了。
　　到这场风暴最后过去的时候，它在德克萨斯州沿海地区倾泻的雨水将多达15万亿加仑。形象一点讲，如果所有这些水从水龙头而不是从天空中倾倒下来，那么根据2010年美国人的用水量来估计，这些水足够美国所有男人、女人和孩子使用42天。这是卡特里娜飓风的两倍多。
　　不管根据哪种估计，这都是一场恐怖的暴风雨。
　　在接下来的日子里，科学家和专家们肯定会争论气候变化在所有这些事件中扮演的角色。他们会争论墨西哥湾温暖的海水在多大程度上增加了飓风的威力——飓风肆虐时，那里的水温比平均温度高出7.2华氏度。他们会讨论芬兰总统周一刚跟美国总统提到的黑碳可能在多大程度上导致了北极变暖，以及那是否足以遏制高层风的步伐，而高层风本可以让缓慢移动的风暴加速离开。
　　那些否认我们的消费行为所导致的气候变化是这场灾难的一个原因的人会说，德克萨斯一直都是一个经常出现极端天气的地方，致命暴风雨过后经常很快出现严重干旱。这是事实。休斯敦现在之所以能成为美国第四大城市，在很大程度上是因为19世纪末、20世纪初的凶猛暴风雨夷平了印第安诺拉，摧毁了加尔维斯顿，为休斯敦的显赫地位扫清了道路。
　　正如我的稻农朋友会跟你说的，暴雨和干旱的交替出现是在德克萨斯州生活必须面对的现实。但他也会对你说，就算你能证明哈维飓风肆虐跟气候变化毫无干系，或者上一次及下一次干旱的程度完全怪不到我们头上，但这些暴雨和干旱的破坏性依然比之前的都要强，因为可破坏的东西更多了。
　　他会对你说，在热带风暴阿利森(Allison)淹没休斯敦之后的16年里，这座以抗拒任何分区规划闻名的城市及其周边地区——它包括15个县的全部或部分地区——经历了一个爆炸性发展的时期，从2000年的480万人增长到今天的700多万人。单是休斯敦所在的哈里斯县就从340万人增长到了460万人。
　　站在西蒙位于贝城的办公室外，你几乎可以感觉到发展的浪潮，商业街和围起来的社区，以及设有更大停车场的巨大卖场正在远处奥斯汀的郊区耸立起来，往休斯敦方向拓展开来，往南部这个地方则是越来越密集。
　　那可是数百万人在干旱期汲取水资源。他会说，实际上，就是因为在上个干旱期，有那么多人需要分享这里的水源，他和德克萨斯这个地区的其他稻农发现，自己的常用水源科罗拉多河下游的水被上游的人截断了，约四万英亩的耕地被迫丢荒。
　　他会跟你说，一个世纪不加控制的发展让很多人发家致富。但那也改变了地貌，导致干旱和洪水的破坏性更强，也让繁荣转瞬即逝。很多地区位于过度开采的墨西哥湾沿岸蓄水层，虽然在过去40年里，人们努力限制用水，但已经有太多水被汲取，有些地方的土地还在下沉，改变了径流走向，导致洪水聚集。
　　更重要的是，这个地区的两百多万新来者所住的房子、开车所走的道路、购物所在的商场都建在从前的草原上，那些草原本可以至少吸收这次和下次洪水的部分威力。从前的那些本可以用于减缓暴风的土地现在大多成了附带伤害——这次灾难造成的损失可能高达400亿美元。
　　得再过几个月，飓风哈维在墨西哥湾沿岸地区的灾难性肆虐造成的影响才会全部显现，也需要再过几年，当地才能完全恢复过来。而我的朋友会告诉你，在这两个时间点之间的某个时刻，或许该想想如何更好地进行重建，该停下来重新思考在何处以及如何开展建设，该反思我们是否正在改变天气，以及是否有办法让自己不那么容易受天气侵扰。也许我们可以采取不同的建设方式，或者留出一片地方，用于在干旱时帮助补充日益减少的供水，在发洪水时帮助减缓洪水行进的速度。
　　关于那些可以怎么做，我的朋友有很多点子。他可以，也乐于巨细无遗地告诉你如何制造手表。但他无法告诉你在下一次风暴来袭之前你有多少时间，或者如何利用这些时间。
　　这取决于你。

　　Seamus McGraw近期著有《把农场押在干旱上：来自气候变化前线的故事》。他正在撰写一本关于德克萨斯州水资源问题的新书。
　　翻译：土土、王相宜、李琼

来源时间：2017/9/1   发布时间：2017/9/1

旧文章ID：14020

作者：Sameer Lalwani, Yun Sun and Liv Dowling  来源：Foreign Policy

How Long Can China and India Avoid War in the Himalayas?

The Doklam crisis shows how quickly a conflict could blow up between Asia’s giants.

A remote corner of the Himalayas has become the unlikely scene of a major power standoff between China and India. Now entering its seventh week, the standoff centers on the tri-junction border shared by China, India, and Bhutan referred to as Doklam in India and Donglang in China. Neither side is spoiling for a fight, nor are they ready to back down anytime soon considering the security concerns, domestic political pressures, and regional reputational stakes. A series of quiet diplomatic interactions has not restrained the brinkmanship or ultimatums and the risk of a major armed clash between two Asian heavyweights remains.

China and India have sparred along the Himalayan border for decades, including a brief war (and clear Chinese victory) in 1962. In areas like Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh, long-standing disputes still play out in regular diplomatic arguments. Yet until recently there seemed to be a settled status quo in the comparatively peaceful tri-national border area, which has special strategic significance, lying as it does above the 14-mile-wide Siliguri valley, or the “chicken’s neck,” that connects northeast India to the rest of the country. As it turns out, both sides had very different visions of just what that status quo was.

The clash of perceptions has left them both smarting, and dialed jingoistic language up to 11. To China, Doklam is its own sovereign territory based on treaties, tacit agreements, and de facto control. India considers Doklam a disputed territory and contends that any changes to the territory’s jurisdiction must be made in consultation with India per a 2012 understanding between the three parties.

Thus, when roughly 100 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers arrived on the Dolam plateau (an area within Doklam) on June 16 with bulldozers and earthmoving machinery to improve and extend an existing Chinese road, a company-sized unit of Indian soldiers crossed into Doklam from a nearby Indian army post and interdicted the construction team. The Indian soldiers formed a “human chain” to physically obstruct the road-building project and urged the Chinese to “desist from changing the status quo.”

Since the Indian interdiction on June 18, PLA construction has halted and both sides remain at an impasse. Between 300-350 Indian troops have pitched tents near the standoff site and dug in for the long haul, supported by supply lines and 2,500 reinforcements. China recently threatened to move its own reinforcements into the area and conducted live-fire military exercises in Tibet. While Indian officials have voiced interest in dialogue, official Chinese statements demand India’s unconditional withdrawal before any talks can begin. After issuing a complaint against Chinese actions on June 20, Bhutan has otherwise remained studiously ambiguous as to its views of the standoff.

The Doklam standoff stems from China’s and India’s deep-seated suspicions about the other’s intentions. Conventional wisdom on international politics guides states to confront, not appease, those attempting to revise any status quo, lest it encourage further belligerence. But identifying exactly who the revisionist side is, and what the status quo was, is notoriously difficult in any case, because the definitions are vague and under-theorized. And it is especially hard amid the murky legacies of empire that make up the Himalayan frontiers.

For China, India’s military deployment into a disputed region is revising norms of sovereignty as well as long-standing public and private agreements. China believes its own actions and demands are sanctioned by existing agreements and understandings, and that India is subverting those agreements for unprecedented military deployments on foreign soil.

For India, China’s attempts to construct roads in disputed territories appears consistent with its previous “salami-slicing” maneuvers of unilaterally revising unsettled borders for territorial aggrandizement and expanded influence in the region. India believes China is deliberately exploiting the ambiguity of existing territorial disputes to expand its borders, influence, and offensive capability while its own actions are more explicitly legitimated by other treaties, arrangements, and security imperatives.

The historical and diplomatic ambiguity around the border has also created plenty of space for both sides to feel self-righteously aggrieved. China contends it has unquestioned sovereignty over Doklam based on an 1890 treaty between Great Britain and China delimiting the border between the Indian state of Sikkim and Tibet, as well as the boundary point with Bhutan. As both India and China have accepted this treaty, India had no legitimate grounds to cross the border and thus its actions constitute an “invasion” of Chinese territory. Secondly, China argues even if Doklam is disputed, India is still inappropriately interfering with and prejudicing a bilateral dispute between Bhutan and China.

India concedes its troops crossed an international border but into Bhutan, not China. India’s interdiction is furthermore justified by another treaty, India’s 2007 treaty of friendship with Bhutan, and both countries’ interest in halting China’s attempts to unilaterally revise the status quo. As several analysts have pointed out, the vagaries of colonial cartography and internal contradictions within the 1890 treaty mean it can actually be interpreted to support both Indian and Chinese claims.

Adding to the confusion is Bhutan’s ambiguous position. As a tiny Himalayan kingdom sandwiched between the region’s two major powers, Bhutan has enjoyed a “special relationship” with India since 1949 that some might describe more as suzerainty. While the 2007 India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty updates the 1949 agreement to accord Bhutan greater autonomy, India still wields considerable influence over Bhutan’s foreign policy. To justify its recent military actions, India has invoked an article which states that neither country will allow its territory to be used for activities that harm the other’s national security interests.

To date, however, Bhutan has yet to clarify whether India acted independently or at Bhutan’s request for military assistance in Doklam. China has argued that, absent a clear invitation, India lacks legitimate grounds for its involvement. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has used more circumspect language like “coordination,” and has flubbed opportunities to clarify Bhutan’s request. It is possible Bhutan privately requested help or that India coerced its way into the dispute for its own security interests as it did in Sri Lanka in 1987.

Another point of contention is private diplomacy among the various actors. While not publicly brandished as justification, our sources suggest (and some reporting seems to corroborate) that PLA actions in Doklam may be based on a private understanding between China and Bhutan. Both countries have at least seven disputed territories between themselves and reports indicate Bhutan may have implicitly agreed to cede Doklam to China in the late 1990s — a period when China was busily cleaning up its frontiers — in favor of territorial gains on its northern border.

Thus, China deems its road-building in Doklam legitimate within this private, pre-settlement agreement, and fearing such a settlement, India’s military “invasion” seeks to challenge that agreement and Bhutan’s sovereignty. It is possible India was privy to this private Chinese-Bhutanese agreement over Doklam and may have tried to thwart it. Regardless, India would likely maintain that no formal agreement means no final settlement. In its diplomatic demarche to China on June 20, Bhutan stated that Chinese actions violated its 1988 and 1998 agreements prohibiting alteration of the status quo before the completion of negotiations. Moreover, another private and superseding 2012 agreement between India and China purportedly required the consultation of all three countries before a final determination on the tri-junction is made.

China also implicitly contends it has had a decades-long presence and effective jurisdiction over Doklam where Tibetan herdsman bring their livestock to graze. According to Chinese records, the PLA began patrolling Doklam once a year since 1975 and gradually extended its geographical coverage southward.

India argues the remoteness of Doklam, its harsh winters, and poor infrastructure mean China has not always exercised de facto control over the area. Bhutanese herdsman have also traditionally used Doklam as a grazing land, and security forces from all three countries have regularly patrolled the area, leading to occasional confrontations. China destroyed two Bhutanese military posts in 2007 and allegedly constructed Chinese posts at the same spot. One unofficial map circulated by Chinese bloggers even refers to a “line of actual control” between China and Bhutan, implying Bhutan exercises de facto control of Doklam.

China is also arguing that India’s actions are unprecedented. To China, India has not only interfered in a bilateral dispute but escalated it by deploying forces across a recognized international border into a third country. Indeed, evenIndian observers have acknowledged Doklam is the first time India has engaged Chinese forces from the soil of a third country. Upending established norms of sovereignty through force in the name of self-defense could permit future “adventurism.”

Yet India’s argument is that it was responding to unprecedented Chinese revision of borders through road construction (both hardening and extension) in disputed territory. Such moves would create permanent facts on the ground with grave implications for Indian national security.

In our estimation, Chinese claims are vulnerable due to the ambiguity of treaty language, private agreements, and de facto possession claims. But Indian claims are by no means less vulnerable given the unprecedented nature of India’s actions on the plateau and Bhutan’s deafening silence. Both sides’ views of the status quo may appear to themselves entirely justifiable, yet to their adversary as thin gruel.

Seven weeks into the crisis, the continued impasse — and increasingly caustic rhetoric — indicates the potential for escalation remains high. The Indian national security advisor’s recent visit to Beijing did not yield any breakthroughs, contrary to some reporting. Aggressive signals of resolve like military exercises or mobilization or perceived windows of tactical opportunity in a different sector of the disputed India-China border could lead either side to miscalculate, resulting in accidental or inadvertent escalation. And any shooting that begins on the border could even expand into other domains like cyber- or naval warfare.

Despite the challenges, there are several possible resolutions in sight if both sides — and third parties trying to defuse tension — strive to understand what might seem like mutually incompatible perspectives.

For example, India could find alternative ways to grant Beijing a “win” by softening its position on China’s “One Belt, One Road” project, both sides could pursue international arbitration, or both sides could wait until harsh winter weather conditions force both sides forces to quietly draw down.

Another “off ramp” to deescalate the crisis is a back-channel agreement with Bhutan appearing as the public arbiter, allowing both sides to save face. The most obvious solution, as many have identified, would be a mutual withdrawal and return to pre-June 16 positions – something which may already be slowly happening, as both draw back troops. For both sides to save face, the public narrative of their back-channel dialogue could rely on Bhutan.

For example, India could claim Bhutan “thanked” India for its support and commitment to upholding the bilateral friendship treaty, but after deploying its own monitoring force, Bhutan requests that India withdraw its forces. This would allow India to withdraw without appearing to bend to Chinese demands, send a message that China’s salami tactics will be challenged, and buttress its credibility with states concerned with Chinese encroachment. For its part, China can claim India withdrew first and quietly halt road construction until a final settlement is reached between itself and Bhutan. This would give all sides, including Bhutan, a face-saving exit necessary to appease domestic audiences. At the same time, India and China will have exchanged clear signals on just how serious they are about the border — and how dangerous assumptions about the other side can be.

来源时间：2017/8/31   发布时间：2017/7/31

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