作者：  来源：中美印象

　　上周，世界众多国家的领导人齐聚北京，一起谈论着中国雄心勃勃的计划——将一万亿美元投资于60多个国家的道路、港口、能源及其他项目，连接亚洲，欧洲和非洲。有人这样描述中国的一带一路计划：覆盖了约世界65%的人口，约占世界GDP的三分之一，以及占世界所有货物和服务的四分之一。
　　有人认为，这一峰会的举行同时也提示人们，美国的预期和影响力在特朗普总统上任后已经不如从前。当特朗普总统强力推行孤立主义和贸易保护主义的美国第一计划并且陷入能力遭质疑的争论时，中国国家主席习近平显露出他想要重新制定全球经济和政治秩序的决心和自信，并且吸引他国加入北京的阵营。
　　习近平主席通过北京峰会来展现他的一带一路宏图，这项计划的目标是创建一个现代版本的丝绸之路，一个联系中国和非洲及欧洲的贸易通路网。几十位领导人，包括俄罗斯的普京总统到场参加。他们之中的很多人赞扬了习近平主席早在2013年就已经提出的格局，并且对在自己国家立项，获得财政资助，发展和管理这些项目表现出极大的热情。一带一路计划提供了多种方式供众国家参与；比如，英国和新加坡似乎对私人借贷感兴趣。
　　很多国家渴望基础设施方面的投资和就业机会。而对于中国自己，它希望打开新的市场来让自己茁壮成长，并且新的市场能够吸收产能过剩的钢铁，水泥和机械装置。据纽约时报的一篇报道，中国的工业过剩是这项计划诞生的一大动因。中国一年可以生产近11亿吨钢铁，相当于世界其他地方产量的总和，但中国国内的钢铁需求只有8亿吨左右。据麦肯锡公司的一篇采访报道，中国的经济发展正在变慢；很多人说而这是中国出口增长的下一个浪潮，会在很多国家（这其中很多是新兴市场）产生影响力并实施基础设施建设，而这些在过去十年中也恰恰加速了中国的高速发展。
　　不过有一些原因值得我们思考这项宏伟的计划能实现多少。比如，在有宗派之分或者政权之争的地区会有安全隐患；在法律不同的国家会有法律纠纷；在无能的政府和腐败官员当道的国家会有官僚主义壁垒。
　　到目前为止，一带一路项目的投资集中在巴基斯坦、阿富汗和其他对中国有地缘政治优势但经济薄弱的国家。参加这次峰会的代表们表达了顾虑，他们担心这些经济薄弱的国家会很难还清来自中国公司和银行的贷款，并强调更多的项目应该是“高质量”的并且是有利可图的。
　　当地人的感受也是一个值得考虑的问题。无论经济好处是什么，任何一个项目都不能无所顾忌的运行，不顾及人民或者破坏当地环境。习近平主席强调磋商，透明和人们的幸福是至关重要的，但是中国目前的记录并不十分乐观。一个例子是缅甸的皎漂，这里一个中缅石油和天然气的管道在秘密修建时，对农民的财产权和当地环境造成了损害。
　　中国的目标似乎是要主导国际体制。如果这个计划成功，重新制定了资金的流向、用途以及法律选择的规则，它就很有可能颠覆二战后美国和它的同盟建立起来的世界秩序。这其中也存在军事隐患：例如，很多缅甸和外国专家担心中国会将皎漂港口为军事目的服务。
　　对于美国，退出奥巴马总统协商来的确保美国和其同盟能为亚洲贸易设定规则的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定，特朗普总统已经将陆地拱手让给了中国。这一举动让很多亚洲国家质疑美国对这个地区的承诺同时以更加认真的态度对待中国。
　　像它的大多数西方同盟一样，美国对习近平总统的一带一路计划也很谨慎。不仅俄罗斯总统普京亲自到场，而美国也在最后关头派出特朗普总统的高级亚洲顾问博明（Matt Pottinger, 白宫国安会亚洲事务高级主管）取代商务部主管部门工作人员参会。美国的公司也渴望从中国“一带一路”带来的能使企业繁荣的商机中分一杯羹，由此它们的利益得以被保护。
　　据纽约时报，今年四月，花旗银行(Citibank)赢得了中国银行的一份合同，负责销售价值30亿美元的债券——后者将用以此筹集的资金在亚洲、东欧和东非各地设立分行。技术与制造企业霍尼韦尔国际(Honeywell International)则在向中亚销售处理天然气的设备。一些非中国企业也在调整自身的业务，以便赢得更多与北京这项计划有关的订单。通用公司（GE）已经对公司的全球能源设备营销人员进行了重新的安排，以赋予他们优先权。
　　有人说中国的一带一路是第二个马歇尔计划。值得注意的是，马歇尔计划是第二次世界大战后欧洲复新的核心，但是其规模也只是一带一路计划构想的二十分之一。如此，规模是一个很重要的问题。这个计划雄心勃勃，也需要雄厚的资金。因此有人认为该计划最终成功与否有两方面的原因 。一方面是资金是否能实际到位并且政府愿意支配。另一方面是资金是否能够合理的运用。一个很大的风险是这些资金用在了错误的地方，用在了一开始就不该投资的地方，以致最终也没能够为为贸易和经济发展做贡献。
　　
中美印象网根据媒体报道综合整理，文章仅代表作者观点
文章来源：纽约时报   编译：段然

来源时间：2017/5/21   发布时间：2017/5/21

旧文章ID：13220

作者：  来源：纽约时报

　　《纽约时报》记者：“特别麻烦的一件事是，我们仍然不知道到底发生了什么。”
　　美国《纽约时报》20日爆出惊人消息：自2010年起，中国捣毁了美国中情局（CIA）一个在华间谍网，令后者出现数十年来最重大安全漏洞之一。
　　《纽约时报》报道截图
　　《纽约时报》称，从2010年末起，中情局隐藏在中国政府内部的多名线人逐步失联。报道称，美国情报系统不能断定失败原因是CIA内部有人“背叛了美国”，还是中国成功“黑”入了中情局与外国线人的联络系统。调查者对失败原因的看法分歧严重，至今也没能最终确定。
　　《纽约时报》的猛料20日迅速在西方媒体流传，BBC，英国《卫报》等都对“中美谍战”跟进报道。

克危克险：中国重创美国间谍行动？
　　中美间谍大战一直在演，从未间断。过去N多年里，中国一直处于守势，实力不如人，技艺不如人，道德不如人。改革开放后，这一被动地位在持续改善，并在局部竞争中处于攻势。然而，即使如美媒曝光中国情报战先下一城，中美情报大战临界点远未到来。在未来相当长一段时间里，美国仍处于强势地位，而且，中国将是美国全球情报大战的重中之重。
　　 
　　当地时间2017年5月20日，美国《纽约时报》推出四名记者联袂重磅报道，题为《击毙中央情报局线人，中国重创美国间谍行动》。文章描述，2010~2012年间，美国在中国布置的间谍被大幅度抄底，在华情报网络损失惨重。个中缘由，分两大派观点，情报界至今仍争论不休：要么中国已破解美国秘密情报通道，要么中国在美国卧底泄露了美国在华间谍名单。
　　 
　　文章透露的核心信息包括：其一、2010~2012年前后，中国官场普遍存在“世界末日”之感，认为这个国家没希望了，出现大规模情报交易。其二、也在那几年，美国在华情报线人不断失踪，有的被直接击毙，重要线人损失至少有20名，但2013年后，美国又稳住阵脚，中国破获美谍成功率大幅度下降。其三、美国启动纠错机制，中央情报局与联邦调查联手调查，审核美国驻华大使馆几乎所有人员，曾查出一名华裔叛徒嫌疑人，但没证据做实，此人虽离开中情局，但仍在亚洲自由活动。其四、美国并没停止对华情报作业，而是派老将重臣出马，试图重建在华间谍网络。其五、2015年，中国黑客成功袭击美国政府独立机构“人事管理办公室”，捞到不少干货。
　　 
　　美国媒体报道显示，似乎中国似乎占了上风，但忽视一个重大背景（不排除故意可能性）。那时，中国曾出现一次超级情报大泄露，中国某情报大佬心腹被美国策反，导致中国苦心经营的N个情报网点被迫撤离，中国对美情报作业损失极其惨重。如果中国在此背景下反击或反制美国，放倒美国那么多重要线人，合乎逻辑。
　　 
　　实际上，在这次事件曝光前，在过去近两个月时间里，两国情报界一直在暗战。与中国有关的事件包括：（1）国外情报圈爆料，中国某情报大佬被双规，另有一位被外放，实际已“被退休”；（2）中国产业间谍被列为来自中国最大的安全风险，建议有关人员出差别从中国过境，并要接受完整的中国安全风险教育；（3）“老妈情报”案曝光，美国国务院一位大妈被逮捕，涉嫌向中国传递机密情报，这对母子被中国情报界收买；（4）维基解密曝光中情局网络武器库后，中国情报机构大肆收购类似网络攻击工具，对以色列的产品特别感兴趣；（5）国外间谍让中国头疼，防不胜防，以至于中国政府乱了章法，比如鼓励“朝阳群众”举报间谍，在小学安排抓间谍教学。克危克险安全专家认为，西方炒作此事实际上是说，只有政府专业机构或专业情报公司才能干抓间谍的活，让朝鲜群众或小学生去抓间谍，根本不可能，中国的这种搞法确实有些荒唐。
　　 
　　与美国有关的议题包括：（1）中国某部委司局级官员在大街上被公开拘捕，涉嫌出卖情报；（2）美籍华人李某在上海一落地，就被当地国安局拘捕，被控接受美国政府FBI派遣，搜集中国国防军工情报；（3）美籍越南裔女间谍某某多年前在中国被捕，最近又传出新进展；（4）世界最顶级情报朋友圈“五眼”（Five Eyes），即五个盎格鲁-萨克森国家：美国、加拿大、英国、澳大利亚和新西兰。1989年春夏，这几个兄弟在北京大街小巷分头行动，协调共享中国情报。刚刚，这“五眼”兄弟在新西兰召开秘密会议，被曝光。
　　 
　　与中美元首峰会后的热线、热络与乐观气氛相比，这种“看不见战线”大斗法，就显得冷心、冷酷与冷战。既然两国元首都这么温暖了，为何还有这么冷的斗法呢？其实不矛盾。
　　 
　　首先，官僚机构惯性运作。“深度国家”所代表的是两国内政中的庞大官僚机器，且一直在按既定力量与惯性运行。只要最高元首的指令没下达到相关层级，“深度国家”就会我行我素，该和则和，该打则打，按既定规矩来，不含糊。这也是职责所在，中美两国都不例外。美国有政令不出白宫，中国有政令不出中南海。
　　 
　　特别是，美国是法治相当完善的联邦制国家，权力并行型，权力制衡有效，政府机构在划定权限范围内运行，要改变状况较为困难。相对的，中国是法治正在完善的共和制国家，权力垂直型，执政党一竿子插到底，具有强大的资源动员能力，要改变状况相对容易。
　　 
　　其次，地缘安全竞争很难跳脱零和游戏。在国际间，地缘安全竞争只有一个法则，以实力为基础的丛林法则。在此法则下，在中美两大国中，但凡涉及国家安全的，都是不可逾越的政治红线。这就意味着，只要有机会防范或打击对手，就会尽力搜集对方情报，打击对方，还会着力反情报，防范对方。在这种背景下，只要发现对方间谍就会用起来，要么抓捕，要么策反，而丝毫不管两国是否友好。当然，两国也有例外的“钓鱼执法”。在中美存在既竞争又合作（竞合）的现实背景下，两国情报与反情报斗争既紧张又激烈，还有可能很刺激，甚至很疯狂。美国有麦肯锡时代，中国有文革时代。
　　 
　　其三，中美竞合既是过去式，也是新常态。只要地缘安全竞争存在，既热络友好又冷酷斗争的竞合状态就会持续，这将成为中美关系新常态，且将持续相当长一段时间。日本、德国与美国关系再友好，也无法进入“五眼”朋友圈。德国总理默克尔、日本首相安倍晋三照样被美国监控监听。可以预见，即使中美关系已出现结构性改变与改善，双方竞合现状也不会改变。中美关系离美日关系很远，离美英关系更远。
　　 
　　最后，中国底线策略应该是，接受竞合，斗而不破。中美关系现在不好不坏，未来也许会更好，也许会更坏，但更坏时最好不要撕破脸，以免两败俱伤，尤其不能伤两国关系基础——民意。现在，美国与俄罗斯关系就因俄干预美国大选而陷入低谷，就连对普京和俄罗斯都十分友好的特朗普政府，都没办法对着民意干。1989年春夏后，美国对中国看法极其负面，至今已近30年，还没完全消除负面影响，今后不应再徒添无谓的反民意负能量。
　　 
　　注：作者为克危克险研究团队，仅代表分析员们的个人立场，授权本公众号独家发表。克危克险是中国本土一家独具特色的新型安全公司，致力于海外安全管理“一站式”服务，主营业务是安全集成服务、情报调查服务。

Killing C.I.A. Informants, China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations

By MARK MAZZETTI, ADAM GOLDMAN, MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT and MATT APUZZOMAY 20, 2017

WASHINGTON — The Chinese government systematically dismantled C.I.A. spying operations in the country starting in 2010, killing or imprisoning more than a dozen sources over two years and crippling intelligence gathering there for years afterward.

Current and former American officials described the intelligence breach as one of the worst in decades. It set off a scramble in Washington’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to contain the fallout, but investigators were bitterly divided over the cause. Some were convinced that a mole within the C.I.A. had betrayed the United States. Others believed that the Chinese had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. Years later, that debate remains unresolved.

But there was no disagreement about the damage. From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, according to former American officials, the Chinese killed at least a dozen of the C.I.A.’s sources. According to three of the officials, one was shot in front of his colleagues in the courtyard of a government building — a message to others who might have been working for the C.I.A.

Still others were put in jail. All told, the Chinese killed or imprisoned 18 to 20 of the C.I.A.’s sources in China, according to two former senior American officials, effectively unraveling a network that had taken years to build.

Assessing the fallout from an exposed spy operation can be difficult, but the episode was considered particularly damaging. The number of American assets lost in China, officials said, rivaled those lost in the Soviet Union and Russia during the betrayals of both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, formerly of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., who divulged intelligence operations to Moscow for years.

The previously unreported episode shows how successful the Chinese were in disrupting American spying efforts and stealing secrets years before a well-publicized breach in 2015 gave Beijing access to thousands of government personnel records, including intelligence contractors. The C.I.A. considers spying in China one of its top priorities, but the country’s extensive security apparatus makes it exceptionally hard for Western spy services to develop sources there.

At a time when the C.I.A. is trying to figure out how some of its most sensitive documents were leaked onto the internet two months ago by WikiLeaks, and the F.B.I. investigates possible ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, the unsettled nature of the China investigation demonstrates the difficulty of conducting counterespionage investigations into sophisticated spy services like those in Russia and China.

The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. both declined to comment.

Details about the investigation have been tightly held. Ten current and former American officials described the investigation on the condition of anonymity because they did not want to be identified discussing the information.

The first signs of trouble emerged in 2010. At the time, the quality of the C.I.A.’s information about the inner workings of the Chinese government was the best it had been for years, the result of recruiting sources deep inside the bureaucracy in Beijing, four former officials said. Some were Chinese nationals who the C.I.A. believed had become disillusioned with the Chinese government’s corruption.

But by the end of the year, the flow of information began to dry up. By early 2011, senior agency officers realized they had a problem: Assets in China, one of their most precious resources, were disappearing.

The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. opened a joint investigation run by top counterintelligence officials at both agencies. Working out of a secret office in Northern Virginia, they began analyzing every operation being run in Beijing. One former senior American official said the investigation had been code-named Honey Badger.

As more and more sources vanished, the operation took on increased urgency. Nearly every employee at the American Embassy was scrutinized, no matter how high ranking. Some investigators believed the Chinese had cracked the encrypted method that the C.I.A. used to communicate with its assets. Others suspected a traitor in the C.I.A., a theory that agency officials were at first reluctant to embrace — and that some in both agencies still do not believe.

Their debates were punctuated with macabre phone calls — “We lost another one” — and urgent questions from the Obama administration wondering why intelligence about the Chinese had slowed.

The mole hunt eventually zeroed in on a former agency operative who had worked in the C.I.A.’s division overseeing China, believing he was most likely responsible for the crippling disclosures. But efforts to gather enough evidence to arrest him failed, and he is now living in another Asian country, current and former officials said.

There was good reason to suspect an insider, some former officials say. Around that time, Chinese spies compromised National Security Agency surveillance in Taiwan — an island Beijing claims is part of China — by infiltrating Taiwanese intelligence, an American partner, according to two former officials. And the C.I.A. had discovered Chinese operatives in the agency’s hiring pipeline, according to officials and court documents.

But the C.I.A.’s top spy hunter, Mark Kelton, resisted the mole theory, at least initially, former officials say. Mr. Kelton had been close friends with Brian J. Kelley, a C.I.A. officer who in the 1990s was wrongly suspected by the F.B.I. of being a Russian spy. The real traitor, it turned out, was Mr. Hanssen. Mr. Kelton often mentioned Mr. Kelley’s mistreatment in meetings during the China episode, former colleagues say, and said he would not accuse someone without ironclad evidence.

Those who rejected the mole theory attributed the losses to sloppy American tradecraft at a time when the Chinese were becoming better at monitoring American espionage activities in the country. Some F.B.I. agents became convinced that C.I.A. handlers in Beijing too often traveled the same routes to the same meeting points, which would have helped China’s vast surveillance network identify the spies in its midst.

Some officers met their sources at a restaurant where Chinese agents had planted listening devices, former officials said, and even the waiters worked for Chinese intelligence.

This carelessness, coupled with the possibility that the Chinese had hacked the covert communications channel, would explain many, if not all, of the disappearances and deaths, some former officials said. Some in the agency, particularly those who had helped build the spy network, resisted this theory and believed they had been caught in the middle of a turf war within the C.I.A.

Still, the Chinese picked off more and more of the agency’s spies, continuing through 2011 and into 2012. As investigators narrowed the list of suspects with access to the information, they started focusing on a Chinese-American who had left the C.I.A. shortly before the intelligence losses began. Some investigators believed he had become disgruntled and had begun spying for China. One official said the man had access to the identities of C.I.A. informants and fit all the indicators on a matrix used to identify espionage threats.

After leaving the C.I.A., the man decided to remain in Asia with his family and pursue a business opportunity, which some officials suspect that Chinese intelligence agents had arranged.

Officials said the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. lured the man back to the United States around 2012 with a ruse about a possible contract with the agency, an arrangement common among former officers. Agents questioned the man, asking why he had decided to stay in Asia, concerned that he possessed a number of secrets that would be valuable to the Chinese. It’s not clear whether agents confronted the man about whether he had spied for China.

The man defended his reasons for living in Asia and did not admit any wrongdoing, an official said. He then returned to Asia.

By 2013, the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. concluded that China’s success in identifying C.I.A. agents had been blunted — it is not clear how — but the damage had been done.

The C.I.A. has tried to rebuild its network of spies in China, officials said, an expensive and time-consuming effort led at one time by the former chief of the East Asia Division. A former intelligence official said the former chief was particularly bitter because he had worked with the suspected mole and recruited some of the spies in China who were ultimately executed.

China has been particularly aggressive in its espionage in recent years, beyond the breach of the Office of Personnel Management records in 2015, American officials said. Last year, an F.B.I. employee pleaded guilty to acting as a Chinese agent for years, passing sensitive technology information to Beijing in exchange for cash, lavish hotel rooms during foreign travel and prostitutes.

In March, prosecutors announced the arrest of a longtime State Department employee, Candace Marie Claiborne, accused of lying to investigators about her contacts with Chinese officials. According to the criminal complaint against Ms. Claiborne, who pleaded not guilty, Chinese agents wired cash into her bank account and showered her with gifts that included an iPhone, a laptop and tuition at a Chinese fashion school. In addition, according to the complaint, she received a fully furnished apartment and a stipend.

来源时间：2017/5/21   发布时间：2017/5/21

旧文章ID：13219

作者：MARK LANDLER, GLENN THRUSH  来源：纽约时报中文网

　　华盛顿——周四，特朗普总统坚称他的竞选团队没有和俄罗斯官员勾结，尽管他也表示，“我只能代表自己这么讲。”
　　特朗普在白宫东翼讲话时表示，他尊重司法部任命一位特别检察官调查与俄罗斯关系的决定。
　　“这整件事就是一种政治迫害，”特朗普说。“我、我的竞选团队和俄罗斯人之间肯定没什么勾结，一点也没有——不过我只能代表自己这么讲。”
　　这位总统表示，围绕他的竞选团队与俄罗斯的质疑会造成分裂。
　　“我认为它会让这个国家分化，”特朗普说。“我觉得我们的国家现在之所以分歧这么大，就是这件事，及其他许多事情造成的。”
　　接着，总统将话题转移，开始列举他认为的自己执政期间的成就，包括创造工作机会，以及恢复美国在全球的地位，并指出他周五将踏上中东之旅。
　　特朗普重申了他的承诺，即杜绝毒品交易，以及在美国与墨西哥的边境修一堵墙。特朗普在白宫东厅站在哥伦比亚总统胡安·曼努埃尔·桑托斯(Juan Manuel Santos)身旁指出，尽管哥伦比亚努力打击毒品走私，但该国的古柯叶产量还是处在创纪录的水平。
　　桑托斯则努力寻找能达成共识的领域，他提到了哥伦比亚与美国在打击毒品方面的合作。“我们信奉同样的原则，那就是自由、民主和法治，”他说。
　　周四早些时候，特朗普也发出了猛烈的抨击，称自己是一场史无前例的政治迫害的目标。前一天，司法部任命了一位特别检察官负责调查他的竞选团队与俄罗斯官员之间的关系。
　　特朗普在周四清晨接连发了两条推文，提到他的前任贝拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)的政府和他之前的竞选对手希拉里·克林顿(Hillary Clinton)的“非法行径”（这只是他的说法，并无证据），称司法部就从来不曾任命特别检察官对他们进行调查。
　　“克林顿竞选团队和奥巴马政府做了那么多非法的事，却不见任命过一个特别检察官！”特朗普写道，一开始还拼错了检察官这个单词。
　　过了一会，特朗普接着写道，“这是美国历史上对一名政治人物实施的最严重的政治迫害！”
　　在接近上午8点前发布的这两条推文，与周三晚上司法部宣布任命前联邦调查局(FBI)局长罗伯特·S·穆勒三世(Robert S. Mueller III)调查特朗普竞选团队与俄罗斯官员之间的关系时特朗普做出的温和反应，形成了鲜明的对比。
　　这位总统当时在白宫发布的一份声明中表示，“就像我曾多次讲过的，一项彻底的调查将能确认我们已经知道的情况，即我的竞选团队没有与外国实体勾结。我期待此事能很快了结。”
　　几名高层官员表示，当晚针对特朗普应该对这项任命做出什么反应，椭圆办公室内进行了一场简短而激烈的争论，大多数助手都建议他采取一种谋求好感的语调。但特朗普在早上发推时往往斗志最为旺盛。
　　任命特别检察官的情况十分少见，在这一点上总统的观察是正确的，但他有关克林顿竞选团队与奥巴马政府的说法却无法支持他的观点。国会曾就利比亚班加西遇袭事件，以及奥巴马和时任国务卿的克林顿在其中的责任进行过好几次调查。
　　这不是特朗普第一次将针对他的竞选团队与俄罗斯的质疑比作政治迫害。今年1月，当他还是候任总统时，特朗普就曾在接受《纽约时报》采访时表示，对俄罗斯在美国大选期间的黑客行动的持续关注是一种政治迫害，是由对他战胜克林顿心怀怨恨的人发起的。
　　早在司法部任命这位特别检察官之前，特朗普对俄罗斯调查的不满情绪就一直在加深。周三在美国海岸警卫队学院( United States Coast Guard Academy )毕业典礼上发表讲话时，特朗普突然偏离了令人振奋的主题，开始抱怨“历史上没有哪个政治人物”遭遇过比他“更不公正”的待遇。
　　“你会发现事情并不总是公平的，”他对那些毕业生讲道。“看看我最近的遭遇，尤其是来自媒体的对待。我敢保证，历史上没有哪个政治人物受过比这更恶劣、更不公正的待遇。”
　　Glenn Thrush对本文有报道贡献。

来源时间：2017/5/19   发布时间：2017/5/19

旧文章ID：13217