作者：环球市场播报  来源：新浪微博

全球第一和第二大经济体美国和中国各自经济增长预期和应对的政策截然不同，上周这种差异表现得更为突出，它体现了金融危机以来全球经济更依赖美国推动的巨大转变，也预示着全球市场此后会迎来动荡。 http://t.cn/Rw1xPaG

来源时间：2015/3/10   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2505

作者：新浪军事  来源：新浪微博

面对美国海军的11艘核动力航母，如果爆发中美冲突，航母对于中国而言，到底是累赘还是利器？《汉和防务评论》引述马岛战争中，阿根廷航母成为累赘的观点，认为面对舰载机经验丰富的美国海军，中国航母在战局中的作用并不乐观。http://t.cn/Rw3u3SC

来源时间：2015/3/10   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2504

作者：华尔街日报中文网  来源：新浪微博

六年前，美国经济陷入恐慌，中国成为拉动全球增长的引擎。现在，美国凭藉迅猛的就业增速接演了驱动世界经济发展的马达角色，而中国则陷入增长放缓的泥潭。http://t.cn/Rw1S5eo

来源时间：2015/3/10   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2503

作者：K. WILLIAM WATSON  来源：卡托研究所

　　导读：每个2016年美国总统候选人，都会作出不切实际的承诺，迎合特殊的利益。他们还会把美国的问题怪到外国威胁的头上。出于经济原因，中国成为了出奇受欢迎的靶子，责怪日本和墨西哥已经落伍了。

　　So Begins the Contest to Blame China the Most

　　Some things are an inevitable part of every election season. Without a doubt, every candidate running for President in 2016 will, for example, make unrealistic promises and pander to special interests. They will also just as surely try to blame America’s perceived problems on a foreign menace. For economic issues, China has become the overwhelming favorite as a target for these attacks now that blaming Japan and Mexico has gone out of style.

　　In the 2012 election, the chief China-basher was Mitt Romney, who transformed himselfinto a mercantilist and promised to be tough on Chinese currency manipulation. Republicans running for Congress that year had a similar predisposition, and Pete Hoekstra certainly deserves an award for running the most tasteless anti-China ad. In 2014, it was the Democrats’ turn to blame China on the campaign trail for stealing American jobs.

　　Now we’re getting a taste of how China bashing will play out in the 2016 election. According to Politico, Mike Huckabee has started talking about the Chinese menace in Iowa.

　　He complained that American wages have been stagnant since Chinese trade agreements went into effect over the past few decades.

　　“People are working hard, and they have less to show for it,” he said. “We need to quit apologizing for being America, and we need to start making it so that Americans can prosper and not just so that the Chinese can buy Louis Vuitton and Gucci bags.”

　　The comments came in response to questions about why the government has kept the embargo in place against Cuba, even as trade barriers with China have been lifted.

　　“We have basically surrendered to the Chinese market,” Huckabee said. “We’ve not put the pressure on them.”

　　Aside from pandering to xenophobia, these kinds of comments are distressing because they demonstrate a willingness to vilify normal economic activity. Huckabee describes trade as “the Chinese” fighting a battle against the U.S. economy in pursuit of frivolous luxury.

　　I suppose some rhetorical license should be granted to candidates who need to package their policies in a way that appeals to the most people. So maybe instead of “surrendered to the Chinese market,” Gov. Huckabee meant to say that the United States government has lowered taxes on American consumers and businesses. And maybe instead of “Louis Vuitton and Gucci bags,” he meant clothes, food, and medicine.

　　And maybe, just maybe, when he says “we need to start making it so that Americans can prosper,” he means the government should stay out of the way of mutually beneficial commercial activity and stop protecting politically powerful industries from consumer demand for innovative and affordable products and services.

　　Maybe Mike Huckabee or some of the other candidates will even remember that a majority of Americans in both major parties think that trade is good for the United States.

　　查看原文，点击此处。

来源时间：2015/3/9   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2677

作者：  来源：观察者网

　　据英国《金融时报》网站今日报道，美国联邦储备委员会公布了2009年的政策会议记录，其中显示了美联储前主席伯南克时代对中国经济的担心。

　　文件中关于中国的部分主要有四部分内容：一、美国决策人虽然支持北京经济转型从依赖出口转向内需，但担心能否做到;二、美联储对中国2009年的刺激经济 一揽子计划(四万亿)“目瞪口呆”，但对迅速起到的效果鼓掌叫好，同时看到了问题;美联储不相信中国的数据;美联署明白中国投资巨额外汇于美国国债后的忐忑。

　　报道称，世界上没有哪两个经济体之间的关系如中美这么重要而又如此纠缠不清。因此，政策制订者的公开声明总是听上去很甜蜜，但是——根据近期公布的美联储自2009年来的会议纪要——真实情况却并非如此。

　　这份总共1800页的报告于上周四得以公布，首次以文件的形式展示了在金融危机过后的美国经济转折时期中那些令人担心的争论，这场危机几乎摧毁了美国的经济。

　　美联储前主席本·伯南克

　　这份美联储政策会议实录副本包含了美国联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)在2009年中召开的11次会议，其中有8次是事先安排好的，3次则是计划之外的会议。联邦公开市场委员会在每次政策会议后发布声明，宣布该委员会作出的政策决定，而三周以后有关每次政策会议的纪要则将对这些会议进行概括总结，但不会提及与会官员的姓名，也不会援引他们的言论。美联储在政策会议召开的五年以后则会发布联邦公开市场委员会的会议实录副本，首次公布每一名与会官员在会议上发表的言论。

　　政策会议的与会者包括美联储理事会的7成员、12家地方联储的主席以及美联储的高级职员。

　　对美联储来说，今年这家“央行”可能正面临一个转折点，原因是美国国会议员正在考虑一系列提案，这些提案将令美联储受到更多的国会监管的约束，或是美联储的结构会被重新调整。美联储公布的最新政策会议实录能让人知道，在该行试图找到一条走出危机的道路时，哪些人的观点是正确的，而哪些人的观点则是错误的，这反过来又可能对国会议员正在考虑的提案造成影响，使其对这些提案作出改动。

　　从这些会议记录中可以管窥在华盛顿，美联储的成员们关起门来之后到底是如何谈论中国的。

　　支持中国追求更为平衡的经济结构却质疑其能力

　　关于这一话题，问的最多的就是：北京能够经受住结构改革的冲击，以便从高度依赖出口转换为主要依靠内需的经济结构?

　　美联储前任主席伯南克在2009年4月的会议中，明确表达过这一希望：“我们真正需要的，正如我们已经说过多遍的那样，就是对全球的需求进行再平衡，以便美国能够获取足够的外部需求。”

　　不过与此同时，美联储官员们却还是担忧中国的经济发展过于依赖欧洲和美国的复苏。

　　中国GDP实际增长率

　　投资、出口、消费对中国GDP的贡献比例

　　对2009年中国大规模经济刺激感到惊讶

　　2009年中国出台了总额达4万亿人民币的大规模刺激政策。美联储官员赞赏这一刺激政策富有成效，但也看到了其中的问题。

　　根据2009年的会议记录显示，关于4万亿刺激政策，美联储经济学家希特认为：“依靠财政刺激手段和加快银行信贷，中国第二季度的GDP年化增长率达18.5%。同样惊人的是，本年度前六个月银行信贷的增长达到中国全年GDP的25%。”

　　亚特兰大联储主席洛克哈特回应称：“多年以前，人们总是担忧中国的银行体系已经破产。他们貌似就这样糊弄过去了。不过，中国通过投放如此大规模的直接借贷，所造成的银行系统潜在危机的可能性到底有多大，我们对此到底知道些什么呢?”

　　希特的回答是：“我个人很难相信如此大规模的信用可以在前半年如此迅速地得以分配，至于能否足够有效地分配……所以我的感觉是，随着事情的进展，我们将得以看到过去那六个月会产生某些金融后果。”

　　虽然希特有些担忧，不过他并非全然悲观：“然而，我感觉，中国官方还是有足够的资源在其银行体系中，来解决这些问题。这些问题并不必然是中国经济的首要问题，也并不必然是世界经济的首要问题。”

　　美联储不相信中国的数据

　　在2009年全年的会议记录中，美联储经济学家在引用中国数据时，总是不断重复免责声明。

　　最有趣的一例就是4月28日-29日，达拉斯联储主席费舍尔所讲的话。他那时刚从北京和上海回来，在中国他号称必不可少的“野蛮负责人”。

　　谈到中国的统计数据，费舍尔大笑道：“我总是对他们报道数据的迅速感到惊讶。他们在季度结束之前就仿佛知道数据了。”

　　伯南克倒是比较慎重：“中国大概比其他亚洲国家强些，不过也许并没有其官方统计数据显示的那么强罢了。”

　　达拉斯联储主席费舍尔

　　“马里斯畅游仙境”：中国对持有大规模美债很敏感，美联储认识到了这种敏感

　　(Malice in Wonderland，Malice中文意思为恶意，此处修辞上借用了《爱丽丝畅游仙境》这本书的标题“Alice in Wonderland”——观察者网注)

　　费舍尔在4月对中国的访问过程中，总是被中国人问道美债的问题。

　　他说：“他们永远都在担心。在每场会议中，在总共40场会议中，他们没有一次不提到购买美债的问题，而且他们还怀疑债务到期后，我们能否及时偿还。”

　　费舍尔还继续引用《中国日报》在4月20日一篇文章中的报道。在这篇报道中，中国的一名前任总理曾暗示，购买美债“将会导致美元贬值”，并引发“中国外汇储备缩水”。

　　费舍尔又继续大笑：“这真是个欢乐的地方。我基本上准备把上述暗示加上‘马里斯畅游仙境’的字幕。”

　　观察者网编译自金融时报网站、综合腾讯财经等报道

来源时间：2015/3/9   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2501

作者：ASHLEY PARKER  来源：《纽约时报》中文网

Jabin Botsford/The New York Times

约翰·A·博纳正在艰难地维持自己对党团已经非常微弱的控制力。

　　华盛顿——在今年的首个执政能力重大考验中，共和党人跌跌撞撞，摇摇欲坠，差点导致国土安全部(Department of Homeland Security)停摆。

　　而那次投票可能还算是比较容易的。

 
Doug Mills/TheNew York Times

加利福尼亚州民主党众议员、少数党领袖南希·佩洛西表示，她期待民主党人在面临其他争论时，能够团结一致。

Skip Peterson/Associated Press

俄亥俄州代顿，耗资5亿美元的I-75高速公路现代化工程二期在建的一段公路。公路信托基金是国会需要通过的预算措施之一。

　　今年4月，为享有联邦医疗保险(Medicare)的病人提供治疗服务的医生，将面临收入大幅减少的问题。5月，公路信托基金(Highway Trust Fund)将枯竭。联邦进出口银行(Export-Import Bank)于6月特许期满。然后是10月，全盘开支削减举措将再次实施，政府将耗尽经费，财政部(Treasury)将达到借款上限。

　　这些问题都需要国会采取行动解决，虽然两党代表过去常常不假思索地通过其中很多举措，但在国会中，再也不会有这么简单的事情了。

　　“连在这里上洗手间的问题，我们都没办法弄到我方所需的218票，”宾夕法尼亚州共和党众议员查利·登特(Charlie Dent)说。“如何能在交通运输、贸易，或者无论什么问题上获得218票呢?我们或许还不如面对我们的政治现状，然后采取相应的行动。”

　　他还表示，共和党领导团队“没有做好管理预期的工作，太多人抱有不切实际的期望”。

　　共和党人凭借中期选举明确地夺回了权力，但这些胜利也掩盖了共和党内部的显著分歧。在有关国土安全部拨款问题的争执中，这种分歧分外明显，更多的保守派成员迫使众议院议长约翰·A·博纳(John A. Boehner)采取策略，不得不去争取民主党的投票以通过拨款法案。

　　由于缺少六票，肯塔基州共和党参议员、多数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔(Mitch McConnell)没能阻止民主党使用拖延战术。博纳正在艰难地维持自己对党团已经非常微弱的控制力，有30几名议员一贯拒绝支持领导层的几乎所有计划。

　　共和党的混乱状态，为国会的民主党人增添了力量，他们发现通过统一意见，他们能够行使少数党的重要权力，在上一届国会中，参议院的共和党人曾这样做过，取得了良好效果。

　　加利福尼亚州民主党众议员、少数党领袖南希·佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)接受采访时表示，她期待民主党人在面临其他争论时，能够团结一致。“我们的优势部分在于：他们需要我们的投票才能通过某个举措，”她说。“而还有一部分在于，你们这么做是没有用的，因为总统会否决它，而我们将支持总统的否决决定。这使得总统具有影响力，也使我们具有影响力。”

　　翻译：许欣

来源时间：2015/3/9   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2498

作者：  来源：环球时报

　　资料图：沈大伟

　　美国乔治•华盛顿大学教授沈大伟(David Shambaugh)在《华尔街日报》上撰文，公然宣称“中国共产党统治的最后阶段已经开始，并且它在最后阶段旅途上走得比很多人想象的还要远”。最近围绕“中国崩溃论”不断出现新的叫嚣，就在几天前，美《国家利益》杂志的一篇文章甚至呼吁美国政府要为即将到来的“中国崩溃”做好准备。

　　沈大伟是美国比较著名的研究中国的学者，他曾经对中国体制做过一些“正面解读”，因而常被划入美国的“对华温和派学者”。近一段时间他开始激烈批评中国，成为美国学界动向的一个突出点。

　　无论沈大伟是在做机会主义的新站队，还是这是他晚年对华认识变化的真实反映，这都将被证明是他学术研究的败笔。他对中国的研究缺少超越性的定力，他最终没能跳出西方价值观或政治规律对其研究的干扰，他变得像章家敦之流一样庸俗，靠给中国“占卜”来博西方舆论的眼球。

　　如果美国的主流学者就是以这样过山车般的逻辑开展对华研究并引导美国舆论的话，那么将很令人失望。一段时间以来我们注意到，美国学者对中国情况的资料占有很丰富，但他们的研究结论有很明显立场先行的迹象，并且高度意识形态化。

　　沈大伟应当意识到，他的个人经历和思想方法都有局限，他对非西方世界的认识始终隔着一层，这值得他本人高度警惕。如今全世界看好中国未来的人无疑在增多，第三世界相信中国道路的人尤其越来越普遍。即使在西方，愿意反思对中国认识的人也呈增加之势。他本人对中国的悲观在他周围的圈子里容易得到共鸣，但在世界上却是反常识的。

　　对于自己的“中共末日论”，沈大伟给出五个理由，其中包括中国官场腐败、经济下行压力增大、自由派受到打击等等。它们大多是“中国崩溃论”老掉牙的论据，一些中国学者一时对沈大伟会去附和这些低俗的论述感到惊讶和困惑。

　　沈大伟危言耸听的文章再给中国社会提了个醒：美国即使“温和的”学者都在盼着中国发生什么!那些保守的强硬派们就更不用说了。中国从根本上改变自己的国际舆论环境面临重重挑战，西方主流舆论的对华唱衰有可能增加中国发展的不确定性，我们对西方的防范既不可过头，但也决非是可有可无的。

　　刊登在《华尔街日报》上的这篇文章预测，中国不太可能出现“和平崩溃”，一旦中共“陨落”，这个过程将是“长期、复杂、暴力的”。沈的这部分分析倒是流露出几许西方的“真心思”。西方从未想过中国将有“和平的民主过渡”，他们的目标只有“中国崩溃”，而从未考虑中国人的福祉。他们对中国的和平与发展同国家“崩溃”一起殉葬毫不在乎。

　　沈大伟如果做“中国崩溃论”的先锋鼓吹者，他的学术结局一定是悲剧性的。他前后矛盾，情绪化，对耸人听闻结论的热衷明显高于对搜集新证据的热情。这已经涉及到了学术作风和操守，不简单是某一个学术结论的对错。

　　绝大多数学者都生活在各自的社会环境中，不刻意讨好这个环境是个永恒的考验。中国学界有这个问题，美国学界看来同样有。还是请沈大伟们自重并三思。

　　延伸阅读：

　　今年2月27日沈大伟在智库布鲁金斯学会上的演讲

　　沈大伟2月27日在智库布鲁金斯学会说，中国对自己在国际上的定位，对于自己想要什么并不清楚。

　　沈大伟是在布鲁金斯学会举办的有关中国外交政策演变的一场研讨会上这么说的。这位中国和亚洲事务专家说，中国国内关于中国应扮演何种国际角色的争论从2008年就开始了，目前还在继续。

　　他说，中国的国际定位危机反映在外交关系上，那就是外交行为并没有连贯性。一方面，人们看到中国领导人出席20国集团和联合国等多边场合、在全球事务中进行调停斡旋，似乎扮演着“负责任的大国”角色;另一方面，人们又可以看到外交部发言人和网上民族主义者的强硬言论，中国在领土问题上与邻国产生争议，以及中国在偏远的大陆为了获得资源而进行的“新殖民主义”等。

　　报道称，中共十八大之后，中国展开更加积极的外交，中国似乎抛弃了邓小平“韬光养晦”的战略。从“亚洲新安全观”到“亚洲基础设施投资银行”，外界认为中国在一步步挑战二战后美国领导的国际政治、经济和安全体系。

　　沈大伟说，中国对现存的国际秩序当然有相当的不满意，但这并不表示中国要推翻整个体系。

　　他说：“现在中国虽然资源还不是那么丰富，却越来越发达，我们看到一个更具‘修正主义’姿态的中国。中国对二战后自由体系的不满也越来越显现。不过这并不意味着中国想推翻整个自由体系。我是说，他们对部分体系比如经济体系从整体上说还是很满意的。至于安全体系，他们从来就没有满意过，他们的确在寻求对此做出修改，甚至将其推翻。对于人权和其他社会体系，中国的表现比较模糊，他们可能寻求将其剔除。对其他全球治理问题，他们则倾向于个案解决。”

　　沈大伟说，上世纪70年代以来，由于缺乏资源，中国选择了以务实的姿态加入美国领导的国际体系。

　　具体到美中关系上，沈大伟说，“韬光养晦”还是中国对美国的一个有效运作方式。他说，中国现在所做的是希望“冻结”美国。

　　他说：“在我看来，中国在美中关系上采用的策略是战术性的。他们只是‘敷衍’或是‘冻结’美国。他们在全球或是亚太区域建立关系的同时，他们的最佳希望不是‘反对’美国，而是‘冻结’美国。”

　　沈大伟强调，美国现在要做的就是寻求可以合作的领域，同时管理好两国的“战略竞争”关系。他还说，在全球治理方面，中国还不是美国的好伙伴。

　　2014年6月25日沈大伟在美国《国家利益》上刊文

　　目前，普遍的观点认为中国的主宰地位是无可阻挡的，世界必须适应这个亚洲巨人作为一个——可能已是——全球性大国的事实。十年来，“中国崛起”的预言已小有规模，所有人都描绘了一幅中国成为21世纪主宰者的图景。这种看法可以理解，而且普遍存在——但却是错误的。

　　记得不久前，在20世纪80年代，类似的预言也曾出现过，即日本将成为“世界第一”，加入大国精英俱乐部——但不久后日本陷入30年的停滞期，而且它一个(经济上的)单向度强国，并不具备大国特质所需的较为广泛的基础。因此，当提到当今中国时，持有一些清醒和质疑的态度是可取的。

　　的确，中国是世界上最重要的正在崛起的大国——远远超过印度、巴西和南非的能力——在某些领域它已超过俄罗斯、日本、英国、德国和法国等其他“中等强国”的能力。

　　但能力并不是衡量国家实力和国际实力的唯一标准——也不是最重要的标准。历代社会科学家已确定一个更重要的实力指标，那就是影响力——驾驭局势和左右其他国家行动的能力。

　　当然，各国利用自身实力去影响其他国家实力的行为和事态发展有各种方式：吸引、说服、拉拢、强迫、报偿、诱导、威胁或动用武力。

　　当我们关注当今中国在世界舞台上的存在和行为时，我们需要超越其表面上令人印象深刻的能力看问题，并提出质疑：中国真的正在影响其他国家的行动和各领域国际事务的发展趋势么?简要的回答是：就算真的有，也并不多。可以作出这样的结论，即中国在极少的——如果真的有的话——领域，能够真正对其他国家构成影响、设立全球标准和左右全球趋势。而且中国也没有尽力参与解决全球问题。中国是一个被动大国，它的反应表现是当爆发国际危机时回避挑战并躲藏起来。正在持续的乌克兰危机和叙利亚危机就是近来北京被动反应的绝好例子。

　　此外，当仔细衡量中国的能力时，它们并不非常强大。很多指标仅是在数量上令人印象深刻，但在质量上并非如此。缺少高质量的实力，让中国缺乏实际影响力。中国有一句谚语：外硬内软。如果在很多令人印象深刻的数据表面下进行挖掘，你会发现其普遍存在的一些弱点、阻碍发展的重要因素以及成为一个全球性大国的不牢固的根基。中国可能是一只21世纪的纸老虎。

　　这可以从以下五个方面进行剖析：中国的国际外交、军事能力、文化存在、经济实力和国内因素，则五个方面决定了中国的全球地位。让我们逐一进行审视。

　　从形式上看，中国外交的确已走向全球。尽管与国际社会融为一体且北京采取积极的外交政策，但在外交活动领域，中国仅是一个不完全大国，这是显而易见的。一方面，他表现出一个世界主要大国的特征。它是联合国安理会的常任理事国、20国集团及其他全球重要机构的成员，以及所有重大国际峰会的参与者。另一方面，中国官员在这些场合和大量全球挑战问题上仍表现得非常消极和被动。中国并不是领导者。它未能重塑国际外交，推动其他国家的政策，促成国际共识、组建联盟并解决问题。

　　中国军事能力是其作为一个不完全大国的另一方面：它是一个日渐强大的区域性大国，而绝非一个全球性大国。中国尚不具备向亚洲邻国以外的地区投放军力的能力，即便在亚洲地区，其军力投放能力仍非常有限。目前，根本无法确定中国能否在周边500海里内(如在东中国海和南中国海的争端中)投放军力，以及能否在冲突中坚持足够长的时间而获胜。自1979年以来中国没有打过仗，现在中国的军队还未经受国战争的考验。

　　从硬实力转向软实力，中国作为一个全球文化大国崛起效果如何?并不好。没有其他社会接受中国文化的暗示，也没有其他国家想要模仿中国的政治体制，其经济体制在其他地方也无法复制。尽管自2008年以来中国政府投入巨大努力和资源，试图打造自己的软实力并改善自己的国际形象，但中国在国际上的声誉仍是毁誉参半。 　　

中国作为一个经济强国情况又如何?这是大家希望中国成为一个全球性大国和领导者的一个方面——但中国的影响力比预想的要弱。就像其他方面一样，它在数量上令人印象深刻，但在质量上很弱。中国是世界最大的贸易国，但其出口的通常是低端消费品;其产品的国际认知度极低;它仅有一小部分跨国公司在海外成功运营。

　　衡量中国国内实力的其他标准还显示其在全球排名并不高且不够正面。2014年，美国自由之家就各国新闻自由的程度进行排名，中国在197个国家中排名183位。世界银行的全球治理指标一直对中国在政治稳定与控制腐败、政府效率、管理质量、法治程度和问责方面的评级偏低。

　　这是当今中国的概貌。再过10年或20年，中国的全球地位或许在个方面都会大幅提高，可能会在于美国类似的全球基础上进行运转，但就目前而言，中国充其量只是一个不完全的全球性大国。

　　The Coming Chinese Crack-Up（WSJ，March 6， 2015）
　　The endgame of communist rule in China has begun, and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking point
　　DAVID SHAMBAUGH
　　This past Thursday, the National People’s Congress convened in Beijing in what has become a familiar annual ritual. Some 3,000 "elected" delegates from all over the country-ranging from colorfully clad ethnic minorities to urbane billionaires-will meet for a week to discuss the state of the nation and to engage in the pretense of political participation.
　　Some see this impressive gathering as a sign of the strength of the Chinese political system-but it masks serious weaknesses. Chinese politics has always had a theatrical veneer, with staged events like the congress intended to project the power and stability of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP. Officials and citizens alike know that they are supposed to conform to these rituals, participating cheerfully and parroting back official slogans. This behavior is known in Chinese as biaotai, "declaring where one stands," but it is little more than an act of symbolic compliance.
　　Despite appearances, China’s political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself. China’s strongman leader, Xi Jinping , is hoping that a crackdown on dissent and corruption will shore up the party’s rule. He is determined to avoid becoming the Mikhail Gorbachev of China, presiding over the party’s collapse. But instead of being the antithesis of Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Xi may well wind up having the same effect. His despotism is severely stressing China’s system and society-and bringing it closer to a breaking point.
　　Predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is a risky business. Few Western experts forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union before it occurred in 1991; the CIA missed it entirely. The downfall of Eastern Europe’s communist states two years earlier was similarly scorned as the wishful thinking of anticommunists-until it happened. The post-Soviet "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005, as well as the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, all burst forth unanticipated.
　　China-watchers have been on high alert for telltale signs of regime decay and decline ever since the regime’s near-death experience in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Since then, several seasoned Sinologists have risked their professional reputations by asserting that the collapse of CCP rule was inevitable. Others were more cautious-myself included. But times change in China, and so must our analyses.
　　The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think. We don’t know what the pathway from now until the end will look like, of course. It will probably be highly unstable and unsettled. But until the system begins to unravel in some obvious way, those inside of it will play along-thus contributing to the facade of stability.
　　Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. A single event is unlikely to trigger a peaceful implosion of the regime. Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent. I wouldn’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Xi will be deposed in a power struggle or coup d’état. With his aggressive anticorruption campaign-a focus of this week’s National People’s Congress-he is overplaying a weak hand and deeply aggravating key party, state, military and commercial constituencies.
　　The Chinese have a proverb, waiying, neiruan-hard on the outside, soft on the inside. Mr. Xi is a genuinely tough ruler. He exudes conviction and personal confidence. But this hard personality belies a party and political system that is extremely fragile on the inside.
　　Consider five telling indications of the regime’s vulnerability and the party’s systemic weaknesses.
　　First, China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble. In 2014, Shanghai’s Hurun Research Institute, which studies China’s wealthy, found that 64% of the "high net worth individuals" whom it polled-393 millionaires and billionaires-were either emigrating or planning to do so. Rich Chinese are sending their children to study abroad in record numbers (in itself, an indictment of the quality of the Chinese higher-education system).
　　Just this week, the Journal reported, federal agents searched several Southern California locations that U.S. authorities allege are linked to "multimillion-dollar birth-tourism businesses that enabled thousands of Chinese women to travel here and return home with infants born as U.S. citizens." Wealthy Chinese are also buying property abroad at record levels and prices, and they are parking their financial assets overseas, often in well-shielded tax havens and shell companies.
　　Meanwhile, Beijing is trying to extradite back to China a large number of alleged financial fugitives living abroad. When a country’s elites-many of them party members-flee in such large numbers, it is a telling sign of lack of confidence in the regime and the country’s future.
　　Second, since taking office in 2012, Mr. Xi has greatly intensified the political repression that has blanketed China since 2009. The targets include the press, social media, film, arts and literature, religious groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs, dissidents, lawyers, NGOs, university students and textbooks. The Central Committee sent a draconian order known as Document No. 9 down through the party hierarchy in 2013, ordering all units to ferret out any seeming endorsement of the West’s "universal values"-including constitutional democracy, civil society, a free press and neoliberal economics.
　　A more secure and confident government would not institute such a severe crackdown. It is a symptom of the party leadership’s deep anxiety and insecurity.
　　Third, even many regime loyalists are just going through the motions. It is hard to miss the theater of false pretense that has permeated the Chinese body politic for the past few years. Last summer, I was one of a handful of foreigners (and the only American) who attended a conference about the "China Dream," Mr. Xi’s signature concept, at a party-affiliated think tank in Beijing. We sat through two days of mind-numbing, nonstop presentations by two dozen party scholars-but their faces were frozen, their body language was wooden, and their boredom was palpable. They feigned compliance with the party and their leader’s latest mantra. But it was evident that the propaganda had lost its power, and the emperor had no clothes.
　　In December, I was back in Beijing for a conference at the Central Party School, the party’s highest institution of doctrinal instruction, and once again, the country’s top officials and foreign policy experts recited their stock slogans verbatim. During lunch one day, I went to the campus bookstore-always an important stop so that I can update myself on what China’s leading cadres are being taught. Tomes on the store’s shelves ranged from Lenin’s "Selected Works" to Condoleezza Rice’s memoirs, and a table at the entrance was piled high with copies of a pamphlet by Mr. Xi on his campaign to promote the "mass line"-that is, the party’s connection to the masses. "How is this selling?" I asked the clerk. "Oh, it’s not," she replied. "We give it away." The size of the stack suggested it was hardly a hot item.
　　Fourth, the corruption that riddles the party-state and the military also pervades Chinese society as a whole. Mr. Xi’s anticorruption campaign is more sustained and severe than any previous one, but no campaign can eliminate the problem. It is stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and the absence of the rule of law.
　　Moreover, Mr. Xi’s campaign is turning out to be at least as much a selective purge as an antigraft campaign. Many of its targets to date have been political clients and allies of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin . Now 88, Mr. Jiang is still the godfather figure of Chinese politics. Going after Mr. Jiang’s patronage network while he is still alive is highly risky for Mr. Xi, particularly since Mr. Xi doesn’t seem to have brought along his own coterie of loyal clients to promote into positions of power. Another problem: Mr. Xi, a child of China’s first-generation revolutionary elites, is one of the party’s "princelings," and his political ties largely extend to other princelings. This silver-spoon generation is widely reviled in Chinese society at large.
　　Finally, China’s economy-for all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut-is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit. In November 2013, Mr. Xi presided over the party’s Third Plenum, which unveiled a huge package of proposed economic reforms, but so far, they are sputtering on the launchpad. Yes, consumer spending has been rising, red tape has been reduced, and some fiscal reforms have been introduced, but overall, Mr. Xi’s ambitious goals have been stillborn. The reform package challenges powerful, deeply entrenched interest groups-such as state-owned enterprises and local party cadres-and they are plainly blocking its implementation.
　　These five increasingly evident cracks in the regime’s control can be fixed only through political reform. Until and unless China relaxes its draconian political controls, it will never become an innovative society and a "knowledge economy"-a main goal of the Third Plenum reforms. The political system has become the primary impediment to China’s needed social and economic reforms. If Mr. Xi and party leaders don’t relax their grip, they may be summoning precisely the fate they hope to avoid.
　　In the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upper reaches of China’s leadership have been obsessed with the fall of its fellow communist giant. Hundreds ofChinese postmortem analyses have dissected the causes of the Soviet disintegration.
　　Mr. Xi’s real "China Dream" has been to avoid the Soviet nightmare. Just a few months into his tenure, he gave a telling internal speech ruing the Soviet Union’s demise and bemoaning Mr. Gorbachev’s betrayals, arguing that Moscow had lacked a "real man" to stand up to its reformist last leader. Mr. Xi’s wave of repression today is meant to be the opposite of Mr. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost. Instead of opening up, Mr. Xi is doubling down on controls over dissenters, the economy and even rivals within the party.
　　But reaction and repression aren’t Mr. Xi’s only option. His predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao , drew very different lessons from the Soviet collapse. From 2000 to 2008, they instituted policies intended to open up the system with carefully limited political reforms.
　　They strengthened local party committees and experimented with voting for multicandidate party secretaries. They recruited more businesspeople and intellectuals into the party. They expanded party consultation with nonparty groups and made the Politburo’s proceedings more transparent. They improved feedback mechanisms within the party, implemented more meritocratic criteria for evaluation and promotion, and created a system of mandatory midcareer training for all 45 million state and party cadres. They enforced retirement requirements and rotated officials and military officers between job assignments every couple of years.
　　In effect, for a while Mr. Jiang and Mr. Hu sought to manage change, not to resist it. But Mr. Xi wants none of this. Since 2009 (when even the heretofore open-minded Mr. Hu changed course and started to clamp down), an increasingly anxious regime has rolled back every single one of these political reforms (with the exception of the cadre-training system). These reforms were masterminded by Mr. Jiang’s political acolyte and former vice president, Zeng Qinghong, who retired in 2008 and is now under suspicion in Mr. Xi’s anticorruption campaign-another symbol of Mr. Xi’s hostility to the measures that might ease the ills of a crumbling system.
　　Some experts think that Mr. Xi’s harsh tactics may actually presage a more open and reformist direction later in his term. I don’t buy it. This leader and regime see politics in zero-sum terms: Relaxing control, in their view, is a sure step toward the demise of the system and their own downfall. They also take the conspiratorial view that the U.S. is actively working to subvert Communist Party rule. None of this suggests that sweeping reforms are just around the corner.
　　We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase. The CCP is the world’s second-longest ruling regime (behind only North Korea), and no party can rule forever.
　　Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regime’s instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. Large numbers of citizens and party members alike are already voting with their feet and leaving the country or displaying their insincerity by pretending to comply with party dictates.
　　We should watch for the day when the regime’s propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing the party’s writ-or when they begin to identify with dissidents, like the East German Stasi agent in the film "The Lives of Others" who came to sympathize with the targets of his spying. When human empathy starts to win out over ossified authority, the endgame of Chinese communism will really have begun.
　　Dr. Shambaugh is a professor of international affairs and the director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His books include "China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation" and, most recently, "China Goes Global: The Partial Power."

来源时间：2015/3/9   发布时间：2015/3/9

旧文章ID：2497