作者：Christopher A. Preble, Emma Ashford, and Travis Evans  来源：中美印象

    冷战之后，美国成为这个单极世界的霸主，没有了苏联这个外部威胁，美国看起来确实更安全了，但是这个世界却变得更加复杂了，非政府组织的发展、联盟的变化、国内政治的发展等贯穿美国外交政策的提出与实行。情况日趋复杂的情况下，我们应该重新思考美国的外交政策。现实情况是，关于美国应该如何采取行动的讨论非常激烈，但是关于“美国是否应该介入”的讨论却远远不够。美国不是世界警察，不可能一直都当世界的领导。美国的外交政策应该改变。美国现在的“大战略”外交政策——确保自由世界的霸权，需要美国投入众多的军队，其实不利于美国的利益。

   The transition from socialism to the market economy produced a divide between those who advocated rapid, or “big-bang” reforms, and those who advocated a gradual approach. More than 25 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, providing ample empirical data to test those approaches. Evidence shows that early and rapid reformers by far outperformed gradual reformers, both on economic measures such as GDP per capita and on social indicators such as the United Nations Human Development Index.
   A key argument for gradualism was that too-rapid reforms would cause great social pain. In reality, rapid reformers experienced shorter recessions and recovered much earlier than gradual reformers. Indeed a much broader measure of well-being, the Human Development Index, points to the same conclusion: the social costs of transition in rapidly reforming countries were lower.
   Moreover, the advocates of gradualism argued that institutional development should precede market liberalization, thus increasing the latter’s effectiveness. In a strict sense, it is impossible to disprove this argument, for no post-communist country followed that sequence of events. In all post-communist countries, institutional development lagged considerably behind economic reforms. Waiting for institutional development before implementing economic reforms could easily have become a prescription for no reforms at all.
   However, after 25 years, rapid reformers ended up with better institutions than gradual reformers. This outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that political elites who were committed to economic liberalization were also committed to subsequent institutional development. Conversely, political elites that advocated gradual reforms often did so in order to extract maximum rents from the economy. One extreme consequence of gradualism was the formation of oligarchic classes.
   When it comes to the speed and depth of reforms, the relative position of countries has remained largely unchanged. Most countries that moved ahead early are still farthest ahead.

原文链接：http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/our-foreign-policy-choices-rethinking-americas-global-role

来源时间：2016/7/26   发布时间：2016/7/26

旧文章ID：10940

作者：Prashanth Parameswaran  来源：中美印象

    7月12日，南海仲裁案的结果正式出来，结果毫无意外地一边倒向菲律宾，判定中国的南海主张及其为实现其南海主张而进行的一系列行为是不合法的。正如预想中的，除去法律层面的复杂性，判决被认为是“正义”对“强权”的胜利，是以规则为基础的国际法的胜利，是美国的胜利。然而，这个判决结果也为奥巴马政府未来的南海政策带来了挑战。

   Since the 1990s, the United States has been consistent in its general South China Sea approach that while it does not take a position on competing claims, it does have a view in how those claims are pressed and ultimately resolved. This position is in line with the preservation of key U.S. interests in the South China Sea, which include: safeguarding international norms like the freedom of navigation and overflight; fostering regional peace and stability; and preserving the credibility of the United States in the eyes of its allies, partners, friends, and adversaries.

    Though the Obama administration has grown increasingly concerned about China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea in recent years, it has also been reluctant to let the issue disrupt U.S.-China cooperation on other fronts, drown out the voices of regional states, or dominate U.S. Asia strategy. Following from that, the administration’s approach has rested on three pillars. First, politically, Washington has encouraged claimant states to defuse tensions between themselves. Second, diplomatically, the United States has tried to knit together a group of concerned global actors willing to stand up for the rules-based international order and against Chinese assertiveness which undermines it. Third, militarily, Washington has sought to both build the capacity of Southeast Asian states as well as undertake its own efforts to resist Chinese aggression.

    At first glance, the ruling would seem to be a boost for this three-pillared approach which provides new opportunities for interested actors. For claimants, the clarity on previously contentious issues such as China’s nine-dash line and the status of features now more clearly sets out the parameters for them to resolve their disputes with each other, a process that Washington would view favorably. As one senior State Department official put it in a briefing following the verdict, it could provide fertile ground for “diplomatic creativity” in the South China Sea. Beyond the claimants themselves, U.S. officials also hope that it could revitalize moribund talks towards an elusive, binding code of conduct in the South China Sea between China and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    For actors that have been trumpeting the value of a rules-based order in the face of China’s assertive actions, the tribunal’s verdict means that their interpretations have now been affirmed by a third party with final and binding legal authority, thereby boosting their weight and force. These countries, which include Japan, Australia, and the European Union, are part of an informal diplomatic coalition which Washington has helped form and that will now try to persuade Beijing to abide by the decision. Since the verdict itself lacks any sort of enforcement mechanism, the additional leverage the ruling gives this coalition is important as it seeks to convince Beijing to bring its policies in line with international law.

    For Washington and a few of its allies and partners, the ruling also provides some additional clarity which can inform military decisions to be taken in line with stated principles and preexisting commitments. These include freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), as well as patrols and exercises. To take just one example, with the tribunal finding that Mischief Reef—which China had seized from the Philippines in 1994—lies within Manila’s exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf, the Chinese artificial island at Mischief Reef is no longer entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, and Washington and other willing actors have no obligation to even invoke innocent passage and can legally approach within 500 meters of the island.

    Yet while the ruling does present opportunities for the United States and its allies and partners, they are also likely to confront a series of challenges as they attempt to seize the opportunities that the ruling presents.

    First, getting parties to move towards resolving their disputes or even reducing tensions more generally is much more complex than it seems. For one, it is unclear that the parties have an incentive to move in this direction. Take China, for instance, which has just suffered a stinging legal defeat. To their credit, U.S. officials have gone out of their way to signal restraint to help China find the oft-cited "off-ramp" in the South China Sea, which would see Beijing move to clarify its unlawful nine-dash line in some way and enter into talks with other claimants. Yet it is far from clear if China sees this as being in its own interest. On the one hand, the ruling, combined with the emergence of a more conciliatory government in the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte, would seem to empower those in China who believe that their country’s actions in the South China Sea have tarnished its image and that there may be an opportunity to now shift to a more moderate approach.

    But on the other hand, the verdict could also lead China to initially take a series of steps to signal its resolve in protecting its sovereignty as well as to deter other ASEAN states from challenging it as Manila has done. As it is, we have already seen Beijing take a number of expected kinetic actions such as land civilian aircraft on several reefs and announce military exercises in the South China Sea. But China could also implement more provocative measures that would raise tensions rather than reduce them, including stepping up militarization of the Spratly Islands in violation of President Xi Jinping’s pledge in Washington, D.C. last September or even moving towards declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea. This would be in line with those of a more hawkish persuasion who are willing to take more risks in the South China Sea because they are convinced that China can bear the short-term costs of doing so.

    Even if claimants choose to move toward resolving their disputes and reducing tensions, they may not necessarily do so in a way that is in line with American interests. Take the Philippines, which has emerged as a clear victor following the ruling with a Duterte administration that is in favor of talks with China to get bilateral ties back on track. There have already been worries among some in Philippine and U.S. diplomatic circles that the government may give in to certain Chinese demands that could undermine Philippine interests or even the U.S.-Philippine alliance, in spite of its insistence that it will ensure that talks are in line with the verdict. Needless to say, it will be difficult for Washington to wholeheartedly support Manila’s talks with Beijing if it comes at the expense of U.S.-Philippine security cooperation or even the ruling itself. Though these fears may end up being overstated, Duterte’s personal suspicion of the United States and his eagerness to strengthen economic ties with China to advance his ambitious domestic agenda thus far mean one cannot rule this possibility out.

    Second, the ruling could reveal the fragility of the informal diplomatic coalition that Washington has helped assemble in defense of the rules-based international order. In the administration’s view, bringing to bear the strength of this coalition following the verdict requires aligning policies and coordinating actions between forward-leaning claimants like the Philippines, intra-regional interested actors such as Japan, and extra-regional concerned parties including the United States, in a calibrated way so that capable outside actors can do their part without getting out ahead of the claimants themselves. It also requires at least a few actors who are willing to impose costs on China if necessary through diplomatic, military, and, if necessary, economic measures as well to demonstrate that this coalition is prepared to act on its words.

    That is easier said than done. For one, the lack of regional activism following the verdict could throw off the balance within this coalition between regional and outside actors, thereby bolstering Beijing’s claim that external forces led by the United States are trying to stir up trouble in the South China Sea.

This is not merely an existential concern. ASEAN, which has traditionally been divided on the South China Sea issue, has found it especially difficult to speak with one voice thus far in 2016. Last month, the organization failed to adopt a joint statement in Kunming with Cambodia as well as Laos, this year’s ASEAN chair—countries with little interest in the South China Sea and a lot invested in their relationships with China—backing out of a previously agreed document. Ahead of the upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting later this week, hopes have all but evaporated for a separate statement on the verdict in spite of a clear case for issuing one. If Southeast Asian foreign ministers are unable to at least adopt a joint communiqué with strong South China Sea language in support of the principles undergirding the verdict—along the lines of what their countries already signed at the U.S.-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit back in February—that would further undermine the balance that the coalition needs.

    Beyond words, the lack of action from other allies and partners in U.S.-led initiatives could also pose a potential challenge to the fragile coalition. Though several of the coalition’s key members—most notably Japan, Australia, and the European Union—have already issued statements in support of the ruling to various degrees, the true test of their commitment to safeguarding the rules-based order will be their willingness to contribute to measures that seek to enforce it, if and when it is necessary—particularly if Beijing ends up charting a more assertive course post-verdict. Depending on how things end up playing out, this could include not just regular patrols and exercises, but also potentially more forward-leaning and controversial ones as needed such as joint FONOPs. Hesitance by the United States’ most capable partners to enforce the ruling would both expose the gap between the coalition’s words and actions as well as reveal Washington’s isolation.

    Third, the ruling could also end up raising questions about U.S. credibility on the South China Sea issue. In the lead up to the verdict, the United States used a mixture of unilateral military actions, bilateral dialogue, and capacity-building efforts to clearly signal to China that certain provocative moves—including starting reclamation at Scarborough Shoal or declaring a South China Sea ADIZ—could trigger an even stronger American response. Nonetheless, China could still end up crossing these "red lines" in the next few months after the verdict, challenging the outgoing Obama administration to either risk heightened tensions with China during an election year or have its credibility undermined.

    While there are a whole range of Chinese moves that could throw U.S. credibility into question, actions that affect the Philippines directly would constitute a particular problem for Washington given the fact that Manila is a treaty ally and the United States has been repeatedly touting its “ironclad” commitment to the alliance. China could begin dredging at Scarborough Shoal, which lies just 185 nautical miles from Manila and could give it radar coverage of several facilities recently agreed between the United States and Philippines under their new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Or it could impose a blockade on Philippine marines stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal to prevent its resupply as it did in 2014, which could turn bloody. Though there remains some ambiguity in Article V of the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, should there be an attack on Philippine troops, vessels, or aircraft by China in any one of these instances, a reasonable reading indicates that United States would be committed to respond.

    If the Obama administration fails to respond decisively to the very actions it has deemed unacceptable so soon after the verdict, it would once again prove that might ultimately does make right in the South China Sea. It would give credence to the view among some Chinese officials that the ruling “amounts to nothing more than a piece of paper,” as former state councilor and top diplomat Dai Bingguo told an audience in Washington, D.C. earlier this month. It could also serve to further embolden China in the South China Sea and elsewhere, which could feed into how Beijing deals with the next U.S. administration beginning in January 2017.

    Of course, these challenges are not insurmountable. If China determines that it has an incentive to provide a more conducive environment for the rolling out of its new economic initiatives to Southeast Asian states, we could see Beijing eventually moving towards a more restrained posture in the South China Sea after an initial period of heightened tensions. That would then pave the way for the constructive initiatives that Washington would like to see, be it resolving disputes or repairing ties with the Philippines or making tangible progress on a code of conduct.

    And even if Beijing opts to continue on its more assertive course, claimants and concerned actors in the region and beyond can take initial steps to both raise the costs of Beijing’s non-compliance as well as to discourage it from pursuing provocative actions. If ASEAN is able to forge at least a base consensus around the ruling’s principles and U.S. allies and partners like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines can commit to a series of measures to enforce the ruling, that would help put some real teeth around defending the rules-based order. And if the United States determines that China is moving towards crossing a red line, there may be opportunities for Washington to either deter this course before it occurs or at least attempt to dissuade cooler heads in Beijing against adopting such actions.

    Ultimately, the clarity provided by the Hague verdict is a double-edged sword: The reputational costs of violating the rules-based order are now higher, but the pressure for its adherents to enforce it has also increased. It is up to the concerned countries to both seize the opportunities it offers and overcome the challenges it poses.

原文链接：http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2016/07/22-south-china-sea-policy-parameswaran

来源时间：2016/7/26   发布时间：2016/7/26

旧文章ID：10939

作者：David Dollar  来源：中美印象

    上年，一个关于特朗普曾在其公共演讲中说了234次“中国”的视频在网络走红。特朗普称中国偷走了美国的工作，在与美国的贸易中进行欺骗，但是他还坚称：“他爱中国，他爱中国人。”那么，特朗普对中国的这种有爱又恨的态度，中国是什么反应呢？就官方而言，中国财政部长楼继伟在接受华尔街日报的访问时称：“特朗普不是一个理性的人，如果美国遵循特朗普提出的对中国的贸易原则，那么美国将失去世界的领导力。”作为中国政府的喉舌，中国的官方媒体对特朗普进行了大量的报道，“大嘴”、“小丑”、“反复无常的”。有时候，特朗普还被刻画为西方民主的一个笑话。然而，大选的形势表明，特朗普成为美国总统的可能性正在上升，中国媒体《界面》曾发文称：“有一个只关心贸易的人当总统，比高呼民主价值及大力支持美国在亚洲盟友的人当选，对中国可能更有利。”

   与中国的官方声明不同，在社交媒体上，中国网民们对特朗普的态度更加友好，这背后的理由众多，其中很多人认为他是一个成功的商人，并因此而尊重他。还有一些人认为，中国当今的发展很大一部分原因在于中国共产党的领导，而特朗普有可能成为相似的强硬领导人。总体来说，特朗普对中国的爱恨交加，也换来了中国人民对他的爱恨交加。

    Donald Trump formally accepted the Republican presidential nomination last night. Trump’s rhetoric on the campaign trail shows an obsession with China on par with his determination to build a wall on the Mexican border or expel undocumented immigrants from the country. A viral montage last year counts Trump saying the word “China” 234 times in his public speeches. Trump accuses China of stealing U.S. jobs and cheating in trade deals while also insisting that he “loves” China and Chinese people.

Official circles

China returns his love-hate attitude with a similarly mixed rhetoric. Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei called Donald Trump an “irrational type” back in April in an interview with The Wall Street Journal and said the United States “wouldn’t be entitled to world leadership” if it followed the trade policies that Trump proposed toward China. Lou is so far the only senior Chinese official to publicly comment on Trump. Although the rest of China’s leadership tries to remain silent on this matter, major Chinese media outlets—usually seen as Beijing’s mouthpiece—have been closely following Trump since the beginning of his campaign. They have described him as a “big mouth,” a “clown,” and someone who is “eccentric and capricious.” Trump is sometimes portrayed as a joke to Western democracy. One Xinhua op-ed in March claimed that the “Trump phenomena shows the U.S. public is getting weary of party politics” and that “the democracy America advocates has boundaries.” In responding to Trump’s accusations on issues of China trade and the South China Sea, Global Times, a tabloid affiliated with People’s Daily, says he is just “talking nonsense,” and “if he could move forward with the [anti-China] campaign, then we should show him what China can do when the time comes.”

However, as Trump’s chances to win the White House have increased, there has been greater nuance in the Chinese media portrayal of him. Interface, a website that targets China’s growing middle-class, published an article which said that it’s “better to have a U.S. [p]resident that only cares about trade than someone who aggressively promotes democracy and bolsters U.S. allies in Asia.” It added: “China should welcome Trump to become the next president because his administration will be more friendly towards China than Obama’s as long as we make sure he makes profit.” A Financial Times article even calls Trump China’s “natural choice” because Chinese leaders have long despised Hillary Clinton for her outspoken criticism of their human rights record and her “pivot to Asia” in her tenure as secretary of state. 

Social media

Unlike the official Chinese media’s shifting attitude, popular opinion as expressed in social media has been more consistently favorable towards Trump. In a late March poll of 3,330 Global Times readers, 54 percent of respondents said they supported a Trump presidency—well above the 36 percent of Americans who currently do. On Weibo, China’s Twitter-like micro-blogging website, there are at least 10 Trump fan groups with over a thousand followers—these include “Trump Fan Club”(1,667 followers), “Trump: Light of the World” (3,445 followers), and “Trump Commentary” (2,706 followers). One fan tweeted that Trump displayed a “majestic demeanor” when he took the stage the first day of the Republican National Convention. 

The Chinese internet users who support Trump do so for a number of different reasons. Many see him as a successful businessman and respect him for that. His image resonates with China’s obsession with fortune-seeking today, and people believe that his pragmatic way of conducting business, when translated to politics, would play to China’s advantage. Some believe that the stability and development China enjoys today can be attributed at least in part to the Communist Party’s iron-fisted leadership, and Trump might be a similarly powerful leader. Most enjoy watching him as the “reality show star” of the U.S. presidential campaign. The fact that he is running is the biggest reason they actively follow the campaign. 

On the popular question-and-answer site Quora, one user asked: “Do educated mainland Chinese like Donald Trump?” The question generated 21 answers, mostly by mainland Chinese. Many of the answers revealed a different side of Trump’s popularity in China: his proposed ban on Muslims immigrating to the United States. The social and political unrest in the Xinjiang region, home of China’s Uyghurs, has triggered widespread fear and anger towards Muslim people on Chinese social media. Trump’s harsh rhetoric about Muslims plays well with this audience. 

Overall, therefore, it seems that Trump’s mixed messages on China have produced similarly mixed messages from China on Trump. While official channels tend to disparage him, the candidate’s unique background and style seem to resonate with many Chinese internet users. Of course, only American citizens will actually cast ballots in November—but keeping a finger on the pulse of public opinion overseas helps illuminate what U.S. foreign relations might look like under one candidate versus another. Next week, we’ll take a look at what Chinese media and people are saying about Hillary Clinton. 

原文链接：http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/07/22-trump-china-public-opinion-dollar-wang

来源时间：2016/7/26   发布时间：2016/7/26

旧文章ID：10938

作者：查道炯  来源：中美印象

总第114期 7月25日

    就菲律宾起诉的南海仲裁案，中国已经表明了不参与的立场。因此，北京大学国际关系学院教授查道炯认为在仲裁结果出来之后，中国就不应该再对仲裁结果发表任何言论，而应努力就南海的功能性合作提出具体的计划与倡议。本期《中美印象》周报为您独家翻译查道炯教授讨论中国如何应对南海仲裁结果的文章，以飨读者。   

    2016年7月12日，菲律宾起诉中国的南海仲裁案终于在三年之后有了正式结果，一边倒向菲律宾的决定并不出人意外。中国政府拒绝接受仲裁结果，对于海域划界问题，中国已于2006年依据《公约》298条规定作出排除性声明，因而不再接受使用强制争端解决程序。就中国对仲裁结果的立场，国人或其他公民是仁者见仁，智者见智罢。不管怎样，历史已经翻到了新的一页，我们能做的只是充分利用好当下。

    痛苦、沮丧或者蔑视——媒体对中国政府关于仲裁结果的回应进行了大量的解读。关于这一仲裁的任何问题，中国政府都不应该再去理会，任何的回应都是不明智、有损于自己的。在关于南海的主流言论中，对“共同开发”的关注与讨论远远不够。就像亚投行一样，中国应该在南海的海面和上空积极发起海洋海事功能性合作倡议，以填补亚太地区发展的空白——这一空白是亚太国家所共同面临的巨大挑战，但是对其的关注和讨论却远远不够。

   《南海各方行为准则》的第六章这样写道：“相关方应该探索开始一系列’合作’，比如：1）海洋环境保护；2）海洋科学研究；3）海洋通信与航行安全保障；4）海上搜寻与救援工作；5）打击跨国犯罪，包括但不限于贩运毒品、海上武装抢劫、海盗及军火走私等。”

    需要明确的是，《南海各方行为准则》的第六章的初衷是建立在“达成一个综合而持久的争端解决机制”的基础上，因此，上述合作的一些细节还值得探究。但是这种表述并没有阻止接下来的努力——2004年，东盟——中国联合工作组成立，这个工作组最重要的任务是就发展合作提出建议，贯彻南海各方行为准则。

    此外，在第六章中，还有这样的陈述：不管是双边合作还是单边合作，其方式、范围和地点在得到真正的贯彻前都必须得到相关方的同意。这个可以被视为一个政治保障，考虑到了由于主权争议的存在，在合作开发某些项目中存在的国内情况的复杂性。

    不言而喻，各争议方的开发合作行为是与联合国海洋法公约相符的，联合国海洋法公约赞扬这种合作开发与保护海洋、海事资源的行为。国际法的本质是，一个国家拥有资源开发权的同时也承担着保护它的义务。所有南海周边在联合国海洋法公约上签字的国家，和其他成员国一起合作开发与保护南海，是其法律义务。

    由上述可知，国际法中的功能性合作是一种理想状态下的模式。然而，功能性合作有着其固有的复杂性。为了使得相关提议得到实施，推崇合作发展的专家们提出了一个比喻——低悬的水果（提出一个最低衡量标准），但对一方来说足够“低”的水果，对另一方来说可能太高，以至于够不着。

    亚投行已经建立，并在有序地走向运营，中国应该从其亚投行的建设中寻找经验，提出一些细节以吸引那些坚持睦邻友好政策的专家和政策制定者。

    在南海，我们不应该忘记各方主权声索竞争及其他形式的海洋权益矛盾所带来的复杂性，但另一个不可忽视的事实是——南海的过度捕捞、非法、无证、私自捕捞和栖息地破坏的情况正在加剧。特别是非法、无证、私自捕捞，它对海岸线的捕鱼区是一个很大的损害，是一个严重的威胁。

    从理想主义的角度来看，相关方就捕捞的功能性合作，可以从解决非法、无证、私自捕捞开始，可就此制订一个各方同意的解决办法。在整个非法捕捞的链条中——非法捕捞的区域、人员、资金运转及最终销售等寻找证据以对其进行打击需要各个相关方的努力，需要各方国内执法机构、外交家、法律专业人士的联合支持。

    有兴趣的参与者可以向联合国粮农组织（UN Food and Agriculture Organization）及其他专业性的机构咨询并聘请相关专家。正是在联合国粮农组织的推动下，《沿岸港口国就预防、制止、消除非法、无证、无管制捕捞行为的协议》于2016年6月生效。

    2014年3月8日从吉隆坡飞向北京的马航MH370失事悲剧已经为我们敲响了警钟——在民航安全领域加强国际合作的紧迫性正在上升。不管南海各方的海洋边界划到了哪里，民航领域的安全不仅是国际义务，也是各个国家的利益。

    中国的卫星服务系统，如北斗导航系统，应该在这个过程中发挥作用，并成为有利于公共安全的公共商品。另外，在国际民用航空组织（ICAO）的框架下，中国可以邀请感兴趣的国家一起就加强民航领域的技术及业务拓展进行合作，乘客的安全是每个国家都应该考虑的问题。

    1997－1998年，在东南亚金融危机蔓延之际，中国坚持人民币不贬值，阻止了危机的恶化，这被视为是一种善行，在此无需赘述。如今的国际大环境更为复杂，但塑造一个友好的周边环境的精神实质是一致的：提出一些让其他方感到积极的倡议，这并不需要中国改变最基本的原则立场。

    接下来，关于仲裁结果，中国将遇到来自南海区域内外国家一揽子的政治和外交挑战，这是可以预见的，但是如果中国让自己深陷其中却是不明智的。中国应该将自己的目光集中在提升南海海域与航空安全的项目中，进行海洋资源保护，而不是急着在一个资源萎缩的南海划线。这样做或许无法听到东南亚或区域外国家说声“谢谢”，但是有利于减少他们对中国的敌视，改善中国的国际形象。

    作者简介：
   查道炯（1965－），男，北京大学国际关系学院教授，中国著名石油能源安全问题专家。1989年出国,在美国、日本学习研究14年,2003年回国任教。主要研究方向为能源问题中的国际政治因素、中国能源外交、中外经济关系和非传统安全问题。
   翻译：Hui
 

来源时间：2016/7/25   发布时间：2016/7/25

旧文章ID：10937