作者：Michael J. Mazarr  来源：

   
   为了规避战争与经济危机，二战之后，以联合国与其他各个国际组织为基础，美国建立起了一整以市场经济、自由、民主人权为主调的国际秩序。然而，随着近百年的发展，这套国际秩序正在发生变化。中国、俄罗斯、土耳其等都在积蓄力量调整这套国际秩序，美国应该怎么做？放开领导权，使的国际秩序更为多元、开放？还是显示肌肉保障现存的国际秩序？美国应该学会怎样在更为多元的国际秩序中充当领导地位，这是下一任美国总统首当考虑的。这当然会很难，但这不仅决定这美国的前途也影响着下一个世纪的和平。

    The coming election could turn out to be pivotal for the U.S. role in the world—and not only because of the candidates’ wildly different worldviews.

    Whoever is elected will confront one of the most profound tasks of any post-war U.S. president: reimagining a threatened international order. Mishandled, the challenge could throw world politics into a tailspin. Done right, it could help keep the peace for another half-century.

    The United States and its Western allies erected the modern, rules-based international order after World War II to avoid a repeat of the economic and military mistakes of the 1930s. Initially built around the U.N. and leading economic institutions, the order represented a set of mechanisms to help regulate countries’ behavior.

    Since then it has become a kaleidoscope of mutually reinforcing parts. It includes institutions, like the United Nations, and the Nonproliferation Treaty; rules, in areas such as trade and investment; and norms of conduct, like the idea that countries don’t use force to resolve disputes. It is built on self-consciously liberal principles, including free trade, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    The resulting order has come to represent structures and norms that have accomplished a great deal. It has helped to stabilize and enhance trading relations, financial stability, nonproliferation policies, development aid and peacekeeping, human rights standards and much more.

    The results since 1945 have been impressive: rising living standards, burgeoning democracy, improving health, a world more linked by trade and capital flows, declining poverty rates, falling levels of conflict.

    The rules-based order is only one of several factors that conspired to produce these benefits. But it has played a significant role and offered a powerful support system for U.S. power and values. It is quite simply the framework on which Washington built its post-war security policy.

    Which makes it all the more dangerous that the rules-based order seems to be under assault.

    The biggest challenge comes from frustrated and ambitious countries who see the order as a U.S.-dominated club. China, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey and others have long chafed at the idea of living under a system whose rules they did not set and whose liberal pretensions cause some of them heartburn.

    These states appreciate the value of a rules-based order and aim to preserve most of it. But they understandably want more influence in its institutions and decisions. A few of them, notably Russia and China, are determined to press territorial claims and demands for spheres of influence in belligerent ways that test the core norms of the order.

    Partly as a result, all the momentum these days is to view Russia and China as “revisionists”—a code word for disruptive actors intent on tearing down an existing order. Meantime the United States is growing frustrated with some other major powers—such as India, Brazil and Turkey—who are insisting on their right to shape the order on issues like climate, trade, or nonproliferation.

    Some in Washington are unwilling to share leadership of the international rules-based order, taking the view that the United States built the order, and it should decide how it works.

    But that mindset is no longer tenable. The order will either become more shared, or it will gradually fall apart. The next president will somehow have to identify a path to a more diverse, multilateral order—while reaffirming the U.S.’s intention to stand by its global commitments.

    The task is far from hopeless, because major powers have many shared interests, in areas such as trade, global development, climate change and counterterrorism. And most countries still value U.S. leadership.

    But there is no denying that the path will be bumpy. It’s tough for the dominant leader of any community to embrace new habits of compromise. Flexing muscles and offering accommodations at the same time will be a grueling paradox to manage.

    This is especially true for the United States, which often has trouble with ambivalent relationships—countries that can’t be branded as friend or adversary, and that are happy to collaborate on some issues even as they undercut the United States on others.

    Even in such a more complex, shared order, Washington will have to lead, and can do so boldly and unapologetically. But it will have to learn how to lead in more clever, shared and flexible ways, at the very time it is sorely tempted to start gearing up for fresh global confrontations.

    As the campaign season heats up, then, a great policy question for either candidate is where do they stand. Do they believe that some version of a rules-based order works to the U.S. advantage? And if so, how do they plan to reimagine that order as a more shared, diverse, but still stable global reality?

   链接：http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/06/will-the-new-president-risk-the-stability-of-the-world.html

来源时间：2016/6/17   发布时间：2016/6/17

旧文章ID：10643

作者：布鲁金斯  来源：中美印象

    虽然南海争端是亚洲安全的一个潜在威胁，但也为美印合作保证地区秩序、维护地区和平提供了机会。本文是《转变中的美印关系》的节选。美国在南海的国家利益为航行自由与商道畅通，中美之间就联合国海洋法约的解释也各不相同。同时，印度一心想再东亚扩展影响力，南海争端是一个绝佳的机会。
    
   美印有各自涉入南海争端的考量，两者可以通过以下的途径进行合作：首先，美印应该继续坚持南海的航行自由及联合国海洋法公约在解决南海争端中的关键作用。其次，美国应该坚定地涉入南海争端中。第三，印度应该支持南海争端解决的国际化，支持美国和东盟在解决该事件中的重要作用。此外，美印还可以共同武装越南等南海声索国，共同应对该地区的非传统安全。

    Editors’ Note: Although the South China Sea is a source of potential instability for the Asian region, writes Joseph Liow, disputes there also offer an opportunity for greater cooperation between the United States and India in contributing to the management of regional order. This post is excerpted from a new Brookings India briefing book titled “India-U.S. Relations in Transition.”

    While a source of potential instability for the Asian region, the South China Sea disputes also offer an opportunity for greater cooperation between the United States and India in contributing to the management of regional order.

    The United States has reiterated its neutrality on the matter of competing claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, by way of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, the United States has also stated that the South China Sea is a matter of national interest. Specifically, the U.S. interest in the South China Sea is related to stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East Asia’s waterways. The declaratory policy on the South China Sea has gathered strength with the Obama administration’s strategy of a "pivot" （or "rebalance"） to Asia. This declaratory policy has been accompanied by a deepening of U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic ties with key Southeast Asian claimant states, notably the Philippines and Vietnam. Unilaterally, the United States has also adopted a more robust position on the South China Sea. This is evident in its conduct of several high-profile freedom of navigation operations （FONOPs） after a hiatus of two years, designed to demonstrate the commitment of the United States to stability in the area.

    While the South China Sea is a matter of national interest for the United States, its explicit interest is freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce. Both of these are things China has guaranteed although, granted, both parties have still to arrive at agreement as to acceptable military activities under the rubric of freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea. Commerce however, has little if anything to do with the concerns that both parties have. Underlying their differences on this matter is their competing interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea （UNCLOS） in relation to military activities within a state’s exclusive economic zone （EEZ）。 Whereas Washington has taken the position—despite not having ratified UNCLOS—that military activities in EEZs are permitted under the Convention, Beijing has opposed this.

    India views the South China Sea as a secondary sphere of influence, the most important sphere being South Asia and the broader Bay of Bengal area. It also realizes that it does not have the naval capability to stake any kind of claim as a significant military power in the South China Sea. Increasing tensions in the South China Sea, however, are viewed as affording India certain benefits. First, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea belies China’s “peaceful rise” narrative within Southeast Asia and this raises India’s value as a strategic counterweight to China amongst both Southeast Asian states and the United States （as well as Japan, by proxy）。 Second, and related to the previous point, this allows India to exert some amount of strategic pressure on China in response to the latter’s drive to bolster its strategic reach into the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean region. In a nutshell, India considers the Indian Ocean region, and the Bay of Bengal specifically, as its sphere of influence. China’s challenge to this Indian dominance has led India to make references to the South China Sea in joint statements with the United States and with several claimant and non-claimant ASEAN states. India views this as a low-cost and useful tit-for-tat strategy thus far.

    India’s relationship with Vietnam implicates India, to some extent, directly in the South China Sea dispute. India’s state-owned ONGC started a joint oil exploration project in 1988 in Vietnam’s territorial waters in the South China Sea. For a long time, China did not make any significant reference to this joint project. However, from the early 2000’s China has objected to India’s role in this venture. India has responded in two ways. First, it has asserted the right of its state-owned enterprise to carry out this venture as part of India’s legitimate economic interests. Second, it has begun to sell patrol boats to Vietnam in order to bolster the latter’s coast guard capability. India’s warships have also made port calls to Vietnam and defended its right to do so. India has asserted that it will use its navy to defend installations related to this venture in the eventuality that these come under any threat. The Indian perception is that China will not risk an open confrontation.

    The United States and India can take several steps to stabilize the South China Sea situation:

    • India and the United States should continue to assert that both freedom of navigation and UNCLOS should be adhered to in the South China Sea. This should be done unilaterally but also bilaterally. Freedom of navigation operations by the United States should continue, and India should seriously consider the conduct of such operations as well.

    • The United States should regularly reassure regional states of its commitment to the region. This is crucial because of prevailing anxieties in many Southeast Asian states that the United States may not be able to sustain the attention it accorded to the region under the rubric of the "pivot." Moreover, regional states are also fearful of a U.S.-China condominium in which the United States might be prepared to compromise Southeast Asian interests in exchange for Chinese compromise on a broad range of global issues that could conceivably involve global trade and finance, nuclear proliferation, and North Korea. The United States should bear such concerns in mind.

    • For some time, India has consistently stated that the South China Sea dispute should be settled peacefully through negotiation. In April 2016, India, Russia and China released a joint statement which asserted that “all related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned.” This was seen as a slight departure from the earlier Indian position and closer to the Chinese position against internationalization of the dispute. This interpretation has been disputed by India and they have re-asserted that their position is that the dispute should be resolved peacefully via a mechanism agreed to between the claimant states, which potentially allows ASEAN and the United States a role in managing the dispute.

    Both India and the United States can work together to build coast guard capabilities of claimant states, particularly Vietnam, to deal more effectively against non-traditional threats like piracy and terrorism.

来源时间：2016/6/17   发布时间：2016/6/17

旧文章ID：10642

作者：Tanvi Madan 布鲁金斯学会  来源：中美印象

    上周印度总理莫迪在美国国会发表演讲，称“今天美印关系翻开了新的一章。”除了赞扬美国的民主制度是印度学习的榜样，两国所持的民主自由观念是其发展的信念基础之外，还就恐怖主义、印度经济发展状况、美印经济关系展望、自由市场经济等发表了言论，最后声明印度不会只做一个“搭便车”的国家，而会努力为国际秩序和全球发展做出贡献。

    In his speech to a joint meeting of Congress last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared: “there is a new symphony in play.” He was referring to the relationship, but there were some new themes in his speech as well, in addition to a few familiar, predictable ones.

    Shared Democratic Values. Modi’s speech covered some of the same ground on shared democratic values as his predecessors. Referring to Congress as a “temple of democracy”—a phrased he’s used in the past for the Indian parliament—and to India’s constitution as its “real holy book,” he stressed that freedom and equality were shared beliefs. In a section that elicited laughter, he also commented that the two countries shared certain practices—legislatures known for bipartisanship and operating harmoniously. Also par for the course was Modi’s emphasis on India’s diversity. An implicit response to critics of India on human rights （including minority rights）， freedom of the press, and tolerance of dissent, Modi noted that India’s constitution protected the equal rights of all citizens and enshrined freedom of faith. Echoing former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s words on unity in diversity, he asserted “India lives as one; India grows as one; India celebrates as one.”

    Terrorism. Like Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh before him, Modi highlighted the challenge of terrorism, stressing it was globally the “biggest threat.” Acknowledging existing India-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation, he called for more, including an approach “that isolates those who harbor, support and sponsor terrorists; that does not distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists; and that delinks religion from terrorism.” Like his predecessors, Modi did not explicitly mention Pakistan, but alluded to it. He asserted that while it was a global problem, terrorism was “incubated” in India’s neighborhood. In what seemed like a reference to the Congressional hold on the subsidized sale of F-16s to Pakistan, the Indian prime minister also lauded that body for “sending a clear message to those who preach and practice terrorism for political gains. Refusing to reward them is the first step towards holding them accountable for their actions.”

    The Indian Economy. From Jawaharlal Nehru onward, prime ministers have outlined their domestic objectives in speeches to Congress, highlighting the reforms they’ve undertaken. Modi did too, highlighting India’s growth rate and economic opportunities, while acknowledging that much remained to be done. And there were also subtle responses to criticisms of Indian economic policy: for example, the remark about legislative gridlock suggested that American policymakers should understand why some reforms in India are taking time; the quip about India not claiming intellectual property rights on yoga was a rejoinder to those who give India a hard time about intellectual property rights （especially in the pharmaceutical sector）。 He also noted that in the past “wagers were made on our failure,” and yet Indians have time and again found a way to survive and succeed.

    The new

    Anti-Declinism. For those promising to make America great again, Modi had a message: it already is. In a speech to the U.S.-India Business Council the day before, he exuded optimism—not just about India, but the United States as well, asserting that, to him, “America is not just a country with a great past; it is a country with an exciting future.” In his speech to Congress, he referred to the U.S. as “great” at least four times and spoke of its “innovative genius.” Recalling that he’d thus far visited half of all American states, he noted what he believed was the United States’ “real strength”： Americans’ ability to dream big and be bold.

    In an election year when the nature and extent of American engagement with the world is being debated, Modi acknowledged the country’s global contributions and called for a continued U.S. role in the world. He applauded—and led members of Congress in a round of applause—for “the great sacrifices of the men and women from ‘The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave’ in service of mankind.” With the exception of Nehru, who paid his respects at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Indian premiers have tended not to mention American troops—partly a result of differing views on the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq wars. Modi, on the other hand, explicitly mentioned U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, where “the sacrifices of Americans have helped create a better life.”

    In a more challenging, complex, and uncertain world, he asserted that U.S.-Indian engagement could make an impact, by “promoting cooperation not dominance; connectivity not isolation; respect for global commons; inclusive not exclusive mechanisms; and above all adherence to international rules and norms.” （No prizes for guessing the country that went unnamed）。

    The Open Embrace. Modi-Obama hugs have fueled many a tweet. But the speech signaled and reflected a much broader embrace—an India-U.S. one that has been in the works for at least the last 17 years but has become much more visible in the last two. In 2000, addressing Congress, Vajpayee called for the two countries to “remove the shadow of hesitation that lies between us and our joint vision.” Not all his compatriots will agree, but Modi declared: “Today, our relationship has overcome the hesitations of history” and recalled Vajpayee labeling the two as “natural allies.” Listing the ways the relationship had grown closer, he emphasized that this “remarkable story” was not a partisan effort: “[t]hrough the cycle of elections and transitions of administrations the intensity of our engagements has only grown.” He also talked about what the two countries could do together, and stressed that the relationship was good for India. While he’s previously called the United States “a principal partner in the realization of India’s rise as a responsible, influential world power,” he went further this time, stating: “In every sector of India’s forward march, I see the U.S. as an indispensable partner.”

    Not a Free-Rider. But throughout the speech, Modi asserted that this relationship benefited both countries “in great measure,” with a “positive impact on the lives” of people in each. Echoing Singh, he noted that many members of Congress indeed believed that “a stronger and prosperous India is in America’s strategic interest.” Modi made the case that India is not a free rider—that through its businesses, market, talent, and diaspora it is contributing to American economy and society. The day before, in his speech to business leaders, he stressed that India was also “poised to contribute as a new engine of global growth” （and made a pitch for support to such “democratic” engines）。

    Modi furthermore highlighted Indian contributions to global and regional peace and prosperity, noting, for example, that its “soldiers too have fallen in distant battlefields” for freedom and democracy （alluding to the millions that fought in the World Wars）。 He also highlighted India’s efforts in Afghanistan, its troop contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations, its role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and its evacuation operations in Yemen in which it rescued Americans as well. In addition, Modi noted India’s contributions of ideas, whether yoga or non-violent protest. And he stressed that India would be a responsible stakeholder and security provider—one that, in partnership with the United States, could “anchor peace, prosperity and stability from Asia to Africa and from Indian Ocean to the Pacific. It can also help ensure security of the sea lanes of commerce and freedom of navigation on seas.” But he also called for international institutions to reflect this role and “the realities of today.”

    Members of Congress, for their part, will look to see whether and how Modi’s rhetoric will translate into reality. The prime minister suggested that it won’t always be the way the United States would like. He didn’t use the term “strategic autonomy,” but talked of “autonomy in decision-making”—while noting that it, as well as “diversity in our perspectives,” weren’t bad things for the partnership. And, as is his preferred style, he came up with 3Cs to characterize the state of the relationship: “comfort, candor, and convergence.” Whether they remain characteristic of the partnership, and to what degree, will partly depend on who is the next U.S. president and how she or he sees the U.S. role in the world and India’s place in it.

原文链接：http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/14-reviewing-modis-speech-congress-madan

来源时间：2016/6/17   发布时间：2016/6/17

旧文章ID：10641

作者：Shibley Telhami  来源：中美印象

    随着中东地区冲突的加剧，大量的难民从这些饱受战争摧残的国家流出。是否能够接受更多的难民进入美国？这个问题不仅是华盛顿当权者热议的问题，也是今年总统大选的一个关键话题。本文是对美国民众对中东难民（特别是那些来自叙利亚、伊拉克、利比亚）态度的一个民意调查，其中最主要的发现为：1.59%的美国民众支持美国应该接受难民的进入（其中民主党占77％、青年一代占68%）；41%的美国民众反对（其中共和党占63%、特朗普支持者占77%）。

    With conflicts in the Middle East continuing unabated, refugees continue to flow out of several war-torn countries in massive numbers. The question of whether to admit more refugees into the United States has not only been a source of debate among Washington policymakers, it has also become a central question within the U.S. presidential race. Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami conducted a survey on American public attitudes toward refugees from the Middle East, in particular from Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Below are several key findings from the poll and a download link to the survey’s full results.

来源时间：2016/6/17   发布时间：2016/6/17

旧文章ID：10640