很多人认为,人们不申请食品券或工资补贴,是因为如此会使自己污名化,显得很尴尬很窘迫。但 Matthew Desmond
认为,证据充分表明,人们不接受援助的原因是因为它令人为难,条件苛刻,很难申请。通常每年都要一次又一次地申请,人们往往在不经意间失去援助,仅仅是因为他们无法预约或者忘记了需要重新申请而错过了补贴和援助。
【编者注】近年来,美国国会对华政策展现出愈发强硬的态势,具体表现在贸易、人权、安全等多个领域,并对中国政府施加了一系列法律层面的限制和制裁措施,如特朗普时期通过立法手段限制中国在美市场的进口额度和中企在美上市与投资、通过《香港自治法》、《防止强迫维吾尔人劳动法》对涉港、涉疆事务进行金融制裁和进出口管制,以及制定法规禁止美政府采购华为和中兴产品以遏制网络安全威胁和知识产权侵犯。近期,美国第117届国会完成了针对美中关系的立法。美国国会关于美中关系的最新立法趋势是什么?本轮立法与之前对华政策相比有何变与不变?其将对美中关系和全球政治经济产生怎样的影响?本期编译特选郭保刚教授的文章“第117届美国会对华关系的立法趋势”(“Legislative Trends of the 117th U.S. Congress on U.S.-China Relations”),帮助读者近距离认识和理解美国会对华关系的最新立法趋势及其细节分析。本文对原文部分内容有删改。本文观点不代表本站的立场,文责自负。
近年来,这三大鹰派立法者已经结盟,并在国会中形成了不同的共识,并转移了其重心。【注15】在中国事务上,国会与拜登政府国家安全委员内部的鹰派成员结成联盟,包括国家安全委员会的顾问杰克·沙利文(Jake Sullivan)、《长期博弈:中国战略取代美国秩序》(The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order)的作者杜如松(Rush Doshi)、《永不回头:中国八十年代的禁忌历史》(Never Turn Back: China and the Forbidden History of the 1980s)的作者朱利安·格维茨(Julian Gewirtz)、高级技术和国家安全主任塔伦·查布拉(Tarun Chhabra),以及高级国际经济和劳动主任珍·哈里斯(Jen Harris)。【注16】根据著名的中国问题专家葛莱仪(Bonnie Glaser)所述,美国已迎来针对中国的“鹰派时代”,并将驻足于此。【注17】表2列出了国会中鹰派立法者及其提出的中国议案数量。
受立法工作范围所限,多数美国立法者对中国的认知止于表面。他们所获取的与中国相关的信息多来自于美国媒体带有偏见性的报道、国会研究局(Congressional Research Service)的信息简报,以及呈交国会的各类年度报告,他们的观点受到这些文件的强烈影响。美国国会及行政当局中国委员会(The Congressional-Executive Commission on China)、美国贸易代表办公室(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative)、美国总统机密办公室(Office of the Secrecy to the President),以及美中经济与安全审查委员会(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)例行向国会提交五分年度报告,这些报告对国会的对华政立法议程产生了重要影响。
注1:Baogang Guo, “Sino-U.S. Decoupling: The Roles of Congress,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, (2022) pp. 543-565. Robert Sutter, “Congress and Trump Administration China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy Adjustments and Hardening toward Beijing,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2019, Vol. 28, No. 118, pp. 519-537.
注2:U.C. San Diego, the China Data Lab, Congress Tweetsproject report, Part I “Who in The U.S. Congress Tweets About China?” Authored by Lei Guang, Harris Doshay, Zeyu Li, Bailey Marsheck, Molly Roberts, and Young Yang, available online, https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz-blog/who-in-the-us-congress -tweets-about-china/.
注3:Ibid, Part II, What Do Members of Congress Tweet About China? Authored by Bailey Marsheck, Harris Doshay, Lei Guang, Zeyu Li, Molly Roberts, and Young Yang, Available online, https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz-blog/what-do-members-of-congress-tweet-about-china/.
注4:Robert Sutter, “Congress Is More Important Than Ever in U.S. China Policy,” The Diplomat, January 11, 2022, Available online, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/congress-is-more-important-than-ever-in-us-china-policy/
注5:James McBride and Andrew Chatzky, “Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade?” Council on Foreign Relations, May 13, 2019, Available online, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade
注6:Baogang Guo, “A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 29, No. 126 (2020), pp. 809-823.
注7:O’Donnell & Associates, “Corona Big Book,” Available online, https://static.politico.com/80/54/2f3219384e01833b0a0ddf95181c/corona-virus-big-book-4.17.20.pdf
注9:White House, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, May 2020, Available online, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf.
注11: White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, available online, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, Available online, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/
注12:This increase includes House and Senate Resolutions as well as Joint Resolutions. Data are drawn from Congress.org.
注13:Tao Xie, op cit, p. 147.
注14:Robert, Henry M.; et al. Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised (11th ed.) I Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2011), p. 55.
注15:Girard, B. 2019. A bipartisan congressional group supports Trump’s tough-on-China approach. The Diplomat. April 5. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/a-bipartisan-congressional-group- supports-trumps-tough-on-china-approach/.
注16:Alex Thompson, Phelim Kine and Max Tani, “Jake’s nest of China hawks,” Politico, April 13, 2022, available online, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/west-wing-playbook/2022/04/13/jakes-nest-of-china-hawks-00024976
注17:Matthew Knott, “’A New Cold War:’ China Hawks Have Built a Cozy Nest in White House.” The Age, March 7, 2020, https://www.theage.com.au/
注18:Evie Fordham, “Who are the China hawks?” Foxbusiness.com, June 29, 2020, Available online, https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/china-united-states-rubio-hawley-cotton.
注19:Jordain Carney, “China Hawks Flex Muscle amid Fallout, “The Hill, April 15, 2020.
注20:Arturo Dominguez, “Confronting Cuban American Propaganda Head On,” Latino Rebels, January 14, 2022. Available online, https://www.latinorebels.com/2022/01/14/cubanamprop/
注21:Ann Louis Bardach, “Prodigal Son” Marco Rubio’s Complicated Cuban Legacy,” Politico, Available online, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/marco-rubio-profile-213275/
注22:2021 Annual Report, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Available online, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2021CECC_AnnualReportExecutiveSummary_FINAL.pdf.
拜登政府《国家安全战略》强调在长期合作的基础上,致力于投资卫生安全和卫生系统基础设施,尤其是新冠肺炎疫情的应对措施,这是对此前全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系(Partnership
for Global Infrastructure and Investment,简称PGII)倡议[2]的持续回应。美国国际发展金融公司(US
International Development Finance Corporation,简称
USIDFC)在卫生服务和基础设施、卫生商品生产和供应链、数字卫生以及水、环境卫生和营养等卫生体系项目上投资2.53亿美元来改善非洲卫生基础设施。
相较于前政府进展缓慢、成效甚微,拜登执政后对非动作频频,更显活跃与积极。拜登政府在两年间发起“重建美好世界”(Build Back Better
World,简称B3W)和“全球基础设施与投资伙伴关系”协议(PGII)两项聚焦发展中国家投资缺口的全球基建倡议。从公布的计划投资金额大幅减少以及投资项目的细化上可以看到B3W到PGII更加务实具体。与特朗普政府对非洲的忽视甚至蔑视不同,拜登上任后便加强与非洲的互动,且尽力显示出美非是在互惠互利的前提下进行双向基建投资、开展外交,但B3W和PGII实质上依然延续前政府通过撬动私人资产,推动非洲公共基础设施私有化的做法,为美国企业制造更多就业和收入。