作者：j-zhou
2023-02-08
【编者按】近日，约翰霍普金斯大学讲座教授洪源远（Yuen Yuen Ang）在《报业辛迪加》（Project Syndicate）上发表评论，题为“中国回来了吗？”（Is China Back?）（点击阅读全文）。对于从“最严峻的形势”到“新冠不可怕”等180度政策逆转，洪源远作出一些非常有趣的解读，她认为，如果没有政治改革，疫情后重新开放经济的成功将是短暂的。本站将此文编译成中文以飨读者。
洪源远（Yuen Yuen Ang）在科罗拉多大学获得学士学位后又从斯坦福大学分别获得硕士与博士学位，现在密西根大学任教，最近调入约翰·霍普金斯大学做政治经济学讲座教授，2018年被任命为安德鲁·卡耐基学者（Andrew Carnegie Fellow），是西达·斯考切波奖（Theda Skocpol Prize）的首届获奖者，该奖项由美国政治科学协会颁发，以表彰“对比较政治学产生影响力的学者”，她的学术著作还先后获得政治经济学、经济学和社会学的书籍奖。
洪源远主要研究新兴市场国家，尤其是中国，其研究兴趣为中国政治经济、官僚政治、适应性治理腐败，以及国家在国际发展中日益重要的作用。她的专著《中国如何摆脱贫困陷阱》（How China Escaped the Poverty Trap）荣获2017年度卡赞斯坦图书奖，并被《外交事务》杂志（Foreign Affairs）评为2017年度最佳图书之一。
以下是文章的中文编译：
中国领导层宣布了政策的180度大转弯，这让全球投资者和其他观察人士对中国经济的未来感到乐观。但纠正政策错误并不能取代实现强劲增长所需的改革，包括回归政治实用主义和诚实的反馈。
当美国总统乔·拜登于2021年上任时，他向世界其他地区发出的第一条信息是:“美国回来了。”现在，中国政府似乎正在发布类似的宣言。
在过去的两个月里，中国领导层宣布或暗示了一系列重大政策逆转，突然结束了近三年来严厉的“新冠清零”政策，放松了对科技公司和房地产行业的打压，重申了对经济增长的承诺，并在20国集团峰会上向美国伸出了橄榄枝。随着世界第二大经济体似乎重新开放商业大门，投资者反应热烈。
不过，尽管中国恢复亲商政策对国际贸易和全球和平与稳定是个好兆头，但要让中国经济重回正轨，需要的不仅仅是扭转近期的政策，真正需要的是将实用主义和诚实的反馈带回政治体系。正如我在《中国如何摆脱贫困陷阱》（How China Escaped the Poverty Trap）一书中所阐述的那样，这些特征决定了中国在邓小平时代的适应性治理 (What is really needed is bringing pragmatism and honest feedback back into the political system. As I showed in my book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, these attributes defined China’s adaptive governance during the Deng Xiaoping era) 。
有一种普遍的误解，认为“中国模式”意味着由一个强大的威权政府，辅以强大的国有企业，进行自上而下的控制。事实上，国中以往的贫困和苦难证明，自上而下的计划经济、养尊处优的国有企业和无孔不入的政治压迫的组合是失败的原因。
这就是为什么邓小平引入了一个混合系统，我称之为 “有指导的即兴创作”(That is why Deng introduced a hybrid system that I call “directed improvisation”)。 共产党仍然大权在握，但中央政府将权力下放给地方政府，并将私营企业从国家控制中解放出来。
中央政府扮演着导演而非独裁者的角色，确定了国家目标并制定了适当的激励措施和规则。同时，下级政府和私营部门针对地方问题采取了即兴的解决方案。
在实践中，往往出现了各式各样的地方“治理模式”，自下而上地实现了变革性创新，其方式往往令中央政府感到惊讶。数字经济的崛起就是一个例子。
由于思想必须先于行动，邓小平首先改变了党的思维方式和规范。在1978年12月启动中国“改革开放”时代的讲话中，他将“解放思想”作为党的首要任务。
此前，人们因为害怕受到严厉的惩罚而不敢说真话，形成了一种令人心寒的政治氛围，导致了大跃进等灾难性的政策。但在邓小平时代，新的要求是“实事求是”。政策是为了改善人民的福利，而不是政治正确。
邓小平的混合体制被西方“鹰派”和当今领导层所忽视。中国新一代领导人对中国的成功有不同的解读，并不厌其烦地说颂扬自上而下的举国治理模式比西方民主资本主义的制度更有优势。
这种自上而下的举国治理模式在新冠肺炎暴发初期取得了成效。通过大规模检测、严格控制和其他只有在强大的威权政体制内才能维持的措施，中国从2020年到2022年将感染和死亡人数保持在较低水平。中央政府将“清零政策”视为其标志性成就之一，并在10月份的中共20大上宣布，中国将“毫不动摇”地坚持这一政策。
但随后，事态迅速发生了意想不到的转折。无休止的封锁令激怒了来自各行各业的公民，他们涌上街头抗议，迫使政府改变立场。“清零政策”的突然逆转导致病例和住院人数大幅增加，中国将继续与之斗争。
政府因此希望摆脱疫情，恢复商业信心，放宽经济管制和结束疫情控制来提振资本市场。
而且，在新冠肺炎感染高峰过后，国内消费可能会大幅回升，制造业也将逐步恢复正常。中央政府还承诺增加基础设施支出以促进经济增长。
但想要让新的经济形势在较长时间内取得成效，就需要重新打开政治系统的反馈渠道。这意味中央政府着要树立个人榜样，并向党国官员表明，真诚地希望他们报告当地的实际情况。如果讲真话的人被压制，阿谀奉承者被抬高，那就不会有人再说实话。
政府还需要给民间社会和媒体更多的空间。认为取消言论自由将加强中共对权力的控制是短视的，最终会弄巧成拙。如果没有一个正规的政策反馈系统，政府治理就会陷入困境，从而导致大规模抗议活动，并侵蚀基于业绩的政权合法性。
然而，自上而下的做法的另一个问题是，它将使投资者怀疑中国何时会再次转向。在过去十年中，中国多次宣称致力于各种改革，但其行动却恰恰相反。
给具有实用主义和敢说实话的官员更大的权力将在很大程度上安抚市场。改变政治体系的招聘和晋升标准将比单纯的口号更有说服力。
中国在1970年代末至2010年代初积累了大量的适应性治理经验。但是，到2012年后，邓小平的经济模式已经达到了极限，开始产生的腐败、不平等、债务风险和环境污染等使该经济模式不可持续。
尽管如此，解决方案永远不可能是回到过去。相反，中国需要将“定向即兴治理”（ directed improvisation ）引入21世纪。
Is China back?
China’s leadership has announced major policy U-turns that have left global investors and other observers bullish about its economic future. But correcting policy errors is no substitute for the reforms needed to deliver robust growth, including a return to political pragmatism and honest feedback.
When US President Joe Biden took office in 2021, his first message to the rest of the world was: “America is back.” Having assumed his third term as general secretary of the Communist Party in October, President Xi Jinping appears to be issuing a similar proclamation.
In the past two months, China’s leadership has announced or signalled a series of major policy reversals, abruptly ending nearly three years of severe “zero-Covid” restrictions, easing the crackdown on tech companies and the real-estate sector, reaffirming its commitment to economic growth and extending an olive branch to the United States at the Group of 20 summit. With the world’s second-largest economy apparently reopening its doors for business, investors are reacting with enthusiasm.
But while China’s pro-business reset bodes well for international trade and global peace and stability, putting the Chinese economy on the right track will require more than just a reversal of recent policies. What is really needed is bringing pragmatism and honest feedback back into the political system. As I showed in my book, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, these attributes defined China’s adaptive governance during the Deng Xiaoping era.
There is a common misperception that the “China model” means top-down control by a strong, authoritarian government, flanked by muscular state enterprises. In fact, 30 years of poverty and suffering under Mao Zedong proved that the combination of top-down planning, state ownership and political repression was a recipe for failure.
That is why Deng introduced a hybrid system that I call “directed improvisation”. The Communist Party remained firmly in power, but the central government delegated authority to numerous local authorities across China and liberated private entrepreneurs from state controls.
Playing the part of a director rather than a dictator, the government in Beijing defined national goals and established appropriate incentives and rules. Meanwhile, lower-level authorities and private-sector players improvised local solutions to local problems.
In practice, a wide variety of local “China models” emerged, delivering transformative innovations from the bottom up, often in ways that surprised central authorities. The rise of the digital economy is one example.
Since ideas must come before action, Deng made sure he first changed the party’s mindset and norms. In his December 1978 speech launching China’s era of “reform and opening up”, he made “emancipating the mind” a top priority for the party.
Under Mao, people dared not speak the truth for fear of severe punishment, creating a chilling political climate that gave rise to disastrous policies such as the Great Leap Forward. But under Deng, the new imperative was to “seek truth from facts”. Policies should be chosen because they improved people’s welfare, not because they were politically correct.
Deng’s hybrid system has been overlooked by both Western China hawks and by Xi’s own leadership. When Xi came to power, he favoured a different story about China’s success, celebrating the institutional advantage a top-down command system supposedly has over Western democratic capitalism.
This top-down approach yielded results during the initial Covid-19 outbreak. Through mass testing, strict containment and other measures that could be maintained only under a strong, authoritarian government, China kept infections and deaths at low levels from 2020 through to 2022. Xi embraced “zero Covid” as one of his signature achievements, declaring as recently as October, at the 20th party congress, that China would stick to the policy “without wavering”.
But then events took a rapid, unexpected turn. Exasperated with endless lockdowns, Chinese citizens from various walks of life poured onto the streets in protest, forcing Xi to change his position. The sudden reversal of the “zero-Covid” policy has led to a massive surge of cases and hospitalisations with which China will continue to struggle.
Xi and his team are eager to put the pandemic behind them and restore business confidence. Relaxing economic regulations and ending pandemic controls have buoyed capital markets.
Moreover, after Covid-19 infections peak, domestic consumption is likely to come back with a vengeance and manufacturing will return to normal. The central government has also pledged additional infrastructure spending to boost growth.
But for the new economic terrain to bear fruit over the longer term, Xi needs to reopen the political system’s feedback channels. That means setting a personal example and making clear to party-state officials that he genuinely wants them to report the realities on the ground. That will not happen if truth-tellers are silenced and propagandists are elevated.
The government also needs to give civil society and the media more space. It is short-sighted and ultimately self-defeating to think that quashing free speech will strengthen the party’s hold on power. Governance suffers without a regularised system of policy feedback, leading to the kinds of mass protests that exploded in November and eroding the party’s performance-based legitimacy.
Yet another problem with Xi’s top-down approach is that it will leave investors wondering when China might pivot again. In the past decade, Xi has repeatedly proclaimed a devotion to various reforms, only to do the opposite.
Empowering officials with track records of pragmatism and candour would go a long way towards reassuring markets. Changing the political system’s criteria for recruitment and promotion would speak louder than mere slogans.
China accumulated ample experience in adaptive governance between the late 1970s and the early 2010s. But, by the time Xi came to power in 2012, Deng’s economic model had reached its limits and begun to produce unsustainable levels of corruption, inequality, debt risks and environmental pollution.
Still, the solution can never be a return to Maoism. Rather, China needs to bring “directed improvisation” into the 21st century.
Yuen Yuen Ang, professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University, is the author of How China Escaped the Poverty Trap and China’s Gilded Age. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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