编者按：本文作者周波，曾在中国人民解放军外事局工作多年，目前是清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员。文章（Which countries will pick sides in a US-China conflict over Taiwan?）2025年7月24日首发于香港的《南华早报》，8月3日，观察网发表该文的中文翻译，翻译是刘松瑀。周波对可能在中美冲突中协助中国的三个国家的分析入木三分。这样客观的分析目前能上线是不是说明中国国内的舆论环境有所好转？为方便读者阅读，周波文章的英文全文附在翻译之后。

外界一直猜测，一旦中美因台海爆发冲突，哪些第三方国家会卷入其中。6月，《经济学人》发表了一篇专门探讨这一问题的文章。近日，《金融时报》报道称，美国正在向日本和澳大利亚施压，就台海突发事态中的具体介入角色作出明确表态。

看起来，站在中国一边的国家恐怕寥寥无几。中国唯一的条约盟友是朝鲜。1961 年的《中朝友好合作互助条约》规定，任何一方若遭无端攻击，双方须采取“一切必要措施”共同应对。虽然朝鲜已向乌克兰前线派兵援俄，理论上未来也可能出兵助华，而且相比俄罗斯，中国对正遭受国际制裁的朝鲜政权显然更为关键，但目前中朝关系的温度似乎不及俄朝之间热络。

巴基斯坦被称作中国的“铁哥们”。鉴于印巴关系已几乎无法挽回，若事态发展到最糟糕的地步，中国要求巴基斯坦出手牵制印度，巴基斯坦或许会认真考虑照做。然而，若要巴基斯坦为了协助中国而与美国为敌，则几乎不可能——毕竟美国仍是巴基斯坦的主要援助国。

中国最倚重的战略伙伴无疑是俄罗斯，两国的亲密关系体现在定期举行的海空联合演习中。但如果中国在俄乌冲突中没有向俄罗斯提供军事援助，俄罗斯又为何要卷入台海冲突呢？想必俄罗斯会继续向中国出售石油和天然气，就像中国仍在向俄罗斯出售非军事物资一样，但大概也就仅限于此了。

在美国一方，愿意在与中国冲突时提供军事支援的国家也屈指可数，且多半也不会心甘情愿。《经济学人》的文章似乎也持此观点，文中引用了新美国安全中心（CNAS）的一份最新报告（点击【这里】查看“CNAS：区域与全球对台海冲突的应对分析”），只是该报告的分析并不能完全令人信服。

报告的第一条结论显而易见：如果美国按兵不动，其盟友也会袖手旁观。第二条结论是，一旦美国介入，受其影响最大的盟友将是日本和菲律宾。日本的参与程度大概率仅限潜艇巡逻或导弹打击；菲律宾则会更加谨慎，但若解放军陷入僵局，它可能趁机在南海推进其主权声索。

我同意日本和菲律宾会是受影响最大的国家，因为它们都处于靠近中国海岸的第一岛链上。不过，除非日本自身先遭到中国攻击，否则它最多只会为美国提供后勤支援，不至于对中国发动导弹攻击（点击【这里】查看“没错，日本将保卫台湾”）。至于说菲律宾会趁机在南海“捞地盘”，更是无稽之谈。倘若如此，军力远胜菲律宾的越南和马来西亚为何不出手也捞地盘？一旦中美开战，所有东南亚国家面临的挑战都将是如何避免这场冲突波及整个地区。若冲突升级为全面战争，南海那些有争议的岛屿恐怕都将不复存在。

新美国安全中心的报告说得没错：另一批与美国关系密切的盟友——韩国、澳大利亚和印度——受到的冲击会相对有限，但美方大概率仍会施压，要求它们出力。其中，韩国的首要关切始终是朝鲜半岛的局势。

澳大利亚能为美国提供的最大支持，莫过于允许美国使用其军事基地对中国的舰船和飞机发动攻击。澳大利亚官员担心，若在任何冲突中保持中立，“奥库斯”（AUKUS）潜艇项目或将告吹，这种担忧可以理解，但对澳大利亚而言，避免与本国最大的贸易伙伴发生战争，难道不比购买几艘潜艇更重要吗？

中国国内有人担心，一旦台海开战，印度会趁机在实控线附近蚕食更多领土。但在我看来，这种情况不会发生。我赞同新美国安全中心报告的判断：印度的首要任务将是全力守住与中国的陆上边界。

总而言之，几乎没有国家愿意卷入中美之间的冲突。洛伊研究所（Lowy Institute）的分析指出，全球已有119个国家——占联合国成员总数的62%——选择接受北京提出的主权表述，承认中国对台湾拥有主权；其中89%支持中国完成统一，但并未明确要求这一过程必须和平进行。

美国想逼盟友选边站队，恐怕比它预想的要难，尤其当它自己的介入理由前所未有地站不住脚时。对华鹰派人物埃尔布里奇·科尔比（Elbridge Colby）去年9月在《华尔街日报》撰文直言，“台湾对美国而言，并非生死攸关。”（点击【这里】查看“美暂停对乌军援风波核心人物：美国应将重心放在对抗中国上”）

如果现任美国国防部负责政策事务的副部长科尔比的立场都能“明显软化”，如参议员罗杰·威克在其提名听证会上所说的那样，这就透露出风向正在变化。美国总统特朗普一向不吝表达个人观点，却在台湾问题上出奇的沉默——他是在静待时机、准备“交易”吗？这份沉默，实在是震耳欲聋！（点击【这里】查看“中国將如何阻遏美国干预台海战争”）

图片说明：当地时间2025年7月11日，澳大利亚布里斯班，美国海军“美利坚”号两栖攻击舰停靠在港口。

Which countries will pick sides in a US-China conflict over Taiwan?

Zhou Bo, South China Morning Post, July 24, 2025     

Not only would few countries wish to get involved in such a conflict, it’s not clear that the US itself has an appetite for it.

There has been much speculation as to which third parties might get involved if war broke out between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait. In June, The Economist published an article on this very question. More recently, the Financial Times reported that the US had been putting pressure on Japan and Australia to clarify what role they would play in such a situation.

It appears that there would be few countries on China’s side. China’s only treaty ally is North Korea. A 1961 treaty obliges the two sides to take “all necessary measures” to oppose any country or coalition of countries that attack either nation unprovoked. Although North Korea sending soldiers to fight for Russia in Ukraine could raise the same prospect one day, and Beijing certainly matters much more than Moscow to the survival of a country under extensive international sanctions, currently China’s ties with North Korea appear less warm than those between Russia and North Korea.

Pakistan has been described as an “iron brother” of China. Given its almost unsalvageable relationship with India, Pakistan might seriously consider following through if China asked it to help take on India in a worst-case scenario. However, Islamabad joining a war to assist China against the US – which is a major provider of aid to Pakistan – is highly unlikely.

China’s most useful strategic partner is unquestionably Russia. Their closeness is reflected in their regular air and sea exercises. But why would Russia choose to get involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait if China has not provided Russia with military assistance in the Ukraine war? Presumably Russia would continue to sell China oil and gas, just like China is still selling Russia non-military items, but that’s probably all.

On the American side, not more than a handful of countries would provide military assistance to the US in a conflict with China, and each would do so half-heartedly at best. The Economist article seems to share this view as it quotes a recent paper from the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), though the paper’s analysis is not entirely convincing.

Its first conclusion is obvious: if the US stays out of the war, its allies will, too. The second is that if the US does step in, its most affected allies would be Japan and the Philippines. Japan’s participation would be unlikely to go much further than submarine patrols or missile strikes. The Philippines would be more cautious, the CNAS paper said, but if Chinese forces were bogged down, it might be tempted to advance its claims in the South China Sea.

I agree that Japan and the Philippines would be the countries most affected in that they are both on the first chain of islands close to the Chinese coast. However, I doubt Japan would go beyond providing the US with logistical support for missile attacks on China unless it is attacked by China first.

Meanwhile, it is absurd to suggest the Philippines would be tempted to grab territory in the South China Sea. If that is the case, why wouldn’t Vietnam and Malaysia – which have stronger militaries than the Philippines – do likewise? In the event of China and the US going to war, the challenge for all Southeast Asian countries would be avoiding a conflict that engulfs the entire region. If the conflict spills over into an all-out war, the disputed islands in the South China Sea might not even exist any more.

The CNAS paper is right to say a second group of close US allies and partners – South Korea, Australia and India – would be more insulated, though Washington would likely pressure them to help. South Korea’s primary concern is the Korean peninsula.

The best support Australia could provide the US would be to allow the use of Australian bases to launch attacks on Chinese ships and aircraft. Australian officials worrying that the AUKUS submarine deal could be in jeopardy if Australia stays out of any conflict is understandable, but isn’t avoiding war with the country’s largest trading partner more significant to Canberra than buying a few submarines?

Some in China would argue that India might use a US-China conflict in the Taiwan Strait to claim more territory along the Line of Actual Control, but I doubt that would happen. I agree with the CNAS authors that India would focus on defending its land border with China.

In conclusion, few countries would wish to become involved in a conflict between China and the US. According to Lowy Institute analysis, 199 countries – 62 per cent of UN member states – have endorsed Beijing’s preferred wording, accepting its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Of them, 89 per cent support Beijing’s reunification efforts, without specifying that these efforts should be peaceful.

Washington will find it harder than it thinks to pressure its allies to pick sides, especially when its own involvement looks more questionable than ever. Elbridge Colby, a long-time China hawk, wrote in The Wall Street Journal last September that Taiwan “isn’t itself of existential importance to America”.

If the views of Colby, now US undersecretary of defense for policy, could have “softened considerably”, as Senator Roger Wicker said during his confirmation hearing, it gives a clue as to where things are moving. US President Donald Trump rarely misses a chance to express an opinion, but so far he has not said much on the Taiwan issue. Is he keeping quiet while waiting for a chance to make a deal? His silence could not be louder.